The need for aircraft carrier ships in local wars was perfectly demonstrated by the Americans in Vietnam. With all the superiority of the US Air Force in the number of aviation weapons delivered to the target, the Navy aviation had a colossal advantage in flexibility of use and, if necessary, in the response time of aviation to requests from ground forces.
There were two points in the Gulf of Tonkin: Yankee Station, where aircraft carriers were deployed against North Vietnam, and Dixie Station, from which aircraft operated over South Vietnam. Often, it was Navy aircraft that covered the newly discovered target faster than anyone: it was closer to them to fly than Air Force aircraft from ground-based air bases.
Prior to that, during the Korean War, carrier-based aircraft actually saved South Korea from the occupation of the DPRK. At a certain moment, the South Korean troops were left practically without airfields, and the only "place" from which the troops on the Busan bridgehead could support the aircraft were American aircraft carriers.
In the USSR and Russia, with our defensive installations, the role of an aircraft carrier has always been seen as different - firstly, as an instrument of defensive war and defending its territory, and secondly, as an air defense aircraft carrier, primarily whose air group must fight enemy aviation. These views were summarized in the article Coastal Defense Aircraft Carrier … True, in the end, our only aircraft carrier had to fight as a shock, striking the coast. It’s unsuccessful.
Some comments regarding this ship are also given in the article. “The aircraft carrier question. The fire at Kuznetsov and the possible future of aircraft carriers in the Russian Federation.
However, this is not about Kuznetsov. We are talking about the possibilities that Russia has in the construction of a new aircraft carrier ship. They were also briefly mentioned in the second mentioned article. Due to the fact that the question is beginning to be translated into a practical plane, we will study it in more detail.
Big and atomic?
As a rule of thumb, the larger the aircraft carrier, the better. First, the larger the dimensions, the lower the pitching effect and the fewer flight restrictions. Secondly, the larger the deck, the less accidents and other incidents on it. Both of these claims have been verified many times over by US Navy statistics.
This applies to Russia more than to anyone else. We have the most difficult climatic conditions in the theater of operations, where aircraft carriers will have to operate in a defensive war, with the strongest excitement - the Barents and Norwegian Seas. We still have Su-33s in the ranks, very large aircraft by all standards, which requires space on the deck.
And purely for tactical reasons, a powerful air group with heavy aircraft for various purposes, including auxiliary ones, can be deployed on a large ship. The light ship has a problem with this. And a strong air group is much more useful in the struggle for air and sea supremacy than a weak one, this is obvious.
In addition, Russia is the world leader in the production of nuclear power plants for surface ships and ships. Right now, tests are underway on the newly built icebreaker "Arktika" with a nuclear power plant, and this power plant is built as a fully electric one - the nuclear reactor feeds turbine generators with steam, from which the propulsion motors operate. This is a serious start for the warships of the future, although for an aircraft carrier the power plant of the icebreaker is, of course, small and weak. But who said that you cannot create a more powerful one? Nuclear power plants give Russia the theoretical opportunity to create a ship with a displacement of 70-80 thousand tons, which in terms of efficiency will be comparable to American aircraft carriers and will be utterly superior to all others. There is only one problem with such a ship - Russia cannot build it, out of touch with the available technologies and available components.
Those who follow the military shipbuilding in our country know that practically no project was built without some dire problems and serious difficulties. Even a seemingly completely domestic "Karakurt" stumbled upon a shortage of diesel engines, and now also a "muddy" lawsuit from the Ministry of Defense against the Pella plant, which in fact showed the ability to build warships in Russia quickly. Even small BMZ ships in our country are born in agony, either because of the incomprehensible technical policy of the Navy, or because the corrupt interests of certain influential defense industry figures begin to influence it, right up to the emergence of new ship projects, this is superimposed on a chronic inability In the recent past, the Ministry of Defense had to establish more or less sane financing of shipbuilding programs, the collapse of allied partners, the collapse of cooperation between suppliers from other CIS countries and Russian enterprises, sanctions for the supply of components, and much more.
Everyone is to blame, but the result is important to us: even simple projects in these Augean stables are born with pain and suffering. There is no question of jumping immediately to such a complex task as an aircraft carrier, but even promptly putting things in order in this area will not help to remove all organizational issues instantly.
Russian shipbuilding is going through a stage of degradation of management and really large projects (and a 70-80 thousand-ton nuclear aircraft carrier is a very large project), it will not “master” it.
The second problem is that there is no place to build such a ship. There's just nowhere, that's all. What is needed to build such a ship? First, a slipway or dry dock of appropriate dimensions, with a support surface strong enough to support the mass of the ship. In the case of a dock, after filling it with water, the ship's draft should be less than the depth of the water in the dock. Further, it is necessary that in the water area or basin where the ship will be taken out of the dock or rolled off the slipway, there should also be sufficient depth. If this is not the case, then an appropriate floating dock is needed. Then there must be sufficient depth at the outfitting wall where the ship will be completed, and in addition, it must have a suitable length. For reference, it is worth mentioning that the American AVMA Enterprise, similar to the described hypothetical ship, the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the world, with a displacement of about 74,000 tons had a length of 342 meters, a waterline width of 40, a maximum of nearly 79, and a draft of 12 meters.
It is also desirable to have cranes with a lifting capacity of 700-1000 tons in order to assemble the ship in large blocks, and the route of the ship's withdrawal from the factory to the sea should not have obstacles limiting the height and draft of the ship, and should, in principle, be possible for a ship of this size.
The final touch - all this should be where there are related enterprises, developed communications, labor that does not need to be imported from anywhere, where it is possible to deliver domestic steel at a low cost. That is, to put it bluntly, all this must take place in the European part of Russia, otherwise the already expensive ship will become insanely expensive.
Today there are no such shipyards in the European part of Russia. Moreover, there are no shipyards that could be brought to meet the above requirements within a reasonable time frame and for a reasonable price. Most likely, it will be about the construction of a new shipbuilding complex, moreover, a complex unnecessary for anything else - Russia will build any other ships without it.
The third question is purely military. For the domestic fleet, even several times simpler ship - "Kuznetsov", represents an organizational challenge of such power that it is not clear who will win whom - either all the same "Kuznetsov" and his air group will turn into a deadly combat vehicle, or the ship will be quietly finished off without making it a full-fledged combat unit. In its current state, the Navy simply will not master the "Russian Enterprise", will not be able to control it.
And it is not for nothing that many informed officers are confident that the construction of such a ship will take at least twenty years and will require unpredictable expenses. But there may be design errors, the topic is new for our country (again).
All these factors require the project to be as simple as possible, as little as possible, and preferably at least a little familiar to the domestic industry. And also - feasible for the development of the Navy, which, however, must be prepared for such a ship, putting things in order at all levels, and restoring centralized control, burning out with red-hot iron those who found a sinecure in the service and making this type of the Armed Forces healthier as a whole. And, of course, the planes on it should fly, if not the same ones that today can land on Kuznetsov and take off from it, then at least their modifications.
All this sharply limits the choice options, and in general, in fact, reduces them to one single one.
Russian "Vikrant"
In 1999, work began on the Vikrant light aircraft carrier in India. Russia took an active part in this program, and some documentation for this ship is available in the Nevsky Design Bureau. For the construction of a ship, it, of course, is not nearly enough, but domestic experts have some idea of the design of this ship.
"Vikrant", according to Western data, has a displacement of 40,000 tons, that is, it is about the same heavy and large as the American UDC of the "Wasp" and "America" types. At the same time, its air group is almost twice as large and consists of the MiG-29K aircraft and helicopters of the Kamov Design Bureau, mastered by the Russian industry. At the same time, up to twenty jet fighters are declared in the air group, which is very good, and incomparably better than any UDC with "vertical".
The power plant "Vikranta" is completely gas turbine, it is equipped with four General Electric LM2500 gas turbines with a capacity of 27,500 hp. each one. The turbines work in pairs on the adder reducers, and the latter on the shaft, of which the ship has two. The advantages of such a scheme are simplicity and unification - the gearbox-adders are much simpler than any gearbox for a CODAG-type power plant, where you need to synchronize a high-speed turbine and a diesel engine, and the ship has only one engine type.
The power of one GTE of this ship is 27,500 hp. This is the same as the domestic M-90FRU. Of course, in order to use the turbine as a cruise, it will have to be redesigned, but it is much easier to create engines from scratch and the M-90FRU will serve as a base here.
Building a domestic version on domestic turbines seems to be a much simpler matter from the point of view of where such a ship needs to be built.
As a factory where such a ship can be built, the most suitable seems, oddly enough, Baltic plant.
Building berth "A" of the Baltic Shipyard has a length of 350 meters and allows building buildings with a width of at least 36 meters, and with some reservations, even more. Its carrying capacity is guaranteed to withstand the aircraft carrier, the length is also more than sufficient. The question is about breadth.
And here the design of the "Vikrant" hull speaks. We look in what form it was launched. In order to reach this stage, the Baltic Shipyard does not need any reconstruction at all, it can be done right now at the existing facilities. The water depth at the outfitting embankment and its length are also sufficient for this building.
The problem is how to finish building the ship further."Vikrant" was completed in the dock, and without large and powerful cranes, as the Americans do or as they did in the USSR at the plant in Nikolaev. But we don't have such a dock.
The Baltic plant on the outfitting embankment has only portal cranes with a lifting capacity of 50 tons and a floating crane of the German company Demag with a lifting capacity of 350 tons. And you will have to mount sponsons on which the flight deck and the “island” are located. Speech about large-block assembly just here cannot go. However, there and on the stocks, especially with the blocks, it is impossible to disperse, but afloat with the blocks will be "almost nothing."
On the other hand, perhaps for the sake of this project it makes sense to update the cranes and install a more powerful crane at the factory on the embankment near the outfitting wall - this will be, perhaps, the only thing that needs to be reconstructed to build a light aircraft carrier.
Is it possible to finish building the “Russian“Vikrant”at the outfitting embankment? Yes, it will simply be difficult, much more difficult than assembling it entirely on the slipway or at least in the same dock as the Indians did. You will have to build the ship in small blocks or sections, raise them with a floating crane, weld them afloat, and possibly re-moor the ship. Maybe many times.
This will complicate the construction, make it somewhat more expensive, increase the risks for workers during the docking of body parts, and increase the construction time. Alas, this is usually the price of infrastructural inadequacy. However, the construction of a light aircraft carrier by this method is POSSIBLE. Unlike attempts to repeat Kuznetsov, or to build a normal large aircraft carrier with a nuclear power plant, a certain Russian Enterprise.
The next problem will be the passage of the ship under the western high-speed diameter.
The height restriction when passing under the WHSD is 52 meters. In addition, a pipeline runs along the bottom in the Morskoy Canal, which limits the draft to 9.8 meters. Thus, either the ship will have to be in these dimensions, or it will have to be completed after passing under the WHSD, as an option, the mast with the radar will have to be installed with the same floating crane. The downside will be the inability to return to the plant without disassembly, if there is such a need … well, this is a good reason to immediately make it right, so that no need arises!
One way or another, the construction of a ship with a displacement of "Vikrant", with a similar power, but domestic power plant, with the same air group and within a reasonable timeframe at the Baltic Shipyard is real.
There is, however, one problem that must be resolved before the first ruble is spent on the Russian Vikrant.
The problem of contours
"Vikrant" can be built at the Baltic plant, it has some documentation, the engineers who participated in its development are still working, the power plant can be quickly created on domestic turbines, it was created for serial Russian ship aircraft and using domestic components … but it is too small for the Barents Sea.
By simply reproducing such a hull, Russia risks getting a ship that can be used in local wars somewhere in the south, but will be useless in defending its territory. It would be wrong and it shouldn't be done that way.
The problem is pitching. In our latitudes, sea waves are often too great. And the specificity of the aircraft carrier is that no roll stabilizers are enough to minimize the damage from it. The dimensions are needed, namely the length and width at the waterline, and the draft.
At the same time, it has been experimentally established that these parameters are the minimum for "Kuznetsov". And the "Kuznetsov" only has the same length along the waterline as the "Vikrant" at the extremities. And the draft with the width, of course, is also greater.
Thus, we will formulate the problem - it is necessary to build an aircraft carrier with a non-standard hull, which would have a ratio to the dimensions at the waterline (main dimensions) to the dimensions at the extremities would be completely different from that of the Vikrant. In principle, this problem cannot be considered unsolvable.
We look.
As you can see, even “an estimate by eye tells us that it is easy to increase at least the length of the ship along the waterline. Of course, drawing cannot be a guide to action, such things must first be evaluated using calculations, then using models in the test pool, and nothing else. But the direction in which you need to think is obvious, as it is also obvious that at least partially the problem becomes solvable. How long will the waterline increase? Let's compare.
As you can see, the reverse inclination of the stem and the changed shape of the stern, in theory, make it possible to almost catch up with the Liaoning, which, in turn, is slightly larger than the Kuznetsov. Width and draft questions remain. The building berth of the Baltic Shipyard allows you to build a hull that will be even wider than the Kuznetsov at the waterline, but here the question of the power plant intervenes - it must give speed, the ship can in no case be slow.
The draft is also a problem in some way - it cannot be lower than 9 meters, because otherwise the ship will not be able to navigate under the WHSD. This limitation is probably also surmountable, in the end the icebreaker was carried out under the WHSD, although there, too, everything was "end-to-end" in draft. But here again hydrodynamics can say its word …
Thus, a prerequisite for the construction of such a "mobilization" aircraft carrier is the following.
It can and should be built if, due to non-standard design solutions, it is possible to provide contours with which the ship would have the same restrictions on the use of aviation in waves as Kuznetsov at a smaller size, and a speed sufficient for a combat aircraft carrier. If studies show that this task is solvable, then we can say that the "aircraft carrier puzzle" in Russia has been solved. Imperfect, but with our economy, industry, organizational skills and technology, it will be almost a miracle.
If it turns out that the task is unsolvable, then for our society it will be a challenge of such a scale that in order to respond to it we will have to radically change, creating a different economy, industry, “closing” all our weaknesses in mentality, organizational abilities, and intellectual the level of both government and society.
Modern Russia can master the Vikrant, but the Russian Enterprise or Nimitz can only be mastered by a completely different Russia. This option also cannot be considered unrealistic, we are one of the fastest evolving societies on the planet, but it is better to leave the discussion of this option outside the scope of this article.
Thus, all of the above is true, correct and necessary in the event that the problem of contours is solved. This is a fundamental issue for the creation of a new domestic aircraft carrier. You shouldn't even start without it.
Catapult
The fundamental difference between the "Russian" Vikrant "and the Indian one should be the presence of a catapult launch. The dimensions and displacement of the ship make it possible to have a couple of catapults on it, and the amount of heat in the exhaust gases of four turbines of 27,500 hp each. each, it is quite possible to have a waste heat boiler of sufficient power for these catapults to work from it. Nonsense about freezing a pipe with steam at a temperature of 200 degrees Celsius is best left to children from kindergarten, but the main advantages of a catapult are worth remembering.
Firstly, this is the ability to launch heavy aircraft, which immediately makes it possible to use AWACS aircraft, transport aircraft, tankers and anti-submarine vehicles on the ship, if all this is ever created. Without a catapult, the creation of such aircraft will be much more difficult and expensive, and their take-off weight will be seriously limited.
The second, and this is even more important in the case of the Vikrant, is the reduction in the length of the deck required for the launch of the aircraft.
"Vikrant" is shorter than "Kuznetsov" and a very significant proportion of the deck length is allocated for the start on it. For a ship of this size, this significantly complicates takeoff and landing operations and maneuvering around the deck, and, as a result, greatly reduces the combat effectiveness. If Kuznetsov even has an opportunity (technically, this is not done at all) to ensure takeoff from the front right launch position simultaneously with the landing of another aircraft, then with Vikrant it is unrealistic.
A catapult in the nose is the solution to the problem. It reduces the length of the deck required for take-off to 100 meters and frees up its central part.
Russia has never built ships with a catapult, but the catapult itself for the Ulyanovsk TAVKR was made at the Proletarsky Zavod at one time. A lot of time has passed since then, but that old catapult is proof that if necessary, we can, at least there is a plant where it was made, and it works.
Thus, the fundamental difference between the domestic "Vikrant" and the Indian should be the absence of a springboard and the presence of a pair of catapults. Without this, the ship, even with "finished" contours, will be flawed, with low combat effectiveness.
Issue price
"Vikrant" rose to India at 3.5 billion dollars. With shipbuilding capabilities better than that of Russia, without sanctions, with near-zero climatic and low logistics costs, with cheap labor and the ability to buy components on the world market, and not individually produce them in pilot batches, paying for the cost of R&D, figuratively speaking, for every nut. How much is the same ship, adjusted for the construction of the hull using the technologies of the middle of the last century (at best) and everything else that the Indians do not have, but we have (and vice versa) will cost for Russia?
More recently, the media circulated with reference to some "source in the defense industry", which remained unnamed, that the cost of building an aircraft carrier in Russia would be between 300 and 400 billion rubles.
I must say that this is very close to reality, and, alas, we are not talking about the domestic analogue of "Nimitz". It should be assumed that exactly 400 billion rubles will be the “upper” price of the domestically produced catapult “Vikrant”. If we assume that from the moment of making the final decision on the beginning of the development of the ship and until the last transaction from the Ministry of Defense, for example 10 years will pass for the contractor, then without taking into account inflation, the ship will rise to the country at 40 billion rubles per year within ten years, and its entire cost will “eat »A significant share of the cost of the fleet in the new GPV. Up to 10%.
How to lower prices? First, apply cost design wherever possible.
Secondly, by saving on the design of subsystems, using simple engineering solutions.
Let's give an example. If our ship has two shaftlines and four gas turbines, then it means two gearboxes. Moreover, it is necessary to provide a different direction of rotation. Today "Zvezda-Reducer" produces different gearboxes for warships - right and left.
But the Americans at the "Spruence" at one time simply put the GTU "mirror-like", placing the turbines of the right and left sides in different ways in order to achieve rotation of the shaft lines in opposite directions. At the same time, the ship did not have an inter-gear transmission, which also reduced the cost, and our ship should do the same. It is possible to position the rudders so that the disconnection of one of the shaft lines could be compensated for by the angle of the rudder.
Save on interior decoration, alloys (everywhere only steel) and the like. In addition, it is worth developing the same turbines with an eye not only on the aircraft carrier, but also on future URO ships and, more broadly, on a single turbine for the Navy, again, as the Americans did. In part, this will save some of the price of the aircraft carrier.
Alas, but the main way to reduce the cost of the ship - a series - is unlikely to be available to us. In order for the production costs of the ship to begin to fall from the serial production, you will have to order at least four ships of this type. The Russian budget will not be able to withstand such pressures. This, too, can only be afforded by a completely different country. It will be very good for us if we get a couple of such ships in the next 15-17 years. Just great.
conclusions
Today there is a technical possibility of not very expensive (relatively large aircraft carrier with a nuclear power plant) to build one or two light, about 40,000 tons of aircraft carriers, structurally similar to the Indian aircraft carriers "Vikrant", but equipped with a catapult launch. The prerequisites for success are:
- availability of the necessary capacities, albeit in some way "problematic" - of the Baltic plant;
- the presence of part of the documentation "Vikrant" and people familiar with this ship;
- the possibility of creating a power plant based on serial turbines;
- the ability to create an aircraft for a catapult launch based on the serial MiG-29K;
- the presence of a factory that once made a catapult.
The disadvantages of the project are:
- impossibility of large-block construction at the Baltic plant;
- the difficult process of completing the ship at the outfitting wall;
- the need for final completion after the withdrawal of the ship under the WHSD and the impossibility of returning the built ship back to the factory without partial disassembly;
- the corresponding rise in the cost of the ship.
At the same time, the cost of the ship can be partially reduced due to design solutions and the use of "uniform" R&D for this and other ships (turbines).
A fundamental condition is the possibility of giving the hull of the ship such contours with which it would have the same restrictions on the use of aviation as Kuznetsov, and a speed sufficient for a warship. If this condition is not met (which is possible), then the construction of such a ship cannot begin
And if it is done, then it looks like we have a chance to get out of the aircraft carrier deadlock.
