By the end of the 18th century, Polish lands were divided between Prussia and Austria. As a result of the Napoleonic wars, another redistribution of Poland took place, as a result of which, in 1815, a significant part of its territory became part of Russia. In the First World War, one of the desired goals of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires was a new redistribution of Polish lands. Germany and Austria-Hungary in November 1916 announced their decision to create the Kingdom of Poland on the territory of the Russian part of Poland occupied by their troops in 1915. This "kingdom" did not have definitively defined boundaries and consisted of two zones, ruled respectively by the German and Austro-Hungarian governor-generals. The puppet Polish administration was headed by a Regency Council appointed by the occupiers in the fall of 1917.
Since August 1914, Russia has put forward the slogan of unification under the rule of the king of all Polish lands, promising to provide the Poles with self-government. On March 17, 1917, the Provisional Government announced that all Polish lands would be united as an independent Poland, linked to Russia by a military alliance, the terms of which would be determined by the Russian Constituent Assembly. In October 1917, at the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the Decree on Peace was adopted, in which all the belligerent states were called upon to immediately conclude a peace that would ensure all peoples the right to self-determination. On November 25, 1917, the Russian government adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, which proclaimed the unconditional right of peoples to self-determination, including secession and formation of an independent state. At the negotiations that began in December 1917 between our country and Germany and its allies in Brest, the Russian delegation called for the provision of the right of self-determination for all peoples and at the same time stressed that the recognition of this right for the Poles was incompatible with the recognition of the puppet administration of the Kingdom of Poland.
On March 3, 1918, the RSFSR was forced to ratify the Brest Peace Treaty, which established, in particular, the domination of Germany and Austria-Hungary over the Polish lands of the former Russian Empire. As part of the German embassy established in Moscow, a representative office of the Regency Council was formed. In a letter to this office dated June 22, 1918, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR G. V. Chicherin noted that Russia recognizes the fact of the forcible rejection of Poland from it, but precisely because of the recognition of the right of the Polish people to self-determination, the Regency Council considers the "body of the German occupation".
By a decree of August 29, 1918, the leadership of Soviet Russia declared invalid the treaties of the Russian Empire on the partition of Poland. This act undermined the legal basis for the annexation of Polish territories to Germany and Austria-Hungary. At the end of 1918, Austria-Hungary and Germany were unable to hold onto the Polish lands. With the consent of the occupiers, the Regency Council in the fall of 1918 took over the administration of the Kingdom of Poland. In November 1918, the Austro-Hungarian administration was expelled by the population from Galicia, which was part of Austria-Hungary (most of the inhabitants of Western Galicia were Poles, and Eastern Galicia were Ukrainians) and from the Austro-Hungarian zone of occupation of the Kingdom of Poland. The independent Polish state, which was in the process of institutionalization, began a war to capture Eastern Galicia. The Polish army occupied Eastern Galicia as a result of the war against the East Galician Ukrainian nationalists, which lasted from the fall of 1918 to July 1919.
In mid-November 1918, the Regency Council transferred its powers to Pilsudski, who, after the elections to the Seimas held at the beginning of 1919, became the head of state responsible to parliament. With the outbreak of World War Y. Pilsudski became the organizer of the Polish military units of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies. In the summer of 1917, he opposed the unconditional subordination of military personnel - natives of the Kingdom of Poland to the German command. In July 1917, he was arrested by the German authorities and was imprisoned until November 1918.
By December 1918, German troops were withdrawn from the Polish lands that were formerly part of Russia, with the exception of the Bialystok area, which was transferred by the German command to Poland in February 1919. In January 1919, the German administration from the German-owned Poznan region was also expelled by the Polish population.
Note dated October 9, 1918 G. V. Chicherin informed the Regency Council about the direction of Yu. Markhlevsky as the diplomatic representative of our country in Poland. Thus, Russia officially recognized Poland as an independent state. The desire to establish diplomatic relations was confirmed by the government of the RSFSR in radiograms sent to the Polish government in late 1918 - early 1919. However, Poland did not agree to normalize relations. A convenient pretext for this was the closure of the representative office of the Regency Council in Russia in November 1918. Y. Markhlevsky wrote that this was done by the Poles who were in the RSFSR, who believed that after the dissolution of the Regency Council, its representation ceased to represent the interests of Poland. After receiving radio messages from the Polish government that this mission continues to be a Polish diplomatic mission, the Russian side in December 1918 provided the conditions necessary for the resumption of its activities.
It is worth noting that the Soviet troops stationed in Belarus and Lithuania included military units consisting of Poles. In a radio message to the RSFSR government on December 30, the Polish government claimed that these units were intended for the invasion of Poland, but did not provide any evidence. The exchange of radiograms between the governments of our country and Poland on the issue of the normalization of bilateral relations was terminated after the killing of representatives of the Russian delegation of the Red Cross by Polish gendarmes on January 2, 1919.
In February 1919, in the areas bordering on Belarus, German troops were replaced by Polish ones, who then invaded deep into the Belarusian territories. In order to conceal its predatory plans, the Polish government, by a radiogram dated February 7, 1919, suggested that the RSFSR government send its extraordinary representative A. Ventskovsky to Moscow for negotiations on controversial issues of bilateral relations.
By a reply radiogram dated February 10, 1919, the Russian government agreed to the arrival of A. Venzkowski and called on Poland to begin negotiations with Lithuania and Belarus on resolving disputed territorial issues. The Central Executive Committee of the Byelorussian SSR and the leadership of the Lithuanian SSR notified the Polish government by a radiogram dated February 16 about the formation of the Lithuanian-Byelorussian SSR (Lit-bel) and proposed to establish a joint commission to establish the border of Lit-bel with Poland. The radiogram also expressed a protest against the occupation of the Bialystok district by the Polish troops, and noted that the ethnic composition of the inhabitants of this district corresponds to the population of Litbel. During the negotiations held in Moscow from March to April 1919 between G. Chicherin and A. Ventskovsky, in a letter dated March 24 on behalf of the Soviet government, spoke in favor of defining the Polish eastern borders by holding a "workers' vote" in the disputed areas, and in a letter dated April 15 he announced the proposal of the Ukrainian SSR to begin negotiations on the establishment of the Polish-Ukrainian border.
It should be noted that these proposals contained a number of conditions that could not serve as a basis for a successful settlement of territorial disputes. In particular, the statement about the ethnic composition of the population of Bialystok district, the majority of whose inhabitants were Poles, was erroneous. Establishment of interstate borders by means of "workers' vote", i.e. the removal from voting of a part of the population of the disputed areas, contrary to the generally accepted norms for holding a plebiscite.
But if the Soviet proposals contained certain provisions that were not of a constructive nature, Poland left these proposals unanswered, since in principle it ruled out a peaceful solution to territorial disputes at the negotiating table. On April 4, 1919, the Polish Sejm approved the report of the Foreign Affairs Commission, which provided, in particular, for Poland's refusal to conduct any negotiations on issues of interstate borders with its eastern neighbors.
In April 1919, Poland expanded the scale of hostilities and captured the capital of Litbel, Vilnius. In a letter sent to G. V. Chicherin A. Ventskovsky on April 25, indicated that by doing so, the Polish side disrupted the negotiations that were taking place between them, which Russia was ready to resume as soon as hostilities were suspended. In the summer of 1919, the RSFSR came up with a new peace initiative, proposing to Poland to resolve disputed territorial issues, based on the principle of self-determination of nations. While in June 1919 in the Polish capital on his way from Germany to Russia, Y. Markhlevsky, on his own initiative, agreed to resume negotiations. Having received the appropriate powers from the Soviet leadership, Yu. Markhlevsky at unofficial negotiations in Bialowieza (in eastern Poland) with A. Wentskovsky proposed to determine the state ownership of the disputed territories by a plebiscite with the participation of their entire population. However, the Poles did not accept this offer. The meeting in Bialowieza ended with an agreement on holding a conference of delegations of the Polish and Russian Red Cross, at which the issue of concluding a peace treaty would be discussed.
Until 1920, Western countries officially supported the White Guard's policy towards Poland. On June 12, 1919, the Supreme Council of the Entente approved the provisions presented by the self-proclaimed "supreme ruler of the Russian state" A. Kolchak, confirming the decision taken by the Russian Provisional Government back in 1917 on the formation of the Polish state. Hoping that Soviet power would be overthrown in the near future, the Supreme Council of the Entente on September 15, 1919, refused Poland's offer to make a military campaign against Moscow, if the Western powers provided it with the appropriate material and technical means. On the basis of these factors, the Polish government concluded that the victory of the White Guards in the civil war was not in the interests of Poland.
Taking advantage of the fact that the main forces of the Red Army were first thrown into the fight against Kolchak, and then against Denikin, as well as the refusal of the East Galician Ukrainian nationalists to jointly fight with the Red Army against the aggressive actions of Poland, Polish troops invaded far to the east. In September 1919, they occupied most of Belarus, including Minsk, and in Ukraine, the Poles advanced half the distance from the ethnic border line to Kiev. Then the Polish Army reduced the activity of hostilities against the Soviet troops, which allowed the Soviet command to transfer additional forces to fight against Denikin's Army.
From early October to mid-December 1919, an official conference of Polish and Russian delegations of the Red Cross, headed by Y. Markhlevsky and M. Kossakovsky, was held in Mikashevichi (in the Minsk province occupied by Poland). In parallel with this conference, Y. Markhlevsky, authorized by the government of the RSFSR to determine the foundations of a peace agreement with Poland, conducted unofficial negotiations with Y. Pilsudsky's representatives - first with M. Birnbaum, and then with I. Berner. Markhlevsky proposed to conclude a peace treaty based on the establishment of borders through a plebiscite, the terms of which would be worked out at official negotiations. The Polish side refrained from discussing this issue. But, as Markhlevsky wrote, “on the other hand, it turned out that the intentions of the Polish command did not go east further than the front line of that time,” as a result of which it was possible to suspend hostilities along the entire front. Berner's diary says that he conveyed the following statements by Pilsudski to Markhlevsky: that the Polish Army had suspended active military operations on a large scale against the Red Army, while the validity period of the above decision to suspend hostilities, which was adopted in order to “prevent victories of the reactionary forces in Russia”.
At a meeting of representatives of the Entente countries in London in December 1919, the prime ministers of England and France D. Lloyd George and J. Clemenceau stated that Kolchak and Denikin had been defeated by the Red Army, and therefore it was decided to strengthen Poland so that it would play the role of a reliable barrier against Russia. Claiming that they oppose the organization of a Polish offensive against Russia, the Entente actually spoke in favor of providing Poland with material resources. However, as we remember, a few months earlier Poland promised to start a campaign against Moscow, subject to receiving them.
On December 8, the decision of the Entente leadership on the 2nd of the same month was published to establish a temporary Polish eastern border within the territory of the former Russian Empire, which approximately corresponded to the ethnic border. At the same time, it was stipulated that this does not predetermine the final border that will be established in the future. Two weeks later, the Supreme Council of the Entente decided to transfer the administration of the lands of Eastern Galicia to Poland for a quarter of a century. Considering this territory part of the Polish state, the Polish government did not agree with this decision. Taking this into account, the Supreme Council of the Entente canceled its above resolution and decided to return to the consideration of this issue in the future. Leaving open the question of the Polish eastern borders, the Western powers actually expressed their consent, both with the seizure of the lands of Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania by Poland, and with the restoration of a united and indivisible Russia.
In the middle of 1919, Y. Markhlevsky's unofficial negotiations with representatives of the Polish leadership did not lead to the conclusion of peace. Therefore, the government of the RSFSR decided to follow the path of official negotiations. By a radiogram by V. Chicherin, the government of Poland on December 22, 1919 was invited to start negotiations on a peace treaty.
By a radiogram at the end of January 1920, the Russian government addressed the leadership and people of Poland with confirmation of the recognition of the independence of the Polish Republic and a proposal to hold peace negotiations. It was especially emphasized that the troops of the Red Army would not cross the established front line. The statement of the government of the RSFSR was confirmed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the government of the Ukrainian SSR in radiograms dated February 2 and 22, 1920, respectively. On February 24, an official announcement was made about the meeting of the Polish Sejm Foreign Affairs Committee, dedicated to the conclusion of peace with our country. The message emphasized that the Polish Republic stands for “providing the opportunity to freely express their state ownership of the population of those lands that are not now under the control of Poland, but belonged to it until 1772, when it included most of the Right-Bank Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and part of Latvia. The Soviet press discussed the question of a plebiscite in the Ukrainian and Belarusian regions occupied by the Polish army. In particular, in articles published in the Izvestia newspaper on February 29, 1920, K. B. Radek and the editor of this newspaper Yu. M. Steklov noted that under the current Polish occupation there is no possibility of free expression of the will of the population, and that Belarusians and Ukrainians, having the opportunity to choose, would speak out for joining the Soviet republics.
Delaying the response to the peace proposals made to it, the Polish side thereby whipped up tension, in the conditions of which certain Russian and Ukrainian leaders made statements that ran counter to the political line on these issues, proclaimed by the government of the RSFSR and confirmed by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the government of the Ukrainian SSR. For example, in the aforementioned issue of the Izvestia newspaper for February 29, 1920, A. Myasnikov, secretary of the Moscow Party Committee, argued that "the red troops must make a dent in the direction of the militant kulak, priestly and bison -cratic Poland." It should also be noted that the Executive Bureau of the Polish Communist Party located in the RSFSR, conducting propaganda among the soldiers of the Polish army for the end of the war, at the same time called for the establishment of Soviet power in the Polish Republic.
Preparing for a large-scale offensive against our troops, Polish troops occupied the Kalinkovichi railway junction in March 1920. In radiograms sent to the Polish government, the governments of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR emphasized that the need to repel Polish aggression makes them refuse to comply on the Ukrainian front with the obligation not to cross the line specified in the statement of the Russian government on January 28.
On March 8, 1920, the Polish leadership decided to include Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and the Vilnius region in its state on the same conditions as the ethnic Polish lands, and the rest of Belarus - with the provision of self-government. At the same time, it was envisaged to create an "independent Ukrainian state" between the lands of Western Ukraine and the Polish border of 1772, corresponding approximately to the line of the Dnieper. On the basis of this decision, the Polish government concluded "agreements" with its Ukrainian and Belarusian puppets. The latter recognized the conditions dictated by the Polish authorities in exchange for a promise to transfer to them control over the "independent Ukraine" and "autonomous Belarus" formed by Poland. In April, an agreement was signed with S. V. Petliura Directory, which during the civil war was defeated in Ukraine and fled to the territory occupied by the troops of Yu. Pilsudski. In May, an agreement was also signed with the Highest Rada, formed in Belarus during the Polish occupation.
With a radiogram dated March 27, the Polish government proposed to the RSFSR government to start a Russian-Polish peace conference on April 10, 1920 in the front-line Belarusian city of Borisov occupied by the Polish army and to cease hostilities in this sector of the front for the period of negotiations. By a response radiogram dated March 28, 1920, our side agreed with the proposed date for the start of the conference, and also called for it to be held on the territory of a neutral state, and to conclude an armistice along the entire front in order to create suitable conditions for negotiations.
In April, the exchange of radiograms continued on the conditions for holding the peace conference. Expressing its readiness to negotiate anywhere outside the front line, the RSFSR government stressed that it could not agree to organize a conference near the front line without establishing an armistice. The insufficiently flexible position of the Russian side objectively contributed to the breakdown of the negotiations by the Polish government, which refused to conclude an armistice and insisted on holding a conference in Borisov.
On April 17, Yu. Pilsudskiy signed an order to start an offensive on the territory of Ukraine from April 22. However, in the official communication of the Polish Foreign Ministry on April 20, 1920, the desire was expressed for the earliest possible start of negotiations and the conclusion of peace. This is convincing evidence of the duplicity of the Polish government. Poland showed a willingness to negotiate only to conceal preparations for a new offensive. Thus, the Poles repeated the maneuver with a proposal for negotiations, undertaken by them at the beginning of the invasion of Belarus and Lithuania in 1919.
On April 25, the Polish Army, equipped with the Entente powers, began a rapid offensive deep into the territory of Ukraine, on a wide sector of the front from Pripyat to the Dniester. On May 6 they occupied Kiev. In this situation, on April 29, 1920, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the government of the RSFSR formulated a new political line regarding Poland. A readiness was expressed in the event of a "glimpse of common sense among the White Poles" to conclude a peace that would meet the interests of the peoples of the two countries. At the same time, the slogan "Long live workers 'and peasants' Poland!" And M. N. Tukhachevsky, in his order of July 2, gave more categorical wording. Claiming that "the fate of the world revolution is now being decided in the west," the path to which lies "through the corpse of white Poland," Tukhachevsky appealed to the front troops with an appeal: "We will carry happiness and peace to working mankind on bayonets."
In mid-May, a Soviet counteroffensive began, and in June, Polish troops withdrew behind the line on which they had stood before the attack on Kiev. In July, the Red Army liberated the lands of Lithuania and Belarus from the Polish occupiers, and entered Eastern Galicia in Ukraine. By mid-August, our troops reached the outskirts of Warsaw and Lvov. Poland received active diplomatic support from Great Britain, which repeatedly appealed to the RSFSR with demands to conclude an armistice on the Polish front, which not only did not provide for the conclusion of a peace treaty establishing interstate borders along ethnic borders, but also preserved the Polish occupation regime in part of the Ukrainian lands of Eastern Galicia. In particular, in the radiogram of the head of the Foreign Ministry J. Curzon on July 11, it was proposed to conclude an armistice with the condition that the Polish troops be withdrawn behind the temporary border of Poland, determined by the Entente at the end of 1919, within the territory of Tsarist Russia and the preservation of the positions occupied by the parties in Eastern Galicia. At the same time, it was especially emphasized that Britain and its allies would provide Poland with all-round assistance in the event that the Red Army crossed the Polish temporary eastern border established by the Entente. As such a border, which received the name of the Curzon Line, was indicated the border previously defined by the Entente within the limits of Tsarist Russia, extended south to the Carpathians and separating Eastern Galicia from Poland.
By a reply radiogram from Chicherin of July 17, 1920, the British government was informed about the readiness of the RSFSR to start peace negotiations with Poland in the event of an appropriate direct appeal from her side, and to conclude a peace establishing the eastern Polish border along the ethnic border of the Polish lands, passing slightly east of the Curzon line …However, Poland, hoping to stop the offensive of the Red Army, sought to delay the start of negotiations.
On July 19, 1920, the Organizing Bureau of the party formed the Polish Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) (Polburo) from the Communist Poles who were in Russia and Ukraine, under the chairmanship of F. E. Dzerzhinsky. On July 30, 1920, in Bialystok, occupied by the Red Army, Polburo formed from among its members the Provisional Revolutionary Committee of Poland (Polrevk), headed by Yu. Markhlevsky. On the same day, Polrevkom announced the seizure of power in Poland, but was not properly supported by the population even in the Polish territory occupied by the Red Army. It should be noted that the attempt to impose on Poland a change in its socio-political system only made it difficult to reach an agreement on the conclusion of a peace treaty with the de facto Polish government.
On the last day of July 1920, the re-establishment of the Byelorussian SSR was proclaimed in Minsk. In accordance with the concluded peace treaty between Lithuania and the RSFSR, which determined the line of the Soviet-Lithuanian border, and the convention on the withdrawal of our troops from Lithuanian territory, signed on July 32 and August 6, respectively, the city of Vilnius was transferred to Lithuania.
The Poles were trying to gain time to prepare for a new offensive against the Red Army, which was approaching the Curzon line. Again, as in February 1919 and in March-April 1920, Poland declared its readiness to negotiate with the RSFSR. By radio messages dated July 22, 1920, the Polish government proposed to conclude an armistice and begin peace negotiations, and the military command only to establish an armistice. In reply radiograms dated July 23, 1920, the Russian government and the military leadership agreed to negotiate an armistice and conclude a peace treaty. It was agreed that the Polish peace delegation would cross the front line on July 30, 1920.
On July 27, 1920, the English and French Prime Ministers D. Lloyd George and A. Millerand, who met in Boulogne, decided that the purpose of the Soviet-Polish negotiations should be the conclusion of an armistice without Poland accepting obligations regarding a peace treaty. At the same time, the same decision was made by the State Defense Council formed by the Polish Sejm, which had extraordinary powers in resolving issues of warfare and the conclusion of peace. On July 29, 1920, the Polish government decided to refrain from negotiating both an armistice and peace. Thus, the breakdown of the negotiations was a foregone conclusion. Having crossed the front line on July 30, 1920, the Polish delegation returned to Warsaw after our side proposed on August 2 to negotiate simultaneously on an armistice and preliminary conditions for peace. The continued offensive of the Red Army forced the Polish Defense Council to decide to agree to negotiate peace.
However, the coordination of the issue was delayed until the end of August 1920. The reason for this was the poor radio communication between Moscow and Warsaw. Attempts to make radio communications through London caused long transmission delays on the part of the British. As a result, it was agreed that the Polish delegation would cross the front line on August 14.
By the fall of 1920, the situation on the Soviet-Polish front was in favor of Poland, which received military assistance from the Entente countries. At the same time, the Red Army was forced to send its reserves to fight against Wrangel's troops. In addition, the Red Army scattered its forces, advancing in parallel on Warsaw and Lvov. The Poles successfully used the mistakes of the Soviet military command, primarily Tukhachevsky, and defeated our Western Front, which operated in the Warsaw direction. Such were the conditions on August 17, when the peace conference gathered in Minsk for a meeting. The Soviet delegation proposed to conclude a peace treaty and establish a border between states, in general, corresponding to the Curzon line, taking into account ethnic boundaries. In addition, it was proposed to reduce the Polish army, and transfer the weapons of the reduced units to the RSFSR. A number of proposals bore, in fact, the meaning of direct interference in the internal affairs of Poland, since the Soviet side proposed the creation of civilian militia units from among Polish workers, to which the RSFSR would transfer part of the weapons to the Polish army. Naturally, the Polish country could not accept such proposals.
Taking advantage of the weakening of Soviet troops, Polish troops in October 1920 reached Minsk and the lines from which the Poles began offensive operations in April. At the same time, Poland began hostilities on the territory of Lithuania, and on October 9 captured Vilnius. However, the limited material resources forced the Poles to cease hostilities. The rebuff received by the Polish troops also tempered their territorial appetites to the lines, which, although located west of the positions occupied by the Polish troops before the attack on Kiev, still included a significant part of the national Ukrainian and Belarusian territories. At the Soviet-Polish peace conference held on September 21, 1920 in Riga, the Poles proposed an agreement that provided for the entry of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus into Poland. Military operations, according to the treaty, ceased on October 18, 1920. On March 18, 1921, a peace treaty was signed. On April 30, 1921, the instruments of ratification were exchanged and the treaty entered into force.
