Why did the Decembrists lose? And really, why? After all, the attempt at an armed coup, undertaken by the liberal conspirators, seemed to have every chance of success, and no worse than a quarter of a century before that.
Fake News vs. Truth
So, first of all, the interregnum situation worked for the rebels after the death of Alexander I. The general tension in the Russian elite was especially aggravated after the abandonment of the rights to the throne of the late Tsar Konstantin Pavlovich's elder brother, inexplicable for the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the empire. Many of the subjects have already managed to swear allegiance to him as the legitimate sovereign.
A situation has formed in the country, which today would be called an information vacuum. Not only the "rabble", but also a significant part of the nobility and even the court circles were in the dark about the motives of the behavior of the pretenders to the throne and the future of the monarchy. Rumors and the most incredible guesses fed the imagination of subjects left without the highest care.
The truth often looks much less convincing than the lie. At one time, the reliable information of the government of Boris Godunov about Grishka Otrepiev could not compete with the entertaining legend of the miraculously escaped Tsarevich Dimitri.
Here is the official version of the emperor's renunciation of the rights to the throne and the need for a new oath to his brother, although it corresponded to the true state of affairs, but in the eyes of the average man looked like an impudent deception. At the same time, all kinds of "fakes", for example, that Tsar Constantine was going from Warsaw to the capital to defend his throne, or even hidden in the Senate building, on the contrary, were unconditionally accepted by many on faith.
This greatly facilitated the task of agitation among the soldiers of the guards regiments, whom the officers involved in the conspiracy urged not to swear allegiance to the "usurper" Nicholas, but to defend the true sovereign. In this regard, the usual definition of the revolt of 1825 as an anti-monarchist protest should be considered at least conditional, because only the top of the Decembrists considered it as such.
Often, the popular masses were drawn into political movements by deception, promises, false or misunderstood slogans, or unfounded expectations of the participants themselves. Often, the interests of the various forces involved in the movement coincided only partly and for a time, but the case when the goals of the leaders and their supporters were initially directly opposite, must be recognized as unique not only in domestic, but also, perhaps, in world history.
If the instigators of the coup set the task of changing the state system, breaking the existing political system, then for the personnel of the insurgent regiments, the motive was the restoration of legal order, which was threatened by the insidious "thief of the throne" Nikolai. The townspeople thought the same.
It is for this reason that the Petersburgers gathered around the square of rebels warmly sympathized with them, and the following calls were heard from the crowd to the newly made autocrat: "Come here, impostor, we will show you how to take away someone else's!" When Metropolitan Seraphim approached the rebels, convincing them that Constantine was in Warsaw, they did not believe him: "No, he is not in Warsaw, but at the last station in chains … Bring him here!.. Hurray, Constantine!"
What can we say about the lower ranks of the guards regiments or urban inhabitants, if even some Decembrist officers considered what was happening as an act in support of the legitimate sovereign. For example, Prince Dmitry Shchepin-Rostovsky, by whose diligence the Moscow regiment was brought to the square, did not think about any limitation of the monarchy, but went to defend the right to the throne of the legitimate emperor Constantine.
The uprising on Senate Square was a military coup, which took the form of suppressing an imaginary putsch, a mutiny under the guise of curbing the rebels.
Romanov and emptiness
In this regard, the question arises: how, in the light of all these circumstances, the Decembrists could retain power if they succeeded. But, as they say, this is a completely different story, and we will try not to go beyond the events of December 14. And on this day, we repeat, the conspirators' chances of victory were very high.
Despite the organizational looseness and flaws in planning (which we will talk about in more detail), the Decembrists nevertheless made preparations for the coup quite consistently. Nicholas, although he was warned of the conspiracy, but contrary to popular wisdom, he was not "armed" at all, since he had no one to arm. Accordingly, the Grand Duke did not and could not have any even the most approximate plan of action or counter-action.
The real power in the capital belonged to the Governor-General Mikhail Miloradovich, to whom both the troops and the secret police were subordinate. Miloradovich openly supported Constantine and prevented his younger brother's accession to the throne. Nicholas, of course, remembered that the head of the conspiracy against Paul I, Count Peter Palen, in the fateful days of March 1801, also held the post of St. Petersburg military governor, and such an analogy could not but worry him.
Having on hand information about the anti-government intentions of the main conspirators and direct instructions on their account, Governor-General Miloradovich was almost demonstratively inactive. He was inactive even on December 13, when the head of the Southern Society, Colonel Pavel Pestel, was arrested at the headquarters of the 2nd Army in Tulchin (now the Vinnitsa region of Ukraine).
At this time, in the capital of the empire, with the full connivance of the police, the head of the Northern Society, Kondraty Ryleev, was completing preparations for the uprising. Nevertheless, the author does not share the version that Miloradovich almost stood behind the backs of the putschists. Mikhail Andreevich felt too much power behind him to trade in conspiratorial games with figures like Ryleev and his insignificant associates. He knew about the maturing conspiracy and was not averse to using it to his advantage - nothing more.
But if, unlike Miloradovich, other generals and dignitaries did not risk openly confronting Nicholas, this did not mean that the future emperor could rely on them. And this is another argument in favor of the success of the uprising: even if the conspirators clearly lacked "thick epaulettes" in their ranks, they at least firmly relied on the "company commanders" and most of them already confirmed their determination during the speech.
Nikolai did not have this either. A vacuum formed around him: any of the officers or generals around him could turn out to be a traitor. “The day after tomorrow, in the morning, I am either the sovereign, or without breathing,” the Grand Duke confessed in his letter.
In this regard, the position of the commander of the Guards Infantry Karl Bistrom, then only a Lieutenant General, is noteworthy, with all his merits and length of service. Both General's adjutants Yevgeny Obolensky and Yakov Rostovtsev were among the conspirators, Karl Ivanovich himself declared that he would not swear an oath to anyone but Constantine.
Bistrom, sharing the political preferences of his boss Miloradovich, obviously feared that the southern temperament and self-confidence of the military governor would harm both him and the cause of Nikolai's ill-wishers. It should be borne in mind that Bistrom had a personal reserve in the form of a regiment of guards rangers, which he commanded for several years. At the decisive moment, the general was ready to throw his trump card on the table.
On December 14, Bistrom postponed the oath of the rangers and, taking a truly Mkhatov pause, waited to see which side the scales would tilt. Ostsee's composure did not disappoint Karl Ivanovich, and although the emperor himself did not hide that Bystrom's behavior on the day of the putsch looked at least strange, no one put forward specific claims to the general, and his subsequent career was quite successful.
In the light of all of the above, we can assume that the oath of allegiance to Nikolai, scheduled for December 14, turned into an experiment, the result of which seemed unpredictable for all its participants. Only the swearing-in process itself could show who is who. Nicholas had the worst - to wait. He did everything possible: he brought the date of the oath closer, promised a promotion for the officers in case of a successful outcome for himself, but the opposite side, if successful, could offer them their bonuses.
The whole initiative was in the hands of the opponents of the monarchy. Unlike Nicholas, by the morning of December 14, the putschists had sufficiently complete information about what was happening in the garrison, the mood of the lower ranks and officers, and had the opportunity to coordinate their efforts.
Moreover, as the "dictator" of the uprising, Prince Sergei Trubetskoy, writes in his notes, the conspirators were well informed about all the actions of the Grand Duke and the entire military leadership. Under these conditions, the Decembrists could only lose to themselves. Which they did.
Do you have a plan, Mr. Fix?
In school textbooks, the actions of the rebels on December 14 look like a mysterious standing on Senate Square in anticipation of the gathering of government troops and, as a result, of their defeat. As in his time M. V. Nechkina, and today Ya. A. Gordin are trying to refute the established opinion about the inaction of the rebels.
So, Nechkina noted that it was “not standing, but the process of collecting parts,” which, in our opinion, does not fundamentally change anything in the picture of events. Gordin adds emotion, emphasizing that the insurgent units fought their way to the square, but this again does not add anything to the essence of the matter.
V. A. Fedorov in the book "The Decembrists and Their Time" just adheres to the "school" version, pointing out that the Decembrists had every opportunity to seize the Winter Palace, the Peter and Paul Fortress, the Arsenal and even arrest Nicholas and his family. But they limited themselves to active defense and, not daring to go on the offensive, took a waiting position, which allowed Nicholas I to gather the military forces he needed.
The researcher notes a number of other tactical errors, in particular, "an order to gather at Senate Square, but without precise instructions on how to proceed." But in this case, who exactly made tactical mistakes, who exactly gave the order to gather for the Senate?
Fedorov reports that the first plan of the uprising was developed by Trubetskoy: its general meaning was that even before the abdication of Constantine, to withdraw the regiments out of the city, and, relying on armed force, to demand from the government to introduce a constitution and representative government. The historian, noting the realism of this plan, indicates that it was rejected, and the plan of Ryleev and Pushchin was adopted, according to which, with the beginning of the oath, the indignant units were taken to Senate Square in order to force the Senate to declare a Manifesto on the destruction of the old government.
With Gordin, the Ryleev-Pushchin plan becomes … Trubetskoy's plan, more precisely, a "battle plan", apparently, in contrast to the previous version of the military demonstration presented by the prince. This plan of Trubetskoy allegedly consisted of two main components: the first was the capture of the palace by a shock group and the arrest of Nicholas with his family and the generals, the second was the concentration of all other forces at the Senate, the establishment of control over the Senate building, subsequent strikes in the right directions - the seizure of the fortress, the arsenal.
“With this plan in mind, Trubetskoy went to see Ryleev on the evening of December 12,” Gordin said.
Not being able to "get into the head" of Trubetskoy, let us give the floor to the prince himself. During the investigation, the dictator showed the following: “Regarding the order made about the actions on December 14, I did not change anything in my previous assumption; that is, for the Marine crew to go to the Izmailovsky regiment, this one to the Moscow regiment, but the Leib-Grenadier and Finnish regiment had to go straight to Senate Square, where the others would have come."
However, this is a completely different plan! And Gordin mentions him, however, as preliminary and without naming the author. It was based on the following system of actions: the first units that refused to swear allegiance follow a certain route from barracks to barracks and captivate others with their example, and then follow to Senate Square. "But this plan, with its cumbersomeness, slowness and uncertainty, did not suit Ryleev at all," Gordin emphasizes, "Trubetskoy took it for lack of better …"
But what is cumbersome, vague and slow in this regard? On the contrary, the approach of the rebel troops would have a decisive effect on the doubters from other regiments and would have accelerated and intensified the concentration of the insurrectionary forces many times over. In this variant, the gathering of troops, instead of passive waiting on the square, assumed active actions.
From the starting point of the movement, the Marine crew, to the Izmailovskie barracks about fifteen minutes walk, and from there along the Fontanka, half an hour to the Moscow regiment. Trubetskoy completes the presentation of the plan by joining the Moscow regiment and, for obvious reasons, says nothing about the plans for the Winter Palace.
However, it is obvious that parts of the rebels went along Gorokhovaya Street to the Admiralty, but from there they could turn left towards the Senate, or they could turn right towards the Winter Palace. As for the Senate, the units located away from this route were supposed to move there: the Finland regiment was located on Vasilievsky Island, and the Life Guards were on the Petersburg side.
It is understood that these are only sketches of the plan, but its logic is quite clear. Meanwhile, they want to assure us that, for lack of anything else, Trubetskoy took the variant that had come from nowhere as a basis. However, the prince not only does not hide his authorship, moreover, it follows from his words that this tactic was proposed to him before, and he continued to insist on it.
Senate Factor
It is believed that the rebels intended to force the Senate to renounce the oath of allegiance to Nicholas and proclaim the Manifesto they had prepared, but the Grand Duke got ahead of them, reassigning the date of the oath to an earlier time. Considering that the leaders of the uprising knew about the transfer of the oath and had the opportunity to react to the change in the situation, standing on the square in front of an empty Senate looks absurd. It turns out that the Decembrists, without having prepared plan "B", continued to act according to plan "A", realizing that it was unrealizable ?!
Gordin tries to resolve this conflict, noting that the Decembrists did not expect to be in time with the soldiers on the square for the Senate oath.
“The leaders of the secret society had no doubt that if they succeeded in carrying out a coup, arresting the imperial family and taking control of the Senate building, then it would not be difficult to gather senators with the help of Senate couriers. Whether they find senators in the Senate or not, they did not care at all."
Is it so? Nechkina, relying on the numerous testimonies of the participants in the putsch, indicates that the Decembrists intended to force the Senate to take their side, which, of course, implies not sending couriers, but the violent seizure of the building along with the dignitaries sitting there and direct influence on them.
The rejection of the Senate oath could serve as a powerful catalyst for the uprising and predetermine the position of the vacillating both among the lower ranks and among the highest dignitaries and generals. But as soon as difficulties arose that required correcting actions, Ryleev and his entourage somehow very easily rejected this promising option, allowing the senators to swear allegiance to Nikolai, which just significantly complicated the achievement of their goals.
The presence of a Senate courier service is, of course, wonderful, but what would prevent the senators, who had just sworn allegiance to Emperor Nicholas, from ordering these couriers down the stairs? Even the capture of the Winter Palace and the arrest of the tsar would have made little difference in the situation. Only one circumstance could radically affect the position of the Senate and the entire alignment of forces - the death of the sovereign.
Gordin believes that "the Ryleev-Trubetskoy group" was not at all going to leave Nikolai in power: "It was not for nothing that the tacit element of the tactical plan was regicide, the physical elimination of Nikolai." But in another place, the historian points out that for Ryleev the regicide should have preceded the capture of the palace or coincided with it in time, but Trubetskoy learned about this plan only during the investigation.
Then what is this "Trubetskoy plan", the author of which did not know about its most important element, and what kind of "Ryleev-Trubetskoy" group is this, one of whose members is hiding his plan from the other? It is known that Trubetskoy considered it necessary to hold the trial of Nikolai, but this implied the implementation of the original intention - to force the Senate to side with the putschists. Ryleev hoped to "sort out" Nikolai in haste without trial or investigation. With this turn of events, the senators' oath became a secondary factor that could be ignored.
According to Gordin, the most important role in the mutiny was intended for the dragoon captain Alexander Yakubovich, who undertook to lead the Guards crew and go to the palace, but refused, allegedly out of jealousy of Trubetskoy's supremacy. The historian repeatedly emphasizes that it was the irresponsible behavior of Yakubovich and Colonel Alexander Bulatov, who was supposed to lead the well-known grenadier regiment, that caused the failure of the coup.
On November 12, at a meeting with Ryleev, Bulatov and Yakubovich were elected deputies of the "dictator", and Lieutenant Prince Obolensky was elected chief of staff. Obviously, for the sake of the interests of the case, these characters were obliged to interact closely with each other. Meanwhile, Trubetskoy testified at the investigation that he had seen Yakubovich once in his life and would have preferred never to see him again.
An even more interesting story happened with Bulatov. At about 10 am on December 14, according to the testimony of the colonel himself, he came to Ryleev and saw Obolensky for the first time: "He was terribly delighted at my arrival, and we, seeing each other for the first time, greeted each other and shook hands."
So, the uprising has already begun, and the chief of staff sees the “deputy dictator” for the first time, and at the same time Obolensky is “terribly happy”. Just what? After all, Bulatov should get the Life Guards out of the barracks, and not travel around the city with visits! The chief of staff does not seem to know anything about such an assignment. Moreover, the "deputy dictator" declares to his comrades-in-arms that he will not "dirty himself" if the insurgents do not collect enough units!
That is, instead of bringing in troops, the colonel demands this from Ryleev and Co. We add that Bulatov has no need to play around and cast a shadow over the fence: he himself confessed to the emperor, insisted on his arrest, and later committed suicide in the Peter and Paul Fortress.
So what actually preceded the December 14 uprising and what predetermined its bizarre course and tragic ending? About this - in the second part of the story.
