Go to the square at the appointed hour
On November 10, 1825, Prince Sergei Petrovich Trubetskoy came to St. Petersburg on vacation from Kiev, where he had served for almost a year. In the capital, he was caught by the news of the death of Alexander I and the resulting excitement among the liberal opposition.
The presence at the height of the political crisis in St. Petersburg of an old and authoritative participant in the Decembrist associations, such as Trubetskoy, who was also an experienced and well-known military leader among the officers, could be considered a real gift for opponents of the autocracy. Naturally, Trubetskoy immediately becomes one of the key figures among the conspirators and is responsible for planning a military coup.
Obviously, the head of the Northern Society, Kondraty Ryleev, initially welcomed and supported the prince in every possible way. But then his tactical schemes began to constrain the ardent poetic imagination of the leader of the "northerners". And the closer to the beginning of the speech, the more obviously Ryleev acts bypassing Trubetskoy and his proposals, nominating his protégés Yakubovich and Bulatov to the first roles and giving them instructions directly.
On the afternoon of the 13th, Ryleev suggested Bulatov to be in the barracks of the grenadier at seven o'clock. Later, he informed the colonel that the gathering was scheduled for eight in the morning on December 14. It is characteristic that during the aforementioned conversation on the morning of December 14 at Ryleyev's apartment, Ivan Pushchin asked the colonel: "But how many [troops] do you need?" And he received the answer: "As much as Ryleev promised."
The head of the Northern Society and the colonel clearly have an individual agreement, the content of which remains unclear to others. The whole role of Bulatov, which he failed so brilliantly, was written from beginning to end by Kondraty Ivanovich and remained unknown to Trubetskoy and even Obolensky. And Trubetskoy is silent about the assignments of Yakubovich and Bulatov, not out of caution, but for the simple reason that he almost never crossed paths with these individuals and did not know what instructions they received.
Meanwhile, Ryleev gives orders not only to his confidants, but also to the “company chiefs”. So, on December 12, at a meeting with Obolensky - in the absence of Trubetskoy - Ryleev "decisively announced" to his accomplices that "they have gathered now more and more to honestly commit themselves to be on the square on the day of the oath with the number of troops that everyone can bring in Otherwise, be on the square yourself. " That is, the whole tactical scheme boils down to gathering at the Senate - when it will work out and with whom will it work out.
Lieutenant of the Finland Regiment Andrei Rosen reported in his memoirs:
“On December 12, in the evening, I was invited to a meeting with Ryleev … there I found the main participants on December 14. It was decided on the day appointed for the new oath to gather on Senate Square, to lead as many troops there as possible under the pretext of maintaining the rights of Constantine, to entrust the command over the army to Prince Trubetskoy …"
Obolensky, obviously, took all these instructions as a kind of preliminary version and on the afternoon of the 13th directly asked Ryleev "what plan", to which he replied that Trubetskoy would inform the plan (when, on the square?) who comes first. So, there are several hours left before the putsch, and the chief of staff does not know the order of actions, and Ryleev, referring to Trubetskoy for the sake of appearance, nevertheless repeats that the meaning of their speech is to gather in the square.
But then the evening comes. Nikolai Bestuzhev reports in his memoirs:
“At 10 o'clock, Ryleev arrived with Pushchin and announced to us what was supposed to be done at the meeting that tomorrow, when taking the oath, we should raise the troops, for which there is hope, and, no matter how small the forces with which they will enter the square, go with them immediately to the palace."
How to understand this: it does not matter how much forces are gathered, but to the palace - "immediately" …
And here is what Peter Kakhovsky reports on the evening of December 13:
“Ryleev said, when I asked him about the order, that we must first see our forces and that Trubetskoy would dispose of everything on Petrovskaya Square. It was supposed to occupy the Senate, the fortress, but it was not appointed to whom exactly”.
Until the start of the coup, nothing remains, and from the specifics again only the collection from the Senate, everything else is in a fog. And nothing more about going to the palace.
Midnight is approaching, but there is still no plan …
The situation is more than strange, isn't it? And it arose largely due to the isolation, more precisely, the self-isolation of Trubetskoy. According to the prince's testimony, upon his arrival from Kiev, he began to collect information about the state of mind in the regiments and the number of members of the society itself.
The results did not inspire optimism: "… the disposition of the mind does not give hope for the success of the execution, and the society consists of the most insignificant persons." It is not surprising that, for example, Kakhovsky never heard Trubetskoy say: "He, Prince Obolensky, Prince Odoevsky, Nikolai Bestuzhev, Pushchin always locked themselves with Ryleev."
The cautious prince considered it unnecessary to discuss the details of the future performance with a bunch of "insignificant persons", limiting his communication to a narrow circle of leaders. Commitment to conspiracy played a cruel joke with Trubetskoy. For most of the participants in the coup, the "dictator" remained an authoritative, but little-known figure, about whose intentions, as well as about disagreements with other leaders, they knew nothing.
This was used by Ryleev, who, on the contrary, was in close contact with all the characters of the future drama and could freely pass off his ideas as "Trubetskoy's plan." To summarize what has been said, let us try to identify the main differences in the approaches of the two coup leaders.
Trubetskoy
Ryleev
Chicks of Kondratyev's nest
In the latter version, the troops on the square were needed rather for a beautiful picture - a solemn parade to commemorate the victory of freedom, equality and brotherhood over tyranny. And Senate Square was chosen primarily not for practical, but for symbolic reasons: it was here that the Senate, under the jubilant cries of the audience, was to proclaim the abolition of the previous government and the onset of a new era in the life of Russia.
Ryleev was far from a stupid person, but his rich imagination clearly outpaced logic, and what he wanted easily replaced reality. Perhaps at some stage he decided: the more complex the idea, the more difficult it is to implement it. However, Kondraty Ivanovich simplified the coup plan to such an extent that in the end its outcome began to depend on one shot, which was to be fired by Pyotr Kakhovsky.
Ryleev, perhaps, was right in his own way in the sense that the murder of the Grand Duke solved all problems at once. Therefore, the Guards crew with Yakubovich and the Life Guards with Bulatov were dispatched to capture the palace and "neutralize" Nicholas. Obviously, the two units had to act independently, backing each other up, since their coordination was virtually impossible. And in case of their failure, Kakhovsky was waiting for the new emperor.
And here we come to such an important aspect of the preparation of the coup as the selection and placement of personnel. Here the organizational skills of Kondraty Ivanovich were revealed most vividly. All of his creatures (Kakhovsky, Yakubovich, Bulatov), despite the obvious differences, were similar in one thing: all these people, as it were defined by psychiatrists, were in a state of extreme emotional instability. Along with the instability of mood, it is characterized by a pronounced tendency to act impulsively, without considering the consequences, as well as a minimal ability to plan.
Kakhovsky is an embittered loser, without connections and relatives, expelled from the army for laziness and immoral behavior, then he was reinstated, rose to the rank of lieutenant, but retired due to illness, although, apparently, it was a sin to complain about his physical health.
As a result, the companions in the Northern Society themselves gave Kakhovsky the following characterization: “The Smolensk landowner, having lost and ruined in the game, came to Petersburg in the hope of marrying a rich bride; he did not succeed in doing this. Having agreed with Ryleev, he devoted himself to him and to society unconditionally. Ryleev and other comrades supported him in St. Petersburg at their own expense. “A person who is upset with something, lonely, gloomy, ready for doom; in a word, Kakhovsky”(this is how the Decembrist Vladimir Shteingel describes him).
Bulatov is a man broken by the death of his beloved wife, on whose grave he built a church, spending almost all of his money on it. And if the state of the colonel can be characterized as a breakdown, then the leitmotif of Yakubovich's behavior is anguish. His personal courage did not prevent him from remaining in the memory of his contemporaries as a poseur and fanfare.
Such natures, obviously, corresponded to the romantic mindset of Ryleev, but were completely unused for a responsible business. Nevertheless, it was this trio, in the presentation of Ryleev, should have played a decisive role in the putsch.
A very remarkable scene turned out to be witnessed on December 13 by several conspirators. Ryleev, embracing Kakhovsky, said: "Dear friend, you are a sire on this earth, I know your selflessness, you can be more useful than on the square - destroy the king."
"Engineer of Human Souls" found the right words. After them, the future regicide felt not like a paladin of freedom and a tyrannical fighter, but a technical performer, an orphan, whom his rich friends unambiguously reminded him of the need to work off the bread fed to him. It is not surprising that after such instruction, the “killer” was not eager to complete the task.
At about six o'clock in the morning on December 14, Kakhovsky came to Alexander Bestuzhev, who described this scene as follows: "Is Ryleev sending you to Palace Square?" - I said. He replied: "Yes, but I don't want something." "And don't go," I objected, "it's not necessary at all." - "But what will Ryleev say?" - "I'll take it upon myself; be with everyone on Petrovskaya Square."
Kakhovsky was still with Bestuzhev, when Yakubovich came and said that he had refused to take the palace, “foreseeing that it would not be possible without blood …” At this time, the senators were already gathering to take the oath, and Colonel Bulatov, instead of guards, prayed for the peace of his wife's soul and for the future of young daughters.
Dictator or zits-chairman?
Actually, at 6 o'clock in the morning, the coup as planned by Ryleev had already become impossible. Now the putschists could be helped either by a fluke or by the fatal mistake of their opponents. But fortune did not smile at the Decembrists, and Nikolai acted decisively and promptly.
The general collection from the Senate appointed by Ryleev, having become an end in itself, deprived the rebels of the initiative, it inexorably passed to the pro-government forces. At first, no one opposed the Moscow regiment, which was the first to enter the square. But this rather formidable force (800 bayonets) froze in anticipation. As a result, in the evening against 3,000 rebels there were 12,000 government troops, and even with artillery.
The actions on that day of the Life Guards under the command of Lieutenant Nikolai Panov, who were the last to join the rebels, are very indicative. Panova's company moved after a gunfight was heard in the city center. Obviously, the lieutenant decided that a decisive battle had begun, and, unlike fellow soldier Alexander Sutgof, who spoke earlier, he did not go directly to the Senate, but to the Winter Palace, believing that the main forces of the putschists had begun a battle for the palace.
Panov's soldiers even entered the courtyard of the Winter Palace, but, faced with the guards sappers loyal to Nicholas, they turned to the Senate. Panov cannot be denied decisiveness, his company twice entered the battle, but he was also dominated by the installation to join with the rest of the forces. Not finding them at the Winter Palace, the lieutenant acted like everyone else, finding himself trapped in the Senate Square.
But back to the beginning of the day on December 14th. At 7 o'clock in the morning, Trubetskoy came to Ryleev, however, as the prince told at the investigation, "I was not in that spirit to ask questions, Ryleev did not want to talk either." At 10 in the morning, Ryleev and Pushchin arrived at Trubetskoy on the English Embankment, but the conversation did not work out again, the owner of the house only gave the guests to read the Manifesto on Nikolai's accession to the throne.
An amazing picture: the performance has begun, and its leaders have nothing to say to each other! Of course, the prince is dark: the conversations were and certainly were of a stormy nature. But Trubetskoy understood that as soon as he hinted at the disagreements between him and Ryleev, especially the conflict, he would give the investigators a thread, pulling on which they would pull out all the ins and outs.
On the morning of the 14th Trubetskoy had something to be furious with: he was made a fool, as they say, in full. His plan was tampered with by the Senate collection instructions. The colonel was clearly aware not only that the coup was already doomed to failure, but also that he, as a "dictator", might be the main culprit for the defeat for his supporters and (which is absolutely certain) would appear as the main accused for his opponents.
The materials of the investigation confirm these guesses of the prince. During interrogations, Ryleev, with a blue eye, argued that everything depended on Trubetskoy, and he himself could not give any instructions.
Here is his testimony:
“Trubetskoy was already our sovereign boss; he either himself, or through me, or through Obolensky made orders. Colonel Bulatov and Captain Yakubovich were supposed to appear in the square to help him. before, and therefore a few days before the 14th, he asked me to introduce him to Yakubovich personally, which was done."
Colonel Bulatov, according to Ryleev, also wanted to get acquainted with the dictator before making the final decisions, "with whom," says Ryleev, "I brought him together." He also assured that on the evening of December 12, Trubetskoy, Bulatov, Yakubovich "were discussing a plan of action."
Ryleev, who personally gave the most important orders, not only hides behind Trubetskoy's back, but also tries in every possible way to "tie" Yakubovich and Bulatov to him. Just as vilely, the head of the Northern Society tried to hide his participation in regicide plans, shifting the initiative to the "sire" of Kakhovsky.
It is clear that if Trubetskoy appeared on the square, he would hang out on him at the gallows along with other most dangerous villains. Fully aware of this prospect, if not at the first, then at the second meeting on the morning of the 14th, Trubetskoy firmly decided not to go to any square.
Ivan Pushchin's farewell remark addressed to the colonel ("… but, if anything happens, you will come to us"), even in a dry retelling by Trubetskoy, sounds ingratiating. The embarrassed Pushchin clearly understood what was happening in the prince's soul. However, as Trubetskoy admitted during the investigation, he did not have the courage to “just say no”. He also did not have the heart to retire away from the epicenter of events, from participation in which he refused.
The role of the prince, although outwardly and looked contradictory and inconsistent, did not evoke condemnation of his associates. The son of the Decembrist Ivan Yakushkin wrote the following about Trubetskoy:
“His behavior on December 14, which is not entirely clear to us, did not cause any accusations against Trubetskoy among his comrades. Among the Decembrists and after December 14, Trubetskoy retained common love and respect; the failure of the uprising depended not on the erroneousness of Trubetskoy's actions on that day."
Nevertheless, the majority of pre-revolutionary, Soviet, and even modern historians judge the "dictator" much more strictly. And there are obvious reasons for that. A rare scoundrel, narrow-minded, but ambitious leader of the "northerners" Kondraty Ivanovich Ryleev, having fallen into the category of sacred victims of autocracy and martyrs in the name of freedom, found himself outside the zone of criticism or even an unbiased assessment of his activities in organizing the uprising.
Trubetskoy, on the contrary, turned out to be a very convenient candidate for the role of the culprit of the defeat of the putschists, the antihero and antagonist of the fiery revolutionary Ryleev.
We hope that our notes will help to more objectively assess the relationship between the main leaders of the rebellion on December 14, 1825 and their influence on the course of the uprising.
