"On Ostankino!"
When it seemed that one could not count on a successful outcome, the day came on October 3. I don’t remember how I learned that the president’s opponents, who had gathered on Smolenskaya Square, two kilometers from the White House, dispersed the internal troops who had blocked their way to the parliament. It seemed incredible. I jumped out of the house and was stunned: the police and the troops seemed to vanish into thin air at the wave of a magic wand.
Thousands of jubilant crowds freely flocked down the streets to the building of the Supreme Soviet. The breakthrough of the blockade, which only yesterday seemed inconceivable, has become a reality. I regretted that I had forgotten the camera, but did not want to return. Perhaps it saved my life: in the next few hours, almost everyone who filmed what was happening on camera: Russians and foreigners, cameramen and photographers, professional journalists and amateurs, were killed or seriously injured.
A group of armed people, led by General Albert Makashov, rushed to the mayor's office, located in the "book" of the former CMEA building. Shots rang out. People began to hide behind parked cars. However, the skirmish was short-lived. Satisfied Makashov came out of the mayor's office, who solemnly announced that "from now on there will be no mayors, no peers, no crap on our land."
And on the square in front of the White House, a rally of many thousands was already raging. The speakers congratulated the audience on the victory. Everyone around, like crazy, shouted one phrase: "On Ostankino!" The television lies so fed up with the supporters of the parliament that it seems that at these moments no one doubted the need to immediately seize the television center and go on the air with a report on the events at the "White House".
A group began to form for a raid on Ostankino. I found myself next to the buses for the transport of soldiers of the internal troops, abandoned near the building of the Supreme Council, and without much hesitation got into one of them. Of the “crew” of our bus, the author of these lines, who was not yet thirty at the time, turned out to be the “oldest”: the rest of the passengers were 22-25 years old. There was no one in camouflage, ordinary young students of student appearance. I absolutely remember that there were no weapons on our bus. In those minutes it seemed completely natural: after the blockade was broken, it seemed that all other goals would be achieved in the same wonderful bloodless way.
In our convoy there were about a dozen pieces of equipment - buses and covered military trucks. Having left on Novoarbatsky Prospekt, we found ourselves in the middle of the human sea enveloped in delight, which accompanied us several kilometers from the White House along the Garden Ring to Mayakovsky Square. (Then the crowd was less frequent, and towards Samoteka it completely dispersed.) I think that during these hours at least two hundred thousand citizens went to the Moscow central highways free of transport. Needless to say, the appearance of a column moving to Ostankino caused a surge of jubilation. One got the impression that we were not driving along the asphalt of Moscow streets, but floating along the waves of general celebration. Is the shame of Yeltsin's rule over, disappeared like an obsession, like a bad dream ?!
Euphoria played a cruel joke on the supporters of the Supreme Council. As many interlocutors later admitted to me, on October 3 they went home in full confidence that the job was done. As a result, no more than 200 people arrived at Ostankino, and about 20 of them were armed. Then the number of "storming" people increased: it seems that "our" buses managed to make another trip to the White House and back to Ostankino; someone arrived on their own, someone on public transport - but they were all unarmed people, like me, doomed to the role of extras.
Meanwhile, the leaders of the "storm" demanded to provide them with TV air. They were promised something, meaningless negotiations began, precious minutes were lost, and with them the chances of success slipped away. Finally, we moved from words to deeds. However, this business was both conceived and executed very badly. The militants from among the supporters of the Supreme Soviet decided to "storm" the studio complex ASK-3. This "glass", built for the Olympics-80, to penetrate into which was not difficult, given the huge perimeter of the building, clearly not adapted to repel attacks.
However, a disastrous decision was made to attack head-on - through the central entrance. Meanwhile, the main hall of ASK-3 consists of two tiers, with the upper one hanging over the basement in a semicircle; it is bordered by a concrete parapet trimmed with marble tiles. (In any case, this was the case in those days.) An ideal position for defense - anyone who penetrates through the main entrance will immediately fall under the crossfire, while the defenders are practically invulnerable. Makashov might not have known this, but the former television reporter Anpilov knew very well.
Makashov decided to repeat the trick that worked in the former CMEA building: they tried to ram the doors of the main entrance of the studio complex with a truck, but it got stuck under the visor covering the entrance. Even theoretically, the chances of success were nil. I still have the feeling that if the supporters of the Supreme Soviet were headed not by the armchair strategist and tribune Zlatoust Makashov, but by the airborne battalion commander, the situation could have developed according to a different scenario. Even taking into account all the currently known circumstances.
At that moment, an explosion was heard inside the building. Submachine gun fire followed from the studio complex, mowing down the people outside. Later it will become known that as a result of that explosion, a special forces soldier Sitnikov died. Pro-presidential forces immediately blamed parliamentary supporters for his death, who allegedly used a grenade launcher. However, the State Duma commission, investigating the events of October 1993, came to the conclusion that Sitnikov was lying behind a concrete parapet at the time of the explosion, and getting into him when fired from the side of the attackers was excluded. Nevertheless, the mysterious explosion was a pretext to open fire on the supporters of the Supreme Council.
It got dark. Automatic bursts of fire were heard more and more often. The first civilian casualties appeared. And then again I bumped into Anpilov, who muttered something encouraging like: “Yes, they are shooting … What did you want? To be welcomed here with flowers? " It became clear that the campaign to Ostankino ended in complete failure, and the inevitable fall would be followed by the "White House".
… I headed towards the nearest metro station VDNKh. The passengers were dumbfounded to stare at the boys entering the carriage with shields and rubber truncheons - they picked up this ammunition abandoned by the special forces from the White House and were in no hurry to part with the "trophies". The bewilderment of the metro passengers was easy to explain. On this Sunday evening, people were returning from the countryside from their garden plots, collecting and exporting crops, not even suspecting that unarmed fellow citizens were being shot on the streets of Moscow at that time. Until now, I have not decided for myself what it is: the shameful indifference of the people - to dig up potatoes at a time when the fate of the country is being decided, or, on the contrary, its greatest wisdom. Or this episode is not a reason for thinking about such lofty matters …
Anatomy of a provocation
Now, after the passage of years, we can confidently judge by what scenario the events in Moscow developed during these autumn days of 1993. By the end of September it became obvious to Yeltsin's entourage that it would not be possible to solve the "problem" of the Supreme Soviet without a lot of blood. But to give the go-ahead for the power option for the time being did not have the spirit. Moreover, there was no certainty how the security forces would behave after receiving such an order. It is difficult to say for whom the time worked in that situation: on the one hand, the noose around the parliament's neck was tightening, on the other hand, the moral authority of the Supreme Soviet and public sympathy for its supporters grew every day. The information blockade could not be airtight: the further, the more Russians learned the truth about the events in Moscow.
This precarious balance was unwittingly upset by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexy II. With the best of intentions, the patriarch offered his mediation services for the negotiations, which took place on October 1. It was impossible to refuse Alexy's offer, but agreeing to negotiations implied a willingness to compromise. They, in fact, were achieved: in the "White House" they restored communications, resumed the supply of electricity. Also, the parties signed a protocol on the gradual "removal of the severity of the confrontation."
However, for Yeltsin's entourage, such a scenario was unacceptable: they started a "phased constitutional reform" for the sake of completely eliminating parliament, and not for the sake of looking for common ground. Yeltsin had to act, and act immediately. Meanwhile, after the intervention of the patriarch, the seizure of the White House by force became impossible: the "reputational costs" turned out to be too great. This means that the blame for the violation of the truce was to fall on the Supreme Soviet.
The following scenario was chosen. The leader of the Labor Russia movement, Viktor Anpilov, who in this episode (it seems quite deliberately) played the role of a provocateur, convened another rally of parliamentary supporters. Having waited until the number of the demonstrating crowd reached an impressive size, Anpilov suddenly urged the audience to go for a breakthrough. As Anpilov himself said, the old women who responded to his cry began to throw into the cordon what came to hand, after which the soldiers rushed scatteringly, dropping shields and clubs. This stampede and the sudden disappearance of several thousand soldiers and militia stationed around the parliament were undoubtedly part of a well-thought-out plan.
Such a rapid change in the situation disorientated the leaders of the opposition: they simply had no idea what to do with this freedom that had suddenly collapsed on them. Others have already thought for them. Alexander Rutskoi argued that when he called to go to Ostankino, he only repeated what was said around; I guess his words can be trusted. A couple of loud voices were enough for this cry, finding a response in the hearts of those gathered at the "White House", and responded a thousandfold. And here buses and trucks with carefully left ignition keys came in handy.
Now let's see what the “assault on Ostankino” meant in tactical terms. In the area of Presnya there are about two hundred thousand supporters of the Supreme Council. The complex of buildings of the Ministry of Defense is located two and a half kilometers from the White House, three kilometers away is the presidential residence in the Kremlin, and four and a half kilometers away is the building of the Russian government. An hour at most, and a crowd of two hundred thousand, moving on foot, will reach the farthest point of this route, and even more people will certainly join it along the way.
Coping with this avalanche, even unarmed, is extremely difficult. Instead, attention turns to distant Ostankino, where 20 armed rebels reach through half the city, some of whom have no idea how to handle weapons. In parallel with the column from the "White House" to Ostankino, the special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs "Vityaz" moved forward. This is a hundred armed professionals. In total, 1200 representatives of various security forces guarded the TV center that day.
Now Yeltsin's hands were untied. On the morning of October 4, he spoke on the radio (the main TV channels stopped broadcasting the night before) with a statement that parliamentary supporters "raised their hand against the elderly and children." It was an obvious lie. That evening, at Ostankino, several dozen supporters of the Supreme Soviet were killed and wounded. On the opposite side, in addition to the aforementioned special forces soldier Sitnikov, an employee of the television center Krasilnikov died. Meanwhile, according to the results of the examination and the testimony of witnesses, the shot that killed Krasilnikov was fired from inside the building, which, let me remind you, was guarded by servicemen of the internal troops and employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
It is clear that the presidential side did not need the truth, but an excuse to start a military operation. But all the same, Yeltsin's morning statement sounded somehow very strange - not as an improvisation, but as part of a preparation, which for some reason was not implemented, but went into action under different circumstances. What the blank was, it became clear a little later, when snipers appeared in Moscow, the victims of which were bystanders. The author became a witness of their "work" on Novy Arbat in the afternoon of October 4. I had to move in dashes along the lanes so as not to fall under their fire.
And here one more strange statement must be remembered. On the evening of October 3, Yegor Gaidar called on supporters of "democracy" to come to the mayor's residence on Tverskaya, 13, which allegedly needs protection from the impending attack by the "Khasbulatovites". The statement is completely absurd: no one even thought about the headquarters of Yuri Luzhkov even during the day, all the more they did not remember this "object" when the events at Ostankino were in full swing. But even if there were at least some real underpinnings under this threat, why was it necessary to cover the mayor's office with a human shield of Muscovites, when by that time the security forces had already taken control of the situation in the center of Moscow?
What is behind Gaidar's appeal: confusion, fear, inadequate assessment of the situation? I believe that a sober calculation. The Yeltsinists were gathered outside the city administration building not for the sake of mythical protection, but as suitable targets, cannon fodder. It was in the evening of the 3rd that the snipers were supposed to work on Tverskaya, and then in the morning Yeltsin received grounds to accuse the rebels of raising their hand against the "old people and children."
Official propaganda indicated that snipers (of whom, of course, no one was arrested) had arrived from Transnistria to protect the Supreme Soviet. But in the afternoon of October 4, sniper fire on Muscovites could in no way help the supporters of the parliament - neither militarily, nor informationally, or in any other way. But to damage - very much. And the Transnistrian floodplains are not the best place to gain experience for conducting military operations in a metropolis.
Meanwhile, Tverskaya (like Novy Arbat) belongs to special routes, where each adjacent house, its entrances, attics, roofs, are well known to specialists from the competent authorities. The media more than once reported that at the end of September, the head of the Yeltsin guard, General Korzhakov, met a mysterious sports delegation from Israel at the airport. Perhaps these "athletes" and took up combat positions on the roofs of buildings on Tverskaya on the evening of October 3. But something didn't work out.
I must say that the Yeltsinists did not have much that day. And this was inevitable. The general plan of the provocation was clear, but there was little time for preparation, coordination and coordination of actions. In addition, the operation involved the services of various departments, whose leaders played their games and tried, taking advantage of the situation, to bargain for personal additional bonuses. In such an environment, the overlays were predictable. And ordinary policemen and servicemen had to pay for them.
Quite a lot has been said about the shootings between pro-government forces in the Ostankino area and their victims. I'll tell you about an episode unknown to a wide audience.
A few days after the October tragedy, I had the opportunity to talk with the firemen of the television center, who were on duty that fateful night. According to them (in the sincerity of which there is hardly any reason to doubt), they saw pools of blood in the underground passage between ASK-3 and the main building of Ostankino. Since both complexes were occupied by troops loyal to Yeltsin, obviously, this was another result of a crazy exchange of fire between their own.
The denouement of the tragedy was approaching. Yeltsin declared a state of emergency in Moscow. On the morning of October 4, tanks appeared on the bridge across the Moskva River in front of the White House and began shelling the main facade of the building. Operation leaders claimed that the firing was carried out with blank charges. However, an examination of the White House premises after the attack showed that, in addition to the usual blanks, they fired cumulative charges, which in some offices burned everything out along with the people who were there.
The killings continued even after the resistance of the defenders was broken. According to the written testimony of a former employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the security forces who broke into the "White House" staged a reprisal against the defenders of the parliament: they cut, finished off the wounded, and raped women. Many were shot or beaten to death after they left the parliament building.
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According to the conclusions of the commission of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, in Moscow during the events of September 21 - October 5, 1993, about 200 people were killed or died from their wounds, and nearly 1000 people were injured or other bodily injuries of varying severity. According to unofficial data, the death toll is at least 1,500.
Instead of an epilogue
Opponents of the presidential course were defeated. However, the bloody fall of 1993 remained the dominant factor in Russia's political life throughout Yeltsin's rule. For the opposition, it became a point of moral support, for the authorities - a shameful stigma that could not be washed away. The pro-presidential forces did not feel themselves victors for long: in December of the same 1993, they suffered a crushing fiasco in the elections to a new legislative body - the State Duma.
In 1996, at the presidential elections, at the cost of unprecedented information pressure and large-scale rigging, Yeltsin was re-elected to the presidency. At this time, he was already a screen covering the domination of oligarchic groups. However, in the midst of a severe crisis caused by the default on government bonds and the collapse of the national currency, Yeltsin was forced to appoint Yevgeny Primakov to the post of Prime Minister. The new prime minister's program on key points coincided with the demands of the defenders of the "White House": an independent foreign policy, rejection of liberal experiments in the economy, measures to develop the production sector and the agrarian complex, social support of the population.
Irritated by the rapid rise in popularity of the prime minister, Yeltsin dismissed Primakov six months later. At the same time, it became obvious that a return to the former, completely discredited liberal course was impossible, and other people had to carry out the new policy. On the eve of the new, 1999, Yeltsin announced his resignation. He explained that he was leaving "not for health reasons, but for the totality of all problems," and asked for forgiveness from the citizens of Russia. And although he did not mention a word of October 1993, everyone understood that it was primarily about the shooting of the "White House". Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was appointed acting president.
Does this mean that events like the tragedy of "Black October" 1993 have sunk into oblivion? Or are the above notes related to the genre of memories of the future?
