Tank unit on the march, September 1935. To increase operational mobility from February of this year in mechanized corps, high-speed BT, which replaced the T-26, became the main vehicle. Each mechanized corps in the state of 1935 consisted of 348 BT.
On June 9, 1940, the NKO of the USSR S. K. Timoshenko approved the plan for the formation of mechanized corps and submitted his proposals to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. On July 6, 1940, the USSR Council of People's Commissars issued a decree No. 1193-464ss, which stated:
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decides:
1. To approve the organization of a mechanized corps consisting of two tank divisions, a motorized division, a motorcycle regiment, one air squadron, a road battalion and a corps communications battalion. To give the mechanized corps one air brigade, consisting of 2 short-range and one fighter air regiments.
2. To approve the organization of a mechanized corps armored division and a separate armored division consisting of:
a) 2 tank regiments, one battalion of heavy tanks (in each), 2 battalions of medium tanks and a battalion of flamethrower tanks in each regiment;
b) one motorized regiment consisting of 3 rifle battalions and one 6-gun battery of regimental artillery;
c) one artillery regiment consisting of 2 divisions: one division of 122-mm howitzers and one division of 152-mm howitzers;
d) anti-aircraft battalion, reconnaissance battalion, bridge battalion and rear service units …
3. To have a motorized division in the composition and organization approved by the Decree of the Defense Committee of May 22, 1940 No. 215ss.
4. To approve the number of staff:
a) control of a mechanized corps with a motorcycle regiment for peacetime - 2662 people, and for wartime - 2862 people;
b) a tank division for peacetime - 10,943 people, and for wartime - 11,343 people:
c) a motorized division for peacetime - 11,000 people, for wartime - 12,000 people. 5. In total, the Red Army has 8 mechanized corps and 2 separate tank divisions, a total of 8 mechanized corps departments with a motorcycle regiment and corps units, 18 tank divisions and 8 motorized divisions …"
The existing tank brigades, mainly in the border military districts, were directed to the formation of tank divisions. Motorized divisions were created on the basis of rifle divisions. Personnel and command personnel came from disbanded cavalry divisions and corps.
Each mechanized corps, when fully equipped, had tremendous striking power. According to the staff in 1941, it was supposed to have 36,000 people, 1031 tanks (120 heavy, 420 medium, 316 BT, 17 light and 152 chemical), 358 guns and mortars, 268 BA-10 armored vehicles, 116 BA-20.
BT-5 LenVO during winter driving lessons. On the left is a command tank with a radio station. Winter 1936
Column T-26 at a halt. Ahead are tanks of the 1933 model, equipped with a 71-TK-1 radio station. With the increase in their number in the troops, such tanks began to be used not only as commanders, but also as ordinary line tanks. Leningrad Military District, April 1936
The main form of employing the mechanized corps in a defensive operation was considered to be the infliction of powerful counterattacks in order to destroy the enemy groupings that had broken through. The palpable "dizziness with success" that was read in these plans, subordinated to the strategy of a preemptive strike, turned into a tragedy a few months later. Most of the mechanized corps were part of the covering armies, being their main striking force. The rest were subordinate to the district, constituting a reserve of front commanders in case of war. This reorganization, designed to provide the Red Army with an unprecedentedly powerful strike force, ultimately turned out to be unsuccessful both in its untimely (on the eve of war) and in the impossibility of quickly completing it with the available resources. The very idea turned into a protracted period of reorganization, rotation of people and equipment, which led to a decrease in the combat readiness of already established units and formations. The best on the brink of war turned out to be the enemy of the good.
Inspection and refueling before entering the parade. In service - BT-5 with welded (in the foreground) and riveted, more angular, towers. May 1934
BT-5 with removed gun and without fenders is towing skiers. Winter, 1936
The pace of deployment of mechanized corps was very high, which caused a lot of problems. Due to the lack of new tanks, they had to be taken from tank battalions of rifle divisions and tank regiments of cavalry divisions, depriving these formations of their main strike force. As G. K. Zhukov admitted in his memoirs, “we did not calculate the objective capabilities of our tank industry. To fully equip the new mechanized corps, 16.6 thousand tanks of only new types were required, and only about 32 thousand tanks. Under almost any conditions, there was nowhere to get it, there was a lack of technical and command personnel. Nine corps seemed small to the command of the Red Army, although if they were staffed, they would have more than twice surpassed the German tank forces in the number of vehicles and could decide the outcome of any battle. But instead of equipping the existing mechanized corps and their combat deployment in February 1941, the General Staff developed an even broader plan for the formation of armored and mechanized troops, which provided for the creation of another 21 corps.
BT-7 in the exercise. On the fenders are wooden sleepers, often used for self-pulling and laying on soft ground. On the turret plate lies a "candle" - a spare suspension spring. 1936 g.
T-26 at the triumphal column before the start of the May Day parade of 1934 in Leningrad.
Stalin did not immediately support this plan, approving it only in March 1941. From April 1941, the massive deployment of new mechanized corps began, for which there were no tanks, no command personnel, or trained tankers. Personnel was hastily retrained from other combat arms, which did not have the best effect on the level of newly minted crews, who received scanty practice in operating tanks. For this process, the remaining tank brigades and some cavalry divisions were involved (for example, the 27th MK SAVO was created on the basis of the 19th cd). But if yesterday's artillerymen, signalmen and drivers were nevertheless suitable for the role of gunners and driver-mechanics, then there was simply no one to appoint to leading positions (that's when the consequences of the "purges" of previous years affected). Commanding skills, experience and responsibility were forged by many years of practice, and on the eve of the war, even the leading departments, including operational and reconnaissance departments, remained understaffed in many headquarters (this was the case in the 15th, 16th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps).
Command personnel were trained by the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization (WAMM) in Moscow and one-year courses at it. To train the command and technical personnel of the middle level, the network of ABTV educational institutions was expanded. By 1941, it included the Frunze Oryol, 1st Kharkov, 1st and 2nd Saratov, 1st Ulyanovsk tank, Kiev tank-technical, Pushkin auto-technical, Gorky auto-motorcycle, Poltava tractor school. In February-March 1941, Kazan, Syzranskoye, Chkalovskoye, 2nd Ulyanovsk, 3rd Saratov tank, Ordzhenikidzegradskoye auto-motorcycle, Kamyshinskoye tractor schools were deployed.
Small amphibious tank T-37, put into service on August 11, 1933 as a tank for reconnaissance units. In the photo - an early release T-37A without fenders.
T-37A on the exercises of the 5th mechanized corps them. Kalinovsky. Moscow Military District, May 1936
But, despite all efforts, the problem of command and technical personnel was very acute. Here are the data on some formations for June 1941: in the 35th TD of the 9th MK KOVO, instead of 8 tank battalion commanders, there were 3 (manning 37%), company commanders - 13 instead of 24 (54, 2%), platoon commanders - 6 instead of 74 (8%). In the 215th MD, the 22nd MK KOVO lacked 5 battalion commanders, 13 company commanders, staffing with junior command personnel - 31%, technical - 27%. The 11th mechanized corps of the Western Military District was provided with command personnel by 36%. In 1940-1941. Stalin even decided to release some of the repressed commanders from the camps and send them to the mechanized corps. So, K. K. Rokossovsky from a prisoner became the commander of the 9th mechanized corps in KOVO.
Due to the rapid pace of deployment of mechanized corps, it was not possible to organize combat coordination of units and subunits. In December 1940, speaking at a meeting of the highest command personnel of the Red Army, the head of the ABTU YN Fedorenko noted: “This year the corps and divisions worked out the issues of entering the breakthrough and offensive, but this is just an introduction, no combat interaction and solidarity in these matters. not yet . The preparation of a tank company in a defensive and offensive battle was supposed to be completed only by May-June 1941, and the coordination of the regiment, division and corps was planned at a later date.
By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, 29 mechanized corps were formed, with varying degrees of staffing.
May Day parade on Red Square. 1936 g.
Table No. 1. Mechanized corps of the Red Army
Most mechanized corps did not have the required amount of weapons and military equipment. The staffing level by mid-June 1941 was 39% for cars, 44% for tractors, 29% for repair facilities, and 17% for motorcycles.
The following table tells about the quantitative composition of the tank park of mechanized corps:
In other sources, there are different numbers. So, according to Vladimirsky, in the 9th MK KOVO there were 300 tanks, in the 19th MK - 450, in the 22nd MK - 707. As you can see, the difference is quite large.
Table No. 2. The quantitative composition of the tank fleet of mechanized corps by the middle of June 1941
Celebrating the anniversary of the October Revolution on November 7, 1940 in Leningrad …
The largest number of tanks was in the KOVO mechanized corps, which fully corresponded to Stalin's point of view that in the event of war, the Germans would strike the main blow in Ukraine. Therefore, the southwestern direction was considered the main one. The 4th and 8th mechanized corps had about 600 KB and T-34s alone and more than 1,000 tanks of other brands.
A lot of trouble was caused by the diversity of the tank fleet of the corps. Many cars were discontinued, and spare parts were no longer produced for them.
Due to the fact that the manning of the mechanized corps was delayed, the General Staff on May 16, 1941 sent a directive to the troops, according to which, in order to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the troops, 50 tank regiments of the mechanized corps, before they received tanks, were armed with 76- and 45-mm cannons and DT machine guns for their use, if necessary, as anti-tank regiments and divisions. The regiment relied on 18 45-mm cannons, 24 76-mm cannons, 24 machine guns. But it was not possible to implement the General Staff's directive before the start of the war, and the 17th and 20th mechanized corps of the ZAPOVO, whose tank regiments were supposed to receive anti-tank artillery, were generally used in battles as rifle units.
… and in Moscow: STZ-5 artillery tractors with M-ZO howitzers are moving along Red Square.
The crew of the BT-5 of the participants in the "Stakhanovist tankers" competition of the 7th mechanized corps of the Leningrad Military District is cleaning the cannon after firing. December 1935
The deployment of mechanized corps on the eve of the war was beneficial for conducting offensive operations. On the Bialystok ledge were the 6th, 11th and 13th mechanized corps, on the Lvov ledge - the 4th, 8th and 15th MK, which made it possible in the event of a conflict to strike at the flanks of the Lublin group of the Germans. The 3rd and 12th MK were intended for actions against the Tilsit group. The 2nd and 18th MK posed a threat to the oil fields in Romania. From the north, the 16th mechanized corps of the 12th army and the mechanized corps of district subordination KOVO hung over Romania. However, the German attack changed the situation - this arrangement of the Soviet troops became a trap for themselves.
Table No. 3. The ratio of the state and actually available number of combat vehicles, artillery in mechanized corps on June 13-19, 1941
So, 18 MK, located on the territory of the annexed Bessarabia, was literally squeezed into a "corner" between the sea coast and the elongated Dniester estuary. With the exit of the Romanians and Germans to the Dniester, 18 microns would be completely cut off from their own. There were no crossings across the estuary, which reached 30 km in width, even floating T-37 and T-38 (there were more than 130 in the mechanized corps) did not dare to let through it, and the corps had to retreat almost towards the approaching enemy. After a 100 km march along the sands along the estuary, the corps continued to retreat, accepting the first battle only a month after the start of the war (and in this sector of the front in June, the command conducted successful counteroffensive operations).
BA-I and FAI armored cars after exercises. The Kommunar artillery tractors are visible in the background.
Medium armored vehicles BA-10 on Khreshchatyk in Kiev on May 1, 1939
