12 failures of Napoleon Bonaparte. In French there is such an expression "C'est la bérézina": "This is Berezina." The expression is extremely harsh, almost on a par with traditional French abuse, denoting complete collapse, failure, catastrophe.
"Civilizers". On the way to Paris
It is believed that the French emperor was able to bring about 45 thousand fully combat-ready soldiers to the Berezina, who were joined by no less than 30 thousand "fellow travelers", including travel agents, waitresses, as well as soldiers from already completely destroyed regiments and divisions. Among them were several thousand wounded and even Russian prisoners. With such an encumbrance, the very fact of the French crossing the Berezina may well be considered an achievement.
Don't wait for a story about the "tragedy of the Great Army." There is no point in repeating everything that has already been described many times. However, one cannot but recall that, having crossed the Berezina, Napoleon will immediately go to France. Many in his entourage, and in the army, guessed about this. This is evidenced not only by the memoirs of contemporaries, but also by the few surviving documents.
Nevertheless, even at the last crossing, no one could have imagined that in this case tens of thousands of absolutely helpless people would be practically abandoned to their fate. Everyone stubbornly continued to believe in the "star of Bonaparte", apparently because after several weeks of terrible suffering and losses there was nothing more to believe in.
Maneuvering on the banks of the Berezina, Napoleon was not at all obliged to justify these expectations. The tough pragmatist did everything to ensure that the maximum possible number of battle-hardened soldiers and officers left Russia. That he would answer the Russians for the failed campaign of 1812, the emperor himself had no doubts.
As Vladlen Sirotkin convincingly proved in his studies, the war with Russia was generally thought of by Napoleon as a struggle of European civilization against semi-Asian barbarism. However, the Great Army, which had won many times in the fields of Europe, in fact no longer existed. Even as a backbone for the new army, the gathering of "civilizers" who, in the opinion of many researchers, could really play the role of liberators in Russia, was hardly suitable.
Here is how General Roge, one of the divisional commanders of the Young Guard, and not the most famous of the memoirists of the era, described their "tragic" retreat:
“In the evening of October 19, by order of Napoleon, I left Moscow as the commander of the guard of the treasury and property of the quartermaster’s headquarters evacuated from the city. I took trophies with me from the Kremlin: a cross from the bell tower of Ivan the Great; numerous decorations for the coronation of emperors; all the banners taken by the Russian troops from the Turks for a whole century; an image of the Mother of God adorned with precious stones, presented in 1740 by the Empress Anna Ioannovna to Moscow in memory of the victories against the Poles and the capture of Danzig in 1733.
The treasury contained silver in coins and silver objects melted down into ingots, found in huge quantities in burnt-down Moscow. Accompanying the treasury and trophies, I moved along the 15 leagues (66 km) of our army's convoys laden with useless baggage. The French, men and women who lived in Moscow before the war, were a heavy burden for our troops: few of them survived the retreat from Moscow."
This is called "unnecessary comments."
Russian "troika"
The main forces of the Russian army after a fierce battle near Krasnoye, where the guards snapped for the last time, lagged behind Napoleon. At some point, when the French were already busy building bridges, Kutuzov was in four passages from the Berezina. The Russian commander-in-chief could not have known that Napoleon, long before the last crossing, had ordered to get rid of practically the entire pontoon park.
The calculation was made on the fact that this time "General Frost" will be on the side of the French - the rivers will rise and it will not be difficult to leave Kutuzov. Moreover, at first Napoleon seriously hoped to recoup the armies of Wittgenstein and Chichagov, who managed to shake the sides of the flanking corps of the Great Army, beating both his three marshals and allied commanders.
By that time, the Prussians were only pretending to continue to fight on the side of the French emperor. The Austrian commander-in-chief Schwarzenberg, who would very soon receive the rank of generalissimo, actually let the Moldavian army go into the rear of Napoleon's main forces. As an excuse, he cited some unthinkable data about the forces and capabilities of the 3rd Russian army that opposed him. In fact, this army, as a separate unit, no longer existed at all.
It might seem that in the most favorable situation for the encirclement of the Napoleonic army, Kutuzov deliberately slowed down so that his great enemy did not rush to cross the last major river on the territory of Russia. With more competent actions of the Russian armies, which operated on the flanks, the traffic jam at the exit from the Berezinsky crossings, wherever they were guided by the French, could be plugged quite reliably.
The main reason that Napoleon eventually escaped, although leaving most of the convoy and transport carriers, was not even the contradictions between the three Russian commanders, but the fact that, in fact, they generally acted without paying attention to each other. Kutuzov tried to save everything that remained of his main forces, and openly exposed much more recent troops, which were advancing from the north and south, to Napoleon's blow.
He understood perfectly well that Napoleon, even having attached the corps of Oudinot, Victor and MacDonald, or General Rainier, would no longer be able to defeat at least one of the Russian formations. The field marshal was sure that if Napoleon was suddenly thirsty again, he would always have time to bring his main forces to the field of a big battle.
At the same time, we must not forget that the Russian commanders on the flanks - and Admiral P. V. Chichagov, and the newly-minted general from the cavalry P. H. Wittgenstein, not taking into account all the messages of the partisans and Cossacks, as well as Kutuzov's urgent dispatches, considered the remnants of the Great Army to be still a powerful force. And so powerful that the prospect of meeting her in battle separately, both equated to suicide.
In the end, it all ended with the fact that in the battle at Studianka they fought side by side against the French, but by that time Napoleon had already managed to go far, and leave with generally considerable forces. The Guard, as well as everything that remained of his best corps, also managed to get out of the almost inevitable encirclement.
And even with such detailed maps in hand, it is difficult to understand how Napoleon succeeded in an amazing feint that forced Admiral Chichagov with his entire army of almost 40,000 to make a useless march south, in the direction of Borisov. This is a separate topic for many more studies.
For two hundred years, historians have not agreed on a single version. The events of several days on the Berezina in detail and fairly objectively, which is recognized by both experts and readers, are considered in one of the publications on the "Military Review": "The Battle of the Berezina on November 14-17 (26-29), 1812".
It remains to express only a few considerations about the reasons for another crushing defeat of Napoleon, announced by another victory, as well as about those who played both positive and negative roles in this battle.
The reasons undoubtedly lie on the surface: the Napoleonic army towards the Berezina has already ceased to be that indestructible force with which Kutuzov preferred to enter into direct confrontation as rarely as possible. With personalities, everything is also not so difficult - Kutuzov did not even try to hide the fact that he did not crave the blood of Napoleon, and most importantly, he very much appreciates Russian blood.
Well, the young Alexander Eagles, 43-year-old Wittgenstein and 45-year-old Chichagov, simply turned out to be no match for their almost the same age, Napoleon, a truly brilliant commander who, even with an exhausted army, managed to outplay them.
What if Napoleon had been caught?
You can repeat as much as you like that history does not know the subjunctive mood, but this does not interfere with considering possible scenarios for the development of events under slightly different circumstances. So, the Russians had the opportunity to encircle the French main forces on the eastern bank of the Berezina and even take Bonaparte himself prisoner, and they were quite real.
And it may seem that neither foreign campaigns nor the capture of Paris would be needed. However, events, most likely, would not take the most favorable turn for Russia. But let's start with the fact that Napoleon did not just stock up on poison after the battle at Maloyaroslavets. On the Berezina, he could use it, leaving the remnants of the army and all his comrades-in-arms to the mercy of the victors.
And it seems that even peace with France, capable of overshadowing the shame of Tilsit, could be concluded almost immediately. But with whom? The then France would not have dared to think about any Bourbons. With the infant Roman King Napoleon II in the arms of Marie-Louise or with the traitor Talleyrand. Or maybe with Murat or with Viceroy Eugene de Beauharnais in the role of regent, who, in fact, could have been taken by the Napoleonic elite.
Paris after such a Berezina would hardly have been as quiet and serene as on the day of General Male's conspiracy. And in general, without Napoleon, a republican coup in France would certainly have been much more likely than the return of the royalists. It was the allies on their bayonets that could return the pot-bellied Louis XVIII to the Tuileries palace, and it was no coincidence that in 100 days he was so easily thrown out of there.
But France, for all its then hegemony on the old continent, did not oppose Russia alone. Prussia and Austria, two of the strongest European powers, remained Napoleon's allies. About the members of the Rhine Union, as well as about Saxony or the same Spain, no matter how many English soldiers there were, in this context it is enough just to mention.
And is it necessary to remind here how difficult it was to return the same Prussia and Austria, and then Saxony and Bavaria to the camp of Napoleon's enemies. And without him at the head of the empire and the army, there would have been a terrible rift, which would hardly have rallied everyone against the "other" France. But against Russia - what the devil is not joking. Forty years later, already under Nicholas I, this became a terrible reality of the Crimean War.
By the way, here even Sweden, with its heir to the throne, Bernadotte, could again turn to Petersburg by no means a face. And Turkey, no longer fearing the wrath of the French emperor and the partition he promised one day, would probably have gotten involved with the Russians in a new war.
All the mini-versions considered here are quite suitable for the case if Napoleon had not taken the poison, but simply surrendered to "brother Alexander". However, in this case, all political and military combinations would become even more complicated. So the Russian emperor, in fact, should also thank Kutuzov for the fact that he did not catch Bonaparte, but pushed him to Polish and German lands.
“All different Germans,” starting with the Prussians together with the Austrians, after that had no choice but to forget about the alliance with France and march into the new anti-Napoleonic coalition. With Russia at the head. And with the British Empire behind.
