When we talked about the Yak-1, Mig-3 and LaGG-3, many readers recalled this particular aircraft. Say, if I went to the I-180 series, the alignment would be completely different. And so - the undercover schemers ruined an excellent car and made it possible for all mediocre talent to supply our Air Force, do not understand what is under the guise of aircraft.
Let's think and reason. As befits people who are smart and objective.
Two mistakes of the designer Polikarpov
Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov is, of course, a star in our history.
You can say whatever you want, but while Yakovlev, Lavochkin, Gurevich, Ilyushin taught their first gliders and airplanes to fly, Polikarpov's fighters closed our sky.
This is a fact, as they say, "dray". This must not be forgotten. Just as one should not forget that the Russian man Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov could well have ended up in a well-fed and promising America in the 1920s with his teacher, the great Sikorsky.
But this is how it happened, and the great Sikorsky continued his work in America, and the great Polikarpov … However, let's wait until the analysis of the personal case.
The fact is that our entire galaxy was later. And first there were Tupolev and Polikarpov. And these two giants, under the canopy of their wings, allowed to grow a whole cohort of designers. But that's not the point.
The question is, what was the I-180. And what Polikarpov himself saw on this plane.
1937 year. Benefit, so to speak, Bf-109 in Spain. All Soviet aircraft designers rushed to create a similar plan for aircraft with water-cooled engines.
Everyone except Polikarpov.
The question of why he did this will remain a question for a long time. Most likely, Nikolai Nikolaevich initially decided to rely on more tenacious air-cooled motors. Well, the king of fighters had the right to do so. And end up being right …
What thought then captured Polikarpov? Improving the flight performance of aircraft by using double-row radial motors with a large number of cylinders. 12 to 16.
The idea, as shown by the practice of the Second World War, was a good one. It was the planes with double-row "stars" that became the best fighters (and not only) of that war.
Was there such a motor in the USSR? Obviously, no. There was another project. M-85.
The basis for the project of the new M-85 engine was a weak French motor "Mistral-Major" from the "Gnome-Ron" company. The engine was not a Mistral, and it was rather conditional as a major, since it produced only 850 horsepower.
The first mistake of Nikolai Nikolaevich was the calculation on this particular motor. And as soon as the production of the M-85 was mastered in Zaporozhye, it was for it that they began to develop the I-180.
Here it is worth understanding that Polikarpov had a reliable and fully mastered motor. M-25, aka "Wright-Cyclone R-1820-F3", successfully installed in the same years on the I-15, I-15bis, I-16 and I-153.
But Polikarpov looked much further. And he saw a perspective that was clearly present. And in subsequent years, the line of engines progressed, there were M-86 (900 hp), M-87 (950 hp), M-88 (1100 hp). But at the start of work on the I-180 there was only a very "raw" M-85 with all the ensuing consequences. And this was Polikarpov's first mistake.
It was a forced mistake, since the plane was needed both in fact and politically. Both the country and Polikarpov needed him personally, because … because he had reasons to launch this aircraft into series.
And the second fatal mistake was the haste with which the work on the I-180 was carried out. Literally a year after the start, the M-87 was completely rolled out, and it would be possible to build an airplane. But alas, the same flight happened in 1938.
But we will not judge so much, since the war in Spain, where the Bf-109 suddenly made its debut, and the transfers from place to place, which fell on Polikarpov's design bureau, and a very large load of the design bureau, which participated in the creation of several projects, will also speak for Polikarpov. in addition to the I-180 (VIT-1, VIT-2 and the future Su-2).
It is generally easy to judge many years later … But Polikarpov had more than enough envious people. And those who want to oust him from the design Olympus even more so.
The pangs of creativity in Soviet style
And in 1938, on the basis of the 1937 project of the I-165 fighter with the M-88 engine, Polikarpov developed the I-180 project.
It was an aircraft very similar in design and layout to the I-16. The large size of the engine entailed an increase in the entire structure, so that the plane was not a "donkey", but something "thicker".
It was planned to arm the I-180 with four synchronous ShKAS machine guns: two to be installed above the engine and two at the root of the wing. In the future, wing-mounted machine guns could easily be replaced with cannons. The wing allowed such an operation, it is worth remembering that the I-16 fully allowed such a procedure, but in fact the planes were very similar in proportions.
D. L. Tomashevich became the leading designer of the new machine.
It should be noted that motor dances did not pass even the king of fighters. The I-165 project was postponed because for it … there was no engine! Very new, isn't it?
More precisely, there was a motor, but … But the existing M-88R differed from the simple M-88 in that it had a gearbox. And, accordingly, he demanded a propeller with a size of at least 3.2 meters for his reduced speed.
It is clear what this threatened the fighter with. A raised nose, impairing taxiing, higher (and therefore fragile) landing gear legs, and so on. But even with the M-88R, it was not, thank God, that is why the project was postponed.
And they started designing a seemingly similar aircraft based on the I-165, but originally planned for the M-88R. Tomashevich decided to wriggle out of the situation by using in the project a new model of the propeller, VISH-23E, which, according to calculations, was supposed to compensate for the use of the "wrong" motor.
And in the summer of 1938, the construction of a prototype I-180 began. All of it is nothing, but in the fall, the storming began, caused by the Messerschmitts in Spain.
Here you need to understand the following thing: the fighter was sent for construction to the experimental plant No. 156 in Moscow. Everything seems to be logical, and only proves the importance of the project.
Not really.
And here's the thing: Experimental Plant No. 156 was a really skillful and powerful team with an excellent base. But just look at what this plant has been up to! He was in the Tupolev Design Bureau! And he built all sorts of giants such as "Maxim Gorky", "Motherland", RD planes for Chkalov and Gromov, and so on. Large aircraft class. And even gigantic ones.
And here - here you are a fighter …
So everything is clear, we remember that in 1937 Tupolev, Petlyakov, Bartini, Myasishchev and many others ended up in the "Tupolev sharaga", or TsKB-29 of the NKVD. The abandoned plant was handed over to the first project that came across with all the ensuing consequences.
And the consequences were. Polikarpov has repeatedly reported on the low quality of the aircraft components produced, he could not help but report. But it was simply not realistic to do something drastic.
And then something happened that should have happened. A "commissar" from the NKAP was sent to the plant. A person, in my personal opinion, is completely unfit for this.
Semyon Ilyich Belyaikin. Member of the Civil War, military commissar of the divisional school and head of the political department of the 7th Vladimir rifle division. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner, but not for military services, but in honor of the 10th anniversary of the Red Army.
From 1931 to June 1938 he worked at the Moscow Aviation Institute, reached the position of director of the institute. And suddenly he was sent to an aircraft plant, deputy director. Strange, isn't it?
From February 23, 1938 - Head of the 1st Main Directorate of the USSR People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry. Supervised the aircraft industry …
There is, apparently, a strong desire to curry favor. However, in those days it was normal. Belyaikin began to "press" not only Polikarpov and Tomashevich, but the entire staff of the plant. The goal is, let's say, a good one: to speed up the production of the aircraft. What methods the former commissar used is also clear. As I understand it, the situation at the plant was the same …
But Belyaikin paid dearly for everything. On December 20, 1938, he was arrested and, as a result, rightly declared one of the perpetrators of Chkalov's death. Sentenced to 15 years in a forced labor camp. He died in custody.
But even Belyaikin's screams and threats did not help. The aircraft did not have time to be manufactured in the allotted time. Another "gift" was the unavailability of the VISH-23E propeller. The manufacturer did not do it on time. The automatic screw pitch change was not received either.
And it was in such a situation that what is today called a "collective farm" began.
Polikarpov decided to use the VISH-3E propeller for the initial stage of testing. He was … let's say, similar in characteristics. But for him there was no automaton for changing the pitch of the propeller, so the propeller was controlled manually. Management, let's say, was minimal. In fact, the propeller was set in take-off mode, and it was possible to slightly change the angle of attack to achieve maximum speed. That's all the adjustments are made.
Naturally, this immediately led to a noticeable decrease in the efficiency of the propeller group as a whole and overheating of the motor in particular. Plus, constant work at high speeds could not have a positive effect on the engine resource.
They decided to deal with engine overheating by a simple action: they took and removed the engine cooling shutters.
Understandable in principle. Polikarpov, whom Belyaikin put pressure on, wanted to carry out all the tests on time, report, and then, when a VISH-23E and an automatic control would appear at his disposal, return everything back and install the blinds. In principle, more than reasonable for such a situation.
But “I blinded him out of what was” is still not for aviation.
In general, the somehow stuck together aircraft in December (we emphasize) went for flight tests.
Fatal flight
Despite a number of breakdowns and identified defects, the I-180 stubbornly went to the first flight. And that day has come. And at the same time it became a day of tragedy.
It is still not clear who made the decision to fly. A lot says that it was Chkalov himself. Polikarpov and Tomashevich did not approve the flight list, which actually saved Polikarpov.
In the column "Signature of the person in charge of releasing the plane" no one signed at all. As follows from this document, the task ensured a safe landing even in the event of an engine stop: "… flight without retraction of the landing gear, with speed limitation, according to the instructions of the chief designer of the plant, comrade NN Polikarpov. Along the CA route. At an altitude of 600 m. Duration 10 -15 minutes…"
The task was signed by the leading engineer N. Lazarev, who, in principle, had no right to do this. Hence we can conclude that Chkalov himself put pressure on Lazarev. The reasons that prompted Chkalov to do this, of course, we will never know, we can only assume that Valery Ivanovich was rooting for the fate of the plane and just wanted to help his design bureau with the plane at all costs.
Good intentions … Chkalov had the best intentions, and he was an expert on "raw" aircraft, but nevertheless, the consequences were dire.
On December 15, it suddenly got colder to -25 degrees. Nevertheless, Chkalov took off on the I-180.
He made the first circle over the airfield, but on the second he went with a great distance, at an altitude of about 2000 m, which was a clear violation of the flight mission. The landing glide path turned out to be steeper than the pilot had originally anticipated, and it was necessary to slightly tighten the plane by giving gas. Alas, the engine simply stalled, and Chkalov sat down among the buildings and structures. Including on the way of the plane was the ill-fated power line support.
In general, test pilots died when testing machines of other designers. And nothing, the cars went in series and successfully flew. It is the fate of any tester to walk along the edge of the abyss.
If Chkalov had not been Polikarpov's regular tester, it might have been all right. But the hero of the polar flight, the popular favorite and favorite of Stalin …
The government commission called the engine shutdown due to hypothermia due to the absence of those same frontal shutters as the cause of the disaster. Now there are other opinions, of very different kinds, but stopping due to hypothermia in the frosty winter air seems quite obvious to me.
Causes and consequences
The consequences were the most sad. Belyaikin, the director of the plant No. 156 Usachev, the head of the testing service of the Paray plant, the deputy of Polikarpov Tomashevich (sent to the "sharaga" to Tupolev) and about a dozen other employees involved, according to the investigation, were arrested.
In 1956, everyone was rehabilitated (Belyaikin and Paray - posthumously) after the work of an expert commission chaired by M. M. Gromova.
The most authoritative Mikhail Mikhailovich directly dealt with the causes of the disaster, and in his book "On Earth and in the Sky" he wrote the following about this:
"TO. E. Voroshilov appointed a commission to investigate the causes of the disaster. I was a member of this commission, its chairman - engineer Alekseev. The opinion of the commission was unanimous: the propeller stopped due to hypothermia of the motor. Who is guilty? There were so many "guilty ones" that you can't even count …
The government was also to blame for not issuing a directive: the plane must be made to the end, and only then can it be tested in the air. Of course, the decision of this commission was not taken into account by Stalin.
Quite a few years have passed. After the war, the engine designer and I were suddenly summoned again to explain the cause of V. P. Chkalov's death and to identify those responsible.
We again, as well as then, confirmed our opinion, saying that, if we talk about the guilty, we can only blame the aircraft designer, who did not manage to install the engine cooling temperature control system and allowed to fly on such an aircraft, and the test pilot, especially since the last was Chkalov, who had enough experience to understand the seriousness of the situation and refuse to fly, or fly with the expectation of landing at any time at the airfield with the engine stopped."
But Polikarpov did not give permission to take off. It is a fact. So the tragedy was the result of a kind of guerrilla warfare, based on the well-known principle "Winners are not judged." But since there were no winners, everyone was judged in a row.
Even many years later, Chkalov's death haunts many researchers. There are, of course, stupid and fantastic ones, and there are also more balanced ones. But it is the version of Gromov, who is more than versed in flying, that is considered more realistic.
But in general, Polikarpov got more than enough for this flight. It's a shame to see Georgy Baidukov and Igor Chkalov among the accused, but their opinion, the opinion of loved ones, can be considered justified.
But if by and large: who on that day could have stopped Chkalov himself, who decided to fly at all costs? Although all that was needed - either not to fly, or not to disrupt the flight mission … Caution - that's what Valery Pavlovich really lacked that day, seriously.
It is believed that the death of Chkalov was a turning point in the fate of Polikarpov. Many, including the aforementioned Georgy Baidukov, said so: "It was Chkalov that was needed by Polikarpov's planes."
To be honest: either stupidity, or just emotions. It turns out that the "king of fighters" needed a pilot like Chkalov? The calmer ones like Suprun, Gromov, Gallai were not good at all?
One thing is indisputable: such a chief pilot as Chkalov, and even enjoying such prestige with Himself, was definitely a great help for Polikarpov. If Valery Pavlovich had stayed alive, there would have been no many misadventures of the Polikarpov Design Bureau.
Go further, forward, to victory …
But even the death of Chkalov did not stop the work on the plane. And that was also normal in those years. True, the second prototype was built at another plant - No. 1. It was there that Polikarpov's design bureau was transferred after Tupolev was returned to his "native" plant. More precisely, the overgrown "sharaga" TsKB-29 swallowed plant No. 156, and Polikarpov was once again evicted.
Nevertheless, the work was going on. The M-88 was replaced with a less powerful, but seemingly more advanced M-87A, and then with an M-87B. And in an already calmer atmosphere, I-180-2 made its first normal flight on April 19, and on May 1, 1939, under the control of S. P. Suprun's plane participated in the air parade over Red Square.
During testing, the I-180-2 showed a speed of 540 km / h. Not God knows what, but the prospect was observed. The aircraft was recommended for serial production with the M-88 engine, which had passed state tests by that time. For testing, they decided to build a third prototype - I-180-3.
On September 5, 1939, at the end of state tests of the I-180-2, test pilot T. P. Suzi died.
It was the 53rd flight with the mission to reach the "ceiling". With the plane crash, not everything is clear even today, reports say that the plane was either steeply descending, or spinning from a great height. Upon reaching 3000 m, he switched to level flight, flew normally for a while, then went into a spin again. At an altitude of 300 m, the plane came out of a tailspin, and for some reason the pilot left the car, but did not use the parachute.
Various assumptions were made about the causes of the disaster, but the true cause remained unclear.
Contrary to popular belief, the I-180 continued on its way. Implementation work at Plant No. 21 continued. The whole question is how.
First, the plant # 21 (located in Gorky) had a large order for the I-16. And, admittedly, the plant's management was, to put it mildly, not happy with the new aircraft. Moreover, the plant had its own design bureau, in which they created their own aircraft!
It was a version of the same I-16 performed by M. M. Pashinin. And the plant was counting on the fact that they would produce "their" aircraft, in many respects similar to the I-16, which did not cause problems. The I-21 aircraft had a number of original solutions; during tests it showed a good speed - 573 km / h, but was not stable enough and had a number of other disadvantages. As a result, it did not go into production, but the work on the I-180 slowed down considerably.
Everything became even worse in 1940, when instead of M. M. Kaganovich was appointed People's Commissar A. I. Shakhurin, and his deputy for science and experimental construction - A. S. Yakovleva.
On January 14, 1940, Polikarpov and his deputy and leading designer Yangel (yes, the same future missile engineer) wrote to the NKAP: “The construction of the military series is extremely slow, all the previously given deadlines have been disrupted, the director of plant No. 21 Agadzhanov Suren Ivanovich almost all I transferred the designers from the I-180 to the I-21”.
In the end, Polikarpov was heard, and to consider issues related to the release of the I-180, a special commission of the NKAP and the Air Force Directorate worked at plant No. 21 under the chairmanship of one of the deputy people's commissars - V. P. Balandin.
The commission decided to oblige the plant to produce a series of 30 cars within two months, but this did not help at all. All release dates were missed.
This is not to say that no one listened to Polikarpov. Head of the Air Force Research Institute A. I. Owl in a report to the Main Directorate of the Air Force wrote:
“I report that the situation with the construction of the military series of I-180 M-88 aircraft … is abnormal, the construction of the aircraft is actually being delayed indefinitely. I think that the delay in the release of the military series delays the fine-tuning of the aircraft necessary for the Red Army Air Force."
And only in April, the first three serial I-180S were somehow ready. Again, they were shown at the parade, and a light seemed to dawn at the end of the tunnel.
Moreover, by that time the factory tests of the I-180-3 had already ended. I must say that, on its own initiative, the Polikarpov Design Bureau somewhat modified the car, first of all, by strengthening the armament.
Two 12.7 mm BS machine guns and two 7.62 mm ShKAS were assembled into one battery. The machine guns were placed on a gun carriage, which greatly facilitated operation (reloading, cleaning, repairing).
The aircraft showed very good results: speed at an altitude of 3000 m - 575 km / h, time to climb 5000 m - 5.6 minutes. Test pilot Ulyakhin noted in the reports that the I-180 is very similar in parameters to the I-16, but more stable and better behaves in turns and landing.
Of course, shortcomings were also recorded. Lack of a canopy, poor adjustment of the tail wheel retraction mechanism, unsatisfactory propeller design, poor surface finish. It was believed that varnishing surfaces should bring an additional 25-30 km / h.
Polikarpovtsy worked, they installed a lantern on the plane, designed and manufactured a new propeller, increased the transverse V wing. In this form, the fighter was transferred for state tests at the Air Force Research Institute, which were generally successful.
But the I-180 was waiting for another blow of fate. You don't have to be a soothsayer to guess who is to blame. Yes, the motor again!
Motor infarction
Numerous complaints of defects and failures led to the fact that the M-88 was discontinued! At the same time, flights were banned for all aircraft with this engine, including the I-180. Of course, the engine builders did everything to solve the problems, but the Su-2, Il-4, I-180 remained on the ground. And only at the very end of 1940 (December) the M-88 was re-tested, and the ban was lifted. Work resumed.
The Polikarpov Design Bureau constantly improved its aircraft. At the beginning of 1941, projects for the new M-88A and M-89 engines were ready. The RSI-4 radio station was registered on the planes on a permanent basis. According to calculations in the design bureau, the maximum speed of the I-180 with the M-89 engine was supposed to reach 650 km / h.
Looking ahead, it should be said that in 1942 the M-89 was discontinued as an unreliable and unfinished engine. He was simply brushed aside in favor of the mastered M-88B. According to the laws of wartime, in principle, it is fair.
But at the beginning of 1941, the decision to discontinue production of the I-180 struck like a bolt from the sky!
Already long after the war, the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry Shakhurin, after serving his time, after rehabilitation, recalled in his memoirs that the NKAP was really overly carried away by water-cooled engines. It is clear that the Messerschmitt flew and flew well, but this is absolutely no reason to copy everything to the cog.
Although, I must admit that they copied everything.
In general, air-cooled radial motors were found to be impractical for use. All programs have been canceled. In response to Polikarpov, Deputy People's Commissar of the Presidential Administration Yakovlev wrote:
“The resumption of work on three I-180 airplanes, built as a standard for serial production at plant No. 21, cannot be permitted. Further work on the refinement and testing of these aircraft is impractical due to the existing solution under the plant's program for 1941. At the present time, all attention should be paid to the fulfillment of the new assignment received by the plant”.
And at the plant №21 they began to master the production of LaGG-3. An aircraft with a completely different technology. I would like to note that plant # 21, which for a year could not squeeze out 10 I-180s, was already in a month “driving” LaGG-3 as if nothing had happened.
Malevolence or envy?
It is hard to say. I think that the I-180 would have been a "trial balloon" anyway, followed by the I-185, a more promising aircraft. And here the technological chain I-16 - I-180 - I-185 was traced, the main value of which was the presence of continuity in production.
We will talk about the I-185 in the next article, the plane is worthy of a separate discussion. At the turn of 1940, the I-185 was already ready, it was waiting, waiting for its engine.
Let's reason. If the I-180 with a 1100 hp engine showed a speed of about 600 km / h, then for the more perfect in terms of aerodynamics I-185, and even with an engine of 1700-1900 hp. the estimated speed of the order of 700 km / h was quite real.
By the way, this is 1945 for the Germans. If the Focke-Wulf had a 2200-2500 hp engine, it would be a terrible car …
If the I-180 went into production, the MiG-1, LaGG-3, Yak-1 would not be needed. Or they are needed, but not in such quantities. The MiG-3 was not a competitor in terms of weapons, the LaGG-3 was inferior in terms of flight performance, the Yak-1 …
With "Yak" in general, everything was sad. I spoke about this quite specifically in the material on this aircraft. More than 7 thousand design changes are serious.
Let's look, look with all eyes!
LaGG-3. The most successful of the triad, in my opinion (La-5 and La-7 confirm this), but expensive to manufacture due to delta wood and with a very weak motor.
But Gorbunov worked as the head of the 4th department of the First Main Directorate of the NKAP. It is clear that not Yakovlev, but still. Lavochkin and Gudkov were his subordinates who oversaw aircraft factories.
Probably, here you can find the answer to the question why LaGG-3s began to be driven at as many as five factories, and not one was left for Polikarpov. The designer's brother, Sergei Petrovich Gorbunov, (1902-1933) was one of the organizers of the Soviet aircraft industry, director of the largest aircraft building plant in Europe № 22 in Fili.
MiG-3. Not a bad plane, but a perfect "iron" at low altitudes. Attempts to lighten the aircraft made the weapons the weakest of all.
But Artem Mikoyan was the younger brother of Anastas Mikoyan himself. No comments.
Yak-1. The most under-reported plane of all. Also, by the way, who took the lives of test pilots to the sky. And if the state tests of the MiG and LaGG were more or less normal, then with the Yak-1 the situation was much more complicated.
But Yakovlev was the deputy people's commissar of the AP Shakhurin.
Coincidences? Do not know. It is very difficult to judge today. But it is difficult to comment, especially knowing that Polikarpov had nothing behind his back except what he had. And he had absolutely no support.
Everything is possible. Launched in a series of aircraft for many - recognition, orders, immunity (possibly). But first of all - the opportunity to live and work. Others (like Polikarpov) could also receive pardon. You are a fighter country, it is you - 10 years conditionally instead of real.
As an example, it is worth mentioning the same Yak-1. The plane claimed the life of Yulian Piontkovsky, test pilot of the Yakovlev Design Bureau, but the second flight copy (I-26-2), which began flying even before the crash of the first and had the same defects, on May 29, the NKAP commission chaired by A. S. Yakovlev considered it suitable for transfer for state tests. And three days later, the Air Force Research Institute recognized the car as having passed state tests.
Questions? Comments? So I don’t. However, we have already talked a lot about the Soviet triad of the early 40s. There are more than enough strange moments and dark spots on reputations.
In principle, I have no questions left. Could Polikarpov resist a cohort of "young and zealous", striving to the top of the designers?
Not of proletarian origin, a disciple of the emigrated Sikorsky, with a suspended sentence behind him and the prospect of playing "sharaga" at any moment?
So I think I could not. And even to resist such people. With such, as they would say now, "garters".
Polikarpov could only design airplanes and build them, if he was allowed to. Support for the NCAP? Objectivity? Absolutely not.
At least, I would not call the withdrawal of the I-180 from serial production six months before the war and the launch of the LaGG-3, which was inferior to it in many respects, at plant No. 21, in its place, in favor of the state.
And today it becomes clear why they began to produce three models at once. Who can, so to speak. It is clear that the MiG and LaGG were a kind of safety net for the completely unsuccessful Yak.
Again, why was it necessary to start assembling LaGGi at five factories, depriving Polikarpov of the only plant?
I will say a seditious thing. I can imagine how happy Yakovlev, Gorbunov and Mikoyan were when Polikarpov lost his shield - Chkalova. It really was a gift of fate …
It is very difficult to say how good the I-180 could be. Very difficult. But given that royal ranks are not given just like that, I think that the plane could be no worse than the triad. Perhaps better.
But there is another point. If the comrades (who are sometimes worse than the gentlemen), the designers would not have been in such a hurry to drown Polikarpov, at the time of 1941-22-06 the Red Army Air Force could have so many modern and powerful fighters that an instant blitzkrieg might not have taken place.
But these are arguments solely in favor of the losers. But we will discuss this topic later in the conversation about the I-185.
