In various books and TV shows, I constantly came across the assessment of the Panther as one of the best tanks of the Second World War. And in the program on the National Geographic channel, he was generally called the absolutely best tank, a tank that was "ahead of its time."
Historical reference
Panzerkampfwagen V Panther, abbr. PzKpfw V "Panther" - German tank during the Second World War. This combat vehicle was developed by MAN in 1941-1942 as the main tank of the Wehrmacht. According to the German classification, the Panther was considered a medium tank. In the Soviet tank classification "Panther" was considered a heavy tank. In the departmental end-to-end system of designations of military equipment of Nazi Germany, "Panther" had the index Sd. Kfz. 171. Beginning on February 27, 1944, the Fuehrer ordered to use only the name "Panther" for the designation of the tank.
The battle on the Kursk Bulge became the combat debut of the "Panther"; subsequently, tanks of this type were actively used by the Wehrmacht and the SS troops in all European theaters of military operations. According to a number of experts, "Panther" is the best German tank of the Second World War and one of the best in the world. At the same time, the tank had a number of shortcomings, was difficult and expensive to manufacture and operate. On the basis of the Panther, the Jagdpanther self-propelled artillery unit (SAU) and a number of specialized vehicles for engineering and artillery units of the German armed forces were produced.
What was the real significance of such an outstanding machine for the course of the war? Why didn't Germany, having such an outstanding tank, utterly defeat the Soviet armored forces?
Panther battalions on the Eastern Front. The period from the end of 1943 to 1945
The "Panthers" that survived on the Kursk Bulge were assembled as part of the 52nd tank battalion, which was renamed I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 15 on August 24, 1943. as part of the grenadier division "Grossdeutschland". By the end of August, the 52nd battalion had irrevocably lost 36 Panthers. As of August 31, 1943, the 52nd tank battalion had 15 combat-ready tanks, 45 more vehicles were under repair.
At the end of August 1943, 1. Abteilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 2, which was part of the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich", arrived at the front. This battalion consisted of 71 Panthers. Three command tanks were at the headquarters, and each of the four companies had 17 vehicles: two in the headquarters section and five in each platoon. On August 31, 1943, the battalion had 21 combat-ready tanks, 40 vehicles needed repair, 10 were decommissioned.
The fourth Panther battalion, which ended up on the Eastern Front, was II. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 23. The battalion had 96 Panthers, the majority of which were Ausf. D, but there were also a few Ausf. A. The fifth was I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 2, equipped with 71 Panthers, mainly Ausf. A. From the report of the 13th Panzer Division on October 20, 1943:
"Due to the threatening situation at the front, the battalion was thrown to the front line, barely having time to disembark. The battalion acted in companies. Because of the haste, it was not possible to establish interaction with the grenadiers. Often, unnecessarily turning into counterattacks, tank squads supported the actions of the infantry. As it turned out," later, this use of tanks was contrary to basic tactical principles, but the situation at the front left no choice."
The following are excerpts from the reports of the commander I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 2. Hauptmann Bollert, covering the period from 9 to 19 October 1943:
Tactical training
"Insufficient tactical training of crews did not seriously affect the battalion's combat effectiveness, since more than half of the battalion's personnel have combat experience. In such an environment, young soldiers quickly improve their skills. tanks in a combat-ready condition. In any case, it is highly desirable to have an experienced platoon commander."
Technical training in Germany
During several weeks of training, the driver and maintenance personnel did not always learn what was required on the front lines. Some of the soldiers were engaged in one task all the time, for example, changing the road wheels. Thus, many did not have a holistic view of the PzKpfw V device. Under the guidance of an experienced instructor, young soldiers sometimes achieved excellent results in a very short time. The opportunity to study the materiel is at every factory that assembles tanks.
Mechanical problems
The cylinder head seal is burnt through. The shaft of the fuel pump is destroyed.
The bolts on the large final drive gear are ripped off. Plugs often fall out, resulting in oil leakage. Oil also often leaks out through the seam between the final drive housing and the side of the tank. The bolts that attach the final drives to the side of the hull often loosen.
The upper fan bearing is often seized. Insufficient lubrication even if the oil level is correct. Fan damage is often accompanied by damage to the fan drive.
Propeller shaft bearings are damaged. The hydraulic pump drive is worn out.
Weapon Issues: The compressor clutch is sticking, interfering with the barrel blowdown system. The TZF 12 sight breaks down as a result of hitting the gun mask. The scope consumption is very high.
It is absolutely necessary to equip the tank with a machine gun to fight the enemy infantry. The need for a course machine gun is felt especially acutely when the coaxial machine gun falls silent.
The frontal armor of the PzKpfw V is very good. 76, 2-mm armor-piercing shells leave dents on it no deeper than 45 mm. "Panthers" fail in case of direct hit of 152-mm high-explosive shells - the shell breaks through the armor. Almost all "Panthers" received frontal hits from 76-mm shells, while the combat effectiveness of the tanks practically did not suffer. In one case, a 45-mm projectile fired from a distance of 30 m pierced the cannon's mask. The crew was not injured.
However, the side armor is very vulnerable. The side of the tower on one of the "Panthers" was pierced by an anti-tank rifle. The side of the other "Panther" was also pierced by a small-caliber shell. All this damage occurs during battles in the streets or in the forest, where it is not possible to close the flanks.
A direct hit of an artillery shell in the lower part of the frontal armor led to the fact that the welded seams burst, and a piece of several centimeters long broke off from the armor plate. Obviously, the seam was not welded to the full depth.
The skirt performed well enough. The fasteners of the sheets are not reliable enough and are very inconveniently located. Since the sheets are suspended at a distance of 8 cm from the side of the tank, they are easily torn off by branches of trees and bushes.
The new road wheels were not satisfactory. Almost all "Panthers" lost their speed due to explosions of high-explosive shells. One track roller is punctured right through, three are damaged. Several road wheels have splintered. Although 45mm and 76mm shells pierce the tracks, they cannot immobilize the tank. In any case, "Panther" can leave the battlefield on its own. During prolonged marches at top speed, the rubber tires on the road wheels wear out quickly.
The gun proved to be excellent, only a few minor problems were noted. The frontal armor of the KV-1 confidently breaks through from a distance of 600 m. The SU-152 makes its way from a distance of 800 m.
The new commander's cupola has a rather successful design. The diopter, which greatly helped the tank commander in aiming the gun at the target, is absent. The three front periscopes should be moved a little closer together. The field of view through periscopes is good, but binoculars cannot be used. When shells hit the turret, the periscope optics often fail and require replacement.
In addition, the driver's and radio operator's periscopes should be better sealed. When it rains, water seeps in and makes work very difficult.
Bergepanther tugs have proven their worth. One Bergepanther is enough to evacuate one tank in dry weather. In deep mud, even two tugs are not enough to evacuate one Panther. To date, Bergepanther tugs have evacuated 20 Panthers. In total, the damaged tanks were towed to a distance of 600 m. The Bergepanther were used only to tow the damaged tanks from the front line to the near rear. The battalion's experience shows that it is necessary to have at least four Bergepanther tugs, at least at the expense of the usual 18-ton tugs. The equipment of the tugs with radio stations came in handy. During the battle, Bergepanther commanders received radio instructions.
To tow one Panther in dry weather, two Zugkraftwagen 18t tractors are required. However, in deep mud, even four 18-ton tractors cannot move the tank.
On October 16, the battalion launched an attack with 31 tanks. Although the distance traveled was short, 12 Panthers were out of order due to mechanical failures. By October 18, 1943, the battalion had 26 combat-ready Panthers. 39 tanks needed repairs and 6 vehicles had to be written off. In the period from 9 to 19 October, the average number of combat-ready tanks was 22 "Panthers".
Results: 46 tanks and 4 self-propelled guns were knocked out. Destroyed 28 anti-tank guns, 14 artillery pieces and 26 anti-tank guns. Our irrecoverable pockets - 8 tanks (6 were knocked out and burned during the battles, two were dismantled for spare parts)."
Due to the mechanical unreliability of the Panthers and the high level of losses, on November 1, 1943, Hitler decided to send 60 tanks without engines to the Leningrad Front, which had to be dug into the ground opposite the Kronstadt Bay. From 5 to 25 November 1943, 60 Panthers (fully operational) were sent to the command of Army Group North.
On November 30, 1943, the command of the L Army Corps reported that 60 Panthers had entered the 9th and 10th Luftwaffe Field Divisions. "Panthers" were dug three by three along the line of defense, having in front of them a range of 1000-1500 m. 10 of the most efficient vehicles were left on the move as a mobile reserve.
From the I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 29, 60 people were allocated (20 commanders, 20 driver mechanics, 15 gunners and 5 radio gunners). On December 26, III Panzer Corps received an order to collect all the Panthers that remained mobile as part of I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 29. The dug Panthers remained under the control of the divisions.
In November 1943, two Panther battalions arrived on the Eastern Front. These were Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment 1, with 76 Panthers (17 tanks in a company), and Ableilung / SS-Panzer-Regiment 1, fully equipped with 96 Panthers. Both battalions operated as part of their own divisions.
In early November, the 1st battalion of the 15th tank regiment received reinforcements in the form of 31 Panthers. At the end of December 1943, the 1st battalion of the 1st tank regiment received 16 new "Panthers". Apart from 60 Panthers sent to the Leningrad Front, in 1943, 841 Panthers were sent to the Eastern Front. By December 31, 1943, the Germans had only 217 "Panthers", of which only 80 remained operational. 624 tanks were decommissioned (74% loss).
From 5 to 11 December 1943, 76 Panthers were delivered to the 1st battalion of the 2nd tank regiment. Another 94 Panthers arrived as reinforcements to other battalions. However, all these tanks were first used in battle in January 1944.
On March 5, 1944, Guderian reported:
“As the experience of recent battles has shown,“Panther”has finally been brought to mind. In a report dated February 22, 1944, received from the 1st Tank Regiment, it is said: “In the current version, the Panther is suitable for front-line use. It significantly exceeds the T-34. Almost all the shortcomings have been eliminated. The tank has excellent armor, armament, maneuverability and speed. Currently, the average motor mileage is within 700-1000 km. The number of engine breakdowns has decreased. Final drive failures are no longer reported. The steering and transmission are reliable enough."
However, this report from the 1st Panzer Regiment was premature. Indeed, the "Panther" felt good in winter on frozen ground, but already in the report of April 22, 1944 from the 1st battalion of the 2nd tank regiment, it was reported about numerous technical problems caused by the spring off-road:
The report summarizes the experience gained between March 5 and April 15, 1944.
Maybach HL 230 P30 engine;
In general, the new engines are much more reliable than their predecessors. Sometimes the engine runs up to 1700-1800 km without repair, and 3 "Panthers", having covered this distance, still remain on the move. But the nature of the breakdown has not changed: destruction of mechanical parts and damage to bearings.
Engine fires
The number of fires in the engine compartment has decreased markedly. The following causes of fires have been identified:
Oil leaks from valves due to poor seals. Oil droplets fall onto the hot exhaust pipes and ignite.
In some cases, the carburetor overflow is noted. The candles are filled with gasoline and do not spark. The unburned fuel is then thrown into the exhaust pipes and seeps out through the seals, causing a fire.
Transmission
The transmission life has also increased. On average, every 1500 km of run, 3rd gear fails, and the breakdown cannot be repaired in the field. The failure of the 3rd gear is due to its overload when driving through mud. Since the transmission sometimes fails, we have operated three Panthers with a faulty transmission. Shifting from 2nd immediately to 4th gear sometimes caused clutch breakage, but repairing the clutch is much easier. It happens that tanks pass 1500-1800 km without breaking the clutch, and 4 Panthers have already surpassed this record.
The rapid deterioration of the steering is also due to constant off-road driving. The steering system has a rather complex design, and the qualifications of the driver-mechanics are not enough to independently eliminate the malfunctions that arise. Therefore, tanks are controlled using onboard brakes, which leads to their rapid wear and frequent failure.
Onboard transmissions
Very often, tanks fail due to breakdowns of the final drives. For example, on March 11, it was necessary to replace the side gears on 30 tanks. The left final drive fails more often than the right. The bolts on the large final drive gear often come loose. Reversing in mud is particularly detrimental to final drives.
Suspension and tracks
After 1500-1800 km of run, there is a strong wear of the tracks. In many cases, the guide teeth will break off or bend. Four times the tracks had to be changed entirely, since there was no guide tooth left on any track.
Despite the fact that the reliability of tanks has increased markedly, efforts should continue to be made to improve reliability even more. For this, it is necessary that the "Panthers" be adapted to the following combat situations:
Running the engine at its limit when driving uphill or in deep mud.
Taxiing when reversing (inevitable maneuver during combat).
Overloading the clutch.
The decrease in breakdown rates is also due to the increased experience of driver mechanics and tank commanders. In the 4th company of the 2nd tank regiment, the tank of corporal Gablewski (PzKpfw V. Fgst. Nr. 154338. Motor Nr. 83220046) to date has passed 1,878 km without repair and still retained full combat capability. During all this time, it was necessary to change several road wheels and tracked tracks. The oil consumption on the tank is about 10 liters. for 100 km. The Panther still has an engine and transmission installed at the factory."
In order to close the huge gap on the Eastern Front made by the Red Army in July 1944, 14 tank brigades were hastily formed. Only seven of them were sent to the Eastern Front. The remaining seven had to be sent west as the Allies launched a successful offensive in France in August 1944. Each brigade with numbers from 101 to 110, as well as the Fuehrer brigade, had one Panther battalion. The battalion consisted of a headquarters (3 "Panthers") and three companies, 11 "Panthers" in each (2 in the headquarters section and 3 in three platoons).
From August 1944, the Allied bombing began to affect the productivity of the German tank factories. Production of "Panthers" fell, and losses on the fronts, on the contrary, grew. I had to go to the reduction of tanks in battalions. For example, in I. Abteilung / Panzer-Regiment73160; 10 had three vehicles at the headquarters and 17 "Panthers" in the 2nd and 4th companies.
In the 1st battalion of the Hermann Goering tank regiment there were 4 Panthers at the battalion headquarters and 14 Panthers in each of the four companies (two Panthers in the headquarters section and four in three platoons). The 1st battalions of the 6th, 11th, 24th and 130th tank regiments were organized according to the same scheme. In these four battalions, all 60 Panthers were equipped with night vision devices. Field trials were unsuccessful. therefore, all night vision devices were dismantled and sent to the warehouse even before the parts were sent to the front.
After the failure of the offensive on the Western Front, in February 1945, 8 divisions (1st, 2nd, 9th, 10th and 12th SS Divisions, as well as the 21st Division, 25th Grenadier Division and Grenadier division "Fuehrer"), with a total of 271 tanks, were transferred to the east.
On February 12, 1945, the Inspector General of Tank Forces ordered the 1st Company of the 101st Tank Battalion of the Tank Brigade "Fuehrer" to begin military testing of the FG 1250 night vision device. Ten "Panthers" companies were sent to Altengrabov to be equipped with noctavisors. In addition, the company received three SdKfz 251/20. equipped with IR illuminators BG 1251 (Uhu). On March 26, 1945, Major Wöllwart and Hauptmann Ritz reported on the course of the first night battle using infrared scopes. The battle was successful, night vision devices were quite reliable. Having received encouraging results, the German command equipped tanks with infrared sights in the following units:
I./PzRgt 6 (3. PzDiv) - March 1 10 pieces;
Ausbildungs-Lehrgang Fallingbostel - March 16 4 pieces;
I./PzRgt 130 (25. PzGrDiv) - March 23 10 pieces:
I./PzRgt 29 (PzDiv Muenchenberg) - April 5, 10 pieces;
4. Kp / PzRgt 11-8 April 10 pieces.
With the exception of the four Panthers sent to Fallingbostel, all vehicles equipped with the FG 1250 (50 units) took part in the battles on the Eastern Front.
The largest number of combat-ready "Panthers" was at the disposal of the German command in the summer and autumn of 1944. At this time, the peak number of combat-ready tanks reached 522 pieces. At the same time, the Red Army had several thousand T-34, KV-1, IS-2 and M4 Sherman. Despite many local successes, the Panthers were never able to turn the tide of the war.
Well, what do we have in the bottom line? In addition to combat and technical characteristics, any combat vehicle has other characteristics. Such as reliability, maintainability, and most importantly - the price and the resulting ability to mass production. If we evaluate the bare numbers of technical characteristics, then the car looks outstanding, even the statistics of battles with our tanks speak in favor of the Panther. But the above qualities, which often go away from the attention of ordinary fans of military history, make it just awful. And despite its technical excellence, this machine practically destroyed the Third Reich, leaving it virtually without tanks. For these qualities, "Panther" was not ahead of its time, but rather late. She was supposed to appear in the pre-war period, and all her childhood illnesses should have been eliminated even before the war, and not at a critical moment for Germany.
Was there an alternative? I personally do not see her. Before the war, such a machine could not appear. Since it was the result of understanding the battles against the T-34
What did Germany have to do? Probably, those colleagues are right who wrote that the only correct action would be to continue the modernization of the T-IV. The machines are quite outdated, which, in my opinion, even in large numbers, would hardly have changed the course of the war.
