Even at the beginning of World War II, Nazi Germany took care of the creation of promising anti-aircraft weapons of various kinds. Since a certain time, along with other products, promising anti-aircraft guided missiles have been developed. However, not a single project of this kind has been brought to full operation. Even the most successful samples of German-made anti-aircraft guided missiles could not advance beyond the proving grounds.
Despite the lack of real results, early German anti-aircraft missile projects are of great interest. In particular, the question arises: how effective could such a weapon be if the work was successfully completed? Another question directly follows from it, connected with the possible influence of such weapons on the general course of the war. Let's figure out how dangerous the German missiles were and how they could affect the outcome of the Second World War.
Bold projects
The very first German anti-aircraft missile project was launched in 1940 and remained in history under the name Feuerlilie ("Fire Lily"). A number of research and development organizations were required to create a radio-command missile capable of attacking modern and promising aircraft. First, the F-25 version of the Feuerlilie rocket was developed. In the middle of 1943, this product was taken for testing, but it did not show the desired characteristics. A few months later, the Feuerlilie F-25 project was closed for lack of prospects.
SAM Feuerlilie F-55 in the assembly shop. Photo National Museum of Aeronautics and Astronautics / airandspace.si.edu
Shortly after the F-25, development began on the larger and heavier F-55 missile. Due to numerous technical and technological problems, tests of the F-55 began only in 1944. Several test launches showed the rocket's imperfection. Attempts were made to improve it, but at the end of January 1945, the project was closed in favor of other developments.
In 1941, work began on the next project, later called Wasserfall ("Waterfall"). At the end of November 1942, the final appearance of such a missile defense system was approved. It provided for the use of a liquid-propellant rocket engine and an improved guidance system. With the help of the radar, the operator had to follow the flight of the target and the missile, adjusting the trajectory of the latter. Testing "Waterfall" began in the spring of 1944 and continued until the winter of 1945. During this time, several dozen test launches were carried out, but the tests were not completed, and the air defense system was not put into service.
In 1943, when the Allies began regularly and massively bombing targets in the German rear, Henschel launched the Hs 117 Schmetterling SAM project ("Butterfly"). The concept of this project was formed back in 1941 by Professor G. A. Wagner. However, there is a plausible version, according to which the Hs 117 project was based on the Italian developments on the DAAC rocket. It was proposed to build a cruise missile with a liquid propellant engine and a guidance system of the type used on the Feuerlilie. In the first months of 1944, "Butterfly" was submitted for testing, and in a few months the product was fine-tuned.
"Fire Lily" at the Royal Air Force Museum. Photo Wikimedia Commons
The Hs 117 Schmetterling project can be considered the most successful German development in the field of air defense systems. So, at the very end of 1944, according to the test results, an order appeared for the mass production of such missiles; their deployment was scheduled for next March. Soon it was possible to establish a serial assembly, which in the future was supposed to reach a rate of about 3 thousand missiles per month. A variant of the Hs 117 air-to-air missile was also being developed. However, at the very beginning of February 1945, all work on the "Butterfly" had to be curtailed due to the presence of more pressing problems.
Since November 1942, by order of the German ground forces, the Rheinmetall-Borsig company has been developing the Rheintochter missile defense system ("Daughters of the Rhine"). Created three versions of such missiles. R1 and R2 were two-stage products with solid propellant engines, and the R3 project provided for the use of starting solid propellants and sustainer rocket engines. The control was to be carried out manually with the transmission of commands by radio. The possibility of creating an aviation version of the rocket was being worked out. Testing of the Daughters of the Rhine began in the summer of 1943, but the R1 and R2 versions showed insufficient performance. The R3 product is stuck at the design stage. In February 1945, the Rheintochter project was closed, along with several others.
In 1943, Messerschmitt began work on the Enzian missile defense project ("Gentian"). The main idea of this project was to use the developments on the Me-163 fighter-rocket plane. Thus, the Enzian rocket was supposed to be a large product with a delta wing and rocket engine. The use of radio command control was proposed; the possibility of creating a thermal GOS was also studied. In the spring of 1944, the first test launches took place. Work on "Gentian" continued until January 1945, after which they were turned down as useless.
Product Hs 117 Schmetterling. Photo National Museum of Aeronautics and Astronautics / airandspace.si.edu
Thus, during the Second World War, Hitlerite Germany developed eight projects of anti-aircraft guided missiles; almost all of these samples managed to go into testing, and some even coped with them and received a recommendation for putting into service. Nevertheless, the mass production of missiles was not launched and such weapons were not put on duty.
Fighting qualities
To determine the real potential of German missiles, first of all, it is necessary to consider their tactical and technical characteristics. It should be noted that in some cases we are talking only about the calculated and "tabular" values of these parameters. All missile projects faced one or another problem that affected their characteristics. As a result, experimental missiles of different batches could differ significantly from each other, as well as lag behind the given parameters and not correspond to the desired level. However, even tabular parameters will be sufficient for a general assessment.
According to known data, the Feuerlilie F-55 rocket was supposed to have a starting weight of 600 kg and carry a 100-kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead. The maximum speed, according to various sources, was supposed to reach 1200-1500 km / h. The altitude reach is 10,000 m. The smaller F-25 could show more modest flight and combat characteristics.
Rocket Rheintochter R1 on the launcher, 1944 Photo Wikimedia Commons
SAM Wassserfall with a length of 6, 13 m had a starting weight of 3, 7 tons, of which 235 kg fell on a fragmentation warhead. The missile was supposed to reach a speed of more than 2700 km / h, which allowed it to hit targets within a radius of 25 km at altitudes up to 18 km.
The 420-kg Hs 177 rocket received a 25 kg fragmentation warhead. With the help of starting solid propellants and a sustainer rocket engine, she was supposed to reach speeds of up to 900-1000 km / h. The firing range reached 30-32 km, the target destruction height was no more than 9 km.
Rheintochter missiles of the R1 and R2 versions were supposed to have a launch weight of 1750 kg and carry a 136-kg warhead. In the first tests, it was possible to obtain a flight speed of slightly less than 1750 km / h, as well as an altitude of 6 km and a range of 12 km. However, such characteristics were considered insufficient. The R3 modification was supposed to hit targets at distances up to 20-25 km and altitudes over 10 km. This version of the missile defense system was developed, but in practice its capabilities were not tested.
The Enzian rocket weighed just over 1800 kg and was supposed to show flight characteristics at the level of the basic Me-163 fighter. The stock of liquid propellants in the internal tanks limited the flight range of 25-27 km.
Rheintochter R1 in flight, 1944. Photo by Wikimedia Commons
Understanding the low accuracy of missile guidance and the specifics of the use of enemy long-range aviation, German engineers used relatively heavy warheads in almost all cases. A charge weighing 100-200 kg could inflict damage on a bomber even if it exploded several tens of meters away. When firing at large formations of aircraft, there was a significant chance with one explosion, at least, to damage several targets.
Differing from each other in design, technical characteristics, guidance principles, etc., all German missiles belonged to the same category of weapons. They were intended primarily for the protection of strategically important facilities within a radius of 20-30 km. In the current classification, this is short-range object air defense.
Naturally, the air defense systems of the German army were not supposed to work alone. They were supposed to be built into existing air defense systems. As part of the latter, the missiles were supposed to interact with the existing detection and control systems. They were supposed to be a more accurate and effective addition to anti-aircraft artillery. They would also have to share their niche with fighter aircraft. Thus, in theory, the Third Reich could receive a developed echeloned air defense system of strategically important areas, built on the basis of heterogeneous means.
Disadvantages and problems
However, none of the German SAM never entered service, and the most successful projects had to be closed at the stage of preparation for mass production. This result was predetermined by a number of objective factors. The projects faced various difficulties, some of which at that time were fundamentally insurmountable. In addition, each new project had its own difficulties and difficulties, which took a lot of time and effort.
Museum sample of the R1 rocket. Photo National Museum of Aeronautics and Astronautics / airandspace.si.edu
First of all, difficulties at all stages were associated with the general technological complexity and novelty of the tasks being solved. German specialists had to study new directions for themselves and solve unusual design problems. Without serious experience in most of the necessary areas, they were forced to spend time and resources on working out all relevant solutions.
Such work was hampered by an extremely complex general situation. With all the importance of promising developments, the bulk of the resources were used in production to meet the current needs of the front. Lower priority projects have consistently suffered from resource and staff shortages. In addition, Allied air raids played a prominent role in reducing German defense potential. Finally, at the final stage of the war, the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition seized part of the military enterprises of the Third Reich - it was during this period that the SAM projects were closed one after another.
Attempts to develop several projects at the same time cannot be considered a plus. The military industry had to disperse its efforts into several different programs, each of which was highly complex. This led to an unnecessary waste of time and resources - and without that, not endless. Perhaps holding a full-fledged competition with the choice of one or two projects for further development could correct the situation and ensure the delivery of missiles to the army. However, choosing the best project from among several undelivered ones could become another problem.
Museum model Rheintochter R3. Photo Wikimedia Commons
When creating all the projected missiles, perhaps the greatest difficulties were associated with control and guidance systems. The insufficient level of development of radio-electronic technologies forced the use of the simplest solutions. So, all the developed samples used radio command guidance, and most of them required the participation of the operator. The latter was supposed to follow the rocket and control its flight using the three-point method.
At the same time, the Wasserfall missile received a more advanced control system. Its flight and target were to be monitored by two separate radars. The operator was asked to follow the markings on the screen and control the trajectory of the rocket. Directly, the commands were generated and transmitted to the rocket automatically. We managed to develop and test such a system in the conditions of the landfill.
An important problem was the lack of technical reliability of all major systems. Because of her, all the samples required lengthy refinement, and in some cases it was not possible to complete it within a reasonable time frame. At any stage of the flight, any system could fail, and this obviously reduced the real effectiveness of the application.
Test launch of the Wasserfall missile defense system, September 23, 1944 Photo of the Bundesarchiv
A significant drawback of all air defense systems was the complexity of operation. They had to be deployed in prepared positions, and the preparation process for launch took a lot of time. Long-term positions were to become a priority target for enemy bombers, which could lead to serious losses in equipment and, as a result, in air defense capabilities. The creation of a full-fledged mobile air defense system at that time was an extremely difficult task or even impossible.
In a hypothetical battle
Obviously, if brought to a series and put on duty, the German missiles could become a serious problem for the Allied bomber aviation. The appearance of such weapons should have led to the complication of delivering strikes and an increase in losses. However, missiles, having a lot of shortcomings, could hardly become a panacea and with a guarantee to protect the territory of Germany from raids.
To obtain maximum combat effectiveness, German troops should have deployed air defense systems in all dangerous areas and next to all objects that attract the enemy's attention. Moreover, they should have been combined with existing air defense systems. The simultaneous use of artillery, fighters and missiles could cause serious damage to the strike force. Moreover, the heaviest missiles with one explosion could damage several bombers at once.
"Waterfall" being tested by American specialists, April 1, 1946. Photo by US Army
The combat use of the air defense missile system at the front line or in the tactical depth was not possible. Deploying such systems at the front could be overly difficult, and in addition, they risked becoming an easy target for artillery or tactical aviation.
The actual use of most German missiles should have been difficult due to the specifics of the controls. The use of manual control "by three points" made it possible to solve the assigned tasks, but imposed certain limitations. The effectiveness of such control directly depended on the quality of the operator's optical instruments and on the weather conditions. Cloudiness could make it difficult or even exclude the use of air defense systems. The only exception was the Wasserfall missile, for which a semi-automatic radar system was developed.
The flight performance estimates indicate that German missiles - if reached - could pose a serious threat to aircraft and strike forces. The high speed of the missiles and the ability to maneuver reduced the likelihood of timely detection and destruction of Allied bombers by standard defenses. They could not count on the help of fighters either.
Guided missile Enzian. Photo National Museum of Aeronautics and Astronautics / airandspace.si.edu
According to their tabular characteristics, the German missiles blocked the main working heights of the Allied long-range aviation. Thus, an increase in flight altitude, which had previously reduced the negative impact of artillery, could no longer help in the new situation. It was also impossible to count on relatively safe flights in the dark - the "Waterfall" air defense missile system, devoid of optical search means, was not dependent on natural light.
Traditional defenses were unlikely to help, but the missile threat had to be reduced with new means. By that time, the Coalition already had the simplest means of electronic warfare, which could interfere with the work of German radars and, at least, make it difficult to detect and track aircraft. Accordingly, missile guidance became more complicated.
The answer to the new weapon could also be new tactics, as well as promising aircraft weapons. Air defense systems of Germany could spur the development of guided weapons of the Allies - especially since the first samples of this kind already existed and were used.
Unrealized benefits
Thus, with a massive release and competent organization, German missiles could well influence the course of battles and prevent Allied raids. At the same time, the enemy could take action and partially protect himself from such weapons. In fact, another arms race was outlined in the field of aviation and air defense.
SAM Enzian at the Australian War Memorial's Treloar Technology Center. Photo Wikimedia Commons
However, in order to obtain such results, the Third Reich had to bring the projects to serial production and operation in the army. This he did not succeed. For technical, technological, organizational and other reasons, not a single SAM sample went beyond the test ranges. Moreover, in the last months of the war, Germany had to close projects that no longer made much sense. As a result, until the spring of 1945, German troops had to continue to use only existing models, not counting on a fundamentally new weapon. The results of this development are well known. Hitlerite Germany was defeated and ceased to exist.
However, the German developments have not disappeared. They went to the Allies and in some cases were developed. Based on their own ideas and revised German solutions, the winning countries were able to create their own air defense systems and successfully bring them to operation.
From the point of view of practical results, the German missile defense projects - with all their positive features - turned out to be useful only for the enemy. During the war, such developments led to unnecessary and, as it turned out, useless waste of time, effort and resources. These resources could be used to supply troops, delivering additional problems to the enemy, but they decided to throw them on promising projects. The latter, in turn, had no effect on the course of the war. In the future, the achievements created by the Nazi regime at their own expense went to the winners. And they were able to re-use the wrong decisions of others in their favor. All this makes it possible to consider German developments in the field of anti-aircraft missiles as both a technological breakthrough and useless projection at the same time.
