He said that in 1941 the T-34 tank cost the state 269 thousand rubles, in 1942 - 193 thousand, and in 1945 - 135 thousand. The cost of the Il-4 aircraft changed from 800 thousand rubles in 1941 to 380 thousand in 1945. Shpagin's submachine gun cost 500 rubles in the first year of the war, 400 rubles the next year and 148 rubles by the end of the war. In total, during the war, about 50 billion rubles were saved on purchases of military equipment.
For comparison, we can cite the cost of German technology (without weapons, radio, optical and special equipment). Source: Werner Oswald "Complete catalog of German military vehicles and tanks 1900-1982". Exchange rate in 1940: 1 Reichsmark - 2, 12 Soviet rubles. Tanks: Pz II (Sd. Kfz. 121) - 49 300 RM, heavy infantry gun on the chassis of the Pz 38 (t) tank ("Marder") - 53 000 RM, Pz III (Sd. Kfz. 141) - 96 200 RM, assault gun StuG III - 82,500 RM, Pz IV (Sd. Kfz. 161) - 103,500 RM, "Panther" - 130,000 RM, "Tiger" - 260,000 RM. A fully equipped tank was sold filled with full ammunition. "Tiger", for example, cost the Panzerwaffe about 350,000 RM. Fighter aircraft Bf-109 - 60,000 RM, with weapons, radio equipment, etc. - 100,000 RM. Before the war, the K98 rifle cost 70 Reichsmarks, the MP.38 submachine gun - 57 Reichsmarks, the MG.34 light machine gun - 327 Reichsmarks.
Crews of T-34 tanks from the 130th Tank Brigade of the Red Army. 1942 year
Obviously, the victory of the USSR in the war was caused by the difference in views on the future war and, accordingly, the industrial and economic systems proceeding from this concept. Based on the lessons of the First World War, Berlin wanted to avoid a war on two fronts (for this they entered into a secret conspiracy with the masters of London) and a protracted, positional war that was depleting the country's resources. It was decided to defeat the economically strong, with a large population, France and England, and in the east - the USSR, it was decided with the help of the strategy of "lightning war" (blitzkrieg), ensuring the qualitative superiority of the armed forces for a short time. That is, the question of the priority of the mass character of technology was not raised. The calculation of the blitzkrieg strategy and the quality of weapons gave a good chance to achieve victory in cash, without total mobilization. Success in Europe (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Northern Europe, France, etc.) confirmed the correctness of the chosen course. Therefore, the Germans could afford to improve the existing machines, create more and more new types of weapons, etc.
In the USSR, on the contrary, they drew different conclusions. The Russian empire (agrarian power) could not withstand the protracted war due to the weakness of the industry, which was unable to supply the troops with rifles, guns and ammunition, to launch mass production of airplanes, etc. Technological lag behind the Western countries became one of the most important reasons for the defeat of Russia. The USSR carried out industrialization, with an emphasis on heavy industry, the military-industrial complex. A highly developed industry, a means of production, has been created in the Union, especially machine building and metalworking; socialist industry became independent of the capitalist countries and was able to fully provide the national economy with equipment, and the Soviet army with military equipment; ensured high rates of production; changed the geographical location of industry and created new industrial bases in the eastern regions of the country, this made it possible to ensure high rates of industrial production in the conditions of war and the occupation of the old industrial bases of Russia in the west by the enemy; a powerful working class was formed in the country, technically literate and educated politically and culturally.
In addition, Moscow knew that the "Russian question" in a new big war would be dealt with as cruelly as possible. Fascist and Nazi regimes in Europe were characterized by extreme aggressiveness and hatred of Soviet civilization. Therefore, the Soviet Union was preparing for an all-out war of survival. As a result, the quality and debugging of military equipment were sacrificed for the sake of mass character. For example, it is well known that the equipment of Soviet tanks with communications equipment, optics and interior decoration was much worse than that of the Germans, especially in the initial period of the war.
As you know, the Soviet Union won the most brutal war on the planet and proved the correctness of the chosen strategy. The blitzkrieg mechanism in the vast Russian expanses failed in the first year of the war, and a protracted war of attrition began. In the first period of the war, the Red Army suffered defeat after defeat at the hands of the high-class military machinery of the Third Reich. However, the Union turned out to be ready for such a war, the military industry not only did not reduce production, but increased it, and Germany's stake on a lightning-fast campaign and quality superiority was beaten. The losses of the Wehrmacht were constantly growing, and in 1942 it became obvious that there was no way to produce high-quality German equipment in quantities that would make up for the losses. It turned out that even the most advanced combat vehicles in small numbers are not able to turn the tide of hostilities. In addition, the gap between the combat capabilities of German and Soviet military equipment is not so great that German quality becomes a decisive factor in victory. But the Soviet numerical superiority turned out to be able not only to make up for the catastrophic losses of the beginning of the war and further bloody battles, but also to influence the outcome of the war as a whole. The Germans realized that it was impossible to fight in the previous economic regime, without full mobilization. I had to start mobilizing the country's economy. But it was already too late, in the conditions of war, these actions were very late, it was necessary to prepare before the start of a big war, as in the USSR.
Column of Soviet T-34-85 before the march. The picture was supposedly taken in Hungary in 1944-1945. Photo source:
