Troubles. 1920 year. At the beginning of 1920, General Slashchev's corps withdrew behind the isthmus and for several months successfully repelled the attacks of the Red Army, preserving the last refuge of the White Army in southern Russia - Crimea.
As a result, the Crimean peninsula became the last bastion of the White movement, and Slashchev rightfully acquired the honorary prefix "Crimean" to his surname - the last military leader in the history of the Russian army.
General situation
In the fall of 1919, the ARSUR suffered a strategic defeat during the campaign against Moscow. White troops retreated everywhere, lost their former positions, lost Kiev, Belgorod, Kursk, Donbass, Don region and Tsaritsyn. Denikin took the main forces behind the Don, in the direction of the North Caucasus. Part of the Volunteer Army, the grouping of General Schilling, remained in Novorossiya (Crimea, Kherson and Odessa). The 3rd Army Corps of General Slashchev (13th and 34th Infantry Divisions, 1st Caucasian, Chechen and Slavic Regiments, Don Cavalry Brigade Morozov), which fought against Makhno in the Yekaterinoslav region, was ordered to go beyond the Dnieper and organize the protection of the Crimea and Northern Tavria.
At first, it was planned to send the 2nd Army Corps of General Promtov there, but then the plans changed, and the 2nd Corps was assigned to defend the Odessa direction. Slashchev believed that this was a mistake. If initially larger white units were sent to the Crimea, they could not only conduct a defense, but also counterattack, preventing the Reds from attacking the Caucasus.
Slashchev-Krymsky
Yakov Aleksandrovich Slashchev (Slashchov) was noted as one of the most successful commanders of the White Army. From a noble family, hereditary military man. Graduated from the Pavlovsk military school (1905) and the Nikolaev military academy (1911). He served in the guard, taught tactics in the Corps of Pages. He fought bravely during the First World War and was wounded several times. Awarded with the Order of St. George, 4th degree, St. George's arms. He rose to the rank of colonel, was assistant to the commander of the Finnish regiment, in the summer of 1917 he was appointed commander of the Moscow Guards regiment.
At the end of 1917 he joined the White movement, was sent to the North Caucasus to form officer units. He served as chief of staff of the partisan detachment Shkuro, then chief of staff of the 2nd Kuban Cossack division, General Ulagai. Since the fall of 1918, he commanded the Kuban Plastun brigade, in 1919 he was promoted to major general, first commanded a brigade of the 4th division, then the entire 4th division.
Slashchev already had experience of military operations in the Crimea. In the spring of 1919, he held the Kerch bridgehead, when the entire Crimean peninsula was occupied by the Reds. During the general offensive of Denikin's army, he launched a counteroffensive, took part in the liberation of the Crimea from the Bolsheviks. He successfully fought against the Makhnovists and was appointed commander of the 3rd Army Corps.
Among his soldiers and subordinates he enjoyed great respect and authority, he was nicknamed General Yasha. High discipline and combat capability were maintained in its units. He was a contradictory person, so his contemporaries gave him a variety of characteristics. They called him a drunkard, a drug addict, a clown (for shocking antics) and an adventurer. At the same time, energy, personal courage, strong will, the talent of a commander, the tactics of a commander who, with small forces, successfully resisted the superior forces of the enemy, were noted.
Denikin wrote in his memoirs about Slashchev:
“Probably, by nature, he was better than the timelessness, success and gross flattery of the Crimean animal lovers made him. He was still a very young general, a man of posture, shallow, with great ambition and a thick touch of adventurism. But behind all this, he possessed undeniable military ability, impulse, initiative and determination. And the corps obeyed him and fought well."
Battle for Crimea
Having received Denikin's order to defend Northern Tavria and the Crimea, Slashchev shot down the Makhnovist barriers and by the beginning of 1920 had withdrawn his troops to Melitopol. Slashchev had few troops: only about 4 thousand fighters with 32 guns, and the 13th and 14th Soviet armies were advancing from the north. True, Slashchev was lucky. The Soviet command dispersed its forces: it launched an offensive simultaneously from the area of the Lower Dnieper in both the Odessa and the Crimean directions. If the Reds left Odessa alone for a while and concentrated on the Crimea, then the Denikinites would not have had a chance to keep the peninsula. The forces were too unequal.
Correctly assessing the situation, Slashchev did not linger in the steppes of Tavria and immediately went to the Crimea. He did not have troops to successfully conduct hostilities in the large theater of operations in Tavria. But he could hold out on narrow isthmuses. Soviet troops tried to cut off the whites from the isthmuses, but they did not succeed. The White General gave the order:
“He took command of the troops defending the Crimea. I declare to everyone that as long as I am in command of the troops, I will not leave Crimea and I make the protection of Crimea a question of not only duty, but also honor."
The main forces of the whites fled to the Caucasus and Odessa, but a mass of individuals and wreckage of units, mainly rear, economic, fled to the Crimea. But this allowed Slashchev to replenish his corps, improve the material part, he even received several armored trains (albeit in need of repair) and 6 tanks.
Slashchev held a military meeting with senior commanders who were in the Crimea. He outlined his plan: there are few troops and they are too upset to defend, passive defense, sooner or later, with the superiority of the enemy's forces and means, will lead to defeat, therefore it is necessary to conduct a maneuverable struggle, having a large reserve, to respond with blow for blow. Cover the flanks with the fleet, leave only guards on the isthmus, the enemy will not be able to deploy forces on the isthmus, it will be possible to beat him in parts. Take advantage of winter conditions. The winter was frosty, there was almost no housing on the isthmus, and the Whites, like the Reds, did not have the opportunity to organize a positional struggle in such conditions.
The commander decided to arrange the main position along the southern coast of the Sivash, to the north of Yushun, a flank position was prepared with the front to the west, the main reserve was located in the Bohemka - Voinki - Dzhankoy area. He did not allow the enemy to attack, he attacked the unfolding enemy himself, preferably on the flank.
Slashchev withdrew parts of the isthmus, to settlements, set up only guards and concentrated troops and reserves to parry enemy attacks. The Reds suffered from frost, could not deploy troops in a narrow place and defeat the attacker because of the isthmuses of the enemy's strength. Meanwhile, while the Reds once again went to storm the fortifications, overcoming narrow isthmuses, exhausted, frozen, Slashchev raised his fresh units, counterattacked and threw the Reds back. In addition, the conflict between the Bolsheviks and Makhno began again; in February, hostilities began between the Reds and the Makhnovists, who wedged themselves into the positions of the 14th Soviet army. All this allowed Slashchev to keep the Crimean front.
The White Navy also played a role. The supremacy of the Whites on the sea made the landing of the Reds in the Crimea from the rear impossible. The commander of the naval detachment, Captain 1st Rank Mashukov, and the detachment of Colonel Gravitsky on the Arabat Spit played a positive role in holding the Crimea. Slashchev also took a number of decisive measures to solve the problem of supplying troops and restoring order in the rear. He ordered at all costs to build a railway to Yushun from Dzhankoy, this solved the supply problem. With the most severe measures, he cleared the rear of the bands, reinforced the local garrisons with strong commanders.
The red units moved slowly and only by January 21 they surrounded the isthmuses. This allowed Slashchev to gather all his forces and prepare for the defense. In addition, the enemy went to the isthmuses in parts, which also facilitated the White defense of the Crimea. The recklessness of the Reds, their underestimation of the enemy, also played a role. The Red Army marched forward victoriously, whites fled everywhere. This relaxed the troops. The first to reach the isthmus were units of the 46th Infantry and 8th Cavalry Divisions (about 8 thousand people).
At dawn on January 23, 1920, the 46th Soviet Division launched an attack on Perekop. Everything went according to Slashchev's scenario: the white guard escaped (the Slavic regiment - 100 bayonets), the fortress battery (4 guns) fired, then the artillerymen withdrew at about 12 o'clock; The Red Army men occupied the rampart and pulled themselves into the isthmus. The Reds occupied Armyansk and moved towards Yushun, then night fell. The Reds had to spend the night in an open field in a frost of 16 degrees. At that time, there was panic in the Crimea, the newspapers reported about the fall of Perekop and Armyansk, everyone was going to flee, in ports they were loaded onto ships. At dawn on January 24, the Red troops continued their offensive and came under fire from the Yushun position. The Whites (34th division, Vilensky regiment and Morozov's cavalry brigade) counterattacked. The Reds were defeated and retreated, and soon their retreat turned into a flight. The white guards took up their former positions, the rest of the units returned to their apartments. The first victory significantly increased the morale of Slashchev's corps.
Subsequent battles developed according to a similar plan. On January 28, the Reds' offensive was supported by the 8th Cavalry Division, but the Whites again threw back the enemy. Gradually building up their forces, the Reds on February 5 made another attempt at an offensive. They walked across the ice of the frozen Sivash and took Perekop again. And again Slashchev struck a counterattack and threw the enemy back. On February 24, there was a new assault. The Reds broke through the Chongar Isthmus and even took Dzhankoy on the move. Then they were stopped again and driven back.
Crimean politics
Interestingly, Slashchev's tactics terribly unnerved the Crimean public, the rear and allies who were sitting in Crimea on pins and needles. They were greatly frightened that the Reds had infiltrated the Crimea over and over again. In their opinion, the general should have put his soldiers in trenches and fortifications. Part of the military demanded to replace Slashchev with another general. The head of the government, General Lukomsky, fearing a breakthrough by the Bolsheviks in the Crimea, asked to replace the obstinate commander "with a person who could enjoy the confidence of both the troops and the population." However, the tactics of the white commander turned out to be quite successful. Therefore, Denikin did not change the initiative and decisive commander.
In general, the psychological atmosphere in Crimea was difficult. There were still several political forces that had a negative attitude towards whites. Bandits and red partisans waged their own war. They were reinforced by new mobs of refugees and deserters who scattered across the peninsula and plundered villages. There was a threat of an uprising on the peninsula in favor of the Reds. There were also many refugees in the cities. Among them there were many military, capable men, but, like in Odessa, they did not want to fight on the front lines. Many only wanted to fill their pockets, find a ship and escape to Europe, or dissolve among the Crimean population. The local military authorities could not, and did not want to do anything about it. At the same time, the situation of the refugees did not seem as dire as that of the refugees in Odessa or Novorossiysk. In material and economic terms, everything was relatively well. There were battles on Perekop, but the peninsula itself was a typical rear area. In addition, the Crimea was cut off from the high command, left to itself, Denikin was in the Kuban, Schilling - in Odessa. The peninsula has become a focus of intrigue, gossip, political squabbles, conflicts, presenting a vivid picture of the internal discord of the White movement. From Slashchev's report dated April 5, 1920 to Wrangel:
"Intrigues in the small territory of Crimea are growing incredibly."
One of the breeding grounds for this "infection" was the white fleet. Denikin practically did not interfere in the affairs of the fleet. The White Navy lived its own life, became a "state within a state." There were many problems. Many ships were in need of major repairs. There was an acute shortage of qualified sailors, they were recruited from gymnasium students, students. The personnel were very different. Some ships, like the destroyers Zharkiy and Pylkiy, were at the forefront, supporting the ground units. On other ships, especially transports, the picture was different. Here the carriages decomposed. They sailed between various Black Sea ports, the sailors engaged in speculation, earned good money. All this was done under any government: under the Germans and the hetman, under the French, red and white. On the coast, the Sevastopol command was engaged in the "revival of the fleet", inflated headquarters, rear bases and port services. There were enough officers, they fled here from other ports of the Black Sea, from the Baltic Fleet and Petrograd. Only these officers were not of the best quality: logisticians, careerists and opportunists. Military officers who were not afraid to go against everyone died back in 1917 or fought on land. Coastal headquarters and services were a good feeding trough. Therefore, even the high command of the fleet was of dubious quality.
In the conditions of the civil war, these headquarters had nothing to do. Nobody really wanted to go to war, so they were engaged in gossip and intrigue. The chief of staff of the fleet, Admiral Bubnov, even organized a "naval circle", where they analyzed the "mistakes" of the command of the ground forces. All orders received were immediately criticized, the naval ones got into "politics." From civilian and naval politicians, the army's rear also became infected, everyone wanted to play "politics" and "democracy". This soon led to Orlov's mutiny.
Orlovshchina
In Simferopol, the Duke of Leuchtenberg and Captain Orlov, a brave officer, but decomposed and with a mental disorder, were engaged in the formation of reinforcements for Slashchev's corps. Doubtful people began to group around him. Local Bolsheviks even came into contact with him. The city began to talk about the impending uprising. Having recruited more than 300 people, Orlov refused to take the position by order of the command and on February 4, just before the next assault by the Reds, he seized power in Simferopol. Other rear units of the whites, which were in the city, declared "neutrality." Orlov arrested the Tavrichesky governor Tatishchev, the chief of staff of the troops of the Novorossiysk region, General Chernavin, the commandant of the Sevastopol fortress Subbotin, and others, announcing that they were "corrupting the rear." He announced that he expresses the interests of the "young officers". He asked for the support of the "comrades of the workers."
This rebellion stirred up the entire peninsula. In Sevastopol, the "young officers", following the example of Orlov, were going to arrest the fleet commander, Admiral Nenyukov, and the chief of staff, Bubnov. Slashchev, repelling another attack of the Red Army, was forced to send troops to the rear. Most of Orlov's detachment fled. He himself, with the rest, freed the arrested, took the provincial treasury and went into the mountains.
Meanwhile, another squabble began in the rear. After the fall of Odessa, General Schilling arrived in Sevastopol. He was immediately accused of the Odessa disaster. The naval command demanded that Schilling transfer command in the Crimea to Wrangel (without Denikin's consent). General Wrangel at this time resigned and arrived on the peninsula while on vacation. The same demands were put forward by various public and officer organizations. General Lukomsky was of the same opinion. Assessing the situation, Wrangel agreed to take command, but only with the consent of Denikin. Slashchev, having learned about this conflict, said that he would obey only the orders of Schilling and Denikin.
At this time, Orlov descended from the mountains and captured Alushta and Yalta. Generals Pokrovsky and Borovsky who were in Yalta tried to organize resistance, but their detachment fled without a fight. The generals were arrested, the local treasury was plundered. Schilling sent the ship "Colchis" with the landing party against Orlov. However, the crew and the landing party refused to fight and returned to Sevastopol, bringing Orlov's appeal. He called for uniting forces around Wrangel. The rear seethed even more.
Crimean Troubles
Since the fall of Odessa and the arrival of Schilling and Wrangel on the peninsula, the struggle for power on the peninsula begins. Stormy correspondence and negotiations took place between Sevastopol, Dzhankoy (Slashchev) and Tikhoretskaya (Denikin's headquarters). This caused great excitement ("turmoil") in the Crimea. Under pressure from Lukomsky, Schilling invited Wrangel to lead the Sevastopol fortress and rear units in order to restore order. Wrangel refused this "temporary" post, so as not to aggravate the situation with a new division of powers. Lukomsky sent one telegram after another to Denikin, proposing to appoint Wrangel as the Crimean commander. This idea was supported by Schilling, who was broken by the Odessa catastrophe. The Crimean public did not believe Schilling and demanded that Wrangel be appointed "Crimean savior".
However, Denikin rested. He saw in this situation another intrigue against himself. He categorically refused to transfer power. In addition, Denikin rightly feared that such a concession and the "election" of the command "would only aggravate the" Crimean turmoil. " On February 21, admirals Nenyukov and Bubnov were dismissed from service, and previous requests for the resignation of Lukomsky and Wrangel were satisfied. Denikin issued an order to "liquidate the Crimean turmoil", where he ordered all the participants in the Oryol mutiny to appear at the headquarters of the 3rd corps and go to the front to atone for the sight with blood. A Senatorial Commission was established to investigate the causes of the turmoil. Orlov went to negotiations, obeyed the order and went to the front. But in March he again raised a mutiny: he unauthorizedly took away his detachment, planned to seize Simferopol and was defeated by the slushchevs. I ran to the mountains again.
Wrangel was advised to leave Crimea for a while. Wrangel considered himself insulted and departed for Constantinople. From there, he sent a pamphlet letter to Denikin, which he conveyed to the public, accusing the commander-in-chief:
"Poisoned by the poison of ambition, having tasted power, surrounded by dishonest flatterers, you have already thought not about saving the Fatherland, but only about preserving power …"
The baron accused Denikin's army of "arbitrariness, robbery and drunkenness." This letter was widely circulated by opponents of Denikin.
At this time, while the rear was seething and intriguing, battles continued on the isthmuses. Slashchev continued to defend himself. The Reds were building up their forces in the Crimean direction. The Estonian rifle division of Sablin was pulled up. The commander of the 13th Army, Hecker, was actively preparing for the offensive. As a result, by the beginning of March 1920, a shock group was formed from parts of the 13th and 14th armies, which included the 46th, Estonian and 8th cavalry divisions. Slashchev also did not sit still, was actively preparing for a new battle: he formed a consolidated regiment of the 9th cavalry division (400 sabers), a combined guards detachment (150 fighters), replenished the convoy and deployed a battalion of German colonists to the cavalry regiment (up to 350 fighters), horse-artillery battalion and howitzer battalion (from the guns of the fugitives).
On March 8, the Red Army again launched an assault on the isthmus. Everything repeated: the Reds again took Perekop, on the 10th they reached Yushuni, overturned the brigade of the 34th division, which fled to Voinka in complete disarray. By the morning of March 11, about 6 thousand Red Army men passed through the Perekop Isthmus to the Crimea and they developed an offensive from Yushun to Simferopol. Slashchev struck with all the forces at his disposal (about 4500 bayonets and sabers). By 12 o'clock the Reds were already retreating. The Reds suffered such losses that the 46th and Estonian divisions had to be united.
As a result, Slashchev held the Crimea in January - March 1920 in front of the significantly superior forces of the Reds. The Whites lost the Caucasus, evacuated from Novorossiysk to their last refuge - the Crimean bridgehead. Already in exile, Slashchev wrote:
"It was I who dragged out the Civil War for fourteen long months …"
On March 22 (April 5), 1920, General Denikin transferred his powers to Baron Wrangel. He combined in his person the posts of commander-in-chief and ruler of the South of Russia. In fact, he became a military dictator. The army was transformed into a Russian army.
Thus, the Crimean peninsula became the last bastion of White Russia, and General Yakov Slashchev rightfully acquired the honorary prefix "Crimean" to his surname - the last of the generals in the history of the Russian army.
