A sea-foam shroud was all that this frigate expected when meeting the enemy.
Last week my esteemed colleague listed the advantages of the Oliver Perry and elevated it to the standard of naval weapons. It turned out that many of the ideas implemented in the creation of "Perry" should be used in the construction of domestic warships.
But were those ideas that helpful?
And will there be any benefit from a ship designed with an eye on a foreign frigate from a bygone era?
We need to stop seeing Perry as a simple, cheap and, therefore, a mass ship.
It did not become widespread because it was cheap. And it was not cheap because it was planned to become widespread. The logic based on domestic examples does not work in the case of Perry.
Serial construction of frigates (51 for the US Navy) was carried out in the period 1977-1989. During the same period, the fleet was replenished with … 53 warships of the "cruiser" and "destroyer" classes!
31 "Spruens" and 14 "Ticonderogs" up to 1989 inclusive. Plus the "white elephants", by chance, the destroyers "Kidd", who happened to be under the striped flag, are the strongest in their class. And hi-end "exotic" - four atomic cruisers "Virginia".
That's the whole truth about simple and cheap "workhorses". If the main body of the Navy really consisted of 4,200-ton ships of a simplified design, designed according to the methods of "Oliver Perry", such a fleet would be worthless.
In addition to 53 cruisers and destroyers of new projects, the US Navy included over 20 missile cruisers, Kunz / Faragat missile destroyers and other serious equipment of the past decades. As of the mid-late 1980s, the number of large warships actually exceeded the number of "cheap and massive" frigates.
Just as nowadays the number of Berks built is four times the number of smaller LCSs.
Frigates "Perry" came out cheap because they were going to perform a limited range of tasks, behind the backs of their senior colleagues. And 51 of them were built, because the Yankees considered it necessary just such a number of auxiliary ships.
Nobody was chasing numerical records and mass character.
The choice of "Perry" for the role of a reference in the design of future Russian ships can cause nothing but a smile
Taking into account the role and purpose of the project, further questions to the technical side of the ship disappear. The forced compromises in its design did not come as a surprise to the customer.
With a given displacement on the technological backlog of the 70s, the frigate was obliged to concede in combat capabilities to cruisers and destroyers.
The appearance of "Perry" was chosen not by a computer, but by living people. In their ideas about the frigate as a single-shaft ship with a sharp clipper nose, simple chopped superstructure and transom stern with a displacement of approx. 4000 tons, the creators of "Perry" were guided by its predecessors - anti-submarine frigates of the "Knox" type. Taking into account these preferences, the computer calculated the exact dimensions and helped to choose the optimal layout of the compartments and mechanisms. But the trends were set by people themselves, looking at existing projects of similar sizes.
The predecessors, "Knox", were created to escort convoys in the third world war. Where only Soviet submarines could become the only enemy on the transatlantic routes.
With a displacement of 4,000 tons, the frigate "Knox" was fully consistent with its purpose. Taking into account the volume and complexity of the work to be done, it was a very expensive ship carrying the most sophisticated anti-submarine weapons of that time.
"Knox" did not know how to do anything else, and until the end of his days he never learned anything.
As for the Perry, its creators used a hull similar in size to the Knox to create a ship for daily service in the cold war, which had to enter the zones of local conflicts, where every boat and aircraft found could be the carrier of an anti-ship missile … Where they could shoot from the shore. Where at any moment a battle could break out with the "mosquito forces" of an unpredictable enemy (who was considered an ally in the morning). Where the ship could be required to provide artillery support to forces on the shore. Or a lightning strike on the deck of an enemy corvette, using missiles with a disabled proximity fuse.
The Yankees considered a frigate with a primitive two-coordinate radar and a single-channel air defense system acceptable for these purposes. In the absence of full-fledged countermeasures and electronic warfare.
In addition, the frigate was equipped with a single "Falanx" covering the aft corners, that is, in the language of specialists, it had an open air defense circuit.
Taking into account the "one-armed" launcher and the accepted consumption of two missiles per target, the frigate had every chance of not surviving a meeting even with a pair of enemy aircraft. However, like any other ship of its size, built using the technologies of the 1960-1970s.
The customer received exactly the kind of frigate the Navy needed: an auxiliary unit of the second or even third rank, on which it was a pity to spend an extra cent.
The safety of the Perry was not guaranteed by the strength of its weapons or the training of its crew. Let's paraphrase the Soviet commander, who proudly responded to the provocative calls of NATO ships:
- You are going on a dangerous cruise.
- Our safety is ensured by the flag of the Soviet Union!
Breaking the Perry was not difficult. It is then difficult to survive under the sanctions. However, once this logic did not justify itself.
The consequences of the attack on "Stark" do not contain sensational overtones
Such a ship could not sink from the hits of a pair of "Exosets", all the damage fell above the waterline. The explosion of the second "Exoset" effectively coped with the fire that arose from the engine stuck in the superstructure of the anti-ship missile system. Which, paradoxical as it sounds, even eased the position of the frigate.
Unlike Sheffield, which was damaged at the end of the earth, Stark was located near the American base in Bahrain, where he was brought the next day.
As for the general assessment of survivability, the Perry frigates received the traditional for that time superstructure made of fire-hazardous aluminum-magnesium alloys. Subsequently, this decision was found unacceptable, and such ships have not been built for a long time.
The single-shaft design of the power plant is another compromise. The creators of "Perry" considered such a decision to be justified for a second-rate 2-rank unit.
The statement of my colleague that there is no effect on survivability when using a one- or two-shaft power plant scheme is contrary to common sense. It is interesting how the experience of using single-shaft ships in the years of WWII was analyzed, if warships of the main classes with a single-shaft power plant simply did not exist.
Even the smallest destroyers of that time with a displacement of approx. 2000 tons were equipped with a two-shaft power plant.
Of course, the two-shaft power plant radically increased survivability. There are a great many cases of combat damage to a propeller on one shaft or destruction of engine rooms on one side. At the same time, the ships retained the ability to set in motion. An example is the second trip to Feodosia by the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz.
Is it worth looking for meaning where there is none?
The Oliver Perry-class frigate was programmed to kill. The only question was the willingness to give him a fight. As time has shown, none of his opponents had the determination (or the need) to attack small ships. The unique incident with "Stark" has remained a mystery of history. Who gave the insane order and for what purpose?
In addition to the compromises, the Perry design contained positive elements. Among them, a set of technical means under the abbreviation LAMPS, which made it possible to link together all the anti-submarine means of the frigate, including search and sighting systems on board helicopters. When criticizing the Perry, one should not forget about the scientific and technical level of the country in which that ship was created.
The Oliver Perry's fatal congenital flaw was her mediocre seaworthiness. In fresh weather, with a longitudinal roll, the bow of the frigate was shown out of the water, after which a terrible blow followed (bottom slamming). In addition to the loss of the sonar's performance, the constant impacts destroyed the already fragile structure, causing multimeter cracks in the superstructure.
It had nothing to do with the size of the Perry; it, like any ship, was small only on paper. The reason for the slamming was too large an elongation of the hull (9, 7), which made it possible to do with a lower power plant at full speed. And, probably, mistakes in the design of contours.
Apparently, the computer did not take into account something in the calculations.
At the beginning of the new century, the Perry underwent extensive modernization: the "one-armed bandit" was dismantled from their decks, and a patch was welded in its place. Left without missile weapons, they began to gradually withdraw from the fleet.
If twenty years ago the decommissioned Perry was a welcome gift for the US allies, today they are not even of interest to them. Modern ships have long had a different look and are built to different standards.
