How the Duce tried to take over the southern part of France

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How the Duce tried to take over the southern part of France
How the Duce tried to take over the southern part of France

Video: How the Duce tried to take over the southern part of France

Video: How the Duce tried to take over the southern part of France
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How the Duce tried to take over the southern part of France
How the Duce tried to take over the southern part of France

80 years ago, on June 10, 1940, Italy declared war on France and Great Britain. Mussolini feared to be late for the division of the "French pie" promised to him by a quick German victory in France.

Italian empire

By the beginning of a new world war, Italian fascism set itself the goal of creating a great colonial Italian empire following the example of Ancient Rome. The Italian empire's sphere of influence was to include the basins of the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Red Seas, their coasts and lands in North and East Africa.

Thus, Mussolini dreamed of capturing the western part of the Balkan Peninsula (Albania, Greece, part of Yugoslavia), a significant part of the Middle East - the territories of Turkey, Syria, Palestine, all of North Africa with Egypt, Libya, French Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. In East Africa, Italy laid claim to Abyssinia-Ethiopia (in 1935-1936 the Italian army occupied Ethiopia) and Somalia. In Western Europe, the Italians planned to include the southern part of France and part of Spain in their empire.

Duce waited until France was on the verge of complete defeat. By this time, little remained of the French front. German panzer divisions broke it, and several "cauldrons" arose. Less than in Dunkirk, but also large. Numerous garrisons of the fortifications of the Maginot Line were blocked. On June 9, the Germans occupied Rouen. On June 10, the French government of Reynaud fled from Paris to Tours, then to Bordeaux, and essentially lost control of the country.

Up to this point, the Italian leader was openly afraid to go to war. He, in fact, supported the position of most of the German generals, who feared war with France and Great Britain. Hitler's game looked painfully risky. However, the brilliant and seemingly easy victories of the Fuhrer in Holland, Belgium and Northern France knocked the Duce out of the chosen line, aroused burning envy of the Reich's successes. The Dunker operation showed that the outcome of the war had been determined. And Mussolini twitched, wanted to cling to the victory, the section of the "French pie". He turned to Hitler, said that Italy was ready to oppose France.

Hitler, of course, understood the full implications of the Duce policy. But he was used to looking condescendingly at the weakness of a partner. He did not offend, expressed his joy that Italy is finally showing military brotherhood. He even offered to join the war later, when the French were finally crushed. However, Mussolini was in a hurry, he wanted battle laurels. As Duce himself said to the chief of the Italian General Staff, Marshal Badoglio: "I need only a few thousand killed in order to sit down as a participant in the war at the table of a peace conference." Mussolini did not think about the prospects of a possible longer war (including the war with England), for which Italy was not ready.

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Ready for war

Italy concentrated army group West against France under the command of the heir to the throne, Prince Umberto of Savoy. The army group consisted of the 4th Army, which occupied the northern sector of the front from Monte Rosa to Mont Granero, and the 1st Army, which stood in the area from Mont Granero to the sea. In total, the Italians initially deployed 22 divisions (18 infantry and 4 alpine) - 325 thousand people, about 6 thousand guns and mortars. In the future, the Italians planned to bring the 7th Army and separate tank divisions into the battle. This increased the Italian forces to 32 divisions. In the rear, the 6th Army was also formed. The Italian Air Force numbered over 3,400 aircraft; over 1,800 combat vehicles could be deployed against France.

The Italians were opposed by the French Alpine army under the command of Rene Olry. The French were significantly inferior to the Italian group, with only 6 divisions, about 175 thousand people. However, the French troops were in advantageous, well-equipped engineering positions. The Alpine Line (continuation of the Maginot Line) was a serious obstacle. Also in the French army there were dozens of reconnaissance detachments, selected troops prepared for mountain warfare, trained in rock climbing and had the appropriate ammunition. The Italian divisions, concentrated in narrow mountain valleys, could not turn around, outflank the enemy and use their numerical superiority.

The Italian army was inferior in quality than the French, in morale and logistical support. Even the First World War showed the low fighting qualities of the Italian soldier and officers. By the Second World War, there were no significant changes. Fascist propaganda created the image of an "invincible" army, but this was an illusion. Even before the war, in the spring of 1939, the German General Staff drew up a detailed report on "the limits of the capabilities of the Italian empire in the war," in which the weaknesses of the Italian troops were frankly stated. The Fuhrer even ordered the withdrawal of this document from headquarters so as not to undermine the credibility of the partner in the military-political alliance.

Italy was ill-prepared for war. By the beginning of the invasion of France, Italy had mobilized 1.5 million people and formed 73 divisions. However, only about 20 divisions were brought to 70% of the wartime states, another 20 divisions - up to 50%. The divisions were weakened, two-regimental composition (7 thousand people), the number of artillery was also reduced. The Italian division was weaker than the French in terms of personnel training, strength, armament and equipment. The troops lacked weapons and equipment. The Italian army was notable for its low mechanization. There were not enough tank units. Only a few divisions could be called motorized and armored. However, there were no full-fledged motorized or tank divisions, such as those of Germany or the USSR. The mobile units were armed with outdated Carro CV3 / 33 tankettes, armed with two machine guns and bulletproof armor. There were very few new M11 / 39 medium tanks. At the same time, this tank had weak armor, weak and outdated armament - a 37-mm gun.

The technical equipment of the Italian army was hampered by a relatively low level of development of the military industry and a lack of funds (there were many plans, and finances were "singing romances"). The army lacked anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Mussolini repeatedly asked Hitler to send him various weapons, including 88-mm anti-aircraft guns. Artillery in general was outdated, a significant part of the guns survived from the First World War. Mussolini's Air Force attached great importance. Aviation consisted of a large number of aircraft, but most of them were of obsolete types. The Italian pilots had high morale and were ready for war. The quality of the infantry was low, the non-commissioned officer corps was small in number and performed mainly administrative and economic functions. A significant part of the young officers consisted of reserve officers with minimal training. There were not enough regular officers.

The fleet was best prepared for war: 8 battleships, 20 cruisers, over 50 destroyers, over 60 destroyers and over 100 submarines. Such a Navy, with the employment of the British in other theaters, could well achieve dominance in the Mediterranean. However, the fleet also had serious shortcomings. In particular, the shortcomings of combat training (the fleet neglected training in the conduct of hostilities at night); strong centralization of management, which stifled the initiative of the middle and lower command staff; the absence of aircraft carriers, poor cooperation between the fleet and coastal aviation, etc. A serious problem of the Italian fleet was the chronic lack of fuel. This problem was solved with the help of Germany.

Thus, the Italian military was well suited for the political bluff of the Duce. But in terms of the quality of their command, morale and training, material and technical equipment, the Italian troops were seriously inferior to the enemy.

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Combat action. Italian occupation zone

Initially, the Allies in the Alps planned to attack. However, at the end of 1939, Olrie's army was reduced, its mobile units were sent north, to the German front. Therefore, the army had to defend itself. In late May 1940, the Anglo-French Supreme Military Council decided that if Italy went to war, the Air Force would strike at naval bases and industrial and oil-related centers in northern Italy. The allies wanted to lure the Italian fleet out into the open sea and defeat it. However, as soon as Italy entered the war, the Supreme Council of the Allies, in connection with the general catastrophe, abandoned any offensive action against the Italians.

Initially, the Italian command also abandoned active ground forces. The Italians waited for the French front to finally collapse under German pressure. Italian aviation only carried out raids on Malta, Corsica, Bizerte (Tunisia), Toulon, Marseille and some important airfields. A limited number of machines were used in the operations. In response, the French fleet shelled the industrial area of Genoa. British aircraft bombed oil reserves in the Venice region and industrial facilities in Genoa. The French bombed targets in Sicily from bases in North Africa. On the Alpine line, ground forces fought artillery fire, there were minor clashes between patrols. That is, at first there was a "strange war". The Italian army did not want a full-fledged assault on enemy positions, which could lead to serious losses.

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On June 17, the new French government of Petain asked Hitler for an armistice. France's proposal for an armistice was also sent to Italy. Pétain addressed the people and the army on the radio with an appeal to "end the struggle." Having received a proposal for an armistice, the Fuhrer was in no hurry to accept this proposal. First, the Germans planned to use the collapse of the French front to occupy as much territory as possible. Secondly, it was necessary to resolve the issue of the territorial claims of the Duce. Italian Foreign Minister Ciano handed over a memorandum in which Italy claimed territory up to the Rhone River. That is, the Italians wanted to get Nice, Toulon, Lyon, Valence, Avignon, to gain control of Corsica, Tunisia, French Somalia, naval bases in Algeria and Morocco (Algeria, Mers el-Kebir, Casablanca. Also Italy was to get part of the French navy, aviation, weapons, transport. The Duce's lip was not a fool. In fact, if Hitler agreed to these claims, then Mussolini gained control over the Mediterranean basin.

Hitler did not want such a strengthening of the ally. In addition, Germany had already put France in a humiliating position, now a new humiliation could follow. Italy did not defeat France to impose such conditions. The Fuehrer believed that at this moment it was inappropriate to present "unnecessary" demands to the French. The French armed forces in the metropolis were crushed at this moment. However, the French still had a huge colonial empire with colossal material and human resources. The Germans did not have the opportunity to immediately seize the overseas possessions of France. The French could create a government in exile, continue the struggle. A strong French fleet would have withdrawn from its bases in France and taken over by the British. The war would take on a protracted nature, dangerous for the Reich. Hitler planned to end the war in the West as soon as possible.

To prove his usefulness and solvency to the Germans, on June 19, Mussolini ordered a decisive offensive. On June 20, Italian troops in the Alps launched a general offensive. But the French met the enemy with strong fire and held the line of defense in the Alps. The Italians had little progress only in the southern sector of the front in the Menton area. Mussolini was furious that his army could not capture a large chunk of France by the beginning of the peace talks. I even wanted to drop an airborne assault (a regiment of Alpine riflemen) in the Lyon area. But the German command did not support this idea, and the Duce abandoned it. As a result, 32 Italian divisions were unable to break the resistance of about 6 French divisions. The Italians have proven their reputation as bad soldiers. True, they didn't really try. The losses of the sides were small. The French lost about 280 people on the Italian front, the Italians - over 3800 (including more than 600 killed).

On June 22, 1940, France signed an armistice with Germany. On June 23, the French delegation arrived in Rome. On June 24, the Franco-Italian armistice agreement was signed. The Italians, under pressure from Hitler, abandoned their initial demands. The Italian occupation zone was 832 sq. km and had a population of 28, 5 thousand people. Savoie, Menton, part of the Alps territory went to Italy. Also on the border of France, a 50-kilometer demilitarized zone was created. The French disarmed bases in Toulon, Bizerte, Ajaccio (Corsica), Oran (port in Algeria), some zones in Algeria, Tunisia and French Somalia.

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