The desire of Georgia to expand its territory at the expense of the Sochi District led to a Georgian volunteer war. Georgian troops were defeated, Denikin's army returned Sochi to Russia.
The first contacts of the Volunteer Army with Georgia
During the campaign of the Taman Army ("Heroic Campaign of the Taman Army"), which was retreating under the onslaught of volunteers, at the end of August 1918, the Reds clashed with units of the infantry division of the Georgian Republic near Gelendzhik. The Georgian army, based in Tuapse, occupied the Black Sea coast to Gelendzhik. The Tamans easily knocked down the advance shield of the Georgians and on August 27 occupied Gelendzhik.
Continuing the offensive, the Reds overturned the Georgians near the village of Pshadskaya, and on August 28 approached Arkhipo-Osipovka, where they encountered more serious resistance. Reinforcements - an infantry regiment and a battery - approached the Georgian forward forces. The Georgians opened heavy fire and stopped the Tamans. Then the Reds with the help of cavalry bypassed the enemy and completely defeated him. The Georgians suffered serious losses. On August 29, the Tamans occupied Novo-Mikhailovskaya. On September 1, the Tamans in a fierce battle, again using a roundabout cavalry maneuver, defeated the Georgian division and took Tuapse. The Reds lost several hundred people killed and wounded, and destroyed, according to the commander of the Taman army Kovtyukh, the entire enemy division - about 7 thousand people (apparently, an exaggeration, for the most part Georgians simply fled). At the same time, the Tamans, who had practically exhausted their ammunition, captured a large number of trophies, weapons and supplies from the Georgian infantry division in Tuapse. This allowed the Taman division to continue the campaign and successfully break through to their own.
After the departure of the Tamans from Tuapse, the Georgians again occupied the city. Almost simultaneously with them volunteers, Kolosovsky's cavalry entered the city. On the instructions of Denikin, the former Quartermaster General of the headquarters of the Caucasian Front E. V. Maslovsky, left for the Tuapse region. He was supposed to unite all anti-Bolshevik forces on the Black Sea coast to Maikop. At the same time, relying on his authority as the former quartermaster general of the headquarters of the Caucasian Front, Maslovsky had to include the Black Sea region in the sphere of the Volunteer Army. Many former officers of the Russian Imperial Army, such as General Mazniev, became the core of the Georgian army. The commander of the Georgian division, Mazniev, agreed to become subordinate to the Volunteer Army (DA). The head of the Volunteer Army, General Alekseev, sent a letter to Mazniev expressing his joy at the union.
Denikin during this period tried to limit the disintegration of Russia, keeping the Transcaucasus in its sphere of influence. Georgia, according to Denikin, lived "by the Russian heritage" (which was true) and could not be an independent state. Also in Georgia were the main rear warehouses of the former Caucasian Front, and the whites needed weapons, ammunition and equipment for the war with the Reds. Denikin wanted to receive part of this legacy of the Russian Empire. In addition, Georgia at that time was under the influence of Germany, and Denikin considered himself loyal to the alliance with the Entente.
It seemed that the two anti-Bolshevik forces would enter into a lasting alliance. Georgian leaders, whose policy Denikin described as "anti-Russian", did not want an alliance with either the Bolsheviks or the volunteers. The Mensheviks saw a threat in both the Bolsheviks and whites. The Georgian Mensheviks were real revolutionaries, they took part in organizing the February Revolution and the subsequent turmoil in Russia. Now they feared both the Bolsheviks, who had established their dictatorship and "with iron and blood" reunited the empire, and Denikinists, whom they regarded as reactionary. A "colonialist" force hostile to social democracy and trying to destroy all the gains of the revolution.
Therefore, General Mazniev was accused of Russophilia and recalled to Tiflis. He was replaced by General A. Koniev. He took a tough stance against the volunteers. Georgian troops were withdrawn from Tuapse and formed a front near Sochi, Dagomys and Adler, where the Georgians pulled together additional forces and began to build fortifications. Thus, Tiflis blocked the further advance of Denikin's army along the coast.
Negotiations in Yekaterinodar
To find a common language, the white command invited the Georgian side to negotiate in Yekaterinodar. The Georgian government sent a delegation to Yekaterinodar headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs E. P. Gegechkori, who was accompanied by General Mazniev. Negotiations took place on September 25-26. The volunteer army was represented by Alekseev, Denikin, Dragomirov, Lukomsky, Romanovsky, Stepanov and Shulgin. On the part of the Kuban government, the ataman Filimonov, the head of the government Bych and a member of the government Vorobyov took part in the negotiations.
The following issues were raised at the meeting: 1) the establishment of trade between Georgia and the Kuban regional government, YES; 2) the question of the military property of the Russian army on the territory of Georgia. Denikin wanted to receive weapons and ammunition, if not gratuitously, as allied aid, then in exchange for food (food was bad in Georgia); 3) the question of the border, belonging to the Sochi District; 4) on the situation of Russians in Georgia; 5) about the possible alliance and the nature of Georgia's relations with the DA. The Whites wanted to see a benevolent neighbor in Georgia in order to have a calm rear and not have to keep serious forces on the Georgian border, so necessary to fight the Reds.
However, the negotiations quickly fell through. Neither side was able to make fundamental concessions. The white government was not going to give Tiflis the Russian territories of the Black Sea province, although they were de facto occupied by the Georgian army. The Georgian side did not want to soften the Russophobic policy towards Russians in Georgia and return the illegally occupied Sochi district. According to Denikin's information, most of the district's villages were Russian, the rest with a mixed population and only one Georgian. And Georgians made up only about 11% of the population in the Sochi district. At the same time, the Sochi District was turned from a wasteland into a flourishing health resort with Russian money. Therefore, General Denikin rightly noted that Georgia had no rights to the Sochi district either for historical or ethnographic reasons. Abkhazia was also forcibly seized by Georgia, but on it Denikin and Alekseev were ready to make concessions if the Georgians cleared Sochi.
According to the Georgian delegation, there were 22% of Georgians in the Sochi district and the DA cannot represent the interests of the Russians, as it is a private organization. Tiflis considered the Sochi district to be very important in terms of ensuring the independence of Georgia. The Georgians planned to turn the Sochi region into an "insurmountable barrier" for the White Army of Alekseev and Denikin.
The situation with regard to the Russians in Georgia was difficult. It is worth noting that, in general, the Georgian people treated Russians well, and the government, with the support of the nationalist minority, pursued a Russophobic policy. In Georgia, as Russia moved in the Caucasus, a significant Russian community was formed of various specialists and employees. In addition, after the World War in Georgia, and the headquarters of the Caucasian Front was located in Tiflis, several thousand Russian officers remained. The Georgian authorities feared them, considered them unreliable and disloyal to the new government. Russian officers, if they wanted, could take power in Georgia, but there was no organizing force among them. Many were at a loss, for them the Caucasus, Tiflis was their homeland, and suddenly they became "strangers", "abroad." That is why Russians in Georgia were “harassed” with all sorts of nagging, deprived of civil rights, and with active protest they were arrested and deported. Russian officers in Tiflis lived in poverty, for the most part they did not have capital, sources of income, were in a beggarly state. At the same time, the Georgian authorities diligently suppressed the attempts of officers to leave to join the Volunteer Army. It is clear that all this irritated Denikin.
At the same time, with the radicalization of local authorities and the growth of nationalist sentiments, the situation of Russians in Tiflis became simply dangerous. Russian officers were beaten, robbed and maimed by gangs of nationalists and the tramps and criminals who joined them. Russians found themselves in Georgia “outside the law”, that is, defenseless. It is clear that in such a situation, the mass of officials, employees and military thrown into the street began to look for a way out. Many decided to flee to Little Russia. -Ukraine, for this they were looking for "Ukrainian roots". Hetman Ukraine hoped to get rid of the threat of nationalists and the arrival of the Bolsheviks (under the protection of German bayonets). As a result, most of the officers fled to Ukraine.
Thus, the negotiations failed due to the intransigence of the parties. Alekseev expressed his readiness to recognize "friendly and independent Georgia", but he harshly raised the question of the need to end the persecution of Russians in the newly formed Georgian state and the withdrawal of the Georgian army from Sochi. In turn, Gegechkori, this “desperate, vicious, intolerant Georgian chauvinist,” as the famous Russian politician and ideologist of the Whites, Shulgin, described him, took a firm stand. He did not admit that Russians were oppressed in Georgia and refused to recognize the Volunteer Army as the legal successor of the Russian Empire, thereby insulting Alekseev. The Georgian side refused to leave the Sochi District.
Commander of the Volunteer Army, General A. I. Denikin, late 1918 or early 1919
White Guard-Georgian War
After the failure of the negotiations in Yekaterinodar in the Sochi District, until the end of 1918 - the beginning of 1919, the position of "no peace, no war" remained. The volunteers were stationed south of Tuapse, occupying the village of Lazarevskoye with the advance units. Opposite them, at the Loo station, were the Georgian forces of General Koniev. The Georgians continued to plunder the Sochi District and oppressed the Armenian community. Local residents asked Denikin's army to free them from the Georgian occupation.
The reason for the start of an open confrontation between Georgia and the DA was the Georgian-Armenian war that began in December 1918. After the withdrawal of the German-Turkish occupation forces, the Georgian government, continuing its policy of expansion, decided to establish control over the regions of the former Tiflis province of Borchaly (Lori) and Akhalkalaki, where the Armenian population predominated. In addition, the richest copper mines were located in the Lori region. Thus, one Alaverdi Copper Chemical Combine produced one fourth of the copper smelting of the entire Russian Empire.
The war was stopped under British pressure. British troops have landed in Georgia. The British forced the Armenians and Georgians to conclude peace. In January 1919, an agreement was signed in Tiflis according to which, until the final resolution of all disputed territorial issues at the Paris Conference, the northern part of Borchali district was transferred to Georgia, the southern part to Armenia, and the middle part (in which the Alaverdi copper mines were located) was declared a neutral zone and was under control Englishmen. The Armenian authorities agreed to withdraw their claims to the Akhalkalaki district on the condition that the district is under British control and the participation of Armenians in local self-government is guaranteed.
Because of the war with Armenia, the Georgians began to transfer troops from the Sochi district to the line of the new front. Volunteers began to move, occupying the abandoned territories. On December 29, the Georgians left the Loo station, which was occupied by the whites. Then the withdrawal of the Georgian troops stopped, and for a month the sides occupied positions on the Loo River.
The war between Armenia and Georgia was reflected in the Armenian community of the Sochi district. The Armenians, who made up one third of the region's population, revolted. In many respects it was caused by the predatory, repressive policy of the Georgian authorities. Georgian troops began to suppress the uprising. The Armenians turned to Denikin for help. The commander-in-chief ordered the commander of the troops in the Black Sea region, General Matvey Burnevich, to occupy Sochi. At the same time, Denikin ignored the demand of the commander of British troops in the Caucasus, General Forestier-Walker, to stop the offensive in the Sochi district until England's consent was obtained.
On February 6, 1919, the Denikinites crossed the Loo River. From the rear, the Georgian troops attacked the Armenian partisans. The Georgian commander, General Koniev, and his headquarters at that time were walking at a wedding in Gagra. Therefore, the attack of the Russian troops was unexpected for the Georgians. With little resistance, the Georgian troops surrendered. White occupied Sochi. General Koniev was taken prisoner at the same time. A few days later, the Denikinites liberated the entire district, Gagra, and reached the border of the Bzyb River. Georgia sent 6 battalions of the People's Guard to the river, but the further development of the war was stopped by the British. They divided the warring parties with their post. The British command issued an ultimatum to Denikin demanding that the Sochi circle be cleared. However, Denikin refused to give up the Russian land. Koniev and his soldiers were returned to Georgia some time later. The Georgian authorities responded by stepping up a repressive policy towards the Russian community.
Subsequently, DA and Georgia remained in hostile relations. In the spring of 1919, when the white command transferred the main forces to the north to fight the Red Army, the Georgians prepared an offensive to recapture Sochi. Behind Bzyb 6 - 8 thousand were concentrated. soldier with 20 guns. In addition, an uprising of the "green" bandits was organized in the rear of the whites. Under the onslaught of the Georgian army, the Whites retreated across the Mzymta River. With the help of reinforcements from Sochi, the Whites defeated the Greens and stabilized the front. The Whites were preparing a counterattack, but at the suggestion of the British they entered into new negotiations. They led nowhere. The front stabilized at Mehadyri.
Until the spring of 1920, the white command kept from 2, 5 to 6, 5 thousand people on the Black Sea coast in order to restrain the Georgians and the "greens" who were supported by the Georgian authorities who were trying to organize an uprising in the rear of the White Army. In addition, Georgia, like Azerbaijan, supported the uprisings of highlanders and jihadists in Chechnya and Dagestan. Tiflis tried to support the creation of a mountain republic in the North Caucasus in order to obtain a buffer territory between Georgia and Russia. Therefore, Georgia supported the insurgent bandit formations, sending instructors, fighters and weapons to the mountainous regions of the North Caucasus.
In the spring of 1920, the Red Army reached the borders of the Black Sea province and the Georgian government had to abandon plans to expand Georgia at the expense of Russian territory.
White 2nd Infantry Division in the city of Sochi, liberated from the troops of independent Georgia. 1919 year
