"Perm catastrophe"

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"Perm catastrophe"
"Perm catastrophe"

Video: "Perm catastrophe"

Video: "Perm catastrophe"
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100 years ago, on the night of December 24-25, 1918, Kolchak's troops, defeating the 3rd Red Army, took Perm. However, the successful offensive of the White Army was stopped by the counterstrike of the 5th Red Army, which on December 31 took Ufa and created a threat to the left wing and rear of the Siberian Army.

Situation on the Eastern Front

By the beginning of November 1918, the Red Army on the Eastern Front had achieved significant successes: on the right flank (4th Red Army), in the center (1st and 5th Armies). At the same time, the 2nd Red Army occupied the Izhevsk-Votkinsk region (How the Izhevsk-Votkinsk uprising was suppressed; Storming Izhevsk), which entered the Red Front like a wedge and for quite a long time tied up significant forces of the Reds, fettering their operational freedom. These successes were accompanied by the disintegration of the Directory's troops, especially in the Ufa direction. The 3rd Red Army, which had the main enemy forces against itself, was in a more difficult position. However, the defense was stable, and the Reds achieved a number of private successes.

Thus, the general situation at the front was favorable for the Reds and made it possible to develop an offensive in the course of a new campaign. Therefore, the main command of the Red Army decided that the crisis on the Eastern Front had been overcome and that it was possible, at the expense of its troops, to strengthen other fronts, mainly the Southern. At the same time, only the right flank of the Eastern Front was weakened, the left, that is, the 3rd army, was strengthened - the 5th and 7th rifle divisions and the brigade of the 4th rifle division. So, on November 6, it was proposed to separate the entire 1st Army from the Eastern Front to strengthen the Southern Front. At the same time, marching reinforcements in the rear were sent not to the Eastern, but to the Southern Front. New units formed in the rear of the Eastern Front were also redirected. For example, on November 4, the 10th Infantry Division, which was completing its formation in Vyatka, was ordered to be transferred to the Tambov-Kozlov area, in order to then be sent to the Western Front.

At the same time, the Red Army continued its offensive on the Eastern Front. This was due to a number of factors. First, this was due to the strength of the initial blow of the Reds in the Ufa direction, which they inflicted on the Whites. Secondly, there was a process of internal disintegration of the Directory's army, its combat effectiveness fell sharply. Thirdly, the Czechoslovak units, which were the combat core of the White Army, began to leave the front lines in the rear. The Czechs, who sympathized with the Social Democratic government, did not support the military coup in Omsk, but under pressure from the Entente did not oppose the coup. Moreover, they were tired of the war and no longer wanted to fight when they received the news of Germany's surrender. The slogan "home" has become the most popular among Czech legionnaires. They began to leave the front, and coming out of the fighting atmosphere, the Czechoslovak army began to quickly decompose, the main activity of the legionnaires was personal and collective enrichment before returning to their homeland. Their military echelons now resembled freight trains filled with various goods plundered in Russia.

Therefore, in November, all the armies of the Red Eastern Front, except for the 3rd, continued their offensive. So, from 11 to 17 November 1918, the Reds advanced in the Orenburg direction for two transitions to Orenburg. The Reds also advanced in the Ufa direction, attacked Birsk in the Menzelinsky direction, and took the city of Belebey. On the Votkinsk direction, after the capture of Votkinsk on November 11-13, the Reds crossed the Kama. Only in the Perm region did the fighting go on with varying success.

The situation changed only at the beginning of December. In the Ufa direction, White launched a counteroffensive, trying to restrain the Reds. In the area of Belebey, stubborn battles began, he was temporarily lost to the Reds. In the Sarapul direction, the 2nd Army continued to slowly develop its success, occupying a wide strip on the left bank of the Kama. In the sector of the 3rd Army, the Whites began to crowd out the Reds.

After the military coup on November 18, 1918, when, in conditions of complete military and economic failure of the Social Democratic Provisional Government (Directory), the military, with the consent of the Entente, appointed Admiral Alexander Kolchak as the "supreme ruler". The dictator retained the military strategy of the White Czechs: the offensive of the main army forces in the Perm-Vyatka direction, access to Vologda in order to connect with the northern parts of the Whites and the interventionists, and gain access to the ports of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. In fact, Kolchak inherited the military plans of the Czechoslovak command, which sought to find a closer path to Europe (northern ports) than Vladivostok. This idea was supported by the Entente and was followed by General Vasily Boldyrev, Commander-in-Chief of the Directorate troops. On November 2, 1918, the general prepared a directive on the offensive of the Yekaterinburg group of the Siberian army to capture Perm and reach the Kama river line.

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The supreme ruler A. V. Kolchak presents the regimental banner. 1919 g.

However, in fact, it was a strategic impasse. The White command, due to the interests of the Entente, neglected the main operational direction (to Moscow) and the more important southern one, where it was possible to establish contact with the strong armies of the White Cossacks on the Don and Kuban (through the Volga Route and Tsaritsyn). The northern direction was very extensive and absorbed the main striking force of the White Army, communications here were less developed. By the time of the offensive of Kolchak's troops, the Northern Front of the Entente and the Whites was finally shackled by the onset of winter and could not help the Kolchak people with a counter strike. Even with the complete success of the operation and the unification of the Eastern and Northern anti-Bolshevik fronts, the whites received vast areas with an insignificant population and a weak economic (industrial and agrarian) potential. The Bolsheviks retained control over the most developed central part of Russia. The northern front was too weak to seriously strengthen the combat potential of Kolchak's army. The invaders did not strive deep into Russia and did not want to be in the first roles in the battles with the Reds. The West was solving the problem of kindling a fratricidal civil war in Russia, and was not going to use its troops for decisive operations in the vast Russian expanses. It is not surprising that the Czechoslovak units, which were under the control of the Entente, soon left the White Guard front, which also affected the activity of Kolchak's army.

The 2nd Red Army under the command of V. I. Shorin numbered 9.5 thousand bayonets and sabers with 43 guns and 230 machine guns. The 3rd Army of M. M. Lashevich included more than 28 thousand bayonets and sabers with 96 guns and 442 machine guns. They were opposed by the Yekaterinburg and Perm groups of the Siberian army: more than 73, 5 thousand bayonets and sabers, 70 guns and 230 machine guns.

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Artillery of the White Czechs near Kungur

Perm operation

On November 29, 1918, the Whites began the Perm operation. The offensive was started by the Yekaterinburg group of the Siberian army (the 1st Central Siberian army corps of General A. Pepelyaev and the 2nd Czech division), numbering about 45 thousand soldiers. The 3rd Red Army, under the onslaught of superior enemy forces, begins to lose its stability. On November 30, the Reds leave the Vyya station and move to the Kalino and Chusovaya stations. White breaks through the front of the 3rd Army. On December 11, the Kolchak workers took the Lysvensky plant, on December 14 they went to the line of the Chusovsky plant - Kungur. The Reds are trying to stop the enemy at the turn of the river. Chusovaya, but due to heavy losses (up to half of the personnel) and the weak combat capability of the units, they continued their retreat to Kungur and Perm.

It should be noted that the main reason for the rapid defeat of the 3rd Red Army was not its numerical weakness compared to the enemy, but its qualitative weakness. By this time, the army had enough reserves, but its best cadres from the Ural proletariat had already been knocked out, and the influx from the center of the country from relatively well-trained and disciplined, politically literate units had stopped. The 3rd Red Army was replenished with marching battalions with companies from mobilized peasants in the Vyatka and Perm provinces, which were distinguished by weak combat and political training. They only corrupted the rest of the troops, and did not strengthen them. Also, among the reasons for the defeat of the Reds, they note: the length of the front (400 km), lack of food and fodder, natural conditions (severe frosts, deep snow) in the absence of winter uniforms, shoes, fuel and vehicles.

On December 15, Pepeliaev's corps, pursuing the 3rd Army, occupied the Kalino and Chusovaya stations. The command of the Red 3rd Army still had strong quantitatively, but obviously weak qualitatively, reserves. The forces of the 29th and 30th rifle divisions occupied random positions in a continuous wooded and swampy area 40-50 km long, covering Perm from the north and east. Therefore, there were strong gaps in the red line of defense. The Red Command reinforced its left flank from Perm with three regiments of local formations from a special division (up to 5 thousand people) and a Separate Kama brigade (2 thousand soldiers). Several echelons of the 4th Ural Division were sent from Perm to reinforce the 29th division. Then the last army reserve, the brigade of the 4th Ural division, was withdrawn from Perm. As a result, the 3rd Army was left without reserves, which were used to no avail, and Perm was left without a garrison and proper defense. The Whites used the enemy's mistakes and wooded terrain in order to break through to Perm in the interval between the separate sections of the defense of the 3rd Army, which was formed due to the betrayal of one of the new regiments.

On December 24, Kolchak united the Yekaterinburg and Perm groups into a new Siberian army under the command of R. Gaida. On December 21, the Kolchakites took Kungur. On the night of December 24-25, the White Guards captured Perm. The Reds left the city without a fight and fled along the railway line to Glazov. The Kolchakites captured the reserve battalion of the 29th rifle division, large reserves and artillery - 33 guns. White crossed the Kama on the move and captured a large bridgehead on its right bank. There was a threat of a breakthrough by Kolchak's troops to Vyatka and the collapse of the entire left flank of the Red Eastern Front. However, the successful offensive of the Siberian army in the Perm direction soon died out. On December 27, in connection with the successes of the 5th Red Army in the Ufa direction, the white command stopped the offensive in the Perm direction and began to withdraw troops to the reserve. The front of the 3rd Red Army stabilized in front of Glazov. On December 31, Kolchak began to form a new separate Western army under the command of General M. V. Khanzhin (as part of the 3rd Ural corps, Kama and Samara military groups, later - the 8th Ufa and 9th Volga corps), for Ufa direction.

The main command of the Reds drew attention to the crisis situation in the sector of the 3rd Army. On December 10, 1918, it ordered to restore the situation at the front, and to fend off the enemy's attack on Perm by maneuvering the forces of the 2nd and 5th armies. However, the 3rd Army could not restore the situation due to the lack of front reserves, which could be immediately thrown into battle in a dangerous direction. And the results of the operations of the 2nd and 5th armies could not immediately affect the sector of the 3rd army. Therefore, the Reds continued to conduct stubborn oncoming battles and in places to advance in the Orenburg, Ufa and Sarapul directions to the east, and the 3rd Army continued to retreat. On December 14, the main command, in connection with the crisis in the sector of the 3rd Army, sets the command of the Eastern Front to develop an offensive on the Yekaterinburg-Chelyabinsk front. On December 22, the main command once again instructed the 2nd Army to come to the aid of the 3rd.

After the fall of Perm, the main command took measures to strengthen the defense of Izhevsk and Votkinsk. The 2nd Red Army was categorically ordered to stop the offensive to the east and turn north to act in the flank and rear of the enemy's Perm group. On December 27, they decided to leave the 1st Army on the Eastern Front, canceling its transfer to the south. On December 31, the troops of the 5th red army took Ufa, creating threats to break through the white front. On January 6, 1919, Kolchak confirms the transition of troops to the defensive in the Perm region, and sets the task of defeating the red group in the Ufa region and recapturing the city.

In mid-January 1919, the red command organized a counteroffensive in order to recapture Perm, Kungur and restore the situation at the front. The operation was attended by the troops of the 3rd Army (more than 20 thousand bayonets and sabers) and the 2nd Army (18, 5 thousand people), which was reinforced by a brigade of the 7th rifle division from the reserve of the main command and two regiments from the 5 th army. Also, an auxiliary blow to Krasnoufimsk was inflicted by the strike group of the 5th Army (4 thousand people), which in the Ufa region went over to the defensive with its main forces. On January 19, 1919, the 2nd Army went on the offensive from the south and the strike group of the 5th Army, on January 21, the 3rd Army. The operation did not lead to success, affected by: haste in organization and slow regrouping, lack of superiority in forces in the zone of the 2nd Army, as well as harsh winter conditions. By January 28, the 2nd Red Army had advanced 20-40 km, the 3rd Army - 10-20 km, the strike group of the 5th Army - 35-40 km. The red troops were unable to create a serious threat to the Perm group of whites. Unable to break through the enemy's front, the Reds went over to the defensive.

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Map source: Soviet Historical Encyclopedia

Outcomes

Kolchak's army on its right flank broke through the red front and defeated the 3rd army, captured Perm and Kungur. The first stage of establishing communication with the Northern Front through Vyatka and Vologda was successfully implemented. The Whites captured the large urban center and the important Motovilikha factories, as well as a serious communications junction - water, railway and dirt roads.

However, the white command's offensive plan did not receive further development. This was due, firstly, to the measures of the red command. On December 31, the Red 5th Army took Ufa. Kolchak was forced to stop the offensive in the Perm direction. The White Siberian Army went over to the defensive, repelling the Red counteroffensive and preparing a new blow in the Ufa direction.

Secondly, this was due to the strategic mistake of the white command. White stepped on a rake a second time, advancing in the northern, Permian direction. This direction, due to its vast space, climatic and local conditions (swamps and solid forests), small population and weak economic potential, greatly impeded the conduct of offensive operations and absorbed the strike forces of the White Army. In addition, the Northern Front of the interventionists and whites by this time was shackled by winter conditions and could not help Kolchak's army. By this time, part of the Czechoslovakians had left the front line.

Thus, the first success of the whites did not lead to a decisive result, and the neglect of the white command to the main operational direction quite soon led Kolchak's army to a general defeat.

In the Soviet leadership, the loss of Perm became a pretext for an internal party struggle: Lenin - Stalin against Trotsky - Sverdlov. Lenin used the situation to restore his positions as party leader and supreme commander, who were shaken after his injury and temporary absence from the political Olympus. Also, the "Perm catastrophe" became the next stage after the Tsaritsyn conflict in the confrontation between Stalin and Trotsky. Even before the Perm operation, the People's Commissar for Military Affairs and the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, Trotsky, came into conflict with the local Bolsheviks and the leadership of the 3rd Army, demanding to punish the commissars who were supposed to watch the military experts (in particular, in the summer of 1918, the commander of the 3rd Army B. Bogoslovsky went over to the side of the whites). Then Stalin and Dzerzhinsky were assigned to investigate the events of the "Perm catastrophe".

On January 5, 1919, members of the Central Committee arrived in Vyatka, the headquarters of the 3rd Army. After conducting an investigation, they blamed the Revolutionary Military Council and the command of the 3rd Army. Among the reasons for the defeat identified by Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, the following were noted: errors of the army command, the decomposition of the rear (the arrests of supply personnel, convicted of negligence, inaction, drunkenness and other malfeasance, began); the weakness of the local party and Soviet bodies (they began to be purged and strengthened); "Littering" the army with "class alien, counter-revolutionary elements" (Dzerzhinsky toughened up his policy towards military experts); lack of manpower and material reserves, poor material supply of the army. Also, the party commission of inquiry noted the mistakes of the RVSR headed by Trotsky, in particular, the lack of normal interaction between the 2nd and 3rd armies. Lenin praised the activities of the commission. Later, in the 1930s - 1940s, Soviet historiography began to assess Trotsky's activities in this episode of the Civil War as treacherous.

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Perm cannon factories in Motovilikha. Photo source:

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