Troubles. 1920 year. 100 years ago, in January-February 1920, the Red Army defeated General Schilling's Novorossiysk group and liberated Odessa. The Odessa evacuation was another disaster for the white South of Russia.
Defeat of the Novorossiysk group of Schilling
After the breakthrough of the Reds to Rostov-on-Don, the forces of the ARSUR were cut into two parts. The main forces of the White Army under Denikin's command were pushed back beyond the Don. In Novorossia, white units remained under the command of General Schilling - the former Kiev group of General Bredov (Right-Bank Ukraine), the 2nd Army Corps of General Promtov and the 3rd Army (Crimean) Corps of Slashchev.
General Schilling's grouping was weak, had contact with Denikin's troops only by sea, in addition, at the beginning of 1920, it was divided. Two corps (Promtova and Bredova) remained on the right bank of the Dnieper, covering Kherson and Odessa, and Slashchev's corps, which had previously fought against the Makhnovists in the Yekaterinoslav region, was sent to defend Northern Tavria and the Crimean peninsula. However, Slashchev's units were the most combat-ready in the White Novorossiysk grouping. Schilling's other troops were few in number and inferior in combat capability to other volunteer units. Without Slashchev's corps, Schilling could not give a serious battle for Novorossiya.
Thus, the volunteers were unable to organize strong resistance in the Novorossiysk region. On the Right Bank, the Whites retreated, and if they tried to hold out somewhere, the Reds easily bypassed them, crossed the Dnieper in other areas. The Denikinites retreated further. By January 1920, the front ran along the Birzula - Dolinskaya - Nikopol line. The White Guards retained the territories of the Kherson and Odessa regions. Meanwhile, the Red Army continued its offensive. The entire 12th Soviet army of Mezheninov has already crossed over to the Right Bank of Little Russia. From Cherkassy and Kremenchug, the 14th Soviet army of Uborevich also turned south. On January 10, 1920, on the basis of the Southern Front, the South-Western Front was created under the command of Yegorov, it was supposed to complete the defeat of the Whites in Novorossiya.
The White Guards had no rear. The peasant war raged in Little Russia. The villages were engulfed in insurgencies of all kinds - from self-defense and ordinary bandits to "political" ones. The Aleksandrovsk - Krivoy Rog - Dolinskaya railway was controlled by the Makhno army. Detachments of Petliurites operated from Uman to Yekaterinoslav. Therefore, there was no normal communication between the command, headquarters and units. The remnants of White Guard units and subunits, numbering from tens to several hundred fighters, often burdened with families and civilian fugitives, acted independently, often moving at random, obeying the general inertia of the flight and interfering with the crowds and carts of refugees.
Odessa "fortress"
In the current catastrophic situation, the commander-in-chief of the AFYUR Denikin was not going to defend Odessa. It seemed more faithful to pull together combat-ready units to Kherson, and from there it was possible, if necessary, to break through to the Crimea. The Red Army also could not create a continuous front and it was possible to elude the main forces of the enemy. Therefore, at first, Schilling was given the main task - to cover the Crimea. Therefore, the troops had to be withdrawn to the left bank of the Dnieper in the region of Kakhovka and Kherson.
However, the Entente insisted on the defense of Odessa. Since the French occupation of Odessa, this city in the West has become a symbol of the entire white South of Russia, its loss, according to the allied missions, finally undermined the prestige of the White Guards in Europe. Also, the Odessa region covered Romania from the Reds, which occupied part of the Russian land, and feared the presence of the Red Army at the border. In addition, it was important for the Entente to preserve Odessa for strategic reasons (control over the Northern Black Sea region). The allies promised to deliver the necessary weapons and supplies to Odessa. They also promised to support the British fleet.
As a result, under pressure from the allied command, the Whites made concessions and decided to defend Odessa. The 2nd Army Corps of Promtov received the task, instead of forcing the Dnieper in the rear of the 14th Soviet Army and entering the Crimea to connect with Slashchev's corps, to protect Odessa. The White Guards demanded that the Entente, in case of failure, guarantee the evacuation of the allied fleet and agree with Romania on the passage of retreating troops and refugees into its territory. The allies promised to help with all this. The headquarters of the French commander in Constantinople, General Franchet d'Espre, told Denikin's representative that Bucharest generally agreed, putting forward only a number of particular conditions. The British informed General Schilling about this.
In Odessa itself, chaos reigned. Nobody thought about creating a "fortress". Even the numerous officers who fled here in all the last years of the war, thought only about evacuation and preferred to play patriotism, creating numerous officers' organizations and not wanting to leave the city to fight on the front lines. Therefore, it was not possible to mobilize any reinforcements in the large and crowded city. Some townspeople were looking for ways to escape abroad, others, on the contrary, believed that the position at the front was strong and there was no cause for concern, and still others were waiting for the arrival of the Reds. For bribes, officials wrote many citizens who wanted to avoid the army as "foreigners". The criminal world, speculation, smuggling and corruption continued to flourish. As a result, all mobilizations were thwarted. Even the assembled recruits, having received weapons and uniforms, immediately tried to sneak away. Many of them joined the ranks of bandits and local Bolsheviks.
On paper, they created many volunteer units, which in reality could number several people or were generally the fruit of the imagination of some commander. Sometimes it was a way to avoid the front line while the "regiment" was in the "formation stage." Also, the parts were created by various crooks in order to get money, equipment, and then disappear. The well-known politician V. Shulgin recalled: “At a critical moment from the twenty-five thousandth“coffee army”, which was pushing through all the“brothels”of the city, and from all parts of the newly formed and old ones that nailed to Odessa … - at the disposal of Colonel Stoessel, the“chief of defense ", It turned out about three hundred people, counting with us."
Odessa evacuation
The allied command "slowed down" the organization of the evacuation. In Constantinople it was reported that the fall of Odessa was "doubtful" and "incredible." As a result, the evacuation began too late and proceeded slowly.
In mid-January 1920, the Red Army took Krivoy Rog and launched an offensive on Nikolaev. At the forefront of the attack was the 41st Infantry Division and Kotov's cavalry brigade. Schilling, leaving Promtov's corps on the defensive in the Kherson direction, began to pull Bredov's group into the Voznesensk area in order to organize a flank attack on the enemy. However, the Reds were ahead of Denikin's forces, and with all their might struck at Promtov before Bredov's units had time to concentrate and counterattack. Promtov's corps, drained of blood in previous battles, due to the typhus epidemic and mass desertion, was defeated, the defense of the whites was broken. The remnants of the white units fled across the Bug. By the end of January, the Red Army occupied Kherson and Nikolaev. The way to Odessa was clear. The Whites managed to evacuate from Nikolaev and Kherson most of the ships and ships that were there, including those under repair and construction, but the last coal reserves of the Odessa port were used for this.
The Odessa disaster began. The ships from Sevastopol, where the White Black Sea Fleet was located, did not arrive on time. The naval command and the British feared the fall of the Crimea, therefore, under various pretexts, they delayed the exit of the ships necessary for the possible evacuation of Sevastopol. In early January, the Reds reached the shores of the Sea of Azov and Vice Admiral Nenyukov sent part of the ships of the White Fleet to evacuate Mariupol and other ports. A detachment of the Sea of Azov was also formed under the command of the captain of the 2nd rank Mashukov, which included icebreakers and gunboats. He supported the ship's fire and the landing of the troops of Slashchev's corps, which defended the passage to the Crimea. In addition, some of the ships of the white fleet were cruising off the coast of the Caucasus to intimidate the Georgians and the rebels. And the flagship cruiser "Admiral Kornilov" on the eve of the fall of Odessa was sent to Novorossiysk. All this says that at Denikin's headquarters and in Sevastopol they did not realize the seriousness of the situation in Odessa. There was no coal on the ships that were in Odessa (the delivery of coal was a day late). In addition, many ships, due to the sympathies of the sailors for the Bolsheviks, at the right time turned out to be out of order, with machines under repair.
On January 31, General Schilling informed Denikin about the situation, the next day - informed about the impending catastrophe of the Allies. The command of the Black Sea Fleet, which reaches the true state of affairs in the Odessa region, asks the British for help. The British promise help, but first General Slashchev must give them a promise that he will keep the isthmuses. On the night of February 3, a meeting was held in Dzhankoy, at which Slashchev gave the appropriate assurance. On the same day, the British transports Rio Prado and Rio Negro, a steamer with coal and the cruiser Cardiff, adapted for the transport of troops, departed from Sevastopol. Other ships were also to leave within a few days. Admiral Nenyukov sent the floating hospital "Saint Nicholas" to Odessa, then the transport "Nikolay", the auxiliary cruiser "Tsesarevich George", the destroyer "Hot" and several transports.
Meanwhile, the defeated corps of Promtov could not hold on to the Bug and began to retreat to Odessa. Since the city was not ready for defense, and the evacuation of troops by sea was impossible, the remaining troops of Bredov and Promtov were ordered to retreat to the Romanian border, to the Tiraspol region. Due to the retreat of the remnants of the Promtov corps to the west, no white units remained between the Reds advancing from Nikolaev and Odessa. On February 3, a detachment detached from the 41st Division occupied the Ochakov fortress, which blocked the Dnieper-Bug estuary. And the main forces of the division went to Odessa.
On February 4, General Schilling issued a belated evacuation order. There were not enough ships for evacuation. The British, however, sent another battleship "Ajax" and the cruiser "Ceres", several transports, set up their guards in the port and began boarding ships. But these ships and vessels were not enough to organize a quick and large-scale evacuation. Events developed too quickly to organize the systematic removal of people, huge military supplies, valuable cargo and property of refugees. White completely failed the preparatory period. So, the board of the naval port under the command of Captain 1st Rank Dmitriev, based on the reassuring words of Schilling and the chief of the garrison Stessel, did not show the initiative and did not take preparatory measures for the evacuation. Private ships were not mobilized, and some of the steamers left almost without people. The numerous naval officers who were on the register, including the personnel of the administration of the Nikolaev military port evacuated to Odessa, were not involved in the evacuation work. There was practically no traffic control in the port, only the British tried to do this. On the first day, still not believing in the threat, relatively few people went to the breakwaters to be loaded onto ships. But on the morning of February 6, when artillery fire began to be heard in Odessa, which was fought by armored trains retreating to the city, panic began. Thousands of people crowded around the breakwaters, waiting to be loaded.
In addition, in the city itself, having learned about the approach of the Reds, bandits and Bolsheviks with red workers' detachments became more active. The bandits decided that it was time for another big robbery. On February 4, 1920, the uprising began in Moldavanka. Commandant Stoessel with units of the garrison and officer organizations still managed to extinguish it. But on February 6, a new uprising began on Peresyp, it was no longer possible to suppress it. The fire of the uprising spread throughout the city. The Odessa workers took over the workers' districts. Thousands of people fled to the port in panic. The British took only those who had time to board the ships. The Russian ships did the same. Some of the faulty ships were taken to the outer roadstead. Later, the ships took in more of the refugees, but most of them were never able to evacuate.
On the night of February 7, General Schilling with his staff went to the steamer Anatoly Molchanov. In the early morning of February 7 (January 25, old style), 1920, units of the Soviet 41st Infantry Division entered the northeastern part of the city from the side of Peresyp and Kuyalnik almost without resistance. The cavalry brigade bypassed the city and soon occupied the Odessa-Tovarnaya station. The 41st division was weak in composition, and without strong artillery, it was reinforced mainly by partisan detachments. But in Odessa there were no strong volunteer units to give battle and delay the enemy's movement to complete the evacuation. Only in the center of the city did the Stessel garrison units begin to resist the Reds. The shooting in the city and the shelling of the port by the Reds, who occupied the Nikolaevsky boulevard dominating the port, caused panic among those waiting for the start of loading, a stampede began and the remaining steamers hurried to leave. In particular, not having finished loading, having on board only a few hundred people of the convoy and the commander's headquarters, the transport "Anatoly Molchanov" left for the raid. The British, due to the threat of a breakthrough by the Reds into the port, decided to end the evacuation and ordered the ships to leave for the outer roadstead until evening.
On February 8, the Reds completely occupied Odessa. Colonel Stoessel with parts of the garrison, officer detachments, cadets of the Odessa Cadet Corps, a numerous train - evacuated institutions of the white South of Russia, foreigners, wounded, refugees, families of volunteers, were able to break through to the western outskirts of the city and from there moved towards Romania. The destroyers Zharkiy and Tsarevich Georgy arrived late from Sevastopol, and detachments of American and French ships also arrived. But they were only able to take the faulty ships in tow, on the outer roadstead and pick up separate groups of refugees. As a result, only about a third of the refugees were able to evacuate (about 15-16 thousand people). Some of the ships went to the Romanian Sulin, others to the Bulgarian Varna and Constantinople, or to Sevastopol. According to the commander of the 14th Soviet Army in Odessa, more than 3 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, 4 armored trains, 100 guns, hundreds of thousands of ammunition were captured. The unfinished cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" and several ships and steamers were left in the port. A significant amount of military property and material values, equipment, raw materials and foodstuffs was abandoned in the city. The railroad tracks were clogged with trains with various cargoes exported from Kiev and Novorossiya.
The British command decided to destroy two submarines, which were almost completed and remained in the Odessa port, "Lebed" and "Pelican". On February 11, unexpectedly for the Soviet troops, British ships opened heavy fire on the port, and under the cover of it, destroyers entered the harbor, captured and drowned submarines. This operation showed the weakness of the Red forces in Odessa. With proper organization and the will to resist (in particular, by sending parts of Promtov to defend the city), the white and allied command could organize strong resistance and carry out a full-fledged evacuation.
The death of the Ovidiopol detachment
The bulk of the refugees gathered in the large German colony of Gross-Libenthal, 20 km west of Odessa. Those who did not linger for rest and immediately left in the direction of Tiraspol managed to connect with Bredov's units. The next day the road was intercepted by the red cavalry. The remaining refugees - the so-called. The Ovidiopol detachment of Colonel Stoessel, generals Martynov and Vasiliev (a total of about 16 thousand people), moved along the coast to Ovidiopol in order to force the Dniester estuary across the ice and get into Bessarabia, under the protection of the Romanian army. On February 10, 1920, the detachment arrived in Ovidiopol, opposite the city of Akkerman, which was already on the Romanian side. However, the Romanian troops met the refugees with artillery fire. Then, after negotiations, they seemed to be given permission to cross. But they arranged a lengthy document check and only foreigners were allowed through. The Russians were driven out, not even the children were allowed. Those who tried to cross the border without permission were met with fire.
The Ovidiopol detachment found itself in a hopeless position. Red units were approaching - the 45th rifle division and the Kotovsky cavalry brigade. The Romanians were not allowed to visit. The locals were hostile and tried to clean up everything that was lying badly. They decided to leave along the Dniester in the hope of breaking through to the Bredov units in the Tiraspol region and then together to reach the Petliurists and Poles. We left on February 13. But they quickly ran into their pursuers. We were able to repel the first attacks and went further. We walked day and night, without stopping or food. Horses and people fell from fatigue and hunger. On February 15, the Reds, bringing up reinforcements, again attacked. We repulsed this attack too. But the strength was already running out, as was the ammunition. Ahead was the Odessa-Tiraspol railway. But there were red armored trains and troops.
Again they decided to go beyond the Dniester, to Romania. At the same time, the most combat-ready core (soldiers of combat units and volunteer detachments), led by Colonel Stoessel, made a decision, abandoning all the carts and refugees, with a shock group, to try to lightly break out of the encirclement to join the troops of General Bredov. And they succeeded. The remaining troops and refugees, led by General Vasiliev, decided to try again to escape in Romania. They crossed the river and set up a huge camp near the village of Raskayats. The Romanians issued an ultimatum to leave their territory by the morning of February 17. The refugees stayed where they were. Then the Romanian troops set up machine guns and opened fire to kill. In panic, thousands of people fled to the Russian coast, many died. And on the shore, local gangs and rebels were already waiting for them, who robbed and killed refugees. The remnants of the detachment surrendered to the Reds. In total, about 12 thousand people surrendered in various places. Some of them still managed to get into Romania: those who managed to escape during the massacre staged by the Romanian troops; those who returned later in small groups; who bought their pass from local officials for bribes; posing as foreigners, etc.
Bredovsky campaign
Parts of Bredov and Promtov, retreating to Tiraspol, also could not leave for Romania. They were also greeted with machine guns. But here were the most disciplined and combat units. Stoessel's detachment also made its way to them. The Bredovites moved north along the Dniester River. On the way, the Whites repelled attacks from local rebels and Reds. After 14 days of a difficult campaign, between Proskurov and Kamenets-Podolsk, the White Guards met the Poles. An agreement was made. Poland accepted the Whites before returning to the territory occupied by Denikin's army. Weapons and carts were handed over "for preservation." The disarmed units of the Bredovites went over to the position of internees - the Poles drove them into the camps.
At the beginning of the campaign, under the command of Bredov there were about 23 thousand people. In the summer of 1920, about 7 thousand people were transferred to the Crimea. Most died from the typhus epidemic, including in the Polish camps, others chose to stay in Europe or became part of the Polish army.
After this victory, the 12th Soviet army turned against Petliura. Taking advantage of the struggle of the Red Army with the Denikinites, the Petliura detachments, to which they almost did not pay attention, occupied a significant part of Little Russia, entered the Kiev province. Now the Petliurites were quickly shaken off their sides and they fled under the protection of the Poles. In this situation, the Makhnovists first collaborated with the Reds against the White Guards, pretending that there was no conflict. But then the Soviet command ordered Makhno to go with his troops to the Polish front. Naturally, the dad ignored this order and was outlawed. And again the Makhnovists became enemies of the Reds, before the attack of Wrangel's troops.
