Troubles. 1919 year. 100 years ago, at the end of April 1919, the counter-offensive of the Eastern Front of the Red Army began. The Reds stopped the offensive of Kolchak's Russian army, defeated the Whites in the central and southern sectors of the front, and created the conditions for crossing the Ural ridge.
General situation at the front
In early March 1919, anticipating the Reds, who were also preparing for the offensive, Kolchak's white armies began the "Flight to the Volga" - a strategic operation aimed at defeating the Red Eastern Front, reaching the Volga, joining with the White Northern Front and further marching on Moscow (" How the "Flight to the Volga" began; "How Kolchak's army broke through to the Volga").
Initially, Kolchak's strategy repeated the plans of his predecessors, the White Czechs and the Directory. They planned to deliver the main blow in the northern operational direction, Perm - Vyatka - Vologda. A blow in this direction, if successful, led to a connection with the troops of the Whites and the interventionists on the Northern Front. Further, it was possible to organize a campaign against Petrograd, having received assistance from Finland and the Northern Corps in this strategic operation (from the summer of 1919 the North-Western Army). The northern direction as a whole was a dead end, since the Western interventionists were not going to really fight in Russia, acting by the hands of whites and nationalists, there were few communications here, the territories were poorly developed economically, and the population was small.
At the same time, the white command struck a strong blow on the middle Volga line, approximately on the Kazan and Simbirsk front. This direction was more important, as it made it possible to force the Volga, leading the whites to rich material resources and densely populated provinces. Brought together the army of Kolchak with the southern front of the whites. The White Eastern Front struck with three armies: the Siberian army under the command of General Gaida advanced in the Perm-Vyatka direction; The western army of General Khanzhin struck in the Ufa direction (on its southern flank the Southern Army Group was allocated); The Orenburg and Ural armies advanced on Orenburg and Uralsk. Kappel's corps was in reserve. Thus, the main forces of the Russian army of Kolchak (93 thousand people out of 113 thousand) were advancing in the Vyatka, Sarapul and Ufa directions.
The strengths of the whites and reds at the beginning of the battle were approximately equal. The troops of the Red Eastern Front numbered 111 thousand people, had an advantage in firepower (guns, machine guns). At the first stage of the operation, the Whites were helped by the fact that in the central, Ufa direction there was a weak 10-thousandth 5th Red Army. Against her was the strong 49,000-strong white group of Khanzhin. In the northern direction (2nd and 3rd red armies), the forces were approximately equal, in the south, the red had a strong army group (4th, Turkestan and 1st armies).
The moment for the strategic offensive of Kolchak's army was favorable. The military coup that brought Kolchak to power temporarily strengthened the inner unity of the whites. Internal contradictions were smoothed out for a while. Kolchak mobilized in Siberia, the supply was restored, the army was at the peak of its combat effectiveness. Kolchak's Russian army was provided material assistance by the United States, England, France and Japan. The Soviet command transferred part of the forces of the Eastern Front to the Southern, where the situation was extremely tense. The policy of "war communism", especially the food appropriation, caused the growth of peasant uprisings in the rear of the Reds. In the immediate rear of the Eastern Front of the Red Army, a wave of uprisings swept through the Simbirsk and Kazan provinces.
Breakthrough of Kolchak's army to the Volga
The White offensive began on March 4, 1919. The Siberian army of Gaida struck in the area between the cities of Osa and Okhansk. White crossed the Kama on the ice, took both cities and launched an offensive. Haida's army was able to advance 90 - 100 km in a week, but it was not possible to break through the Red front. The further offensive of the Whites was slowed down by the vast space of the theater, off-road conditions and the resistance of the Reds. Retreating, the 2nd and 3rd red armies retained the integrity of the front and combat effectiveness, although they suffered losses in manpower and great material damage. After the defeat in the Perm region, the Reds worked on the mistakes (the Stalin-Dzerzhinsky commission), quantitatively and qualitatively strengthened the direction, and increased the combat capability of the troops.
The Whites occupied a large region, on April 7 they again established themselves in the Izhevsk-Votkinsk region, on April 9 they captured Sarapul, and on April 15, their forward units in the wild Pechora region came into contact with the groups of the white Northern Front. However, this event, as noted earlier, had no strategic significance. In the second half of April 1919, the Siberian army of Gaida did not have great success, and the resistance of the 3rd Red Army increased. However, on the left flank, the Whites pushed the Reds and threw back the right flank of the 2nd Red Army for the lower course of the river. Vyatka.
In the central direction, Kolchak's army achieved greater success. The strike group of the Western army of Khanzhin (this was one of the best commanders of Kolchak) found the enemy's weak spot and attacked in the free space between the inner flanks of the 5th and 2nd armies. The left-flank brigade of the 5th army (from the 27th division) was defeated, the whites moved along the Birsk-Ufa highway to the rear of both divisions of the red army (26th and 27th). During 4-day battles, the 5th Army was defeated, its remnants were retreating in the Menzelinsky and Bugulma directions. On March 13, the Whites took Ufa, captured large trophies.
The introduction of private reserves into the battle and the attempt of the Reds to organize a counterattack on the left flank of the 1st Army in the Sterlitamak area did not lead to success. True, the remnants of the 5th Red Army managed to avoid encirclement and complete destruction. The Reds retreated to Simbirsk and Samara. White continued his breakthrough. On April 5, the Kolchakites occupied Sterlitamak and Menzelinsk, on April 6 - Belebey, on April 13 - Bugulma, on April 15 - Buguruslan. On April 21, the Whites reached the Kama in the area of today's Naberezhnye Chelny and created a threat to Chistopol. On April 25, they took Chistopol, threatening a breakthrough to Kazan. In the southern direction, the armies of the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks took Orsk, Lbischensk, laid siege to Uralsk, and approached Orenburg.
Thus, the blow of the Khanzhin army led to a strategic breakthrough of the central sector of the Red Eastern Front. However, this event did not lead to the collapse of the entire Eastern Front of the Red Army, which could lead to the catastrophe of the Southern Front of the Reds. This was due to the scale of the theater, no matter how deep the breakthrough of the Kolchakites was, it did not affect the situation in the northern and southern directions of the Eastern Front. This made it possible for the supreme Soviet command to take a number of retaliatory measures to transfer reserves, new units to the threatened direction, and prepare a powerful counteroffensive. In addition, the white command simply did not have second-echelon troops and strategic reserves to build on success in the Ufa-Samara and Kazan axes. White could not transfer forces from other directions. The Siberian army of Gaida was diverted to the unpromising Vyatka direction, and in the south the Cossack divisions got bogged down at Orenburg and Uralsk.
As a result, at the end of April 1919, Kolchak's Russian Army broke through the front of the Eastern Front of the Reds, seized vast territories with a population of more than 5 million people. The White Eastern Front has established contact with the Northern Front. Kolchak's men reached the distant approaches to Kazan, Samara and Simbirsk, besieged Orenburg and Uralsk.
A. V. Kolchak. The photo was taken on May 1, 1919, when the general offensive of his armies was choked. Source:
On the reasons for the failure of the further offensive of the armies of Kolchak
The enormous scope of the strategic operation and the decisiveness of the goals of Kolchak's army excluded the possibility of achieving victory in one stage with the available forces. That is, after the exhaustion of the forces of the shock groupings of the Siberian and Western armies, new mobilizations were required. And they passed at the expense of the Siberian peasantry. However, the policy of the Kolchak government ruled out in advance the possibility of finding a common language with the Russian peasantry. As has been noted more than once in a series of articles on the Time of Troubles and the Civil War in Russia, the peasants have fought their own war since the February Revolution and the authorities of the Provisional Government. The struggle against any government in general, not wanting to pay taxes, go to fight in the army of white or red, perform labor duties, etc. The peasant war against any government became one of the brightest and bloody pages of the Russian Troubles. It is clear that the peasants were not going to support the Kolchak regime, which pursued a policy of enslaving them.
Therefore, the new mobilization of peasants into the army only strengthened the resistance of the peasantry, worsened the position of Kolchak's army. In the rear, the movement of red partisans expanded, the peasants raised one revolt after another, the harsh repressive policy of the Kolchak government could not rectify the situation. They suppress a riot in one place, a fire breaks out in another. At the front, however, new reinforcements only decomposed the troops. It is not surprising that when the Reds launched a counteroffensive, many white units began to completely go over to the side of the Red Army.
That is, the whites did not have a serious social base in the east of the country. The peasantry opposed the Kolchak regime and became the mainstay of the Red partisans. The townspeople were generally neutral. The workers were split. Izhevsk and Votkians fought for the Whites, others supported the Reds. The Cossacks were small in number, rather weak (relative to the Cossacks of the Don, Kuban and Terek), and fragmented. The Amur and Ussuri Cossack troops got bogged down in the internal war of Primorye. The leader there was ataman Kalmykov, an outspoken bandit who ignored the Kolchak government and was oriented towards Japan. His people were more engaged in robbery, murder and violence than fighting the Reds. The larger Transbaikal army was subordinate to the ataman Semyonov, who also did not recognize the power of Kolchak and looked at Japan. It was profitable for the Japanese to support the ataman "governments" of Kalmykov and Semyonov, they hoped on the basis of them to create puppet buffer state formations in the Far East and Eastern Siberia, completely dependent on the Japanese Empire. In this troubled water, the Japanese calmly plundered the wealth of Russia. At the same time, the power of the atamans was openly bandit, Semyonov, even against the background of the horrors of the Troubles, was distinguished by the most insane antics, the most brutal murders and terror. Atamans and their henchmen cut, hanged, tortured, raped and robbed everyone who could not offer strong resistance, created "initial capital" in order to live comfortably abroad. In addition, some of the Cossacks recoiled from such outright bandits, created red detachments and fought against Semyonov.
More or less Kolchak's regime was supported by the Siberian Cossacks. Semirechye Cossacks waged their war on the outskirts of the empire. The Orenburg Cossacks were quite powerful. True, there were Red Cossacks here too. Subject to Dutov, the Cossacks became part of the Russian army of Kolchak. The Orenburg army led an offensive in the southern direction. However, the Orenburg Cossacks as a whole fought on their own, communication with them was weak. A similar situation was with the Ural Cossacks.
Also, Kolchak's army did not have a serious qualitative advantage over the Red Army, unlike Denikin's Armed Forces of the South of Russia. The main part of the officers during the collapse of the country and the beginning of the turmoil rushed to the south of the country. In addition, since the uprising of the Czechoslovak Corps, it was much easier to get to the south from the center of Russia than to Siberia through the front. Many then went over to the side of the Reds or until the last tried to maintain neutrality, were tired of the war. But having a base allowed Alekseev, Kornilov and Denikin to create a powerful cadre core of the army. Receive "personalized" selected officer units - Markov, Drozdov, Kornilov, Alekseev, united by traditions, victories and defeats. Kolchak practically did not have such units. The strongest and most efficient units were the Izhevsk and Votkians of the insurgent workers. In the east, cadres were most often random or mobilized. Out of 17 thousand officers, only about 1 thousand were career officers. The rest, at best, are storekeepers, wartime warrant officers, and at worst, “officers” of the production of various constituent organizations, directories and regional governments. An acute shortage of personnel forced young men to be promoted to officers after six-week courses.
Campaign poster of the Siberian army of Kolchak
A similar situation was with the military leaders. In the south of Russia, a whole galaxy of famous commanders advanced, many of whom distinguished themselves during the years of the world war. There were so many prominent generals that they did not have enough troops. They had to be kept in civilian positions and in reserve. In the south, there was an extremely shortage of experienced, competent and talented personnel. This led to the weakness of the headquarters of the Eastern Front of the Whites, to a shortage of experienced commanders at the level of the army, corps and divisions. It was full of all sorts of adventurers, careerists, people who wanted to fill their pockets in the surrounding chaos. Kolchak himself admitted: "… we are poor in people, which is why we have to endure even in high positions, not excluding the posts of ministers, people who are far from corresponding to the places they occupy, but this is because there is no one to replace them …"
In this position, the white command could count on the success of one powerful strike. It was necessary to choose one operational direction, on the others to be limited to auxiliary operations. It was expedient to deliver the main blow south of Ufa in order to join forces with the Southern White Front. However, apparently, the Kolchak government was bound by obligations to the Entente. As a result, the White Army struck two strong blows on Vyatka, in the Middle Volga region. This led to the dispersion of the already limited forces and means of the whites.
It is not surprising that already against the background of victories, problems began to accumulate quickly. Dutov's separate Orenburg army approached Orenburg and got bogged down under it. The Cossack cavalry turned out to be unsuitable for the siege and storming of fortified positions. And the Cossacks did not want to bypass Orenburg, go into a deep breakthrough, they wanted to liberate "their" land first. The Ural Cossacks were bound by the siege of Uralsk. The Orenburg direction was automatically attached to the Western army of Khanzhin. The southern army group of Belov was drawn to cover the gap in the front between the Western army and the Orenburg and Ural armies. As a result, White lost the advantage in cavalry. Instead of entering the gap created by the powerful offensive of the Khanzhin army, smashing the rears of the Reds, their individual units, intercepting communications, all the cavalry forces of the White Army were tied by the struggle for Orenburg and Uralsk.
Meanwhile, Khanzhin's corps were moving farther and farther from each other across the endless expanses of Russia, losing the already weak connection with each other. The white command could still strengthen the Western army at the expense of the Siberian one. However, Kolchak's headquarters did not use this opportunity either. And the red ones didn’t sleep. They pulled up reserves, new units, mobilized the communists, strengthening the cadres of the Eastern Front.
In addition, in mid-April 1919, the spring thaw began, the flooding of rivers. The dash to Samara was drowned in mud. Carts and artillery lagged far behind the advanced units. White troops were cut off from their bases, could not at the decisive moment replenish stocks of weapons, ammunition, ammunition, provisions. The movement of the troops stopped. The Red troops were in the same position, but for them it was a useful pause in the fighting. They were at their bases, they could replenish troops, supplies, rest and regroup their forces.
Poster "Forward to the defense of the Urals!" 1919 g.
VI Lenin makes a speech in front of the regiments of the Vsevobuch on Red Square. Moscow, May 25, 1919
