Troubles. 1919 year. 100 years ago, on July 3, 1919, after the capture of Crimea and Donbass, Kharkov and Tsaritsyn, Denikin set the task of taking Moscow. On July 9, the Central Committee of Lenin's Communist Party put forward the slogan: "All for the fight against Denikin!" The Red Command is taking emergency measures to strengthen the Southern Front.
The offensive of Denikin's army. Victories: Crimea, Donbass and Kharkov
In June 1919, the strategic offensive of the Armed Forces of the South of Russia under the command of Denikin developed. The volunteer army broke through the junction of the 13th Red Army and the 2nd Ukrainian Army and began to develop an offensive on Kharkov. The 3rd Army Corps of the ARSUR launched an offensive from the Ak-Monai positions in the Crimea. On June 18, 1919, a landing under the command of Slashchev landed in the Koktebel region. June 23 - 26 the government of the Crimean Socialist Soviet Republic was evacuated to Kherson. The Whites occupied the Crimean Peninsula.
The volunteer army of May-Mayevsky quickly developed an offensive and threw back the defeated units of the 13th and 8th red armies beyond the Seversky Donets. The red command is hastily trying to organize defense in Kharkov and Yekaterinoslav. Reserves, the strongest communist units, cadets are being pulled there. Trotsky demanded universal armament and promised to keep Kharkov. At the same time, the red command is preparing a flank counterattack, in the Sinelnikovo area a shock group is concentrated from units of the former 2nd Ukrainian Army, transformed into the 14th Army under the command of Voroshilov. The Reds plan to flank the 8th and 9th Red armies out of the attacks of the White Guards, move from Sinelnikovo to the Slavyansk-Yuzovka region (modern Donetsk) to stop the enemy's movement to Kharkov. Then, a simultaneous counter-offensive by the 14th Army and the Kharkov group to return the Donetsk Basin.
However, this plan failed. Voroshilov's army did not manage to complete the regrouping. May 23 - 25 (June 5 - 7) 1919 Shkuro's corps defeated Makhno's units near Gulyai-Pole. Then the White Guards launched an offensive to the north, to Yekaterinoslav, in a number of battles they defeated the 14th Army, which did not have time to concentrate, and quickly advanced to the Dnieper. At the same time, to the south, General Vinogradov's group was successfully advancing on Berdyansk and Melitopol. And the 3rd Army Corps occupied the Crimea.
Having thus successfully covered the left flank, Mai-Mayevsky developed the offensive of the 1st Army Corps of Kutepov and Toporkov's Tersk Division on Kharkov. Without giving red to recover, white was rapidly advancing. The Tertsy of Toporkov took Kupyansk on June 1 (14), by June 11 (24) they captured Kharkov from the north and north-west, cutting off the communications of the Kharkov group of the Reds, crushing the approaching enemy reinforcements. The right flank of Kutepov's corps on June 10 (23) took Belgorod, intercepting the communication between Kharkov and Kursk. During five days of fighting, the Kharkov group of the Reds was defeated and on June 11 (24) the White Guards took Kharkov.
Thus, the White Army captured Donbass, Kharkov, by the end of June 1919 occupied the entire Crimean peninsula, the entire lower course of the Dnieper to Yekaterinoslav. On June 29, Shkuro's troops took Yekaterinoslav. The right flank of the Southern Front (13th, 8th, 9th and 14th armies) of the Reds suffered a severe defeat. The Reds retreated, thousands of soldiers deserted. Combat efficiency fell sharply, whole units fled without a fight. The remnants of the 14th Red Army and the Crimean grouping retreated beyond the Dnieper, the 13th Army - Poltava.
The offensive of the Don army
At the same time, the Don army of General Sidorin went on the offensive. Mamontov's cavalry, breaking through the front at the junction of the red 9th army, went into the rear of the 10th army. The Donets crossed the Don above the mouth of the Donets, in four days passed 200 miles, occupying the right bank of the Don, smashing the red rear and raising the villages. On May 25 (June 7), the White Cossacks were on the Chira, and on June 6 (19), having cut the Povorino - Tsaritsyn railway, they moved further, partly up Medveditsa, partly in the girth of Tsaritsyn.
The second group of the Don army, having crossed at Kalitva, headed along the Khopr to Povorino. The third group of White Cossacks, crossing the Donets on both sides of the South-Eastern Railway, pursued the remnants of the 8th Red Army in the Voronezh direction. A separate cavalry detachment of General Sekretev headed northeast to the area of the uprising of the Cossacks of the Upper Don District.
Thus, White took upwards in the central sector of the front as well. As a result of the successful breakthrough of the Don army, units of the 9th and units of the 8th red armies were defeated. The White Cossacks united with the rebels of the Upper Don District, who, in the course of fierce and bloody battles with superior Red forces, withstood and waited for help. The Don region was again under the control of the White Cossack command. The Don army entered the line Balashov - Povorino - Liski - Novy Oskol. In June - July 1919, the Donets fought on this line, especially stubborn ones on the Balashov and Voronezh directions.
The Don region again became a powerful center of the anti-Bolshevik movement. On June 16 (29), the liberation of the Don land from the Reds was solemnly celebrated in Novocherkassk. The previously defeated, bloodless and demoralized Don army, which in mid-May numbered only 15 thousand fighters, perked up and by the end of June numbered 40 thousand people.
Assault on Tsaritsyn
Wrangel's Caucasian army also successfully advanced, building on the success after victories on the Manych and Sal rivers. The 10th Red Army, having suffered a heavy defeat, retreated. The Reds covered themselves with a rearguard - the Dumenko's cavalry regiments, which had retained their combat effectiveness, destroyed the only railway and bridges, knocking down the enemy's pace of movement. However, the Caucasian army continued its march across the deserted steppe, fighting with a strong enemy. On May 20 (June 2), the Whites captured the last serious obstacle in front of Tsaritsyn - a position on the Esaulovsky Aksai River. In the future, the white command could wait to wait for the repair of bridges, railways, so that armored trains could approach, bring up tanks, planes, approach reinforcements, or, using the factor of speed and surprise, continue the offensive and break into Tsaritsyn on the shoulders of the Reds. Wrangel chose the second option and continued the offensive.
On June 1 (14), 1919, the troops of the Caucasian army attacked the fortifications of Tsaritsyn. However, the red command managed to prepare the city for defense. Reinforcements were transferred to Tsaritsyn, new units from Astrakhan and the Eastern Front (up to 9 new regiments). The commander of the 10th Army Klyuev (he replaced the wounded Yegorov) managed to organize well the defense of the city. Two defensive positions were prepared, which passed along the outer circumference of the ring railway and the suburbs of Tsaritsyn, on its outskirts. Seven armored trains were used as mobile fire groups. According to white intelligence, the Tsaritsyno group of Reds read 21 thousand people (16 thousand bayonets and 5 thousand sabers) with 119 guns. They were supported by the Volga military flotilla.
Barbed wire, a strong garrison, numerous artillery and large stocks of shells made the Tsaritsynian positions formidable. As a result, the two-day assault on June 1 - 2 (14 - 15) ended in the defeat of the Caucasian army. The White Guards ran into a powerful defense, could not break through the Red positions without the support of the artillery of armored trains, and suffered heavy losses. 4 (17) The Red Army launched a counterattack and threw the enemy back from the city. However, the Reds did not have the strength to win a decisive victory. Wrangel's army withdrew several miles and entrenched itself on the Chervlenaya River, where it was preparing for a new attack for a week and a half.
At this time, the strength of the Volunteer Army increased markedly. The bridges and the railway were restored, 5 armored trains arrived, the First Tank Division (it was removed from the Kharkov direction), armored cars, aviation. To help Wrangel, the newly formed 7th Infantry Division of General Bredov (the former Timanovsky brigade, exported from Romania) was transferred from Rostov. The transfer of additional forces was concealed from the enemy. Therefore, a new powerful blow came as a surprise to the Reds. On June 16 (29), 1919, the Caucasian army again began an assault on Tsaritsyn's positions. Tanks, armored cars and armored trains broke through the Red defenses. Behind them, the infantry and cavalry entered the breakthrough. The first position was taken. However, the Red Army men stubbornly fought in the second position, near the city itself. Only on June 17 (30), the troops of the Ulagaya group made their way into the city from the south, and in the west, Tsaritsyn bypassed the corps of Pokrovsky and Shatilov. The remnants of the defeated 10th Red Army retreated up the Volga, pursued by the Kuban. The degree of fierceness of the battle for Tsaritsyn is evidenced by the fact of losses of the white command staff: 5 division chiefs, 2 brigade commanders and 11 regimental commanders were killed.
Thus, Denikin's army won an important victory on the right flank. The 10th Red Army suffered a heavy defeat in the battle for Tsaritsyn. The Whites took Tsaritsyn, a large number of prisoners, their trophies were the artillery of the Tsaritsyn fortified area, large reserves of the Volga base of the Red Army. The White Army cut the Volga route and was able to develop an offensive up the river to Saratov.
Denikin's army failed in only one direction. Sent from the North Caucasus to Astrakhan by General Erdeli 5 thous. the detachment, which was moving in two columns - from the Holy Cross by the steppe and from Kizlyar by the sea coast, did not fulfill its task. This was due to a number of factors: the instability of the Caucasian formations, the desertedness of the theater and the lack of developed communications, the inability to establish normal supplies and uprisings in the rear (in Chechnya and Dagestan). In addition, until the end of June, the British slowed down the transfer of the Caspian flotilla, and the weak white naval forces could not support the offensive of the ground forces, protect the coastal flank from the strong red Volga-Caspian flotilla.
As a result, in mid-June, the White troops were 50 versts from Astrakhan, but then they were pushed back. The attack on Astrakhan failed even after the capture of Tsaritsyn. The units formed in the Caucasus were unreliable, and the operation came to a standstill.
Moscow directive
Thus, by the end of June - beginning of July 1919, the troops of the Armed Forces of South Russia, having inflicted a heavy defeat on the forces of the Southern Front of the Red Army, entered the Kherson - Yekaterinoslav - Belgorod - Balashov - Tsaritsyn line, and rested their flanks against the Dnieper and Volga.
On June 18 (July 1), 1919, Wrangel arrived in Tsaritsyn. On June 20 (July 3), the commander-in-chief of the All-Yugoslavia Denikin arrived in the city. He announced the famous "Moscow Directive", the White Army's strategic offensive plan to take the heart of Russia - Moscow. The Caucasian army of Wrangel was supposed to go to the Saratov-Balashov-Rtishchev front, change the bottom in these directions and develop an offensive on Penza, Arzamas and further on Nizhny Novgorod, Vladimir and Moscow. Wrangel also had to allocate detachments to connect with the Ural army and to capture the lower part of the Volga. The Don army of Sidorin had to continue the offensive on the Kamyshinsky and Balashov directions until it was replaced by the Wrangelites. The rest of the Don troops were to advance in the Voronezh and Yelets directions. The volunteer army of May-Mayevsky received the task of attacking Moscow in the Kursk-Oryol direction. The left flank of the Volunteer Army was to reach the line of the Dnieper and Desna, to capture Kiev. In the seaside direction, the troops of General Dobrorolsky (3rd Army Corps) were given the task of reaching the Dnieper from Aleksandrovsk to the mouth, then occupying Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa. The White Black Sea Fleet was supposed to support the offensive of the ground forces in the seaside theater.
Thus, Denikin's army was going to attack Moscow by the shortest directions - Kursk and Voronezh, covering on the left flank with a movement towards the Dnieper, with successes in Little Russia. Morally, the White Guards, after the convincing victories won and the collapse of the Red Southern Front, were on the rise. Most of the White Guards dreamed of "going to Moscow". Most of the white commanders, including the commander of the Volunteer Army Mai-Mayevsky, the chief of staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia Romanovsky and the commander of the 1st Army Corps Kutepov, considered this decision to be the only correct one.
At the end of June - the first half of July 1919, the troops of the ARSUR won new victories. The western flank of the Volunteer Army, pushing back the troops of the 13th Red Army and Belenkovich's cavalry group, captured Poltava. In the lower reaches of the Dnieper, the Dobrorolsky corps, with the support of the Black Sea Fleet and the British cruiser, occupied the Kinburn Spit and Ochakov, gaining a foothold in the lower part of the Dnieper. On the eastern flank, Wrangel's army, together with the right flank of the Don army, again defeated the 10th Red Army, which tried to go over to a counteroffensive and on July 15 (28)) took Kamyshin. White's advanced units reached the distant approaches to Saratov.
Meanwhile, the red command is taking emergency measures to restore the combat capability of the Southern Front. On July 9, the Soviet political leadership proclaimed the slogan: "All for the fight against Denikin!" Reserves, reinforcements, and units from other fronts are being transferred to the south. Already in July 1919, the number of troops of the Southern Front was increased to 180 thousand people with 900 guns. Therefore, the further advance of the Denikinites to the north in the second half of July - early August slowed down greatly and was small.
It is also worth noting that the armies of the AFSR had a relatively small number, a small mobilization potential, extended communications and a vast front with a large number of important directions in order to develop a powerful strategic offensive against Moscow. The troops of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia attacked in three diverging directions. Denikin's army did not have the strength to conduct a decisive offensive in every direction. It was difficult to find troops to create a reserve for the commander-in-chief. Each transfer of units from one direction to another caused irritation and resentment among the commanders of individual armies. So, the commander of the troops of the North Caucasus, General Erdeli, expressed dissatisfaction with the direction of the strong Kuban units in the Tsaritsyn direction. He feared uprisings in Chechnya and Dagestan, the collapse of the Terek army, the situation on the border with Georgia was difficult. The commander of the Caucasian Army, Wrangel, demanded the transfer of shock formations of the Volunteer Army to his sector of the front. In his opinion, his army, almost without encountering resistance, went to Moscow. In turn, General May-Mayevsky noted that in the event of the transfer of part of his troops to the Caucasian army, he would have to leave Yekaterinoslav, or to expose the Poltava direction. General Sidorin demanded the transfer of reinforcements in the first place to the Don army. When the whites were advancing on the Volga, the command of the Caucasian army wanted to send the 1st Don corps to Kamyshin, and the command of the Don army to Balashov, etc. Therefore, quite quickly the first enthusiasm of the whites died out, serious problems began both on the front line and in the rear.
Wrangel's proposal
At this time, a dispute began again in the command of the White Army about the strategy, the main direction of the offensive. Earlier, Wrangel and his chief of staff, Yuzefovich, had already suggested directing the main efforts to the eastern flank of the AFSR, to break through to meet Kolchak's army. However, then their proposal was rejected by the commander-in-chief Denikin and his chief of staff Romanovsky.
In fact, Wrangel's headquarters waged an internal political struggle with Denikin. Wrangel wanted to show the superiority of his strategic and tactical plans, to blame the failures on the headquarters of the All-Union Soviet of Socialist Republics headed by Romanovsky and personally on Denikin. In a series of telegrams for May - August 1919 and a letter of July 28, Baron Wrangel threw heavy accusations against Denikin. This intrigue was supported by the British, the political opposition, and after the failure of the campaign against Moscow, Denikin was removed from the post of commander-in-chief.
Wrangel and Yuzefovich proposed to form a cavalry group for an offensive on the shortest directions to Moscow - Kursk and Voronezh. It was to be headed by Wrangel. For this, it was proposed to withdraw 3, 5 cavalry divisions from the Caucasian army. Denikin, fearing that such a weakening of the Caucasian army would lead to a successful counter-offensive of the Reds on the Volga and the fall of Tsaritsyn, after which the enemy would again threaten the communications of the Alliance in the Rostov direction, rejected this proposal. Indeed, the Red Army will soon concentrate a strike group on the Volga direction and in August attack the Caucasian army and the right flank of the Don. Wrangel's army will have to leave Kamyshin and retreat to Tsaritsyn.
Wrangel accused the high command of weakening the Caucasian army (although he himself proposed to withdraw horse divisions from it for an attack on Moscow), when the 7th division, the 2nd Terek Plastun brigade and other units were transferred to the Volunteer Army. In exchange, several mountain and foreign regiments from the Caucasus were transferred to Wrangel. The commander of the Caucasian Army accused Denikin of suspending the Astrakhan operation he had begun, which made it possible to use the White Caspian Flotilla on the Volga, to strike at Saratov and Samara, to unite with the Ural Cossack army, which led to the collapse of the southern flank of the Eastern Front of the Reds and supported Kolchak's army. Although Kolchak himself planned the beginning of this operation only after the completion of Kamyshinskaya, with the creation of the Balashov-Volga front. In addition, Wrangel complained about the poor supply of troops, the secondary importance of the material support of the Caucasian army in comparison with the Volunteer.
Thus, Wrangel's claims were related to his political ambitions. His ideas were contradictory: at first he proposed to concentrate all forces on the Tsaritsyn direction (in the spring); then abandon the Volga direction and send the cavalry of the Caucasian army to the Kharkov-Kursk; then he complains that his army is weakened by the fact that Mamontov's Don corps was transferred to the left bank of the Volga. At the same time, Denikin's troops could no longer help Kolchak's army, it was defeated already in April - May 1919 and began a non-stop retreat to the East. And the Ural army was isolated, it was 300 miles from the Wrangelites and had no task to break through to the Volga. In general, if Wrangel's proposals were accepted, the White Army was still defeated, perhaps even faster than it happened in reality.
