75 years ago, the operation of the Red Army began to liberate Crimea. On April 11, 1944, Soviet troops liberated Dzhankoy and Kerch, on April 13 - Feodosia, Simferopol, Evpatoria and Saki, on April 14 - Sudak and on April 15 Alushta, and on April 16 they reached Sevastopol. The Germans fortified the city well, so they took Sevastopol by storm only on May 9.
Background
In November 1941, German troops captured Crimea, with the exception of Sevastopol. At the end of December 1941, the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation was launched. Soviet troops occupied the Kerch Peninsula, creating a bridgehead for the further liberation of the peninsula. However, in May 1942, the Wehrmacht defeated the Kerch group of Soviet troops. In early July 1942, Sevastopol fell. His heroic defense became one of the brightest pages of the Great Patriotic War.
The German invaders created a general district of Crimea (semi-district of Tavria) as part of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. The Germans committed genocide, destroyed Soviet and party workers sympathizing with the partisans, the "racially inferior element" - Jews, Gypsies, Karaites, Slavs, etc. This caused a strong partisan movement. The German leadership planned to bring German colonists to the peninsula and create "Gotenland" ("Gotengau"), which was to become part of the Third Reich. The ancient Goths who lived in the Crimea were considered Germans, and the Fuehrer planned to restore the "Gothic region".
As a result of the Novorossiysk-Taman operation (September - October 1943), the Red Army completed the battle for the Caucasus, knocked out the Wehrmacht from the Kuban-Taman bridgehead. came to the approaches to the Crimean peninsula from the east. The German 17th Army left the Kuban bridgehead and retreated to the Crimea. The German fleet left the Sea of Azov. From October 31 to December 11, 1943, Soviet troops conducted a Kerch-Eltigen landing operation with the aim of seizing a bridgehead in the Kerch region and further liberating Crimea. Our troops failed to recapture the Kerch Peninsula from the enemy, but they were able to occupy a foothold for a future offensive. At the same time, during the Nizhnedneprovsk strategic operation (September - December 1943), the Red Army defeated the German troops in Northern Tavria and blocked the 17th German army in the Crimea. Also, Soviet troops occupied an important bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash.
Soviet mortar boat of the "Ya-5" type, damaged during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. November 1943
Transportation of Soviet equipment during the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation
Armored boat type 1124 and tenders of the Azov flotilla of the RKKF before the landing in the port of Kerch. January 1944
General situation before the start of the operation
The German military-political leadership demanded to hold the Crimea at any cost. In the operational order of the headquarters of the Wehrmacht No. 5 of March 13, 1943, the commander of group "A" Colonel-General E. von Kleist demanded by all means to strengthen the defense of the peninsula. The German command demanded the retention of the peninsula for operational and political reasons. Crimea was an important aviation bridgehead for covering the Romanian oil fields (accordingly, it could become a base for the Soviet Air Force for their bombardment), a naval base for controlling the Black Sea and landing troops on the coast of Romania and Bulgaria. The loss of Crimea could affect the further actions of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, which led to a radical change in the military-political situation on the Balkan Peninsula, not in favor of the Third Reich.
Therefore, Hitler refused to transfer the 17th Army from the Taman Peninsula to Ukraine to help Army Group South, although this was required by the military-operational situation. The 17th Army was transferred to the Crimea. On September 4, 1943, Hitler signed the order of the Wehrmacht headquarters "On the withdrawal from the Kuban bridgehead and the defense of the Crimea", where he demanded that all forces be thrown into the defense of the Crimea. First of all, prepare for the defense of the threatened areas - the Kerch Peninsula, Feodosia, Sudak, etc. Build on the peninsula field-type defensive structures, and then a long-term, fortress. At the head of the 17th Army was General of the Engineering Troops Erwin Eneke (Jenecke). He was an experienced military engineer. He served in the army since 1911, was a participant in the First World War. Participant of hostilities in Poland and France. In 1942 - early 1943. Eneke commanded the 4th Army Corps, which is part of the 6th Army of Paulus, was wounded and evacuated from Stalingrad to Germany. Eneke took new measures to defend the "Crimean Fortress".
From September 26 to November 5, 1943, Soviet troops conducted the Melitopol offensive operation (part of the Nizhnedneprovsk strategic operation). After stubborn battles on October 23, the Red Army liberated Melitopol. In the breakthrough south of Melitopol, a mobile mechanized cavalry group "Tempest" was thrown as part of the 4th Guards Kuban Cossack Cavalry Corps of General N. Ya. Kirichenko and the 19th Tank Corps of General ID Vasiliev, supported by aviation. On October 24, Hitler's troops were forced to begin a general retreat. Pursuing the enemy, Soviet soldiers liberated Genichesk on October 30 and reached the coast of the Sivash Bay. On November 1, Soviet troops, having overcome the Turkish Wall, broke into the Perekop Isthmus. The blow of the Soviet tankmen and cavalrymen was unexpected for the enemy. On the night of November 2, the Germans counterattacked, and with blows from the flanks repulsed the Turkish Wall. The advanced Soviet units that had broken through the Perekop Isthmus were now fighting surrounded. During heavy fighting, tankers and Cossacks broke through the passage to their own and held the bridgehead.
From November 1 to November 3, 1943, the troops of the 10th rifle corps of Major General KP Neverov crossed the Sivash. It was carried out on a 3-kilometer stretch from Cape Kugaran to Cape Dzhangara. For two days of fighting, rifle units, having advanced 23-25 km, liberated nine settlements. The German command organized a series of strong counterattacks, pushing back our troops, which had only light weapons on the bridgehead. The Soviet command transferred reinforcements, artillery, and ammunition to the bridgehead. During the battles on November 7-10, the 10th Rifle Corps expanded the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash to 18 kilometers along the front and 14 kilometers in depth. Thus, the Red Army blocked off the Crimean group of the Wehrmacht from land, seized bridgeheads at Perekop and south of Sivash, creating conditions for the liberation of the Crimea.
German General Eneke, fearing a new Stalingrad, prepared a plan for "Operation Michael" so that at the end of October 1943, the 17th Army was evacuated from the Crimea through Perekop to the Ukraine. However, Adolf Hitler forbade the withdrawal of troops from the Crimean peninsula. Eneke believed that it was necessary to save the army for further hostilities. In the Crimea, she found herself trapped. The Fuhrer proceeded from the strategic and political significance of the Crimean peninsula. Hitler's position was fully supported by the commander-in-chief of the naval forces, Gross Admiral K. Doenitz, who said that, if necessary, the fleet would be able to take out the 200,000-strong Crimean grouping in 40 days (in bad weather - in 80 days). As a result, the 17th Army remained in the Crimea.
The German 17th Army, encircled in the Crimea, was a powerful and combat-ready grouping of troops that relied on strong positions. Hitler still hoped for a counterattack, and Crimea was a strategic bridgehead for the German army. In the future, according to the plan of the German high command, the Crimean group was supposed to create a wedge in the rear of the Russians, and together with the 6th Army located in the Nikopol region, restore the situation in Ukraine, including land communications with the Crimea.
At the same time, the Germans were developing plans for the evacuation of the 17th Army. In November 1943, Operations Litzman and Ruderboot were prepared. On a signal from Litzman, German troops were supposed to mainly break through from the Crimea through Perekop to join the 6th Army, and the rest of the troops were planned to be taken out of Sevastopol with the help of the fleet (Operation Ruderboot). Also, the command of the 17th Army tried to eliminate the Soviet bridgehead south of Sivash, since without this it was impossible to carry out Operation Litzman. On the contrary, the troops of the 10th Rifle Corps further expanded the bridgehead. The troops of the Soviet Separate Primorsky Army in the Kerch region, by a number of private operations, also expanded the captured area. The command of the German army had to transfer additional forces to the Kerch direction in order to contain the pressure of the Russian troops, which worsened the defensive capabilities on the northern front, at Perekop.
Soviet soldiers on the shore of Lake Sivash. Red Army men in the foreground equip a position for a 12.7 mm DShK machine gun.
Soviet soldiers ferry a 122-mm howitzer M-30 model 1938 across the Sivash Bay on a pontoon. November 1943
Soviet troops ferry military equipment and horses through the Sivash. In the foreground is a 45 mm anti-tank gun. December 1943
The position of the Crimean grouping has consistently deteriorated. In January 1944, the Separate Maritime Army conducted another private operation, which pinned down the German troops in the Kerch direction and did not allow them to be transferred to the northern front. In February 1944, the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts conducted a successful Nikopol-Kryvyi Rih operation. The Red Army defeated the 6th German army and eliminated the enemy's Nikopol bridgehead. The hope of rebuilding the land corridor with Crimea was dashed. The 4th Ukrainian Front could now concentrate forces to eliminate the enemy's Crimean grouping. Inside the peninsula, the partisan movement intensified. The German command had to divert the forces necessary on the front line to fight the partisans, to protect important points and communications. At the same time, the Germans themselves admitted that it was possible to defeat the partisans only with the involvement of very significant forces, and this was not possible.
By April 1944, three large formations of partisans were operating on the peninsula, with a total number of up to 4 thousand fighters. The largest was the Southern unit of partisans under the command of I. A. Macedonsky, commissar M. V. Selimov, chief of staff A. A. Aristov. The partisans were located in the reserve of the southern coast of Crimea (Alushta - Bakhchisarai - Yalta region). The detachment consisted of the 4th, 6th and 7th brigades, a total of 2, 2 thousand people. The northern formation under the leadership of P. R. Yampolsky was stationed in the Zuiskii forests. The detachment consisted of the 1st and 5th brigades, numbered more than 700 fighters. The eastern formation under the command of V. S. Kuznetsov was located in the Old Crimean forests, the detachment consisted of the 2nd and 3rd brigades, numbered over 600 partisans. Partisan detachments controlled almost the entire mountain-forest part of the Crimea.
Commander of a Soviet partisan detachment with a PPSh submachine gun in Crimea. RGD-33 grenades are on the stones
Despite the general deterioration of the military situation, the German high command continued to strive to keep Crimea at all costs. Although at this time the Red Army was conducting a successful offensive in Ukraine and the 6th German Army was under threat of destruction. In January-February, the 73rd Infantry Division from the 44th Separate Army Corps was airlifted from southern Ukraine to Crimea, and by March 12, the 111th Infantry Division from the 6th Army of Army Group "A" was transferred. However, the command of the 17th Army understood that two divisions could only temporarily strengthen the position of the grouping, but defeat could not be avoided. Timely evacuation is required.
On February 24 and 25, 1944, the Chief of Staff of the 17th Army, General von Xylander, personally reported to the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, General Kurt Zeitzler, about the need for evacuation. On March 23, the commander of the army, General Eneke, again reported to the command of Army Group A about the need for evacuation. Eneke noted that the situation on the southern flank of the Eastern Front did not allow the 17th Army to be allocated forces and means either for organizing offensive operations or for ensuring a solid defense of the peninsula. Given the offensive of the Russian troops west of the Dnieper and the possibility of losing Odessa, communication, the flow of reinforcements and supplies will soon be disrupted, which will finally undermine the capabilities of the Crimea's defense. The army commander proposed to immediately begin the evacuation of the Crimean grouping, which would allow, if there were a sufficient number of ships and aircraft, to take out most of the troops. If this order is late, then the German and Romanian divisions are threatened with death.
However, the German command has not yet abandoned the idea of holding the Crimea. Although the military-strategic situation continued to deteriorate. The Germans could no longer transfer significant reinforcements to the peninsula, since the Red Army continued its successful offensive on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front. On March 26, 1944, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front entered the area of the city of Balti on the Soviet-Romanian border. Soviet troops crossed the Prut and fought in Romania. On April 8, units of the 1st Ukrainian Front crossed the state border of the USSR with Romania in the foothills of the Carpathians. On April 10, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front liberated Odessa.
Soviet troops - the forces of the 4th Ukrainian Front under the command of General of the Army F. I. Tolbukhin, the Separate Primorsky Army under the command of General of the Army A. I. F. S. Oktyabrsky and the Azov military flotilla, led by Rear Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, were to continue the offensive in March 1944. However, "man proposes, but God disposes." As noted by the chief of staff of the 4th UV, Sergei Biryuzov, it was difficult to establish interaction between the troops, then a snowfall, unexpected for this time, began in Tavria. Snow piled up almost a meter. Earlier, on February 12-18, a powerful storm broke out on the Sivash, which destroyed the crossings. The transfer of troops and ammunition stopped, the beginning of the operation had to be postponed.
Tanks Pz. Kpfw. 38 (t) of the 2nd Romanian tank regiment in Crimea
Two German soldiers in a trench near the Black Sea in Crimea
The commander of the 5th battery of the 505th combined anti-aircraft battalion of the Luftwaffe, reserve lieutenant Johan Moore with a soldier inspect the 88-mm Flak 36 anti-aircraft gun, on the shield (on both sides of the embroidered image of 26 tanks) and the barrel of which there are marks about downed aircraft and knocked out tanks in the area Perekopa
Commander of the Romanian Mountain Corps, General Hugo Schwab (second from left) and Commander of the 49th Mountain Corps of the Wehrmacht, General Rudolf Konrad (first from left), at the 37-mm cannon RaK 35/36 in Crimea. February 1944
German grouping. Defense
By the beginning of April 1944, the German-Romanian grouping in the Crimea consisted of 5 German and 7 Romanian divisions. A total of about 200 thousand people, about 3600 guns and mortars, 215 tanks and assault guns, 148 aircraft. The headquarters of the 17th Army and the 1st Mountain Rifle Corps were stationed in Simferopol. The most powerful 80 thousand. the grouping of the 17th army was located on the northern front: three infantry divisions, a brigade of assault guns from the 49th mountain rifle corps, two infantry and cavalry divisions of the Romanian 3rd cavalry corps. The headquarters of the corps were located in Dzhankoy. The reserve included a German infantry division (without one regiment), a brigade of assault guns and a Romanian cavalry regiment.
The Kerch direction was defended by 60 thousand.grouping: 2 infantry divisions, a brigade of assault guns (5th Army Corps), Romanian mountain rifle and cavalry divisions. The southern coast of the peninsula from Feodosia to Sevastopol was defended by the Romanian 1st Mountain Rifle Corps (two divisions). Also, the Romanians had to fight the partisans. The western coast of the peninsula from Sevastopol to Perekop was guarded by two Romanian cavalry regiments. In total, about 60 thousand soldiers were allocated to defend the coast from enemy landings and to fight the partisans.
In addition, the 17th Army also included the 9th Luftwaffe Air Division, an artillery regiment, three coastal defense artillery regiments, 10 RTK artillery divisions, the Crimea mountain rifle regiment, a separate Bergman regiment, 13 separate security battalions and 12 sapper battalions.
In the area of the Perekop Isthmus, the Germans prepared three defense zones, which were defended by the German 50th Infantry Division, reinforced by separate battalions and special units (up to 20 thousand soldiers in total, with 365 guns and mortars, 50 tanks and self-propelled guns). The main defensive zone, 4-6 km deep, had three defensive positions with full-profile trenches, pillboxes and bunkers. The main link in the defense was Armyansk, prepared for an all-round defense. In the southern part of the Perekop Isthmus, between the Karkinitsky Bay and lakes Staroye and Krasnoye, there was a second line of defense, 6 - 8 km deep. Here the German defense relied on the Ishun positions, which blocked the exit to the steppe regions of the peninsula. The third line of defense, its preparation has not yet been completed, passed along the Chartylyk River.
On the southern bank of the Sivash, where the forces of the 51st Soviet Army seized a bridgehead, the Germans prepared two or three defensive zones 15-17 km deep. The 336th German Infantry Division and the Romanian Infantry Division defended here. The terrain was difficult for the offensive - the isthmuses of four lakes. Therefore, the Germans were able to compact the battle formations, mine everything well, and create a strong defense.
In the Kerch direction, the Germans prepared four defensive zones with a total depth of 70 kilometers. The forward and main line of defense was based on Kerch and its heights. The second line of defense went along the Turetsky, the third went east of the settlements Seven Kolodezey, Kenegez, Adyk, Obekchi, Karasan, the fourth - blocked the Ak-Monaysky isthmus. In addition, the Germans had rear positions on the line Saki - Evpatoria, Sarabuz, Stary Krym, Sudak, Feodosia, Karasubazar - Zuya, Alushta - Yalta, Sevastopol.
Soviet forces. Operation plan
The Soviet forces numbered about 470 thousand people, about 6 thousand guns and mortars, more than 550 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1250 aircraft. The main blow was delivered by the 4th Ukrainian Front, the auxiliary - by the Separate Maritime Army. The Red Army with simultaneous converging strikes from the northern sector (Perekop and Sivash) and from the east (Kerch), in the general direction to Simferopol - Sevastopol, in cooperation with the fleet and partisan detachments, was supposed to break through the enemy's defenses, cut and destroy the 17th the German army, preventing the Germans and Romanians from escaping from the peninsula.
The 4th UV delivered two strikes: the first main one from the bridgehead on the southern bank of the Sivash was delivered by the 51st army of Ya. G. Kreizer and the reinforced 19th tank corps I. D. Vasiliev (from April 11 I. Potseluev) in the direction of Dzhankoy - Simferopol - Sevastopol; the second auxiliary blow was delivered by G. F. Zakharov's 2nd Guards Army at Perekop in the general direction of Evpatoria - Sevastopol.
A separate Primorskaya army was also supposed to deliver two simultaneous strikes - north and south of Bulganak - in the general direction of Vladislavovka and Feodosia. Having broken through the enemy's defenses, the army had to develop movement in the direction of Old Crimea - Simferopol - Sevastopol and along the southern coast through Feodosia - Sudak - Alushta - Yalta to Sevastopol. The Black Sea Fleet was supposed to disrupt the enemy's sea communications with the help of torpedo boats, submarines and naval aviation (over 400 aircraft). In addition, long-range aviation (more than 500 vehicles) was to strike important targets on enemy communications, railway junctions and ports (Konstanz, Galati and Sevastopol).
Soviet marines Vladimir Ivashev and Nikolai Ganzyuk install a ship's jack at the highest point of Kerch - Mount Mithridat. Crimea. April 11, 1944. Photo source:
