On March 4, 1944, the 1st Ukrainian Front went on the offensive under the command of Marshal Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov. The Proskurov-Chernivtsi offensive operation began, one of the largest front-line operations of the Great Patriotic War. As Zhukov recalled: a fierce battle ensued here, such as we have not seen since the Battle of Kursk. For eight days the enemy tried to push our troops back to their starting position.
This operation became part of a large-scale offensive by Soviet troops in the Right-Bank Ukraine (the so-called "second Stalinist strike"). As a result of this operation, Soviet soldiers inflicted a heavy defeat on two German tank armies (1st and 4th). 22 German divisions were defeated, losing a large number of manpower and equipment. The Red Army advanced 80-350 kilometers in the western and southern directions, reaching the foothills of the Carpathians. The German front was split in two.
The crossing of the Dniester River by T-34-85 tanks of the 44th Guards Tank Brigade of the 11th Guards Tank Corps of the 1st Guards Tank Army.
Prerequisites for the operation
During the winter of 1944, during the offensive of the Red Army in Right-Bank Ukraine, Soviet troops inflicted a serious defeat on the Germans near Zhitomir and Berdichev, Kirovograd, defeated the Korsun-Shevchenko and Nikopol-Kryvyi Rih groupings (Second Stalinist strike. Liberation of Right-Bank Ukraine. Part 2. Part 3.).
Then, during the Rovno-Lutsk operation (January 27 - February 11, 1944), the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front liberated Rovno and Lutsk. As a result, Soviet troops enveloped the left wing of Army Group South from the north, and conditions were created for an attack on the flank of the enemy's Proskurov-Chernivtsi grouping. An opportunity arose to complete the liberation of the Soviet southwestern regions and reach the state border of the USSR. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to inflict several strikes almost simultaneously in order to split the German Army Group South into several separate groups. One of these attacks was the Proskurov-Chernivtsi offensive operation (March 4 - April 17, 1944).
Operation plan and forces of the parties
The operation was to be carried out by the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which, after the injury of General Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin (the wound was fatal), was led by Marshal Zhukov. The 1st Ukrainian Front was to launch an offensive from the Dubno - Shepetovka - Lyubar line. The front was given the task of defeating the German troops in the Kremenets, Ternopil, Starokonstantinov areas. Then the 1st Ukrainian Front was to develop an offensive in the direction of Chortkov and, in cooperation with the 40th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, encircle and eliminate the main forces of the enemy's 1st Tank Army.
The 1st Ukrainian Front consisted of: 13th Army under the command of Nikolai Pukhov, 60th Army of Ivan Chernyakhovsky, 1st Guards Army of Andrey Grechko, 18th Army of Yevgeny Zhuravlev and 38th Army of Kirill Moskalenko, 4th tank army of Vasily Badanov (from March 29 Dmitry Lelyushenko), 1st tank army of Mikhail Katukov, 3rd guards tank army of Pavel Rybalko. From the air, the front was supported by the 2nd Air Army under the command of Stepan Krasovsky. By the beginning of March, the front numbered about 800 thousand soldiers, 11, 9 thousand.guns and mortars, 1, 4 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns and about 480 aircraft.
According to the plan of the Soviet command, the main blow was delivered by the 1st Guards, 60th armies, 3rd Guards tank and 4th tank armies. The strike group of the 1st UV was to launch an offensive at the junction of two German tank armies, break through the enemy's defensive lines and move in the general direction of Chortkov. Other armies delivered auxiliary strikes. On the left flank of the front: the 18th Army was advancing on Khmelnik, the 38th Army - on Vinnitsa and Zhmerinka, with part of its forces it was supposed to assist the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the liberation of the Gaisin area. On the right flank, the 13th Army supported the offensive of the front's main strike grouping from the north, conducting hostilities in the Brodsky direction.
The Soviet troops were opposed by two German tank armies: the 4th Panzer Army under the command of Erhard Routh and the 1st Panzer Army under the command of Hans-Valentin Hube. Both armies were part of Army Group South (from April 5 - Army Group Northern Ukraine). Army Group South was commanded by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, but on March 31 he was removed from office and put in reserve (the Fuhrer was enraged by the defeat of Army Group South). The troops were led by Field Marshal Walter Model. From the air, the tank armies were supported by the 4th Air Fleet of Otto Dessloh. By early March, the German armies had 29 divisions (including seven armored and one motorized), a motorized brigade, and a large number of other formations. The German group consisted of about half a million soldiers, about 1, 1 thousand tanks and assault guns, about 5, 5 thousand guns and mortars, 480 aircraft.
Before the start of the operation, the Soviet command had to carry out a significant regrouping of forces and equipment, since the most powerful forces were located on the left flank of the front, and they had to be transferred to the central direction. The 60th, 1st Guards Armies, 3rd Guards Tank Army, a significant number of separate tank, artillery and engineering units were transferred to new zones and areas of concentration. At the same time, many formations of the 18th and 38th armies changed their position. The 1st Panzer Army generally made a whole march to take its place in the shock formations of the main grouping.
The regrouping of troops was carried out in difficult off-road conditions, spring mud. The big problem was supplying the troops with everything they needed, especially fuel. Fuel supplies were insufficient, the troops could conduct active hostilities for only two or three days. However, the Komfronta Zhukov decided not to postpone the start of the offensive, since every day the muddy road only intensified, and the German defense intensified.
Offensive
On the morning of March 4, Soviet artillery struck the German positions. Then, units of the 60th Army of Chernyakhovsky and the 1st Guards Army of Grechko went on the offensive. Following them, the second echelon was brought into battle - Badanov's 4th Tank Army and Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army. By evening, Soviet troops advanced 8-20 km. On March 5, Zhuravlev's 18th army launched an offensive. In two days, the Soviet armies broke through the German defenses, creating a gap up to 180 km wide and wedging in to a depth of 25-50 km. On March 7-10, the advanced units of the Soviet armies reached the Ternopil, Volochisk, Proskurov line. The Lvov-Odessa railway, the main communications of the entire southern wing of the German troops, was intercepted.
The German command began to hastily transfer reserves to the place of the breakthrough. On March 9, units of the 60th Army and the 4th Guards Tank Corps of Pavel Poluboyarov attached to it met strong resistance from German troops on the approaches to Ternopil. Here the defense was held by the 68th and 359th Infantry Divisions, which were transferred from Western Europe. Heavy battles of Chernyakhovsky's army had to be fought in the Volochisk area. Here the German command inflicted counterattacks with the help of the 7th Panzer Division and the SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler". Grechko's 1st Guards Army, supported by Sergei Ivanov's 7th Guards Tank Corps from the 3rd Guards Tank Army, captured the Starokonstantinov area and reached Proskurov. Here the Germans deployed four tank divisions against the advancing Soviet troops: the 1st, 6th, 16th and 17th tank divisions.
The German command of Army Group South brought in large forces into battle: 9 tank and 6 infantry divisions. The Germans saw the main threat in the loss of control over the Lvov-Odessa railway. There was a threat of breaking up the front and dividing Army Group South into two parts. The Germans fiercely counterattacked, trying to stop the Soviet troops and regain control over the lost section of the railway.
In the current situation, the Soviet command decided to temporarily stop the offensive of the troops. It was necessary to repel German counter-attacks, regroup forces, tighten up the rear, artillery, reserves, and determine the direction of new attacks. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command agreed with the proposal of the Military Council of the 1st Ukrainian Front. On March 11, the 60th and 1st Guards armies were ordered to go over to the defensive.
At the same time, the Stavka clarified the tasks of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The main shock group of the front was supposed to cross the Dniester and the Prut on the move, liberate Chernivtsi, and reach the Soviet state border. In the course of this strike, the main formations of the 1st German Tank Army had to be isolated from the 4th Panzer Army, to cut off its escape routes to the south, beyond the Dniester. The German tank army was planned to be surrounded and destroyed in the area northeast of Kamenets-Podolsk. The right wing of the front (13th Army) was supposed to attack Brody and Lvov, assisting the 2nd Belorussian Front, which was to strike in the Kovel direction. The offensive of the army was supported by the 25th Panzer, 1st and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps. The left wing of the front (18th and 38th armies) advanced on Kamenets-Podolsk, assisting the 2nd Ukrainian Front. The 40th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front was to take part in the encirclement of enemy forces in the Kamenets-Podolsky area.
The 13th Army of Pukhov, having broken through the strong defense of the enemy, by the end of March 17, captured an important stronghold of the enemy - Dubno. Two days later, another serious node of the enemy's defense was occupied - Kremenets. By March 20, Pukhov's army, having broken the resistance of seven German divisions, reached the approaches to Brody. This was the end of the army's successes. In the Brody area, the Germans created a strong defense and stubborn battles were fought here until the end of the operation. Zhuravlev's 18th Army and Moskalenko's 38th Army liberated Khmelnik, Vinnitsa, Zhmerinka by March 21, pushing the opposing units of the 1st German Tank Army to Kamenets-Podolsky.
At this time, the formations of the 60th and 1st Guards armies, the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank armies fought off enemy counterattacks in the area of Ternopil, Volochisk and Proskurov. The battle was fierce. The Germans have concentrated large forces. The Soviet armies suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment. So, on March 14, Zhukov reported to Headquarters that only 63 tanks and self-propelled guns remained in Rybalko's army, 20 tanks in Poluboyarov's corps (4th Guards Tank Corps), and other armies suffered heavy losses.
The gunners are firing from a German 75-mm anti-tank gun PaK 40. The area of the Soviet-Romanian border.
By the beginning of a new offensive, the front's strike grouping was strengthened. Four rifle divisions were transferred to the 60th Army from the front reserve, and two divisions were transferred to the 1st Guards Army. The 1st Tank Army of Katukov was transferred to the direction of the main attack. As a result, three tank armies were concentrated in one fist. On March 21, the main strike group went on the offensive again. The German defenses were broken through and on March 23, units of the 60th and 1st Panzer Armies recaptured an important communications center from the enemy - Chortkov. On March 24, Soviet soldiers crossed the Dniester on the move. On March 29, they crossed the Prut and liberated Chernivtsi.
Other armies were also successful. The 4th Panzer Army, having made a roundabout maneuver, occupied Kamenets-Podolsky on March 26. Units of the 3rd Guards Tank Army and the 1st Guards Army recaptured Proskurov on March 25. Then the troops continued their attack on Kamenets-Podolsky from the northern direction. True, on March 28, the 3rd Guards Tank Army was withdrawn to the reserve for replenishment. On March 31, units of the 4th Panzer Army and the 30th Rifle Corps of the 1st Guards Army reached Khotin, where they established contact with the formations of the 40th Army of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
As a result, the 1st German Panzer Army (a total of 23 divisions, including 10 tank divisions, about 220 thousand people) were surrounded in the area northeast of Kamenets-Podolsk. At the same time, the main forces of the 4th German Panzer Army were pushed back to the west. Only in the Ternopil region was a small enemy grouping (12 thousand soldiers) surrounded, which continued to resist. German troops faced the threat of a major military disaster.
However, the lack of forces at the front, the armies had already suffered heavy losses in previous battles, did not allow the creation of a dense internal front of encirclement. In addition, a too "large animal" (23 divisions) got into the net, such a "cauldron" had to be eliminated by the forces of two fronts. Therefore, the encircled Germans, using the gaps in the inner ring of the encirclement, went to break through on March 31. The German group broke through in the direction of Chortkov, Buchach. The Germans advanced in a blizzard, operating at the junction of the 1st Guards and 4th Tank Armies.
Zhukov tried to prevent the breakthrough of the German divisions with the help of the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, 38th Army (74th Rifle Corps), 18th Army (52nd Rifle Corps), separate divisions of the 1st Guards, 18th and 38th armies. However, rifle divisions had to engage in battle after a long march, in a dispersed state, on the move, without prepared positions. Artillery and rear units lagged behind the forward forces. The aviation was unable to provide adequate assistance. The spring thaw has rendered unpaved airfields unusable. The combat effectiveness of the Soviet Air Force dropped dramatically. Therefore, the Soviet divisions could not stop the German tank wedges.
Heavy fighting took place on April 1-2. The Germans fought their way through, breaking the Soviet defenses. He finally turned the tide in favor of the 1st German Panzer Army, unblocking the blow of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, which arrived from France. The German command transferred other formations from Germany, France, Denmark, Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia (in particular, the 1st Hungarian army) to the battle area. On April 4, select SS units struck towards their encircled comrades-in-arms. Significant forces of German aviation were also concentrated here. After three battles, the German encircled group made its way to the Buchach area.
The German army was able to break through to its own. But the 1st Panzer Army suffered huge losses: the divisions lost half of their personnel, only headquarters remained of many units, most of the heavy weapons and equipment were lost. Thus, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front captured 61 aircraft, 187 tanks and assault guns, thousands of vehicles, etc.
The fighting did not end there, the operation continued until April 17. So, the 1st Tank Army of Katukov fought heavy battles on the approaches to Stanislav and in the area of Nadvornaya. The tankers had to repel the enemy's strong counterattacks. Only with the support of Moskalenko's 38th Army formations, which the front command urgently transferred to the right bank of the Dniester, was it possible to stabilize the front. In addition, the front command transferred the 18th Army to the right flank.
The 60th Army fought with the encircled Ternopil enemy grouping. The army surrounded the city on March 31, reaching the outskirts of Ternopil, but could not advance further. Only by repelling the external counterstrikes that the Germans inflicted in order to unblock the encircled grouping and, having completed preparations for the operation, the 60th Army was able to begin a decisive assault. On April 14, Soviet troops launched an assault on Ternopil. After two days of fighting, the German group was defeated, on April 17, its remnants were eliminated. According to German data, only a few dozen people were saved. On the same day, the troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front went over to the defensive. The operation was completed successfully.
Sappers make flooring for the passage of tanks. 1st Ukrainian Front. Spring 1944
Results of the operation
The troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front advanced 80-350 kilometers, reaching the line of Torchin, Brody, Buchach, Stanislav, Nadvornaya. The Red Army reached the borders of Czechoslovakia and Romania. Soviet troops liberated a significant part of the Right-Bank Ukraine - Kamenets-Podolsk region, most of Vinnitsa, Ternopil and Chernivtsi regions, several districts of Rivne and Ivano-Frankivsk regions (about 42 thousand sq. Km). 57 cities were liberated from the Nazis, including three regional centers - Vinnitsa, Ternopil and Chernivtsi, several large railway junctions, a large number of settlements, villages and villages.
The 1st and 4th German armies suffered heavy losses. 22 German divisions, several tank and motorized brigades, and other individual units lost more than half of their personnel and most of their heavy weapons and equipment, in fact, temporarily losing their combat effectiveness. According to Soviet data, only for the period from 4 to 31 March 1944, more than 183 thousand German soldiers were killed, and about 25 thousand were taken prisoner. To close the resulting gap, the German command had to redeploy, in addition to those divisions that had been advanced from the reserve during the battle, up to ten divisions, including two tank divisions and a number of separate formations. The reserves were transferred from Western Europe. The 1st Hungarian army was moved to the foothills of the Carpathians.
Soviet troops reached the Carpathians, the state border of the USSR and fulfilled the main goal of the operation - they cut the enemy's strategic front into two parts. The main rokadny communications of the enemy were cut. However, the 1st Ukrainian Front was unable to fulfill the task of eliminating the 1st Panzer Army. There was not enough strength for this. The units that went out to the external and internal fronts of the encirclement lost a lot of people and equipment in the previous fierce battles. Due to the spring thaw, the artillery and the rear were lagging behind. There were not enough tanks to fight the German tank formations. And due to problems with the landing sites, unpaved airfields could not operate at full load, the aviation was not able to fully support the ground forces. In addition, taking into account the constantly introduced German reserves into battle, the German command constantly increased the number of fighting divisions.
A feature of the operation was the use of large tank groupings by both sides. So, during the second offensive of the 1st Ukrainian Front, which began on March 21, three tank armies and two separate tank corps were thrown into battle at once. From the very beginning of the battle, the Germans had 10 tank and one motorized divisions. This gave the battle a special speed and agility.
On the whole, the operation was successful and showed the increased skill of the Soviet commanders and soldiers. The morale of the Soviet troops was very high, the soldiers were eager to free their native land from the enemy. It is not for nothing that 70 formations and units that distinguished themselves in battle received honorary titles (Proskurovsky, Vinnytsia, Yampolsky, Chernivtsi, etc.).
Residents of Vinnitsa meet Soviet soldiers-liberators. When Soviet troops entered Vinnitsa with battles, the city was engulfed in fires, which were staged by the retreating Germans.
