During the January-February offensive of the Soviet army, conditions were created for the complete expulsion of the German occupiers from Ukraine and Crimea.
Korsun-Shevchenko operation
On January 24, 1944, the 4th Guards, 53rd and 5th Guards Tank Armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Generals Ryzhov, Galanin and Rotmistrov, with the support of General Goryunov's 5th Air Army, began the Korsun-Shevchenko operation. A day later, the offensive and the strike group of the 1st Ukrainian Front (UF) began - the 6th Panzer Army of Kravchenko, part of the forces of the 40th Army of Zhmachenko and the 27th Army of Trofimenko, with air support from the 2nd Air Army of Krasovsky.
The German group consisted of the troops of the 1st tank and 8th field armies: 10 infantry, 2 tank divisions, the SS Wallonia motorized brigade, 4 assault gun divisions and other units. From the air, the Germans were supported by the aviation of the 4th Air Fleet. In total, the German Korsun-Shevchenko group consisted of more than 170 thousand people, 1640 guns and mortars, 140 tanks and self-propelled guns. In addition, the grouping could be supported by large armored reserves: in the area west and northwest of Kirovograd (4 tank divisions) and in the area southwest of Okhmatov (3 tank divisions of the 1st Panzer Army). The German command planned to hold the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky ledge in order not to close the adjacent flanks of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts, to prevent the Russians from reaching the Southern Bug. In addition, the ledge was viewed as a possible springboard for a counteroffensive to restore the defensive line along the Dnieper and return Kiev.
On January 27, 1944, the Germans, with the help of tank divisions, with strikes from the south and north, inflicted counterattacks on the advancing forces of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, which stopped the Russian offensive. The Germans were able to cut off the 20th and 29th Panzer Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army and close the gap in their defenses. Our troops were cut off from the main forces of the front. However, this time the German counterstrike did not change the situation as a whole: the strike group continued to move forward, not fearing for its rear.
On the morning of January 28, 1944, tankmen of the 5th Guards Tank and 6th Tank Armies joined up in the Zvenigorodka area. The German Korsun-Shevchenko group was caught in the "cauldron". According to various estimates, about 60 - 80 thousand Wehrmacht soldiers and officers were in the encirclement ring: 2 army corps consisting of 6 divisions and one brigade. By February 3, units of the 27th Army of the 1st UV and the 4th Guards Army of Ryzhov, the 52nd Army of Koroteev, and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps of Selivanov from the 1st UV, formed an internal front to encircle the enemy. A total of 13 rifle divisions, 3 cavalry divisions, 2 fortified areas and other units. The outer ring of the encirclement was formed by the troops of the tank armies, which were reinforced with rifle corps, artillery, anti-tank and engineering units. The flanks of the tank armies were adjoined by the troops of the 40th Army of the 1st UV and the 53rd Army of the 2nd UV.
Soviet troops sought to dismember and destroy the encircled enemy grouping. The encircled German troops retreated to more convenient defensive positions, consolidated the battle formations, tried to hold out until the unblocking forces approached. Inside the encirclement ring, heavy fighting went on for Boguslav, which Soviet troops took on February 3, for Olshany - until February 6, Kvitki and Gorodishche - until February 9. On February 7, the commander of the 11th Army Corps Wilhelm Stemmermann (Stemmermann's group) was appointed commander of the encircled German troops. The surrounded Germans suffered heavy losses: 150 soldiers remained in the regiments (about 10% of the staff). By February 8, the entire territory occupied by the Nazis was under fire by Soviet artillery. Our bomber aviation continuously attacked the Nazis. The Soviet command, in order to stop the senseless bloodshed, offered the Germans to capitulate. But the Germans rejected the ultimatum, as they were preparing for a breakthrough through Shenderovka.
The German command, as during the Battle of Stalingrad, organized an air bridge. The flights of transport aircraft (mainly Junkers 52 and Heinkel 111) began on January 29. German cars landed at the site in Korsun. They carried ammunition, provisions, fuel, medicines, etc. The wounded were taken out. After February 12, with the loss of airfields, cargo could only be delivered by parachutes.
Dismantled German Junkers Ju-87 (Ju-87) dive bombers captured at a field airfield. Presumably, the picture was taken in Ukraine after the Korsun-Shevchenko operation
The commander of the German 1st Panzer Army, Hube, promised to help out the encircled. Hitler also promised Stemmermann to be released from the cauldron. With the aim of unblocking the encircled troops, the German command, by exposing other sectors of the front, allocated 8 tank and 6 infantry divisions from the 8th field and 1st tank armies (over 110 thousand people, 940 tanks and assault guns). The Germans planned to destroy the Russian forces that had broken through (5th Guards and 6th Tank Armies) with concentric strikes and liberate the encircled grouping. The counteroffensive was scheduled for February 3. However, the early spring thaw in the south of Russia slowed down the concentration of German troops. In addition, complications in other sectors of the Soviet-German front forced to send there a part of the troops intended for the counterstrike. As a result, the troops arrived in parts, and the Germans were unable to organize a powerful simultaneous attack. The German divisions attacked separately, and despite the first successes, they did not achieve their goal.
On February 1, 1944, the German 11th and 13th Panzer Divisions began attacks in the Tolmach, Novomirgorod area. On February 2, units of the 3rd and 14th Panzer Divisions began to approach the area. On February 4, the 24th Panzer Division was supposed to arrive, but the High Command at the last moment transferred the formation to the south, to the 6th Army. The Germans achieved partial successes, but their advance was halted by stubborn resistance from the Soviet troops. The Germans began to regroup their forces to strike at Zvenigorodka.
On February 4, the 16th (reinforced by the 506th Tigers heavy tank battalion) and 17th tank divisions, the Beke heavy tank regiment went on the offensive from the Rizino area. On February 6, units of the 1st Panzer Division began to approach the battle area (the division completed its concentration on February 10). The strike group of the 1st Tank Army was able to break through the defenses of the Soviet 104th Rifle Corps. Front Commander Vatutin, in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through, threw Bogdanov's 2nd tank army into battle, which had just arrived from the headquarters reserve. On the morning of February 6, Soviet tank crews launched a counterattack. After stubborn battles, the Germans were forced to stop the offensive and begin regrouping their forces in order to organize a new attack on Lysyanka.
German tanks Pz. Kpfw. IV with soldiers on armor during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation
Soviet Il-2 attack aircraft of the 17th Air Army are sent to strike at the retreating enemy columns during the Korsun-Shevchenko offensive operation
A salvo of Soviet guards mortars near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky
Having strengthened and regrouped the shock group on the external front, the Germans continued their attempts to save the Korsun-Shevchenko group of troops. On February 11, units of the 11th, 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions launched an offensive on Zvenigorodka. The Germans made little progress, but their further attacks were repulsed. From the Risino area on February 11, troops of the 1st, 16th, 17th Panzer Divisions and the 1st SS Panzer Division "Adolf Hitler" attacked. In this direction, due to a stronger grouping in composition and number of tanks, the Germans achieved more and broke through to Lysyanka. On February 12, the Germans were generally inactive due to lack of fuel, ammunition, and strong resistance from Russian troops. They repulsed the enemy's counterattacks. On February 13, the 16th Panzer Division and Becke's heavy tank regiment were able to reach another 12 km, and about 10 km remained to the Stemmermann group. On February 14-16, the strike group tried to move forward, but did not achieve visible success due to the strong resistance of our troops. The strike capabilities of the German group were exhausted. About 7 km remained to the German encirclement.
Meanwhile, the surrounded German troops tried to break through to their own. In the Steblev area, the German command was gathering forces (72nd Infantry Division) for an attack on Shenderovka, in order to join up with the shock group of the 1st Panzer Army. On February 12, the Germans made a successful night attack, pierced the defenses of the 27th Soviet Army and made their way to Shenderovka. As a result, the distance between the German troops in Lysyanka and Shenderovka was reduced to 10 - 12 km.
The Soviet Headquarters, in order to unite the efforts of all the troops allocated to eliminate the encircled enemy, transferred the 27th Army to the 2nd UV. Also, the 27th Army was strengthened. On February 13-14, troops of the 5th Guards Tank Army attacked the Nazis in the Steblev area. At the same time, the regrouping of the main forces of Rotmistrov's tank army began in the Steblev and Lysyanka area.
The position of the surrounded German grouping became critical. On February 12, the length of the perimeter of the territory they occupied was reduced to 35 km. On February 14, Soviet troops occupied Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. On February 15, the commanders of the encircled German corps Lieb and Stemmermann decided to go for the last breakthrough, otherwise they would die. In the vanguard was Lieb's corps, the most combat-ready forces (Corps Group B, 72nd Division and 5th SS Panzer Division Viking, Brigade Wallonia), it was covered by Stemmermann's Corps (57th and 88th Infantry divisions). The group had about 45 thousand combat-ready people. On February 15, stubborn battles were fought in the area of the villages of Komarovka, Khilki and Novaya Buda, the success of the breakthrough depended on control over them.
On the night of 17-18 February, the Germans marched in three columns for a desperate breakthrough. Part of the group, suffering heavy losses from the shelling of Soviet artillery and when trying to cross the water barrier using improvised means (people died from hypothermia), was able to get through to their own. General Stemmerman was also killed. At the same time, the Nazis had to abandon heavy weapons, artillery and a large number of various equipment. According to Soviet data, German losses in the encirclement amounted to 55 thousand people killed and about 18 thousand prisoners. According to German information, 35 thousand people left the "boiler".
Thus, the Red Army defeated the enemy's Korsun-Shevchenko grouping. The German army suffered a heavy defeat, suffered heavy losses in manpower and equipment, which further worsened the situation on the extended German front. The Red Army radically improved the situation at the junction of the 1st and 2nd Ukrainian fronts. This created the conditions for the development of the offensive to further liberate the Right-Bank Ukraine, for the movement of our troops to the Southern Bug and Dniester.
Column of retreating German troops in Ukraine during the Korsun-Shevchenko operation
The dead German soldiers and the wrecked PaK 38 cannon in the Korsun-Shevchenko direction
German automotive equipment, crashed and abandoned near Korsun-Shevchenkovsky. In the foreground, a wrecked German truck Mercedes-Benz LG 3000
Horse Soviet soldiers pass by a column of broken German equipment and carts near the village of Shenderovka during the Korsun - Shevchenko operation. Photo source:
Development of the Dnieper-Carpathian strategic operation
Almost simultaneously with the development of the Korsun-Shevchenko operation, the troops of the right wing of the 1st UV went on the offensive. A feature of the operation was that the terrain was swampy and wooded and the Germans did not manage to create in Polesie, at the junction of Army Groups "Center" and "South", a continuous line of defense, having only strong points on the main communications.
On January 27, 1944, the 13th and 60th Soviet armies of Generals Pukhov and Chernyakhovsky began the Rovno-Lutsk operation. On the very first day of the operation, the 1st and 6th Guards Cavalry Corps of Generals Baranov and Sokolov plunged into the enemy's location 40-50 kilometers and on January 29-30 they went into the rear of the German forces defending Rovno. The hidden and fast march of the Soviet cavalry proved to be very effective in the marshes and forests of Polesie. In addition, the partisans who attacked enemy lines of communication contributed to the success of our troops. The Germans were forced to retreat. On February 2, our troops liberated Rivne and Lutsk. Later, battles began for Shepetovka, which was liberated on February 11. This operation was successfully completed. Soviet troops advanced 120 km and captured the left wing of Army Group South (the proskurovo-Kamenets grouping) from the north, creating conditions for an attack on its flank and rear.
On the same days, the troops of the 3rd and 4th Ukrainian fronts under the command of generals R. Ya. Malinovsky and F. I. Tolbukhin fought heavy battles against the Nikopol-Krivoy Rog grouping of the Wehrmacht (6th field army). On January 30, 1944, the Red Army launched the Nikopol-Kryvyi Rih operation with the aim of eliminating the Nikopol bridgehead and liberating Nikopol and Krivoy Rog. The German Fuehrer Hitler ordered to defend the iron and manganese mines in the Nikopol area at any cost. In addition, the German troops needed this bridgehead for a possible strike in order to restore land communication with the Crimean group. Therefore, the Nazis, contrary to the expectations of our military, not only did not leave the Nikopol ledge, which was quite rational in military terms, on the contrary, they strengthened the area with all their might and prepared to hold it. It is not surprising that the attacks of the Soviet troops in the first half of January 1944 were repelled by the Germans.
The headquarters reinforced the 3rd Ukrainian Front, which played the main role in the operation, with the 37th Army from the 2nd UV, the 31st Guards Rifle Corps from the Headquarters reserve. The troops were replenished with manpower, equipment, ammunition. The Soviet command prepared two shock groups. The grouping of the 3rd Ukrainian Front - the 8th Guards and 46th Armies of Generals Chuikov and Glagolev and the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps of Tanaschishin - struck in the direction of Apostolovo. At the Apostolovo - Kamenka line, the troops of the 3rd UV were to join up with the forces of the 4th UV, encircle and destroy the enemy's Nikopol grouping. The 4th UV forces of the 3rd Guards, 5th Shock and 28th Armies of Generals Lelushenko, Tsvetaev and Grechkin, the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps of Sviridov advanced on the enemy's Nikopol bridgehead. The 37th and 6th armies of Generals Sharokhin and Shlemin of the 3rd UV carried out auxiliary strikes on Nikopol and Krivoy Rog.
On January 30, 1944, Soviet troops launched auxiliary strikes in the Nikopol and Kryvyi Rih directions. The German command decided that the main blow was directed at Krivoy Rog and transferred its reserves (2 tank divisions) to this direction. On January 31, the main forces of the 3rd UV went on the offensive. The German defense was hacked and the Tanaschishin mechanized corps led the breakthrough. By the end of February 1, our tankers reached Kamenka and Sholokhovo. Realizing their mistake, the Germans turned two tank divisions into a dangerous direction and from the reserves of Army Group South turned the 24th Panzer Division (before that it was sent to the rescue of the Korsun-Shevchenko grouping). However, these decisions were late and could no longer change the situation. By February 5, our troops took Apostolovo and dismembered the 6th German army.
Meanwhile, the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front broke the fierce resistance of the German troops on the Nikopol bridgehead. On February 2, the Germans began to withdraw their troops across the Dnieper. Soviet aviation inflicted strong blows on the main crossings in the area of Nikopol and Bolshaya Lepetekhi, which disrupted enemy communications and caused great damage. However, in general, the Germans, under the cover of strong rearguards, managed to withdraw the divisions from the Nikopol bridgehead, avoiding encirclement. It is worth noting that the spring thaw played an important role in this battle. The Germans retreated, threw heavy weapons and equipment. Our troops also experienced great difficulties, drowning in the mud and unable to intercept the enemy's escape routes. On February 8, our troops liberated Nikopol and the city of Bolshaya Lepetiha, completing the elimination of the Nikopol bridgehead.
Soldiers of the 3rd Ukrainian Front examine a shell from a captured German self-propelled gun StuG III Ausf. G on the road to Nikopol. The vehicle has a winter camouflage, on the surviving track, anti-slip teeth are visible, which were used to improve driving performance on ice or hard snow.
The threat of encirclement of part of the German group remained. Therefore, on February 10-11, German troops launched a strong counterstrike at the junction of the 46th and 8th Guards armies in the direction of Apostolovo with the forces of 2 tank and 4 infantry divisions. The Germans pushed our troops and were able, at the cost of great efforts, to cover the road going from Nikopol along the Dnieper to Dudchany. As a result, the Germans escaped the "cauldron". However, the German troops suffered heavy losses, especially in weapons and equipment. According to the German military historian K. Tippelskirch, the defeat of the Wehrmacht at Nikopol was not much inferior in scale to the catastrophe of the 8th Army at Korsun-Shevchenko.
Pulling up artillery and ammunition, reinforcing the 3rd UV with Pliev's 4th Guards Kavkoprus, our troops continued their offensive. On February 17, the 3rd UV and the right wing of the 4th UV, overcoming strong enemy resistance and repelling his counterattacks, continued their offensive in the Kryvyi Rih direction. Tsvetaev's 5th Shock Army captured a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper, repulsing German counterattacks. However, due to ice, snowstorm and snow drifts, traffic almost stopped. And the ice drift that began on the Dnieper and a significant rise in water thwarted the timely advance of Pliev's cavalry, which was concentrated south of Nikopol. However, nothing, not the elements, not the desperate resistance of the Nazis, could stop the movement of Soviet soldiers. On February 22, 1944, our troops (parts of the 46th Army with the support of the 37th Army) liberated Krivoy Rog. By February 29, the operation was successfully completed.
Thus, the Red Army won another victory. The troops of Malinovsky and Tolbukhin defeated the Nikopol-Kryvyi Rih grouping of the enemy, occupied the Nikopol bridgehead, and liberated Nikopol and Krivoy Rog. The Kirovograd, Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya, Rovno-Lutsk and Nikopol-Kryvyi Rih operations completed the first stage of the liberation of the Right-Bank Ukraine. During the January-February offensive of the Soviet army, conditions were created for the complete expulsion of the German occupiers from Ukraine and Crimea.
Soviet infantry overcomes off-road on the outskirts of Krivoy Rog
German 88-mm anti-aircraft gun FlaK 36, destroyed on the territory of the metallurgical plant "Krivorozhstal" in Krivoy Rog
