In previous articles, we examined in detail the pre-war history of the formation of large formations of the Red Army tank forces, as well as the reasons why in August 1941 our army was forced to "roll back" to the brigade level.
Briefly about the main
Briefly summarizing what was written earlier, we note that the tank brigade was the most familiar for Soviet tank crews an independent formation of the Red Army armored forces, since it existed in them from the beginning of the 30s (however, then they were called mechanized brigades) and until the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, when the overwhelming majority of brigades were disbanded to saturate the mechanized corps. The latter appeared in the Red Army at the very beginning of the 30s, but were later disbanded due to the cumbersomeness and complexity of management. It was assumed that they would be replaced by motorized divisions mod. 1939, and this was an extremely successful decision, since the staff of these formations was as close as possible to the Wehrmacht tank division of the 1941 model. And this division, at that time, was perhaps the most perfect instrument of mobile warfare.
Unfortunately, such a successful undertaking did not develop. Apparently, under the influence of the successes of the Wehrmacht tank forces, the country in 1940 began the formation of tank divisions and mechanized corps, the bulk of which, alas, was lost in the first battles of the Great Patriotic War. The mechanized corps and tank divisions, alas, did not demonstrate high efficiency, and the USSR, having lost significant territories and forced to evacuate masses of industrial enterprises to the rear, could not immediately begin their revival. In addition, the belligerent army experienced a huge need for tanks to support rifle divisions, and all this together led to the decision to abandon the formation of tank divisions and mechanized corps in favor of tank brigades in August 1941.
For all its inevitability, such a return was not the optimal solution, because the tank was never self-sufficient on the battlefield - in order to make its use effective, infantry and artillery support was needed. But the tank brigade had almost no one or the other, and interaction with rifle divisions and corps was rarely satisfactory for a variety of reasons. Therefore, the leadership of the Red Army began to form formations larger than a tank brigade, and included not only purely tank units, but also motorized infantry and artillery - and as soon as at least minimal prerequisites for this arose.
New tank corps
As mentioned above, the formation of tank formations larger than the brigade was abandoned in August 1941. But already on March 31, 1942, the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense issued directive No. 724218ss, according to which four new tank corps were to be formed in April of the same year. But with the pre-war mechanized corps (MK), despite the similarity in names, the new tank corps (TK) had practically nothing in common.
If the 1940 MK had 2 tank and one motorized divisions, then the new TK had the same number of brigades. In addition, the MK included many reinforcement units - a motorcycle regiment, several separate battalions and even an air squadron, and in the TC there was nothing of this, only the control of the corps of 99 people was provided.
Thus, the new TC was a much more compact connection. His two tank brigades, staffed according to the state number 010 / 345-010 / 352, had 46 tanks and 1,107 people. personnel, and the motorized rifle brigade according to state number 010 / 370-010 / 380 had no tanks at all, but at its disposal were 7 armored vehicles, 345 cars, 10 motorcycles and 3,152 people. All in all, the tank corps, according to the original plan, included 100 tanks (20 KV, 40 T-34 and 40 T-60), 20 guns with a caliber of 76, 2 mm, 4 120-mm mortars, 42 82-mm mortars, from anti-tank means: 12 45-mm guns and 66 anti-aircraft guns, as well as 20 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. In addition, the TC was equipped with 539 vehicles. The number of personnel was 5,603 people.
It is interesting that the indicated numbers do not fully coincide with the staffs of the tank and motorized rifle brigades. So, for example, only in a motorized rifle brigade, according to the indicated state, 20 guns of 76, 2-mm were laid, but in addition to this, 4 guns of the same caliber were supposed to be in tank brigades. That is, there should have been 28 of them in total, but it is indicated that there were only 20 of them in the TC. On the contrary, the sum of the personnel of the three brigades and 99 people in the corps control gives 5,465 people, which is 138 people. below the size of the tank corps. One can only assume that in the "corps" brigades there were some minor differences from individual brigades of the same state.
On the whole, the new tank corps looked rather strange formations, most of all reminiscent of the mechanized division of the pre-war model, which had "grown thinner" by about half. Their undoubted advantages were the presence in the compound of some field artillery and a fair amount of motorized infantry - after all, in addition to the motorized rifle brigade itself, the tank brigades each had one motorized rifle battalion, alas, shrunken to 400 people. At the same time, the new tank corps, due to its small number, was, at least in theory, easier to control the formation than a tank or motorized division. But on this, alas, its advantages ended. The lack of command and control and the lack of support formations, such as communications, reconnaissance and rear services, were major shortcomings, as well as the inadequacy of their own firepower. While the German tank division of the sample had its own light and heavy howitzers of 105-mm and 150-mm caliber, respectively, the Soviet tank corps had to be content with only 76, 2-mm artillery. Even with the main striking force - tanks, everything was not in perfect order. Theoretically, of course, having in its composition heavy, light and medium tanks, the corps could form the optimal outfit of forces for solving any problem, but in practice, the presence of three types of tanks only complicated their joint use and operation.
First steps towards excellence
Obviously, the staff of the tank corps, according to the directive of March 31, 1942, was considered suboptimal even at the time of its signing. Therefore, already in the course of the formation of the first TK, there were quite significant changes in its organizational structure - a third tank brigade of the same size was added, which brought the number of tanks in the corps to 150 units, and also an engineering and mine company of 106 people. number.
Some shortcomings could be eradicated by changing the organizational structure of the corps. So, for example, as mentioned earlier, separate tank brigades, which were formed starting in August 1941, had a mixed composition and included 3 types of tanks.
Most likely, this decision was not so much the result of some tactical views, as a consequence of the banal lack of tanks in order to form homogeneous brigades. As you know, the KV, T-34 and T-60, as well as the T-70s used in some cases instead of them, were produced by various factories, and, probably, the Red Army simply brought these tank "streams" together, preventing delay in the formation of new formations … In addition, relatively little KV was produced, so that heavy brigades would be created more slowly than usual, and formations armed only with light tanks would be too weak.
And yet this was a deliberately suboptimal solution. Of course, in 1941-1942. for a separate tank brigade, the presence of a small number of KVs could provide certain tactical advantages. Which, in fact, were later given to the Germans by separate companies of heavy tanks "Tiger", which, in the framework of separate operations, were separated from the heavy tank battalion and attached to other units. But this concerned the tank brigade, which could act separately, supporting, for example, the rifle corps, and not interacting with other tank units, and this had to pay with difficulties in maintenance and less mobility of the brigade's tank fleet. But in a tank corps, consisting of three brigades, "smearing" heavy tanks over brigades, in general, did not make sense.
Therefore, already in May, there was, so to speak, a redistribution of tanks in the corps. If before that the TK had three tank brigades of the same type, each of which had in its composition KV, T-34, and T-60, then starting in May 1942 they were reorganized into one heavy one, which was supposed to have 32 KV and 21 T-60, and a total of 53 tanks and two medium ones, armed with 65 tanks each (44 T-34 and 21 T-60). Thus, the total number of tanks in three brigades reached 183 vehicles, while the share of light tanks decreased from 40 to 34.5%. Alas, this decision turned out to be unbearable for our industry, so the heavy brigade had to be reformed in June 1942, reducing its total number from 53 to 51 vehicles, and reducing the number of KVs from 32 to 24. In this form, the tank corps consisted of 181 tanks, including 24 KV, 88 T-34 and 79 T-60 (or T-70), while the share of light tanks even slightly increased, reaching almost 41.4%.
The formation of tank corps was literally explosive. In March 1942, four TCs were formed (from the 1st to the 4th), in April - eight more (5-7; 10; 21-24), in May - five (9; 11; 12; 14; 15), in June - four (16-18 and 27), and in addition, most likely in the same period, 2 more tank corps were created, the 8th and 13th, the exact date of the formation of which is unknown to the author. Thus, in the period from April to June, the Red Army received 23 tank corps! Subsequently, the pace of their formation was nevertheless reduced, but by the end of 1942, 5 more tank corps were created, in February 1943 - two more and, finally, the extreme, 31st Tank Corps was formed in May 1943.
At the same time, oddly enough, the quantitative growth of tank corps was accompanied (for once!) By qualitative improvements, at least in terms of structure.
Formally, our tank corps, formed in April-June 1942, in terms of the number of tanks, could already be considered a kind of analogue of German tank divisions. Indeed, already in April the nominal number of tanks in the TC reached 150, and in May it exceeded 180, while in a German tank division, depending on the state, their number could reach 160-221 units. But at the same time, the German connection was much larger - 16 thousand people, against about 5, 6-7 thousand people. tank corps with two and three tank brigades, respectively. A German tank division could have up to two regiments of motorized infantry, against one brigade of our mechanized corps, and much stronger artillery, both field and anti-tank and anti-aircraft. The German division had much more vehicles (even in terms of a thousand personnel), in addition, in addition to the "combat" regiments, it had numerous support units, which the "April-June" Soviet tank corps were deprived of.
In addition, the mass formation of tank corps to a certain extent faced the same problems as the pre-war formation of the 21st additional mechanized corps. There were not enough tanks, therefore, often, Lend-Lease vehicles, including infantry tanks Matilda and Valentine, fell into the tank brigades of the TK. The latter would have looked very good in some separate support battalions for rifle divisions, but they were very little suitable for the needs of the tank corps, and besides, they added additional variety, making the tank parks of the TK completely "motley". In addition, usually when forming new TKs, they tried to take existing tank brigades that had been trained, or even had time to fight, but motorized rifle brigades were either formed from "0", or were reorganized from any third-party formations, like ski battalions. At the same time, military coordination between the brigades often simply did not have time to carry out.
But the situation was corrected literally on the go: new units were added to the tank corps, such as a reconnaissance battalion, equipment repair bases and others, although, unfortunately, it is impossible to say exactly when exactly which additions took place. It is likely that such units of the TK were supplemented whenever possible, but nevertheless, all this, of course, served to increase the combat effectiveness of Soviet tank corps. As of January 28, 1943, according to Decree No. GOKO-2791ss, the staff of the tank corps was established as follows:
Office of the building - 122 people.
Tank brigade (3 pcs.) - 3 348 people. that is, 1,116 people. in the brigade.
Motorized rifle brigade - 3,215 people.
Mortar regiment - 827 people.
Self-propelled artillery regiment - 304 people.
Guards mortar division ("Katyusha") - 244 people.
Armored battalion - 111 people.
Signal battalion - 257 people.
Sapper battalion - 491 people.
The company for the delivery of fuels and lubricants - 74 people.
PRB tank - 72 people.
PRB wheeled - 70 people.
In total, with a reserve - 9 667 people.
Also, starting in August 1941, the fight against the different types of equipment in tank brigades began. The fact is that on July 31 of the same year a new staff of tank brigade No. 010/270 - 277 was approved. Perhaps the main difference from the previous states was the change in the composition of tank battalions: if earlier there were 2 battalions with KV, T-34 and T tanks -60 in each, then the new brigade received one battalion of medium tanks (21 T-34) and one mixed battalion of 10 T-34 and 21 T-60 or T-70. Thus, the first step was taken towards the unification of the equipment - not only did only medium and light tanks remain in its composition, but also one battalion had a completely homogeneous composition.
It cannot be said that before that there were no brigades in the Red Army at all, battalions of which would have consisted of vehicles of the same type, but this was, in general, a forced decision, and such brigades were formed by the equipment of the Stalingrad Tank Plant, when the front line approached close to the city - there was no time to wait for the deliveries of light tanks and KV, tank brigades went into battle almost from the gates of the plant.
Of course, the introduction of the new state did not lead to immediate and widespread changes - it was already said above that the newly formed corps still had to be completed not with what was required by the state, but with what was at hand. But the situation gradually improved, and by the end of 1942 most of the tank brigades were transferred to state number 010/270 - 277.
The situation with a small number of motorized infantry was to a certain extent rectified by the creation of mechanized corps, which began in the second half of 1942. In essence, such a mechanized corps was almost an exact copy of a tank corps, with the exception of the "mirror" structure of brigades: instead of three tank and one motorized brigade had three motorized and one tank. Accordingly, the number of the mechanized corps significantly exceeded that of the "tank analogue" and, according to Decree No. GOKO-2791ss of January 28, 1943, totaled 15,740 people.
And so, at the beginning of 1943 …
Thus, we see how the Soviet tank corps, revived in April 1942, gradually, by the end of the same year, gradually became a formidable fighting force, which, of course, was not yet equal to the German tank division of the 1941 model, but … But you need to understand that the German Panzerwaffe also did not remain unchanged. And if the power of the Soviet tank corps gradually grew over time, the combat effectiveness of the German tank division was just as steadily falling.
Yes, in 1942 the Germans determined the number of tanks according to the staff of their divisions at 200 units, and this was an increase for those divisions that had previously been supposed to have 160 tanks (a two-battalion tank regiment), but you need to understand that combat losses led to the fact that only a few divisions could boast of so many armored vehicles. And in its usual state, the number of tanks in the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht often no longer exceeded 100 vehicles. The TD motorized infantry also "lost weight" - although from June 1942 its regiments as part of tank divisions received the sonorous name "Panzer-Grenadier", but later the number of companies in them was reduced from 5 to 4.
As you know, the Germans preferred to use tank and motorized divisions together for offensive encirclement operations (and not only). And if the Soviet tank corps, in essence, had to solve similar tasks with those that were solved by the German tank divisions, then the mechanized corps, to a certain extent, was an analogue of the German motorized divisions. At the same time, as we said above, the Soviet TC has not yet "reached" the German TD. But the Soviet mechanized corps, according to the state established on January 28, 1943, looks perhaps even better than the German MD - if only because it has its own tanks as part of a tank brigade, while the German "mobile" division was their completely devoid.
In general, during 1942, the Red Army was able to form 28 tank corps. It is interesting that they were not thrown into battle immediately as they were recruited, trying to give at least a minimum of time for exercises and combat coordination. Nevertheless, the new tank corps entered the battle for the first time in June 1942, during the Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad strategic defensive operation, and a total of 13 tank corps were involved in it. And since then in the history of the Red Army it would have been very difficult to find a major operation in which the tank corps would not take part.
By the end of the year, three tank corps (7th, 24th and 26th) had been reorganized into Guards Tank Corps, numbered 3rd, 2nd and 1st respectively. Another 5 tank corps were reorganized into mechanized ones, and the total number of mechanized corps reached six. And only one tank corps died in the battle, being almost completely destroyed near Kharkov. All this testified to the growth of the fighting qualities of the Soviet tank forces - especially if we recall how many tank divisions were lost by us in the first months of the Great Patriotic War, alas, causing only minimal damage to the enemy. The German Panzerwaffe still outnumbered our tank forces due to their rich experience, and to some extent still due to the better organization of the troops, but this lag was no longer as significant as in 1941. On the whole, perhaps to say that in the second war year, many of our tank corps learned to conduct successful defensive operations even when they were opposed by the best units of the Wehrmacht, but offensive operations were still lame, although some progress was made here.
We can also say that by the beginning of 1943 the Red Army had created quite adequate instruments of mobile warfare "in the person" of tank and mechanized corps, which still lacked experience, materiel and which were still inferior to the German tank forces, but the difference in combat capability between them was already several times less than the one that existed at the beginning of the war, and it was rapidly declining. And, in addition, the production of the T-34 was increased, which gradually became, in fact, the main battle tank of the Red Army, its childhood diseases were eradicated, so that the T-34 became an increasingly dangerous machine, and its resource gradually increased. Quite a bit remained until the time when in 1943 the "ugly duckling" T-34 from a "blind" machine with difficult controls that required a high qualification of a driver-mechanic and a small engine resource, finally turned into a "white swan" tank war is a reliable and effective combat vehicle, which is so loved in the units, and which has earned well-deserved fame on the battlefields, but …
But the Germans, unfortunately, did not stand still either.
