Why did the T-34 lose to the PzKpfw III, but beat the Tigers and Panthers? In 1941, the "thirty-four" has an ultimatum-powerful armor and cannon in comparison with any armored vehicles of Nazi Germany. However, these advantages were largely counterbalanced by the well-known "blindness" - the lack of observation equipment, the lack of a fifth crew member, the complexity of control, as well as the mass of "childhood illnesses". In addition, on average, Soviet tank crews were trained much worse than German ones, who received combat experience in Poland and France, and units and formations were losing both in experience and in communication, and in the ability to competently combine the actions of infantry, artillery and tanks.
In 1942, the superiority of the T-34 in artillery and armor remained, while the tank was gradually getting rid of "childhood diseases", and the tank troops were gaining the combat experience they needed so much. But the Germans did not sit idly by, and by the end of the year they were able to saturate the troops with long-barreled 50-mm and 75-mm guns, which they also began to equip their tanks and self-propelled guns. This created certain inconveniences for the Germans, but as a result, by the beginning of 1943, the T-34 had lost the honorary title of a tank with anti-cannon armor.
In the first half of 1943, the T-34 finally received major upgrades, such as high-quality air filters, a commander's cupola, a new gearbox, etc., which turned the T-34 into a very perfect tank for mobile warfare and deep operations. According to the author, which he substantiated in a previous article, in terms of the aggregate combat qualities of the T-34 mod. 1943 was quite consistent with the German T-IVH medium tank. The Thirty-four, of course, was inferior to the Quartet in a head-to-head dueling situation, because the very powerful 75-mm cannon of the German tank and the partial armoring of the frontal projection of the hull with 80 mm armor gave it undeniable advantages in such a battle. However, even in such a situation, the superiority of the German tank was not absolute, since its turret and part of the frontal projection of the hull could well have been pierced by solid armor-piercing "blanks" of the T-34. However, the war is not at all limited to a front-to-back tank battle, and in many other aspects the T-IVH was inferior to the T-34 - due to the weak armor of the sides, top of the hull and bottom, it was much more vulnerable to the effects of small-caliber anti-tank artillery, as well as field artillery, infantry anti-tank weapons and mines. At the same time, the T-34 had a long cruising range at one refueling, and, finally, it became a fairly reliable and relatively easy-to-operate tank, suitable for deep operations.
Thus, we can say that from about June 1943, the T-34 with a 76, 2-mm cannon reached the peak of its development.
By the beginning of 1943, the troops received a very considerable number of thirty-fours. In total, at the beginning of this year, the Red Army had 7, 6 thousand medium tanks, and it is obvious that the bulk of them were T-34s of various years of production. A very large figure, given that the Germans had the total number of armored vehicles at the beginning of the same year reached about 8 thousand units, which included light vehicles, and not all of them were on the eastern front. During 1943, the army received 23, 9 thousand medium tanks, including about 15, 6 thousand were "thirty-four". In total in 1943the factories produced 15 696 of these tanks, but perhaps not all of the released ones managed to get into the units, but a certain number of "thirty-fours" produced in 1942 could be transferred to them. However, this will not seriously affect the statistics.
Thus, we can state that the situation in the tank forces has improved in all respects - here is the mass production, and the qualitative improvement of tanks, and the improvement of staff structures, in the form of the formation of tank and mechanized corps of quite adequate composition, and on their basis - tank armies … The former can be considered an analogue of the German tank and motorized divisions, the latter - of the tank corps. In addition, of course, the fighters and commanders received a wealth of military experience.
The ratio of losses in 1943
And, nevertheless, our losses of tanks in 1943 significantly exceeded the German ones. If we take the statistics provided by Müller-Gillebrand, it turns out that the Panzerwaffe this year, on all fronts, irrevocably lost 8,988 tanks and self-propelled guns of all types. At the same time, the losses of the Red Army amounted to about 23, 5 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns.
As mentioned earlier, the figures given are not equivalent, since in the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, losses were accounted for in different ways. Our irrecoverable losses include both non-combat losses and a part of the return losses, in cases where a disabled tank required major repairs or restoration. And here it remains to blame the inaccuracies of historians. For example, G. F. Krivosheev, in the book “The Great Patriotic War. Book of losses indicates that the losses of Soviet armored vehicles listed in the following table are irrecoverable
But he also points out that the column "Received" takes into account the receipts of armored vehicles from factories, lend-lease and returned to the troops from major repairs and after restoration. At the same time, regarding the column of losses, it is indicated that it contains both combat and non-combat losses. But it is quite obvious that the "Losses" also include tanks that have departed for overhaul or restoration, since otherwise the balance would simply not have converged.
Well, the Germans do not have any of this, or if they do, it is far from complete. Why? If we try to balance the Müller-Hillebrand figures, we will see that the balance is not beating in both directions: that is, for some tanks, the calculated balances are lower than the actual ones, for others - higher. It is possible that these are simply inaccuracies in the numbers, but most likely this is a consequence of the lack of accounting for the disposal and return of armored vehicles from overhaul.
Mueller-Gillebrand does not say anything about the losses of captured tanks, and there were many of them in the German troops even on the Kursk Bulge. Accordingly, when recalculated according to the German methodology, the Soviet losses of tanks and self-propelled guns will significantly decrease, and vice versa - the calculation according to the Soviet method will lead to a significant increase in German losses.
All this is true, but for a correct comparison, other factors must also be taken into account - now "in favor" of the Germans. In 1943, their troops fought very fierce battles in Africa, and then surrendered in Tunisia, which naturally led to noticeable losses, including in tanks. And then there was the landing in Sicily and other battles, in which the Germans, naturally, also suffered losses in tanks - and all this should be subtracted from the total number of losses, since, for comparison, we only need those losses that the Germans suffered in the Soviet German front. In addition, in one of the previous articles of this cycle, the author made a very reasonable assumption that in 1943 a significant part of the losses of the Panzerwaffe, which they actually suffered earlier, during 1942 in the Battle of Stalingrad, were taken into account.
Thus, to find out a somewhat reliable ratio of the losses of tanks and self-propelled guns of the USSR and Germany on the Soviet-German front is an extremely difficult, if at all feasible, task. But in any case, we can state that the Red Army lost tanks and self-propelled guns much more than the Wehrmacht and SS. The loss ratio of 2: 1 is probably close to the truth, but it is possible that the affairs of the Red Army were even worse.
And here, of course, a natural question arises: if the organization, combat experience and materiel (in the form of the T-34) of the Soviet tank forces came close to the German "Panzerwaffe", then where did such a difference in losses come from?
Two words about the Kursk Bulge
The Kursk Bulge and its individual episodes, such as the Battle of Prokhorovka, are still the subject of fierce controversy among fans of military history. And one of the reasons for such a dispute is the irrecoverable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns, which the parties suffered.
Of course, it is absolutely impossible to give an exhaustive assessment of the Soviet and German losses of armored vehicles in the format of a journal article, but nevertheless, some observations are worth making. More or less weighted estimates give a ratio of 4: 1 in favor of the Germans - a number of sources name irrecoverable losses in 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns in our country and 1,500 in the Panzerwaffe. Where did these numbers come from?
According to G. F. Krivosheev, in the Kursk defensive, Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operations carried out during July-August 1943, the Red Army lost 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns. Müller-Hillebrand reports that the total irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht equipment in July-August amounted to 1,738 vehicles. Of course, the places in which the Germans lost their tanks were not at all limited to these three operations, since the Donbass, Donetsk and Chernigov-Poltava operations began in the same August, and our allies invaded Sicily, but still the main losses were in armored vehicles. of course, the Germans carried it near Kursk. In addition, the factor of the late decommissioning of Nazi tanks into scrap again played a role (they were often transferred to the “in need of major repairs” column and were written off only later, which is noted by a number of domestic and foreign researchers). Again, one should remember about the incomparability of numbers - in 6,064 tanks and self-propelled guns from G. F. Krivosheeva got equipment that was leaving for major repairs and restoration.
And then the questions begin. The fact is that the battle on the Kursk Bulge for us consisted of 3 battles listed above: Kursk defensive, Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov offensive. The Germans, on the other hand, understood Operation Citadel as only part of the Kursk defensive operation. The latter lasted 19 days, from July 5 to 23, 1943: the Germans, however, understood Operation Citadel as only the period from July 5 to 17. If we assume that the Wehrmacht and the SS have irrevocably lost 1,500 tanks and self-propelled guns in all three operations, then it is obvious that their losses during Operation Citadel were significantly lower.
And this is where a big stumbling block arises between a number of sources, as well as our official history and the revisionists. Previously, it was generally accepted to believe that the German units were drained of blood during the Citadel, and for a long time lost their combat capability. This is confirmed by such an eminent German author as Kurt Tippelskirch, who, after describing the attempts to “cut off” the Kursk salient, points out: “Within a few days it became clear that the German troops, who had suffered irreparable losses, had not been able to achieve their goal.”
However, revisionists see the issue differently. They indicate that the Germans, according to various sources, have concentrated 2,500 - 2,700 tanks and self-propelled guns for Operation Citadel, or even a little more. At the same time, irretrievable losses in armored vehicles during the course of the event amounted to at most several hundred vehicles. For example, according to the German researchers Zetterling and Frankson, who worked in the archives of the FRG, the irrecoverable losses of the advancing on the southern face of Army Group South from July 5 to 17 amounted to only 172 tanks and 18 self-propelled guns, that is, only 190 vehicles. This is confirmed by the German General Heinrici, who indicated the irrecoverable losses of 193 vehicles.
However, our compatriot A. S. Tomzov, who personally came to the archives of the Federal Republic of Germany and studied German documents. Unlike Zetterling and Frankson, he took into account the fact that the Germans often first gave the damaged armored vehicles the status “in need of major repairs”, and wrote them off for scrap only later. After tracing the "fate" of the German tanks, he came to the conclusion that taking into account the later decommissioned vehicles, the real irrecoverable losses of armored vehicles of Army Group South in the period from 5 to 17 July were not 190-193, but 290 vehicles, that is, real irrecoverable losses Germans were about one and a half times higher than the calculated ones.
But even if we take the figure of 290 tanks as a basis, it still turns out that the Soviet troops only managed to scratch the tank units of Army Group South, which, according to the very minimum estimate, consisted of about one and a half thousand tanks and self-propelled guns. After all, it turns out that the irrecoverable losses amounted to no more than 20% of their original number!
And this, according to the revisionists, indicates that in fact, during Operation Citadel, the German Panzerwaffe did not suffer significant damage, and the Germans stopped the operation solely under the influence of the Allied landing in Sicily and the need to transfer tank units to Italy. This is confirmed by the fact that the "defeated" German tank forces subsequently, in the same 1943, very effectively fought against the advancing Soviet troops. And this point of view is confirmed by such a prominent German military leader as E. Manstein, who reports that the German troops under his command were quite capable of completing the Citadel, and if not to achieve complete success with the encirclement, then at least to defeat the Soviet army, and if not for Hitler, who ordered the withdrawal of troops …
Who is right?
Oddly enough, but, in the opinion of the author of this article, both revisionists and "traditionalists" are right at the same time. Most likely, the revisionists are absolutely right that the irrecoverable losses of German armored vehicles during Operation Citadel (that is, from 5 to 17 July) are relatively small. But they completely mistakenly believe that the combat effectiveness of tank forces is determined by the irrecoverable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns.
In fact, of course, the combat effectiveness of tank forces from the point of view of materiel is determined not by their irrecoverable losses, but by the amount of equipment left in service. And here the Germans were not doing very well, because the same General Heinrici cites data that in Operation Citadel the German army lost 1,612 tanks and self-propelled guns, of which 323 were irrevocable. Given that the Germans, according to various sources, at the beginning of the operation had from 2,451 to 2,928 units. armored vehicles (it is interesting that the upper limit is by no means given by Soviet historiography, but by Glantz), it turns out that by July 17 they had 35-45% units left in a combat-ready state. armored vehicles from the original number. And if we take the most common figure of 2,700 cars as a basis, then 40%. Generally speaking, according to the rules of military science, a unit that has suffered losses in excess of 50% is considered broken.
Thus, the irrecoverable losses of the Germans are really small - from 323 to 485 cars, if the amendment of the respected A. S. Tomazova is also true for the 9th Army, advancing from the north, and that the real irrecoverable losses were about one and a half times higher than it followed from the operational German reports. But it is equally true that by July 17, the tank units of the Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses and largely lost their offensive potential.
And what about the Red Army?
Losses of the Soviet army during the Kursk defensive operation by G. F. Krivosheev was 1614 tanks "irrevocably", that is, this figure includes both combat and non-combat losses, as well as not only destroyed tanks, but also requiring major repairs. That is, reasoning logically, if we compare Soviet and German tank losses, then the figures of 1,614 Soviet tanks against 1,612 German ones give a much more accurate picture than 1,614 against 323-485 units. irretrievably lost German tanks and self-propelled guns.
Of course, such a comparison will also not be correct, because in 1612 units. German losses "sit", including those out of order, but not requiring major repairs, and those in 1,614 tanks and self-propelled guns of the USSR are not taken into account. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the USSR lost 1,614 tanks between 5 and 23 July, while German losses were limited on 17 July.
But in any case, one can be sure for sure - although the Soviet losses of tanks and self-propelled guns (irrecoverable plus returnable) during Operation Citadel may have slightly exceeded the German ones, but not many times, and certainly not by orders of magnitude. They were quite comparable, despite even some gross mistakes of the commanders of the Red Army, which led to heavy losses. The biggest of these mistakes was the battle of Prokhorovka, which took place on July 12, and led to unreasonably high losses of Soviet tanks.
Irrecoverable losses of armored vehicles as an indicator of the ability to fight
Absolutely no good, and here's why. Taking as a basis the level of irrecoverable losses from their general level according to General Heinrici, or according to updated data according to A. S. Tomazov, we see that the Germans in Operation Citadel were irretrievably losing 20-30% of the total level of losses of armored vehicles. This is the number of 323-485 "irrecoverable" tanks and self-propelled guns about the total number of German losses of 1,612 vehicles. It can be assumed that in other battles, the percentage of irrecoverable losses of German tanks was at the same level, that is, 20-30% of the total number of irrecoverable and returnable losses.
At the same time, the irrecoverable losses of Soviet armored vehicles averaged 44%, and in some operations in 1943-44. could reach 65-78%.
Dear readers have probably already understood what this is about. Imagine that a German tank division and a Soviet tank corps entered the battle for the possession of a certain village of New Vasyuki. Both of them were pretty battered in previous battles, and retained 100 tanks and self-propelled guns each. The battle went on all day, and by the evening the sides retreated to their original positions, while both the Soviet and German formations lost 50 tanks each.
What conclusions can be drawn from the results of such a battle? Obviously, the battle ended in a draw. Both sides did not fulfill the combat mission, but at the same time prevented the enemy from doing it, and suffered equal losses. So, we can say that the Soviet corps and the German division demonstrated approximately equal martial art.
But out of 50 knocked out Soviet tanks, 20 were completely destroyed, and only 10 out of 50 German ones. That is, the irrecoverable losses of Soviet and German armored vehicles are correlated as 2: 1. And so it turns out that, although in reality the sides were equal in their fighting qualities, the assessment of irrecoverable losses will show that the German division fought twice as much as the Soviet corps!
The same is the case with the Battle of Kursk. When a person interested in military history sees the ratio of irretrievable losses roughly 4: 1 in favor of the Panzerwaffe, he, naturally, will conclude about the overwhelming superiority of the material part and the skill of the Nazi troops. But if we dig a little deeper, we will see that the ratio of irrecoverable losses was actually not four to one at all, but much better for the Soviet troops, and the overall level of losses gives a completely different ratio. And therefore it is necessary to understand that when we look at the ratio of irrecoverable losses for any period of hostilities, or in a particular battle, we see … it is the ratio of irrecoverable losses, but not the ratio of the fighting qualities of the parties.
But still, why did the Soviet irrecoverable losses of armored vehicles in the total losses amounted to 44%, and the German ones - about 30%, that is, one and a half times less? We will talk about this in the next article.
