Why did the T-34 lose to the PzKpfw III, but beat the Tigers and Panthers? Studying the statistics of losses of armored vehicles of Germany and the USSR in the Great Patriotic War, we see that it is absolutely impossible to compare it “head-on”, since the concept of “irrecoverable losses” was understood by both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in different ways. But the problem is not only this - in the previous article the author showed another reason that the irrecoverable losses of armored vehicles cannot serve as a measure of the combat skills of the parties.
The fact is that in 1943 Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns received critical damage, excluding the repair of damaged armored vehicles in 1, 5-2, and possibly more times more often than their German opponents. As the analysis of German losses at the Kursk Bulge shows, their level of irrecoverable losses was 20, a maximum of 30% of the total losses of armored vehicles, and for Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns it reached an average of 44%, but could be even higher. What does this mean? Roughly speaking, in order for the Germans to finally destroy 40 Soviet tanks, they had to knock out 100 of these combat vehicles in battle, but in order for our soldiers to irrevocably destroy 40 German tanks, they had to knock out 150-200 or more.
Why did this happen?
The first reason is very simple
The Germans in 1943 attached great importance to the destruction of disabled enemy armored vehicles. That is, it was not enough for them to knock out a Soviet tank - they still needed to make sure that it received damage that was completely incompatible with further combat activities. If they doubted that the equipment received such damage, tankmen or sappers undermined it. This activity among the Germans was put on stream. Ours, although they were doing the same, but there is a persistent feeling that they did not make such efforts as the Germans did to withdraw the previously knocked out German armored vehicles. However, the author does not have exact figures on this issue.
The second reason, it is also the main
It consists (now you will laugh) in the weakness of the armor protection of German tanks. Yes, yes, you heard right: it is very likely that it was the weakness of the armor that reduced the level of irrecoverable losses of German armored vehicles!
How so? It's very simple. In previous articles, we examined in great detail the evolution of German anti-tank artillery in 1942. Faced with Soviet T-34 and KV tanks, the Germans were forced to saturate their battle formations with specialized 75-mm anti-tank guns, both towed (Pak 40), as soon as possible. and installed on no less specialized anti-tank self-propelled guns ("Marder", etc.). But even this was not enough for them. In the Wehrmacht, there were self-propelled guns, the main task of which was to support infantry units and which were armed with a short-barreled 75-mm gun (StuG), which was very unsuitable for fighting enemy armored vehicles - they were redesigned for a long-barreled 75-mm gun, thus adding the usual anti-tank self-propelled guns possibilities. In addition, the new German tanks also received similar 75 mm guns.
And if during 1942 the Germans had to resort to all sorts of ersatz, such as the massive use of French 75-mm captured guns and (in much smaller volumes) domestic F-22, which were nevertheless created not as specialized anti-tank guns, then on throughout 1943 this deficiency was completely eradicated. If in 1942 the Wehrmacht and SS units received 2 144 units. Pak 40 and 2 854 French guns mounted on a German gun carriage and named Pak 97/40, then in 1943 the number of Pak 40 transferred to the troops reached 8 740 units. At the same time, the production of anti-tank guns of smaller calibers was curtailed in 1943 - if in 1942 4,480 units were produced. a very good long-barreled 50-mm Pak 38, then in 1943 they were created only 2 626 units, and this completely stopped their production. There was also no massive use of captured equipment.
Therefore, in general, we can state that in 1943 the German anti-tank defense was built on a specialized and very powerful 75-mm artillery system, capable of successfully fighting our T-34 and KV. But this, of course, is not all.
In 1943, the massive use of German tanks of a new type began: we are, of course, talking about the "products" T-V "Panther" and T-VI "Tiger". I must say that before that time, both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht possessed an ultimatum-powerful weapon capable of destroying almost any enemy tank at a direct shot range, and even beyond. We are talking, of course, about the famous German 88-mm and somewhat less famous, but also extremely powerful domestic 85-mm anti-aircraft guns.
Both those and others had a sufficient level of armor penetration and projectile power to combat enemy armored vehicles, but there were important factors limiting their use. Firstly, these were anti-aircraft guns, which were needed to counter enemy aircraft, and diverting them to destroy enemy tanks meant weakening air defense in favor of anti-aircraft defense - and this was far from always acceptable. Secondly, such weapons were too expensive to create anti-tank equipment based on them, and there was no need for this, since even the most powerfully armored Soviet vehicles could be handled by artillery of a smaller caliber. It should be understood that even the industrial power of Germany was unable to ensure the production of 88-mm "akht-koma-aht" in volumes covering the needs of the air defense of the troops and the country. Thirdly, the requirements for anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns are fundamentally different in many respects. So, for example, an anti-tank gun should be made as low and inconspicuous as possible. And, since its main combat distance does not exceed the range of a direct shot, a large elevation angle of the anti-tank gun is not required, which makes it possible to get by with a low gun carriage. With an anti-aircraft gun, the opposite is true: the elevation angle should be 90 degrees, which is why a high carriage is needed. In addition, an anti-aircraft gun definitely needs a circular fire, and it must unfold quickly, pull the openers out of the ground and deploy the cannon when firing at enemy aircraft once. For an anti-tank gun, such a skill, in general, will also not be superfluous, but it can be neglected. But for an anti-aircraft gun, dimensions and mass are extremely important, since in battle it is very important that the crew can roll it on their own, but for an anti-aircraft gun this is completely unnecessary, etc.
As a result, anti-aircraft guns, of course, represented a formidable, but highly situational anti-tank weapon. Once in the right place at the right time, anti-aircraft guns could stop almost as many enemy tanks as there were shells in their ammunition, but at the same time, after finding their positions, they became very vulnerable to enemy field artillery, and due to their large size and mass, they did not could quickly change positions.
Understanding the shortcomings of the 88-mm anti-aircraft gun as a means of anti-aircraft defense, the Germans tried to resolve the issue radically. Simply put, they put this, in every respect, an outstanding artillery system on tracks, protected from all sides by 100 mm armor, which provided it with both the necessary mobility and almost ultimate protection against field and anti-tank artillery.
So, in fact, the T-VI "Tiger" tank turned out, which, with all its many shortcomings and in those cases when it was still possible to deliver it to the battlefield on time, was an ideal anti-tank weapon in five minutes. In total, the Germans produced 643 of these machines in 1943. But that's not all - in 1943, the specialized anti-tank towed 88-mm Pak 43 and Pak 43/41 cannon began to enter the troops, which differed from the Pak 43 by using the classic gun carriage from the 105-mm cannon.
Being a perfect "killer of tanks", "Tiger", due to its large mass, huge fuel consumption and other operational characteristics, was completely unsuitable for use as the main combat vehicle for tank divisions. In this role, the Germans intended to use the T-V "Panther", which was a creative rethinking of the ideas embodied in the T-34. We will consider the technical characteristics of this outstanding brainchild of the German tank industry later, but for now we will focus only on its main armament: the 75 mm KwK 42 gun.
Before its appearance, 75-mm KwK 40 with a barrel length of 43 and 48 calibers were massively installed on German armored vehicles. The speed of the caliber armor-piercing projectile of these guns was 770 and 792 m / s, respectively, which was quite enough to confidently defeat the T-34 even in the frontal projection at a distance of up to 1000 m, however, the frontal part of the hull could reliably penetrate only 500, possibly 700 m. But the 75-mm KwK 42, mounted on the "Panther", had a barrel length of 70 calibers and reported an initial speed of 935 m / s to its caliber armor-piercing projectile. Of course, the T-34's armor did not protect against such attacks at all, and at a direct shot range, the Soviet tank made its way into any projection: one could count only on a ricochet, possible only with an extremely successful (for the T-34) coincidence of circumstances.
And what does the "direct shot" have to do with it?
Perhaps the dear reader is already wondering why the author of this article constantly uses the phrase "direct shot range". The fact is that many fans of military history estimate the range of a tank battle solely from the point of view of the armor penetration of the guns of the armored vehicles participating in it. That is, for example, if the tabular armor penetration of the KwK 42 was as much as 89 mm of steel homogeneous armor at a distance of 2 km, then the Panther could easily destroy the T-34 from a distance of 1.5-2 km. However, this approach is too one-sided, since it does not take into account the possibilities of sighting devices of armored vehicles of that time. And it did not provide any reliable defeat of enemy tanks at such great distances.
What is the direct shot range? This is the greatest sighting range, when firing at which the average trajectory does not rise above the height of the target.
That is, with such shooting, in order to hit the target, you need to aim directly at the tank, at the hull or tower, depending on the range, but the point is that, aiming at an enemy vehicle, the artilleryman will hit it. But for shooting at distances exceeding the range of a direct shot, it will be necessary to solve a geometric problem similar to that calculated by naval artillerymen: determine the range and parameters of the target movement, calculate the necessary corrections, because even at a speed of 20 km / h a tank per second overcomes 5, 5 m., etc. All this is difficult and reduces the likelihood of a quick target hit, while enemy tanks, even being caught by surprise, will naturally try to get out of the shelling, so that an anti-tank gun or a tank will unmask its position in vain. Thus, the real battle distances during the Great Patriotic War were significantly lower than the tabular armor penetration of German tanks allowed. As an example, consider the table given in the monograph by A. Shirokorad "The God of War of the Third Reich", devoted, as you might easily guess, to the German artillery of the corresponding period. The table was compiled on the basis of studies of 735 destroyed tanks and self-propelled guns: data from reports were taken, in most cases measurements were taken from the place of the damaged vehicle to the position of German tanks or anti-tank artillery.
The above data irrefutably testifies that in most cases, 75-mm German guns fought at a distance of 400-600 m (33, 5% of cases), and 88-mm - 600-800 m (31, 2%). At the same time, 75-mm guns hit 69.6% of their targets at distances from 100 to 600 m and 84.1% from 100 to 800 m, and 88-mm guns - 67.2% at distances from 100 to 800 m and 80, 7% - at a distance from 100 to 1000 m.
Unfortunately, the fact that the real combat distances were significantly lower than those that, in theory, ensured the armor penetration of the gun, is often forgotten, and this leads to completely incorrect conclusions. A simple example: as we said earlier, the 75-mm T-IVH cannon penetrated the frontal armor of the T-34, with the exception of the frontal part at a distance of 1,000, and according to some reports, even 1,200 m, and the frontal part could penetrate from 500 meters -700. The Soviet tank, although it could penetrate the frontal armor of the tower with a solid caliber armor-piercing projectile at a distance of about 1000 m, but 80 mm of the frontal parts of the hull could only penetrate a sub-caliber projectile and only from a distance of no more than 500 m or even less.
It seems that this gives the German tank a deafening advantage in the event of a head-to-head duel. But if we assume on the basis of the statistics presented above that almost 70% of such duels took place at a distance of up to 600 m, and in 36, 1% of cases, tanks fought at a distance not exceeding 400 m, then we understand that in such a in general, a tactical situation unfavorable for the T-34, the superiority of the German tank is not at all as great as it might seem based on the armor penetration tables. And yet, it becomes clear how important the height of the tank is, because the higher the tank, the farther the distance of a direct shot at it: the same American "Shermans" German anti-tank crews could hit from a greater distance than the T-34.
Does all of the above mean that the German designers were wrong in their desire to provide the Panzerwaffe with extremely powerful 75-88-mm guns? Yes, it never happened. Firstly, a more powerful weapon has a flatter trajectory of ammunition flight, which means a longer direct firing range than a less powerful one. And secondly, at relatively small distances - up to 600 m for 75-mm guns and up to 1,000 m for 88-mm guns, these artillery systems with the highest degree of probability ensured the breakdown of the armor of the same T-34 and the rupture of an armor-piercing projectile in the armor-piercing space.
Brief conclusions on the PTO of the Wehrmacht in 1943
So, let's summarize briefly the main trends of the German anti-tank defense and tank guns in 1943. The German army re-equipped with long-barreled 75-88-mm anti-tank guns, and this concerned both towed artillery and tanks and self-propelled guns, while continuing to be widely used as anti-tank guns 88-mm anti-aircraft "akht-koma-aht". The consequences were not long in coming. If before September 1942, 75-mm artillery accounted for only 10.1% of all damage inflicted on Soviet tanks, and for 88-mm guns this figure was vanishingly small 3.4%, and more than 60% of all damage was caused by 50- mm guns, then in the Stalingrad operation the percentage of damage caused by 75-mm and 88-mm guns was already 12, 1 and 7, 8%, respectively. But in the Oryol offensive operation, 40.5% of all damage was done by 75-mm guns, and another 26% by 88-mm caliber, that is, in aggregate, the artillery systems of these calibers provided 66.5% of the losses of Soviet tanks!
In other words, in 1942 and earlier, the main means of anti-tank equipment in the Wehrmacht were guns with a caliber of 50 mm or less, and in 1943 - 75-88 mm. Accordingly, the number of through holes in the armor protection of Soviet tanks increased: until September 1942, the share of such holes was 46% of their total number (apart from through holes, there were also blind holes), in the Stalingrad operation they accounted for 55% of all defeats, and in the Oryol offensive operations reached 88%!
And so it happened that in 1943, our tank units obviously faced a sharp increase in irrecoverable losses, because the bulk of enemy hits were given by 75-88-mm shells that pierced the armor of the T-34 and KV and exploded in the armored space. The rupture of such a projectile in the ammunition load or in the fuel tank practically guaranteed the destruction of the thirty-four, without the slightest chance of its recovery: the explosion of the ammunition load destroyed the car completely, and burned-out cars in 87-89% of cases could not be restored. But even if nothing of the kind happened, still a relatively heavy German shell could completely destroy a domestic tank - and, alas, it did it.
And what about our VET?
She, alas, turned out to be "corrupted" by the weakness of the protection of German tanks. In conditions when the armor protection of the bulk of German "triplets" and "fours" even in 1942 did not exceed 30-50 mm, even the famous "forty-five" - 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 with a barrel length of 46 calibers.
However, 40-50 mm of armor already presented some problem for her, so in 1942 an improved model of the "forty-five" with a barrel length of 68.6 calibers was developed - we are talking about the M-42.
This artillery system accelerated a caliber armor-piercing projectile weighing 1, 43 kg to a speed of 870 m / s, which was 110 m / s more than that of the arr. 1937 In terms of its combat capabilities, the M-42 was close enough to the capabilities of the German 50-mm Pak 38 (if you do not take into account the quality of the shells), but there is a nuance - the M-42 went into production in 1943, that is, just then when the Pak 38 was discontinued.
In general, of course, the M-42 was a rather formidable anti-tank weapon due to its low weight and size, the relatively low cost of production, and most importantly, due to the frank weakness of the onboard armor of German T-III and T-IV tanks, which usually did not exceed 30 mm. It was easy to hide the M-42, positioning the batteries so that they covered each other with crossfire, so that the Germans had no opportunity to stand in front of them all. But we cannot say that we had so many of these guns in 1943 - in total, 4,151 units of them were fired this year.
A remarkable anti-tank gun was the 57 mm gun mod. 1941 ZiS-2, firing 3, 19 kg caliber rounds with an initial speed of 990 m / s.
Such ammunition could well strike 80-mm T-IVH armor plates in the forehead at a distance of about 500 m, the ZiS-2 could well withstand even the Tiger tanks. But the real mass production of the ZiS-2 in the war years was never established - in 1941, only 141 guns were produced, and then they were removed from production until 1943. But in 1943, only 1,855 were transferred to the troops. such weapons: I must say that the ZiS-2 was completely late for the Kursk Bulge, since of all the troops that the Red Army managed to concentrate there, only 4 anti-tank regiments were armed with them.
Thus, the brunt of the anti-tank battles continued to be borne by the "handyman" 76, 2-mm ZiS-3, the production of which in 1943 amounted to as much as 13,924 units.
But for all its indisputable merits, this artillery system was by no means a specialized anti-tank weapon. The ZiS-3 reported to its caliber armor-piercing projectile an initial speed of only 655 m / s, which was more or less enough for the bulk of German armored vehicles in 1942, but for 1943 it was no longer too good.
And what else? Of course, there was an excellent 85-mm anti-aircraft gun 52-K, capable of confidently hitting German tanks at a direct firing range, but these guns were few - over the years of production, from 1939 to 1945, they were produced 14 422 units, and in our air defense was in dire need of them.
As for domestic armored vehicles, the bulk of Soviet tanks produced in 1943 were armed with 45-mm or 76, 2-mm F-34 cannons, and the latter, in terms of its anti-tank capabilities, approximately corresponded to the ZiS-3. As for the self-propelled guns, the bulk of them were the light SU-76s, all with the same 76, 2-mm cannon, and the SU-122, which was armed with a 122-mm short-barreled howitzer with a barrel length of 22, 7 caliber.
By the way, very high hopes were pinned on the latter precisely in terms of anti-tank warfare, since it was assumed that their cumulative shells would become a very formidable weapon. The shells turned out to be formidable, but very quickly it became clear that because of the "mortar" ballistics of the 122-mm howitzer it was very difficult to get into an enemy tank from it. Specialized anti-tank self-propelled guns, the first tanks with 85-mm guns, our tankers began to receive only from August 1943, they simply did not have time to significantly affect the results of this year's battles. Of course, if you look at the release time, it seems to be going well: from August to December 1943, 756 SU-85s were produced.
But the new technology did not appear on the battlefield immediately after graduation - it had to enter the troops, they - to learn how to use it, etc. Therefore, for example, the German "Panthers", although produced since February 1943, went into battle only near Kursk, in July. And the same applies to the only real "opponent" capable of withstanding the new Wehrmacht tanks in 1943 - the SU-152. In February-June 1943, 290 units of such self-propelled guns were produced, but only 24 of these vehicles hit the Kursk Bulge. And in total, 668 units were produced for the armament of our troops in 1943. SU-152 and 35 more units. ISU-152.
In this case, of course, you need to understand that "the ability to hit an enemy tank" is one thing, and "an effective anti-tank weapon" is a little different. Yes, the SU-152 had a very powerful 152-mm howitzer-gun ML-20S, whose armor-piercing projectile had an initial velocity of 600 m / s with a mass of 46, 5-48, 8 kg. However, the mass of the projectile and the associated separate loading made this artillery system not fast enough for a tank battle - only 1-2 rds / min. Therefore, we can say that the SU-152, although it possessed greater versatility compared to the Wehrmacht self-propelled guns, which received 88-mm guns, as it coped better than them with the destruction of field fortifications, etc., but at the same time it was inferior to them. as a "tank destroyer".
In other words, the Red Army, unlike the Wehrmacht, was late in deploying specialized anti-tank guns of high power, and this happened due to the relatively weak armoring of German equipment, since there was simply no particular need for them until 1943. Alas, when this need was realized, rearmament could not be carried out at once. And the consequence of this was that in 1943 the main burden of the fight against fascist armored vehicles fell on the old and modernized "forty-fives", and on the universal guns of caliber 76, 2-mm F-34 and ZiS-3. At the same time, our guns, moreover, had problems with the quality of armor-piercing shells, as a result of which, for 76, 2-mm artillery systems, the industry was forced to switch to the production of steel blanks 53-BR-350SP, which, although they had acceptable armor penetration, but not carried an explosive.
That is, at a time when the German anti-tank equipment provided the breakdown of armor and the rupture of shells with a caliber of 75-mm or more inside the domestic tank, the domestic anti-tank equipment fought either with a 45-mm projectile, quite capable of penetrating 25-30 mm of the sides of the "triplets" and "fours" and disable them, but at the same time possessing a small armor action, or 76, 2-mm monolithic blanks or sub-caliber projectiles, whose armor action was also low. Such shells, of course, could also put an enemy tank out of action, but they, with rare exceptions, destroyed some of its components and assemblies, but could not completely destroy the tank or self-propelled guns.
In other words, the main reason for the relatively high level of irrecoverable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns of the USSR in 1943 against the background of German tanks was the lack of specialized anti-tank weapons capable of turning enemy tanks into a heap of scrap metal with 1-2 hits. Strange as it may seem, even in these conditions, the Soviet anti-tank equipment coped with its duties very well, its hits knocked out enemy tanks and self-propelled guns - but the problem was that due to the relatively weak armored action of domestic shells, most of the damaged equipment could was put into operation. At the same time, the German 75-88-mm artillery systems left the same "thirty-fours" much less chance of "a second life after overhaul."
And finally, the last thing. At the beginning of 1943, the Germans practically excluded light armored vehicles from their battle formations - their TI, T-II and other Czech models accounted for just over 16% of the total number of tanks and self-propelled guns - out of 7,927 tanks and self-propelled guns with which the Wehrmacht met the new one, 1943, there were only 1,284 units. At the same time, the share of light armored vehicles in the tank forces of the Red Army as of 01.01.1943 was 53.4% - of the 20.6 thousand tanks of the USSR, 11 thousand were light. In addition, the production of light vehicles in the USSR continued in 1943, while in Germany the production of such tanks was completely curtailed.
Thus, we see that there were a lot of objective reasons why the irrecoverable losses of tanks and self-propelled guns of the USSR should have significantly surpassed the German ones in 1943. And they were completely unrelated to the martial art of the Red Army and the qualities of Soviet tankers. In order to compare the level of combat training of the tank forces of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, it is necessary to compare exactly the general, that is, the return and irrecoverable losses of armored vehicles of the parties, but this analysis cannot be done, due to the lack of reliable data from the German side. And the comparison of only irrecoverable losses is completely meaningless, since for the reasons stated above, out of 100 destroyed German tanks, the Germans irretrievably lost 20-30 vehicles, and ours - 44 or more.
But the essence of the matter is that both sides in our example, according to the results of the battles, lost 100 tanks each, not 20-30 or 44. And as a result of this simple arithmetic, the German tank divisions, having irrevocably lost all 15-20% of the initial combat strength, found themselves with 10-20 combat-ready vehicles in front of the steel roller of the Red Army rolling on them. And, of course, they could no longer help their infantry and other units.
And then, after the war, the same E. von Manstein, describing his "victories" at the Kursk Bulge and the "successful" retreat of the troops entrusted to him, during which they, of course, not only fully retained their combat capability, but also defeated many times superior, the "hordes of the Red Army" that attack them, literally a few pages later, I have to grudgingly describe the real state of the troops he led to the Dnieper:
“In this regard, the headquarters of the group reported that as part of the three remaining armies, taking into account the arrival of three more divisions on the march, it disposes directly for the defense of the Dnieper line, 700 km long, only 37 infantry divisions (another 5, were distributed among the rest of the divisions). Thus, each division had to defend a 20 km wide strip. The average strength of the first echelon divisions, however, is currently only 1,000 men.… … Regarding the 17 armored and motorized divisions now at the disposal of the Army Group, the report indicated that none of them was fully operational. The number of tanks has decreased as much as the number of personnel has decreased."
And these words of the German field marshal are a real indicator of how the Red Army fought in 1943.
