In previous articles, the author described in great detail the features of the maneuvering of the Russian squadron right up to the opening of fire by the main forces. In short, the results of the actions of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky look like this:
1. The Russian squadron marched in two parallel columns most of the time from the moment of establishing contact with Japanese scouts. This became known to H. Togo, as a result of which the Japanese commander decided to abandon attempts to deploy "crossing T" and preferred to attack the left column of the Russians. The latter consisted of the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments, that is, it was headed by "Oslyabya", and behind it - the old Russian squadron battleships and coastal defense battleships, which without the support of the main forces of the squadron - four squadron battleships of the "Borodino" type could not withstand the blow of 12 armored ships of the main forces of the Japanese. In other words, H. Togo believed that by attacking the weaker Russian column, he would inflict heavy damage on it, after which the fate of the 1st Russian armored detachment would also be resolved.
2. The attack of the left Russian column made sense only if the Russians did not have time to reorganize into a single wake column before it began. Z. P. Rozhestvensky began to rebuild as soon as he saw the main forces of the Japanese, but rebuilt very slowly, increasing the speed to 11.5 knots. and only slightly (about 9 degrees) turning consistently to the intersection of the course of the left column. As a result, the rebuilding of the Russian squadron should have taken about half an hour, but on the other hand, from the position of the Japanese flagship, it was almost invisible. In other words, the Russians were gradually rebuilding, but H. Togo did not see this, and apparently believed that Z. P. Rozhestvensky had not yet begun rebuilding.
3. Thus, the Russian commander did everything so that the Japanese with all their strength fell on the left column, diverging from it on the countercourse, but by the time the sides approached at a distance of firing, they had to be met by 4 battleships of the Borodino type, which had take place at the head of the column.
In other words, Zinovy Petrovich made an excellent trap for the Japanese admiral. But what didn't work then?
The first mistake, it is also the main
Z. P. Rozhestvensky expected that at the end of the rebuilding, by the time his flagship returned to course NO23, Borodino, Alexander III and Eagle would have enough space to accommodate between Prince Suvorov and Oslyabey. However, this did not happen, and when the Suvorov completed the maneuver and again laid down on the NO23 course, the Orel was abeam of the Oslyabi. What went wrong?
Z. P. Rozhestvensky is often accused of being unable to calculate a relatively simple maneuver, but is that so? Oddly enough, the calculations show that the Russian commander did everything completely right. Zinovy Petrovich explained his maneuver by the example of a right-angled triangle, the hypotenuse of which was formed by the course of the 1st armored detachment - four Borodino-class ships, which took 29 minutes to cross the course of the right column.
Here is how Z. P. himself described this maneuver. Rozhdestvensky:
“To determine what the distance was at 1 hour 49 meters.between the head of the first detachment and the head of the second detachment, it can be assumed that the first walked, with an average speed close to 11, 25 knots, along a line close to the hypotenuse of the triangle, 29 minutes (and passed, therefore, about 5.5 miles), and the other walked on a large leg, at a speed of 9 knots, and passed 4 1/3 miles in 29 minutes. Since the small leg of the same triangle (the distance between the columns) was 0.8 miles, the entire length of the large leg should have been equal to 5.4 miles, and the distance between "Suvorov" and "Oslyabya" was 1 hour 49 m. it should have been 5, 4 - 4, 33 = 1.07 miles."
That is, by the time "Suvorov" turned to NO23, the position of him and "Oslyabi" should have been like this
It is well known that the longest battleships of the "Borodino" type were 121.2 m, and they sailed at intervals of 2 cables. Accordingly, the length of the column of the 1st armored detachment was, from the stem of the "Suvorov" to the sternpost of the closing "Eagle" 8, 6 cables. The rest of the calculations are very simple and show that the maneuver of Z. P. Rozhestvensky left more than 2 cables between the Oslyabi's stem and the Eagle's sternpost, which would have been quite enough to restore the front line.
That is, in theory, the exit of the 1st armored detachment at the head of the Russian column should not have created any problem: nevertheless, it created, because, by the time “Prince Suvorov”, returning to the course NO23, opened fire, “Eagle "was not 2 cables ahead of" Oslyabi ", but at its abeam. What did the Russian admiral fail to take into account?
Z. P. himself Rozhdestvensky assumed the following:
“At the present time, apparently, it turns out that the battleship“Oryol”(4th in the 1st detachment), with the above formation, pulled back and at 1:49 pm was not in its place, but behind the right board "Oslyabya". I have no right to dispute this. Perhaps, "Oryol" was delayed due to his own fault or the fault of the third in the line (the second number followed "Suvorov" in an impeccable distance)."
That is, according to Zinovy Petrovich, the problem arose due to the fact that his small column of 4 battleships stretched out, and either "Borodino" lagged behind "Alexander III", or "Eagle" lagged behind "Borodino".
This is quite possible, but, in the opinion of the author of this article, not only (and not so much) the commanders of the Borodino or Eagle are to blame here, but the confusing order of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. He ordered the 1st armored detachment to hold 11 knots, but "Suvorov" - 11, 5 knots. Obviously, the admiral's calculation was that "Alexander III", "Borodino", and "Oryol" would orient themselves according to "Prince Suvorov" and themselves would select such a number of revolutions of their cars to follow the front matelote, observing the prescribed interval of 2 cables.
On the one hand, this is, of course, the right decision, because, taking into account the uneven acceleration of the ships, it is still easier to catch up with the forward matelot than to slow down if your battleship picks up speed faster than those in front of it. That is, when rebuilding, in any case, it is safer to make a maneuver that will increase the intervals between ships than one that can shorten these intervals. But all this is correct only for those cases when an increase in the length of the column for some time cannot lead to any sad consequences, but in the case we are considering, this was not the case.
In general, we can state that Z. P. Rozhestvensky, planning a maneuver of the "return" of the battleships of the 1st detachment to the head of the column, "designed" it correctly, but too "back to back". He proceeded from the fact that "Oslyabya" goes exactly 9 knots, and believed that 11, 5 knots, which "Prince Suvorov" would develop, would give him, taking into account the time to accelerate from 9 knots. an average speed (11, 25 knots) is enough to change lines. But any, even insignificant deviations - say, "Oslyabya" goes a little faster than 9 knots, or the average speed of the 1st armored detachment will be not 11, 25, but closer to 11 knots - and the distance between "Oslyabya" and "Eagle" in the moment of completion of the maneuver will be less than 2 cables. This means that "Oslyaba" will have to reduce the speed in order to enter service behind the "Eagle", and observe the prescribed two-cable interval.
Well, then exactly what happened happened - maybe the Oslyabya and the right column of Russian battleships were moving a little faster than ZP had imagined. Rozhestvensky, maybe "Suvorov" was going slower, and it is likely that "Borodino" or "Eagle" could stretch the prescribed interval - one of these reasons, or some combination of them led to the fact that instead of a brilliant rearrangement of the 1st armored detachment, in which the "Eagle" was supposed to be about two cables in front and 20-30 m to the right of the course "Oslyabi" … it turned out what happened.
Error Z. P. Rozhestvensky consisted in the fact that when planning a maneuver, he should have laid a small (at least a couple of cables) "margin of safety" for all kinds of mistakes, but he did not. Or maybe he did, but he incorrectly estimated some parameter (the speed of the Oslyabi, for example) and made a mistake in his calculations.
The second mistake - possibly non-existent
Consisted in the fact that Z. P. Rozhestvensky, after turning "Prince Suvorov" reduced its speed to 9 knots.
The fact is that from the "Prince Suvorov" the Russian admiral, completing the rebuilding, could not estimate exactly where the "Eagle" was in relation to the "Oslyabi". Even with ideal visibility (say, if “Alexander III” and “Borodino” suddenly became transparent) it would still be difficult to understand whether the “Eagle” is abeam of the “Oslyabi”, or if it is ahead of it by a couple of cables. the two Russian battleships marching between the "Prince Suvorov" and the "Eagle" were by no means transparent. It turned out that Z. P. Rozhestvensky remained confident that the Oslyabya would be able to get into the wake of the Orel without any problems, but that was absolutely not the case.
It is also necessary to take into account such a moment. Theoretically, the Russian commander, in addition to the two cables between the Oslyabey and the Eagle "laid down" by him in the maneuver, had one more head start. The fact is that the battleships of the 1st detachment, of course, could not reduce their speed from 11, 5 to 9 knots. at the same time, such a “stop” is impossible even for a passenger car. Battleships of the "Borodino" type could do this only gradually, that is, until the moment the speeds were equalized, the distance between the 1st armored detachment and the column of the 2nd and 3rd detachments would continue to increase.
In other words, suppose that the battleships of 1st Detachment reduced their speed from 11.5 knots to 9 knots. in 1-3 minutes, respectively, the indicated time, they would have traveled at an average speed of 10.25 knots, which was 1.25 knots higher than the speed of the Oslyabi and the right column. That is, during the time while the 1st armored detachment was slowing down, the distance between the Oslyabey and the Eagle should have increased by another 0.2-0.6 cables in addition to the 2 and 2 cables that Z. NS. Rozhdestvensky.
Why did Zinovy Petrovich not align the columns in a different way? After all, he could not have reduced the speed of the 1st armored detachment to 9 knots, but instead ordered "Oslyaba" and the ships following him to increase the speed from 9 to 11 knots. This option looks great until you think about it properly.
Although opinions about the mutual disposition of the Russian and Japanese squadrons at the time of the opening of fire differ, we will take the description of our official history as a basis: the turning point of the Japanese squadron was located at 32 cables and 4 points (45 degrees) to the traverse of "Suvorov". At the same time, after the turn, the Japanese ships lay down on a course parallel or almost parallel to the Russian squadron.
Following the previous course at a speed of 9 knots, the Russians were approaching the turning point of the Japanese squadron, while if the ships of H. Kamimura were turning after H. Togo (and at the beginning of the Japanese turn, it all looked like this), then at the moment when the last Japanese armored the cruiser would pass the turning point (14.04), it would be on the abeam of the "Prince Suvorov" about 22.5 cables from it, while the distance from the end Russian to the end Japanese ship would be about 36 cables, as shown in Fig. 1.
Well, if the Russian column had gone 11 knots, it would have moved 5 cables forward (Fig. 2).
So, from the point of view of tactics, Z. P. Rozhestvensky should not have made any maneuvers, but had to go on the same course, approaching the turning point: in this case, an increasing number of Russian ships could participate in the battle, firing on their left side. From this point of view, it would be more useful to go at 11 knots, since in this case the end Japanese ship, having completed the turn, would not be on the abeam of the Suvorov, but almost on the abeam of the Borodino, and it would not be separated from the end of the Russian ship 36, but only 32 cables.
But you need to understand that in this case, the Russian commander, approaching the end of the Japanese, would substitute the head of his column under the concentrated fire of the entire Japanese line. And here Z. P. Rozhestvensky had to choose a compromise speed that would provide his ships with the best conditions for firing at the Japanese passing the turning point, but at the same time did not overly substitute Suvorov, Alexander III, etc. under the fire of the Japanese line. And in this regard, 9 knots seemed to be a more optimal speed than 11 - even from today's positions.
Another thing is interesting - Z. P. Rozhestvensky believed that the time for the Japanese rebuilding could be less than it actually was, and that H. Togo could take 10 minutes. In this case, it would have turned out that "Suvorov", following at 9 knots, would not have reached the traverse of the terminal armored cruiser Kh. Kamimura about 7.5 cables. Then, at least theoretically, the Russian squadron got the opportunity, turning consistently to the left, to pass under the stern of the Japanese formation.
In addition, there were other advantages to the speed of 9 knots. Obviously, it would be much easier to slow down the speed of the 1st armored detachment than to increase the speed of the 2nd and 3rd. In this case, they would have followed for some time with a lag behind the battleships of the "Borodino" type, and it is not a fact that the system would have survived at all - the ships of N. I. Nebogatov could have been delayed, etc. Recall that Zinovy Petrovich had the lowest opinion of the fusion of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons: despite regular maneuvers with N. I. Nebogatov, he could not get him to carry out his orders.
In other words, Z. P. Rozhestvensky could, of course, give 11 knots, but at the same time, the chances were too great that his column of 12 armored ships would stretch out, and the end ones would still remain almost as far from the Japanese pivot point as if the squadron was on 9 knots … That is, rushing to meet the Japanese, the Russian commander won little for the ships of the 2nd and 3rd detachments, but at the same time he exposed his best ships to the concentrated fire of the Japanese.
“Good,” the dear reader will say: “But if the author is sure that the squadron speed of 9 knots was really optimal in that tactical situation, why does he blame ZP? Rozhestvensky, counting it as a mistake of the Russian commander? The answer is very simple.
Z. P. Rozhestvensky should first complete the rebuilding, make sure that all the battleships of the 1st detachment returned to the previous course NO23, and the Oslyabya followed them into the wake - and only after that reduce the speed to 9 knots. In an article devoted to the ways in which a high-speed squadron can expose "crossing T" to a slower enemy, the author ventured to assert that any maneuver performed before the completion of the previous one could entail chaos. This is exactly what we see in this case - when the "Prince Suvorov" turned to NO23 and opened fire, the 1st armored detachment had not yet completed the rebuilding, and did not lie down, following the flagship, on NO23. Save Z. P. Rozhdestvensky speed of 11.5 knots is not for long, and the Oryol, which found itself at 13.49 abeam the Oslyabi, would continue to slowly overtake the flagship, alas, the late DG Felkerzam, which would greatly facilitate the rebuilding of the head battleship of the 2nd detachment to the wake "Eagle". But Z. P. Rozhestvensky began a new maneuver without completing the previous one: he reduced the speed before all 4 battleships of the 1st detachment lay down on NO23. And this is what should be considered the mistake of the Russian admiral.
In other words, there was no mistake in leading the squadron into battle at 9 knots in the current situation: the mistake was that Z. P. Rozhestvensky too early reduced the speed of his 1st armored detachment to 9 knots.
But here's what's interesting: it is possible that Z. P. Rozhdestvensky did not make this mistake. Many sources (for example, A. S. Novikov-Priboy) indicate that "Prince Suvorov" reduced the stroke to 9 knots immediately after turning to NO23, but there is evidence to the contrary. For example, M. V. Ozerov, the commander of the battleship Sisoy Veliky, stated in the testimony of the Investigative Commission:
“At 1:42 pm, Oslyabya opened fire on the enemy. The 1st detachment began to evade to the right, probably in order to lie with the enemy on one course, and the 2nd and 3rd detachments were ordered to enter his wake, the course to have 11 knots. But this move, the indicated two detachments, not only could not go for some time, since the 1st detachment still did not get to the head, but even had to significantly reduce the course in order to allow the ships of the 1st detachment entering the wake to take their places."
Unfortunately, our official history does not comment on this moment in any way: perhaps, precisely for the reason that the testimony of the officers of the squadron is too contradictory to make a definite verdict on this issue.
The third mistake, which is not a mistake at all
This error is considered to be the Z. P signal. Rozhestvensky, which he raised immediately after his flagship turned to NO23: “the 2nd detachment will be in the wake of the first”.
It is interesting that the members of the Historical Commission at the Naval General Staff, who made up the official "Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905." consider giving this signal a completely wrong action of the admiral, calling it "a petty alignment of their squadron." But let's think - could Z. P. Rozhestvensky not to give such a signal? Before the main forces of the Japanese were discovered, the 1st armored detachment maneuvered separately from the rest of the main forces, forming the right column of the Russian system. Now he went out into the heads of the rest, but "Prince Suvorov" completed the rebuilding slightly to the right of the course of the "Oslyabi". In other words, Z. P. Rozhestvensky obviously wanted to reorganize the main forces into a single wake column, regaining control, but how could his flagships have guessed about this? If the Russian commander hadn't raised this signal, and on the Oslyab it would have been left to guess whether Z. P. Rozhestvensky so that the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments follow him, or does he prefer to continue to maneuver only four of his "Borodino" type battleships of the 1st detachment? In other words, the Russian commander had to let know on "Oslyabya" what he expected from the ships he led to joint maneuvering, this was the meaning of the order "the 2nd detachment to be in the wake of the first".
Thus, this instruction was absolutely necessary, and the only question is to understand how timely it was. Maybe it made sense to raise it only when the 1st armored detachment in full force returned to the course NO23? It is unlikely: by the time when only "Prince Suvorov" turned to NO23, it was clearly visible from the "Oslyabi", but after the "Alexander III" would have got into the wake behind it, the opportunity to " Suvorov”were not too great. And when between "Oslyabey" and "Prince Suvorov" there would have lined up as many as three battleships, the chances that the signal of the Russian commander would be considered on the flagship of the 2nd armored detachment were completely illusory. True, for this there were "Pearls" and "Emerald", which were outside the line, and served, among other things, as rehearsal vessels. They were supposed to transmit any signal from the commander to Oslyabya, but, perhaps, in the outset of the battle, Z. P. Rozhestvensky was afraid to rely only on them alone.
The fourth mistake. But whose?
And, in fact, what did all the above-mentioned mistakes of the Russian admiral lead to so terrible? The answer seems to be obvious: due to the mistakes of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky's squadron battleship "Eagle" was not ahead of the "Oslyabi", as planned, but at its abeam, and even began to reduce the speed, equalizing it with the "Oslyabi". As a result, the commander of the flagship battleship of the 2nd detachment had no choice but to follow the commander's order, first reduce the speed down to the smallest, and then stop altogether, letting the "Eagle" go ahead. As a result, the Japanese got an excellent opportunity to practice shooting at a standing target, and quickly achieved success, inflicting severe damage on the Oslyaba, which predetermined the rapid death of the ship. It is so?
If we proceed from the maxim that the commander is responsible for all the actions of his subordinates - then, of course, this is so. But let's think a little about what he did in the period from 13.20 to 13.49 and a little after that the commander of the battleship "Oslyabya" V. I. Baer.
So, until 13.20 the 1st armored detachment went parallel to the 2nd and 3rd, but then "Prince Suvorov" turned back and went across the course of the "Oslyabi". So, what is next? For 29 minutes, Vladimir Iosifovich Baer had the opportunity to observe the execution of this maneuver. It was hardly possible to doubt its significance - it is obvious that in view of the main forces of the enemy, Z. P. Rozhestvensky was going to lead the right column, led by "Oslyabey". And if Zinovy Petrovich did not see that during the rebuilding of his end "Oryol" did not have time to pass in front of "Oslyabey", then on the "Oslyab" it was obvious long before a real threat of collision was created!
But what does V. I. Bair do about this? But nothing. He had the opportunity to see the danger in advance, and to anticipate it - for this all it was necessary to slightly reduce the speed. Of course, the flagship of the 2nd armored detachment had such powers. But no - instead, Vladimir Iosifovich continues to the very extreme to carry out the order given earlier and follows the established course at a given speed, and then, when a collision is almost inevitable, he stops his battleship in view of the enemy, without even thinking to notify the ships following him about such a maneuver!
Let us recall the testimony of Lieutenant Ovander from the battleship Sisoy the Great, which followed the Oslyabey:
“Oslyabya, obviously wanting to help line up as soon as possible, that is, to let the 1st armored detachment come forward, first reduced its speed, and then immediately after that completely stopped the cars … … (signal, semaphore, balls, etc.) did not show."
Without a doubt, it is completely incorrect to compare warships and cars, but still any at least somewhat experienced driver knows how dangerous the situation is when, in a convoy of vehicles following at certain intervals, the head driver sharply "hits" the brakes - something V. I. Baer arranged a similar arrangement for the ships following him.
In other words, Z. P. Rozhestvensky, of course, made a mistake when rebuilding: for one reason or another, listed above, he created a situation in which the "Eagle" did not have time to pass in front of the "Oslyabey". But his mistake could easily be corrected by V. I. Baer, to whom this mistake was obvious long before the situation took on an "emergency" character. It is very difficult not to understand the threat of collision when the battleship of the 1st Detachment is slowly "rolling" onto your ship! But V. I. Baer did absolutely nothing, and his inaction ultimately led to the fact that "Oslyaba" had not only to fold the move, but to completely stop under enemy fire.
V. I. Ber could well reduce the speed in advance, letting the battleships of the 1st detachment of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. But even having brought the situation to the threat of a collision, he still could not go to the wake behind the Eagle, but go a little to the right or to the left, discarding the move and covering the Eagle himself or “hiding” behind him: and when the latter will come forward, then go to his wake. Yes, in this case "Eagle" or "Oslyabya" would "double", and one of them would not be able to shoot at the Japanese ships. But all the same, it was much better than leaving your battleship motionless under fire, also forcing the ships of the 2nd detachment following the Oslyabey to be urgently slowed down.
In other words, Z. P. Rozhestvensky, of course, made a mistake, but only the actions of V. I. Baer, which seem to the author of this article completely illiterate, led to the fact that this mistake turned into a catastrophe - the death of "Oslyabi" at the very beginning of the battle.
And again - was it not Z. P. Is Rozhestvensky responsible for preparing his flagships? One can, of course, assume that he simply intimidated his commanders to a degree completely incompatible with independent decisions. But remember that, being left without the leadership of the flagship, the commander of the battleship "Alexander III" acted more than intelligently: he led his ship between the cruisers of Kh. Kamimura and the battleships of Kh. Togo in order to pass under the stern of the 1st combat detachment of the Japanese: this maneuver was extremely dangerous for "Alexander III", but nullified the tactical advantage that the Japanese had by this time. In essence, Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov sacrificed his battleship for the sake of trying to save the squadron: such a decision can be considered whatever, but the term "lack of initiative" is obviously inapplicable to it. So, we can assume that the commanders of the 2nd Pacific squadron were not so downtrodden.
In the opinion of the author of this article, the case was as follows. On "Oslyab" the rear admiral and commander of the 2nd armored detachment Dmitry Gustavovich von Felkerzam held his flag, who made the main decisions, and V. I. Baer remained, as it were, "in the shadows", only the executor of the admiral's will. But in Cam Ranh, D. G. Felkersam suffered a stroke and died a few days before the battle. As a result, V. I. Baer found himself not only at the head of the battleship, but also at the head of the entire 2nd armored detachment, completely unprepared for such responsibility.
At the end of this article, it remains only to add that the author has deviated too much from the history of the armored cruisers "Pearls" and "Emerald", and in the next article he will gladly return to them. As for the actions of Z. P. Rozhestvensky in the outset of the battle, then another article will be devoted to them, in which the author will try to figure out how effectively the Russian squadron was able to take advantage of those 15 minutes of the advantage of the position that Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky gave it.
