"Jewels of the Imperial Navy." Pearls "and" Emerald "" … So, in the previous article of the series, we analyzed the possible reasons for the refusal of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky from the persecution of "Izumi", in which "Pearls" and "Emerald" could well have taken part. Now is the time to move on to an analysis of the maneuvering of Russian ships right up to the beginning of the battle of the main forces and, most importantly, to the tactical plans of the Russian commander. Having understood them, we can understand why Z. P. Rozhestvensky used his high-speed reconnaissance cruisers exactly as it actually happened, and not in any other way.
As we said earlier, on the morning of May 14, the Russian ships kept their marching formation, but then undertook a series of difficult-to-explain maneuvers: lined up in a wake line, tried to build a front line with part of their forces, but instead fell apart into two columns, etc. Why Z. P. Rozhestvensky allowed such a confusion with the rebuilding of the squadron in order of battle?
Two words about combat formations
To begin with, let's recall a few elementary, in general, truths.
First. As we know, at that time there were three main battle formations: the wake column, as well as the front and bearing formations.
At the same time, the last two were used quite rarely in real combat clashes, the main structure was the wake column. The admirals' commitment to the wake column is explained by the fact that with such a formation the flagship is provided with maximum visibility, and simple maneuvers (sequential turns) can be performed without raising signals, according to the principle "do as I do".
Second. During combat maneuvering, the length of the formation was of great importance. So, 12 armored ships of the Russian squadron, even in a "tight formation", reducing the intervals between ships to only 1 cable, would still stretch for almost 2 miles, and with standard two-cable intervals - all three. As a result, the execution of any maneuver dragged on for a long time: for example, if the Russian flagship, moving at 9 knots, turned sequentially, then the end ship of the squadron would reach the turning point only after almost 20 minutes. In a similar situation, the end ship of the Japanese fleet, following at 15 knots, reached the turning point in 12 minutes. At the same time, in order to avoid misunderstandings, the squadrons of those times had to complete the previous maneuver before starting a new one: this was necessary in order to avoid confusion and the danger of breaking the formation. Thus, we see that the wake column was a rather cumbersome formation, and, having made any decision, the admirals of those times had to "live with it" until the rebuilding was completed. This is a very important point, let us remember it.
Third. The Russian squadron was significantly inferior to the Japanese in speed, which gave H. Togo enormous tactical advantages. In the series of articles "Myths of Tsushima", the author has already described the British maneuvers of 1901-1903, which irrefutably testified: with some correct maneuvering, the speed superiority by only a couple of knots did not leave the slower side a single chance to evade the "crossing the T ", (" Sticks over T "), which was then considered the best tactical technique, allowing you to defeat the enemy fleet.
Many copies were broken on the topic of separating a high-speed detachment of 5 newest battleships from the 2nd Pacific Squadron. But such an action would be justified only if the indicated 5 battleships, acting together, could develop a speed higher than the Japanese fleet. In this case, they could really try to outplay H. Togo, compensating for their small numbers with an advantageous tactical position. But this, of course, was not the case - according to the author of this article, the best Russian battleships could not go together faster than 13-13.5 knots, while the Japanese - 15 knots, and for a short time or more. And even if we assume that the 1st armored detachment and "Oslyabya" were not inferior in speed to the Japanese, then separating them into a separate detachment still made no sense. Lacking superiority in speed, they still could not deliver the "crossing the T" to the Japanese fleet. Thus, everything would boil down to the fact that the five best Russian ships overtook the rest of the forces and were forced to fight with a dozen Japanese armored ships without the support of the "slugs": The balance of forces is so unequal that it "killed" the Russian squadron no worse than the notorious "Crossing the T".
"Emperor Alexander III"
The Russian commander made a lot of efforts to train the ships entrusted to him in maneuvering, although he did not achieve much success in this. But the squadron of N. I. Nebogatova simply did not have time to gain experience of joint actions with the 2nd Pacific. At the same time, the Japanese had amalgamated combat detachments with combat experience and, obviously, surpassed the Russian fleet in coordination of actions.
The conclusion from all of the above is very simple. The Japanese were superior to the Russians in literally every aspect: they were faster, maneuvered better, and had combat experience. Accordingly, Z. P. Rozhestvensky could, of course, arrange in advance the main forces of his squadrons in a wake column, or in the front, or bearing. But none of this gave him an advantage, because the Japanese, seeing the Russian system and taking advantage of the superiority in speed, always had the opportunity to achieve a tactical victory by putting the very "crossing the T" on the Russian commander.
So what can you do?
Strictly speaking, Zinovy Petrovich was faced with a tactically unsolvable task. But, oddly enough, Z. P. Rozhestvensky managed to "find an entrance" out of this practically hopeless situation. And in order not to pull more intrigue, we will immediately indicate what it was.
Since no form of combat formation saved the Russians from defeat, the idea of the Russian commander was to … not accept any formation. In other words, the Russian squadron should have been marching before the enemy appeared. Then she had to wait for H. Togo's maneuver, and when he showed his intentions - to deploy into a combat formation, depending on the decision of the Japanese commander.
The trick here was this. If Z. P. Rozhestvensky led the forces entrusted to him with a wake column or front formation, then H. Togo, notified in advance of the Russian battle order, could calculate in advance the correct maneuver and then execute it. The wake column of the Russians would directly "ask for" the "stick over the T", and if Z. P. Rozhestvensky deployed the squadron to the front, then Kh. Togo could attack one of the flanks of the Russian squadron, still putting up "crossing the T". In other words, if Zinovy Petrovich had lined up his squadron with some kind of battle formation, the Japanese commander would know what he should do, and the Russian admiral would not have been able to fend off the actions of his enemy. But the marching formation created uncertainty, because it was clear that the Russians would turn out of it into a battle formation, but it was completely unclear in what order. Line abreast? A wake column? And where will they be directed?
Such a decision Z. P. Rozhestvensky had one, but a very significant drawback. Visibility on May 14 was limited to 6-7 miles and during the time needed for the Russian squadron to rebuild (about 20 minutes) the Japanese could approach the Russian ships by 10-20 cables. In other words, there was a fairly significant risk that the battle would begin even before the Russian squadron had time to completely rebuild. Nevertheless, this might not have happened, but even if it did, in this case the benefit of the Japanese still turned out to be not as great as it could have been if they had succeeded in crossing the T.
Let's assume as a hypothesis that the plan of the Russian commander was as follows:
1. Wait for the appearance of the Japanese forces, following in the marching formation.
2. Wait for the decision of H. Togo to fight. In other words, the Japanese admiral had to decide how he was going to attack the Russian squadron - try, for example, to put "crossing the T" on two columns at once, or attack a weaker column, or something else.
3. And only when H. Togo makes his decision and begins to execute it, that is, he begins to carry out this or that maneuver, taking advantage of the fact that the implementation of this maneuver will bind the Japanese commander for the next 12-15 minutes, to begin such a reorganization in combat the order in which the Russian main forces will be brought into battle in the best possible way.
In this case, we assume (again, in the form of a hypothesis) that Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not at all “fixate” on his plan: his task was not to precisely fulfill the above “paragraphs”, but to prevent the Japanese from gaining a tactical victory in the outset of the battle.
And now, having made these assumptions, let's analyze the actions of the Russian squadron and its commander right up to the beginning of the battle of the main forces.
A fight with a shadow
So, at about 06.20 in the morning near the Russian squadron, the Izumi was discovered. The marching Russian system, in which it remains unchanged - Z. P. Rozhestvensky is waiting, rightly believing that the main forces of the Japanese are not nearby yet. But now there are new Japanese cruisers - "Chin-Yen", "Matsushima", "Itsukushima" and "Hasidate". This, quite possibly, indicates that a dozen battleships and armored cruisers flying the flag of the rising sun are not far away. Firstly, 3 hours have passed since the appearance of "Izumi", and secondly, it is still difficult to imagine that Heihachiro Togo will send a very slow-moving 3rd combat detachment to watch the Russian squadron, being too far away to have time to come to him to the rescue.
And then the Russian commander begins to rebuild, but how? The right column is ordered to increase speed to 11 knots, while the left one continues to follow, as if nothing had happened, at 9 knots. In other words, the rebuilding is happening very, very slowly, and even if the main forces of the Japanese fleet had appeared after half an hour, or even 40 minutes, he would have seen that the Russians were still marching in two columns, that is, without rebuilding into a marching formation. In other words, the gradual advance of the right column reduced the time required for rebuilding into a battle formation, but until a certain time did not allow an outside observer to understand what this new order would be like. So, for a long time, the "intrigue" - how the Russian commander was going to be reorganized - persisted.
But time passed, and the Japanese main forces were still missing. The right column has practically overtaken the left one, and here the intention of Z. P. Rozhestvensky to line up his troops in a wake was becoming quite obvious. Finally, at 11.05 a.m. new Japanese forces appeared, but these were not the battleships of H. Togo and the armored cruisers of H. Kamimura, but the dogs Chitose, Kasagi, Niitaka and Tsushima.
The trick did not work, the Russian commander was mistaken: the maneuver, which was intended to shorten the rebuilding time, had to be stopped earlier, simply by reducing the speed of the right column to 9 knots, and now it was too late. And - the appearance of "dogs" should have indicated the imminent appearance of the Japanese main forces. Accordingly, there was no longer time to try to return the squadron to the marching formation, and Z. P. Rozhestvensky is left with the only meaningful decision: to line up their ships in a wake column and prepare for battle, hoping for the best.
He does this, however, at 11:15 am, when the squadrons are lining up, an accidental shot from the Eagle provokes a short ten-minute exchange of fire with the Japanese cruisers, as a result of which the latter retreat. However, the Japanese continue to monitor the Russian squadron. At 11.25, the exchange of fire was over, but 15 minutes passed, 20 - and the main forces of Heihachiro Togo were not there, and are not. At this time, it is just the time to turn on the course leading to Vladivostok - to the north. Z. P. Rozhestvensky does so, but there are also Japanese cruisers who continue to track the squadron. Seeing that the Russian column was turning towards them, the scouts retreated and for some time lost sight of our ships.
And here Z. P. Rozhestvensky again attempts to outwit the Japanese. All this time, their cruisers, observing the Russians, were located north of the Russian system, from which we can conclude that the main forces of the Japanese are coming from the north. This was logical, including from the point of view of the locations of the Japanese fleet. The Russian commander expected them to appear at any minute and decided to continue the "shadow boxing".
This time Zinovy Petrovich, obviously, reasoned like this: the "dogs" and the 3rd combat detachment, obviously, will inform H. Togo about the course and formation of the Russian squadron. The Japanese commander, if he is near, will know that the Russian squadron is in the wake formation at NO23. Then, using poor visibility, he can try to deliver "crossing the T" to the lead ships of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. So why not try to surprise Heihachiro Togo and reorganize into the front line?
This is how Zinovy Petrovich himself described it:
“The striving of all Japanese cruising detachments to the north, bypassing the squadron, made one think that their main forces would appear from the north as well. Assuming that the enemy's cruisers report exactly to the fleet commander in detail everything about our system, and that he can decide to start a battle, approaching the front line with our wake column, I considered it useful to rebuild the squadron to the front, taking advantage of the time when the enemy cruisers will be deleted. At about 12.20, when the enemy's light cruisers began to become densely covered, I ordered to raise the signal for the 1st and 2nd battleship detachments to turn sequentially 8 points to the right, assuming then to extend both detachments on a perpendicular course, turn everything suddenly 8 points to the left and force 3 -th detachment to add speed and build a front to the left, as was the practice of the squadron."
In other words, the Russian commander tried to prepare a surprise for the Japanese.
Which, however, failed, because at the time of the execution of the maneuver, the Japanese cruisers appeared again
“With the rise of the signal, the head Suvorov began to turn to the right. He had not yet had time to turn 8 points, when the enemy's light cruisers opened out of the darkness again, but not at an acute angle, but heading to the right, perpendicular to ours."
In other words, another trick of Z. P. Rozhestvensky disappeared in vain - instead of the main forces, he again saw in front of him only Japanese cruisers and further reorganization into the front line lost all meaning. If H. Togo really goes in front formation from the north, and learns in advance that the main forces of the Russians are advancing towards the front, it will not be difficult for him to reorganize into a wake column and attack the flank of the Russian formation, setting up "crossing the T".
And then Z. P. Rozhdestvensky returns to his original plan:
"Not wanting to prematurely show the enemy the formation, I ordered the 2nd detachment to be lifted, and when the first detachment was almost drawn to a perpendicular course, I turned with it successively 8 points to the left."
As a result, the Russian squadron was again divided into 2 columns of armored ships, but now only the 1st armored detachment was in the right column, that is, 4 squadron battleships of the "Prince Suvorov" class.
I must say that this description of the maneuver was compiled from the words of the commander, but there are other opinions. So, the junior flag officer Z. P. Rozhestvensky midshipman Demchinsky described this episode in a different way:
“At about 12.30 the first armored detachment turned 8 points to the right in succession, and then had to turn 8 points to the left suddenly, but during the raising of the signal, an error occurred, and a signal was raised on the front mast about a successive turn. In spite of the fact that a turn signal was suddenly raised on the rear mast and the flag P was on the left knob, Alexander III turned sequentially, thereby knocking down Borodino and Oryol, which suddenly began to turn.
Who is right? The members of the historical commission who made up the "Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905" argue that it was Z. P. Rozhestvensky, based on the fact that in fact on the "rear mast" were raised not the "suddenly" turn signal and the "P" flag, but the callsigns of the 2nd detachment and the "F" signal (canceling), which is confirmed by the logbook " Pearls ". In addition, the testimony of a number of officers of the squadron confirms the words of Zinovy Petrovich. For example, Lieutenant Slavinsky reported:
“12 o'clock. 20 minutes. the signal from Suvorov: "The 1st and 2nd armored detachments have 11 knots to move, turn sequentially 8 points to the right." 5 minutes later from "Suvorov": "2nd armored detachment (F) course NO 23 °". As soon as the 1st armored detachment turned sequentially 8 points to the right, the signal from the Suvorov: "The 1st armored detachment should turn sequentially 8 points to the left." In view of the fact that, realizing the power of our bow fire, the commander assumed that the admiral wanted to build a front line, he did not believe this signal. Then I personally dismantled the flags, looked in the book and reported to the commander that the signal was parsed correctly. In addition to midshipman Shcherbachev, the same signal was analyzed by the senior navigator and the signal foreman, who reported the same thing. There could be no error in parsing the signal."
Interestingly, the version of the commander of the Russian squadron was confirmed even by such an ardent opponent Z. P. Rozhestvensky, as A. S. Novikov-Priboy:
“At the signal of the commander, the first and second armored detachments had to, increasing their speed to eleven knots, turn sequentially to the right by eight points … … "".
Why did the author spend so much time analyzing this maneuver? The fact is that Demchinsky's opinion turned out to be quite widespread. Many who are interested in the history of the fleet sincerely believe that Z. P. Rozhestvensky was really going to build his squadron with the letter "G", where the horizontal stick would be formed by 4 battleships of the "Suvorov" and "Oslyabya" type, and the vertical one - the same "Oslyabya" and the ships of the 2nd and 3rd armored detachments following it. Such a "battle formation", of course, was useless, since both "sticks" of the Russian system would be too weak to withstand the attack of the Japanese fleet. But, as we can see, the Russian commander did not even plan anything of the kind.
“Good,” the dear reader will say: “But if the trick of Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not succeed, and the squadron, due to objective reasons, was divided into 2 columns, why should the commander not immediately correct this misunderstanding, and build the main forces of the squadron back into a single wake formation? The answer to this question is very simple: Zinovy Petrovich was sure that such a squadron formation would give him tactical advantages that would not be found in either the front line or the wake column. Here is how he explained the advantages of such a structure of the Commission of Inquiry:
“… I left the 1st battleship detachment in a separate column, realizing that the formation of the front, if necessary, could be executed quickly, by simultaneously turning the 1st and 2nd detachments sequentially by 8 points to the right, then by turning" all of a sudden "to 8 points to the left and the deployment of the 3rd detachment to the left at the same time. In addition, the presence of 4 faster battleships in a separate column, presenting benefits for building a front, was not an obstacle for the fast transition of the 1st detachment to the head of the left column, if, depending on the formation of the enemy, the squadron needed to be not in the front and into the wake."
In other words, Z. P. Rozhestvensky built up his main forces in a seemingly completely stupid, non-combat formation. But this is only at first glance - in fact, the separation of the 1st armored detachment into a separate column gave the Russians a huge advantage: it practically nullified the tactical advantages of the Japanese, which they had before the outbreak of the battle.
In fact, Kh. Togo, seeing such a formation of the Russian squadron, was faced with a choice: he could either try to deliver "crossing the T" to both columns of Russian battleships, or attack the left or right columns in wake formation, diverging from them on counter courses.
But, moving in two wake columns, Z. P. Rozhestvensky could successfully fend off any of these options, because he could rebuild his forces to the front or wake very quickly. The thing is that to rebuild from an ordinary wake column to the front, at least only the 1st and 2nd armored detachments would have taken Z. P. Rozhestvensky, at a speed of 9 knots, no less than 12 minutes, because the turning point should have been passed by 8 ships stretching for 2 miles. But moving in two parallel columns to rebuild the 1st and 2nd combat detachments to the front turned out to be almost twice as fast, a little more than 5 minutes, since in this case the 1st and 2nd detachments would be deployed simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Perhaps, if the Japanese tried to attack "at full steam", Nebogatov's 3rd detachment would not have had time to turn around, but even in this case, the Japanese would have been met by 8 ships of the 1st and 2nd detachments, as well as approaching the turning point "Emperor Nicholas I".
And the same can be said about rebuilding into a wake column. If, moving in a marching formation, Z. P. Rozhestvensky, in order to reorganize into a wake, had to bring forward the right column of 2 combat detachments, including the relatively low-speed Admiral Nakhimov, Navarin and Sisoy Veliky, but in a new position only a relatively fast-moving four of the Borodino-class battleships.
But nevertheless, the reverse rebuilding into a wake column was associated with certain risks. But, unfortunately, the story about this will have to be postponed until the next article.
