The exit on June 10 was very significant for the 1st Pacific Squadron: its main forces entered the sea in full force, having the task of defeating the Japanese fleet. With the filing of the governor E. I. Alekseeva, squadron commander, Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft, was sure that the Japanese suffered heavy losses on mines and were greatly weakened, which made them easy prey for his ships. However, for Novik, this exit was just another routine trip.
Novik was the first to go to the outer roadstead of Port Arthur on the morning of June 10, but not a cruiser, but a steamer - it had to place training mines with caps along the swept alignment so that they would indicate the route of the other ships of the squadron. The steamer "Novik" moved away from Port Arthur about 6 miles, but then one of the detachments of Japanese destroyers, which were observed on the horizon, began to approach it, and the Russian ships that could cover "Novik" had not yet left the inner harbor. so the steamer eventually came back.
The cruiser "Novik" entered the outer roadstead second (and the first of the warships) at 04.30 in the morning and proceeded to determine the deviation, which he did until 05.15 - this was an important matter, since the "Novik" had to go ahead of the squadron, and on its other ships it was impossible to vouch for the accuracy of the compass readings. By 08.00, all the ships of the squadron, which were supposed to lead into battle, entered the roadstead, only the Pallada was delayed, since it had a malfunction of the steering gear and still managed to hook the telephone cable with an anchor - as a result, she was able to join other ships only at 10.50. But even before the Retvizan left the inner pool, the mine quartermaster Akim Gurko arrived on the Tsarevich, reporting that Diana, Askold and Novik had stood exactly on the mine bank that the Japanese destroyers had left overnight June 9-10. By order of the admiral, the outer raid was raided again, along the ships anchored on it - about 10 mines were found, of which 4 were not far from the "Tsarevich", and one - 60 fathoms from the "Diana".
Finally, at 14.00, at the signal of the flagship, they began to de-anchor. The first was a trawl caravan - three pairs of dredgers, followed by the steamers Novik and Yingkou - with trawls. They were followed by two pairs of destroyers of the 2nd detachment - and also with trawls, and the mine cruisers "Horseman" and "Gaydamak" were moving along the sides of the trawling caravan. Behind the trawl caravan was its direct cover - 7 destroyers of the 1st detachment. They were followed by "Novik", "Askold", and, for some reason, "Diana", then - battleships, and the rear of the column "Bayan" and "Pallada".
At this time, in the line of sight of the Russian squadron were "Chin-Yen", the cruiser "Matsushima", as well as "about 12 destroyers": (1st, 4th squadrons of fighters and 14 squadrons of destroyers) the latter went forward in order to prevent the Russian trawl caravan from doing its job. Then 7 destroyers of the 1st detachment advanced to meet them, bypassing the trawl caravan. The battle between them began at 14.10 with a distance of 30 cables, which quickly decreased to 25, fighters from the 4th detachment and destroyers of the 14th took part in it from the Japanese side, while they were supported by Matsushima fire. It must be said that the Japanese in the official historiography confirm the battle of destroyers, but do not say anything about the fact that they were supported by friendly cruisers with fire. However, this combat encounter is described so briefly that support could simply not be mentioned, due to its insignificance: the Japanese do not claim any success in this battle. At the same time, Russian official history contains a description of a strong explosion under the Vlastny destroyer, which caused a knock in the left propeller, and the destroyer had to stop the car, however, temporarily, and in the future it could develop 18 knots. However, it later turned out that the rotor blade of the destroyer was bent and a key popped out - it is doubtful that a 75-mm shell from a Japanese destroyer could cause such an effect, so most likely there was still fire assistance from the Japanese cruiser.
Realizing that the torpedo boats of the 1st detachment were in a bad situation, at 14.20 Novik increased its speed, bypassed the trawling caravan on the left and opened fire on the enemy destroyers, forcing the latter to retreat to the Chin-Yen. After 10 minutes, from a distance of 50 cables, the Novik was supported by the Diana's cannons, and the Japanese destroyers were forced to retreat, and at 14.45 the shooting stopped. At the same time, "Novik" did not return to its place, but continued to move to the left of the trawl caravan, and soon two armored and four armored cruisers of the Japanese were discovered from it. Then, at 4.40 pm "Novik" gave the admiral's order to the ships of the trawling caravan: to return to Port Arthur. At 16.50 the squadron rebuilt - now 6 battleships headed by the flagship "Tsesarevich" were in front, and cruisers followed them, with the "Novik" being the rear, and the mine cruisers and destroyers went on the right traverse of the squadron.
As you know, V. K. Witgeft led his squadron at sea - he intended to conduct reconnaissance at Ellio and give battle to the weakest Japanese forces, if any were found there. However, the information of the governor about the losses of the United Fleet turned out to be excessively exaggerated, and at the beginning of the sixth hour the Russian commander saw the main forces of the Japanese. VC. Whitgeft attempted to gain an advantageous position for battle until the Japanese forces were determined and appeared to be smaller than they actually were, but his ships lacked speed. Then it turned out that the Japanese are much stronger than expected. All this prompted V. K. Vitgefta to the decision to retreat, which he did: at 18.50 the squadron turned 16 points (180 degrees) and went to the raid. At 19.15 the cruisers were ordered to move to the right flank of the squadron.
It was getting dark, and the Japanese commander sent destroyers to attack. At 20.27 a detachment of Japanese ships of this class tried to attack the Pallada, but was driven off by fire. Then, at 20.45, the destroyers were discovered by Novik and the small cruiser opened fire on them - as a result, the enemy detachment turned away, before reaching 30 cables to the Russian ships. At 21.40 on "Novik" they heard a shout from "Poltava": "Man overboard!" and carried out an exemplary rescue operation. The sailor who fell into the sea was discovered with the help of the cruiser's searchlight, then the boat was lowered, which returned him to the Poltava.
At 22.30 "Novik" anchored between "Tsarevich" and "Askold" and several times during the night opened fire on Japanese destroyers. Only 10 and on the night of June 11, the cruiser used 3 segment and 109 high-explosive 120-mm shells, as well as 6 * 47-mm "steel grenades" and 400 rifle cartridges - the latter were used to shoot the surface mines. Apparently, the Novik's artillerymen did not hit anyone, but the cruiser itself was not damaged, although its decks were showered with shrapnel, and one of the crew members, the mine quartermaster Pereskokov, was shell-shocked by one of them. In addition, during these events, "Novik" saved three people - we already wrote about the sailor from the "Poltava", but when the "Sevastopol" was blown up by a mine during anchoring, some on the battleship succumbed to panic - two sailors board, were caught by "Novik".
The next day, June 11, Novik was the last to enter the internal roadstead - it happened at 14.00.
The next cruiser exit took place a day later, on June 13: I must say, the author of this article does not leave the feeling that on this day the Russian Imperial Navy could have won a noticeable victory if V. K. Vitgeft acted more decisively.
The fact is that on this day the left wing of the Japanese 3rd Army was to conduct an offensive in order to capture the heights they needed. For this, the army asked for help from the fleet, and this assistance was, of course, provided, but how?
The main forces of H. Togo remained at the "flying" base at about. Elliot, from where they, of course, could not come to Port Arthur at once. The cruisers Asama, Itsukushima, two auxiliary gunboats of an unknown type, as well as the 2nd fighter squadron, the 6th, 10th and 21st destroyer detachments were assigned to shell the coast. In addition, the 6th Combat Detachment (Izumi, Suma, Akitsushima, Chiyoda), the 4th and 5th Fighter Squadrons were engaged in reconnaissance and patrolling near Port Arthur. As far as can be understood from the Japanese official historiography, Port Arthur had no other Japanese ships on June 13.
It is difficult to say what the Japanese were guided by, highlighting such an outfit of forces: most likely, the feeling of complete impunity with which their naval forces operated near Port Arthur played a role. However, even in this case, questions remain to the detachment for shelling the coast: the fact is that numbered Japanese destroyers were included in it.
The 10th detachment was equipped with the most modern ships - it included 4 destroyers No. 40-43 with a displacement of up to 110 tons, armed with 2 * 47-mm cannons and 3 * 356-mm torpedo tubes, their maximum speed was 26 knots. For the 21st detachment, things were worse - destroyers No. 44; 47; 48; 49 had a displacement of 89 tons, armament 1 * 47-mm, 3 * 356-mm torpedo tubes and a speed of 24 knots. And the dispatch of the 6th detachment, which consisted of destroyers No. 56-49, ships with a displacement of 52 tons, armament of 1 * 47-mm, 2 * 356-mm torpedo tubes and a speed of 20 knots, looks quite strange!
There could be practically no benefit from 47-mm fluffs when shelling the coast. But the above maximum speed of the destroyers could hardly have been achieved by them in combat conditions - apparently, the ships of the 6th detachment and, most likely, the 21st could not get away from the Bayan, Askold and Novik in if the latter would undertake to pursue them. The same applies to two unidentified Japanese gunboats - the Japanese do not mention their names, and from Russian ships they were generally mistaken for steamships (which, by the way, they could well be, the Japanese could simply re-equip civilian ships) but it is extremely doubtful that they developed speed over 10-13 knots, which was typical for small Japanese ships of this class.
In other words, part of the Japanese forces, due to their low speed, could not have escaped from the Russian high-speed ships, and only one armored cruiser Asama could cover their withdrawal. The sixth combat detachment, when meeting with Russian high-speed cruisers, should have escaped without looking back, hoping that the Chiyoda cars would survive this race. As we said earlier, formally, the full stroke of the Chiyoda was 19 knots, but this was when the mechanisms were forced, while the Bayan could easily go on a natural thrust of 20 knots. But in fact, in the battle with the Varyag, the old Japanese cruiser could not hold even 15 knots for any length of time: until 12.18 she followed the Asama, but then had to slow down to 4-7 knots and left the battle. Of course, if "Asama" and "Itsukushima" joined the 6th Japanese combat detachment, then together they would be stronger than the Russian squad of cruisers, but who prevented the Russian commander from bringing the heavier ships to sea?
If V. K. Vitgeft, having received information about the activity of the Japanese, risked to withdraw a detachment of sufficient strength to the sea and then acted decisively, then the Japanese found themselves in a very unpleasant situation: they could neither give a battle with chances of success, nor evade the battle. In fact, they only had to run with those ships that had enough speed for that, leaving the rest to "be devoured" by the 1st Pacific squadron. But in order to implement such an option, it was necessary to put into the sea, in addition to a detachment of cruisers and all combat-ready destroyers, "Peresvet" or "Pobeda", or better - both of these ships at once.
In fact, the risk of such an exit was minimal - the "scene" was not far from Port Arthur, the indicated "battleships-cruisers" were noticeably faster than squadron battleships of the "Sevastopol" class and, although they were inferior in speed to the Japanese battleships, they could still keep a constant stroke of at least 15 knots. This was quite enough to have time to retreat to Port Arthur even if our detachment had found the main forces of H. Victory "did not retreat under the cover of coastal batteries, and the Japanese did not like to meddle there. In addition, it would be possible to bring other battleships of the squadron to the outer raid, even without using them directly, but only as a cover just in case.
Alas, to expect the same from V. K. Vitgeft was completely impossible. It is interesting that in this case one cannot even refer to the governor E. I. Alekseeva: the fact is that the latter's courage and determination grew in direct proportion to the distance separating him from Port Arthur. That is, the further this statesman was from Port Arthur (and from responsibility, in the event of the defeat of the 1st Pacific Squadron), the more he advocated active actions: at some point in time, for example, he strongly recommended V. K. Witgefta undertake a raid with the Peresvet and destroyers to the Elliot Islands. In essence, E. I. Alekseev gave V. K. Witgeft had very contradictory instructions - on the one hand, “to take care and not to risk,” that is, his instructions directly indicated the need to preserve the forces of the squadron for a decisive battle, without wasting them. On the other hand, E. I. Alekseev demanded from V. K. Vitgefta decisive action: it is obvious that in such a position, the governor was "covered" from all sides. If V. K. Vitgeft will not heed the demands of the governor to wage an active naval war, because it is V. K. Vitgeft, and not the governor, and if Wilhelm Karlovich would still have risked, but suffered significant losses, then the governor, again, would not have been to blame - he also ordered V. K. Witgeft not risk in vain!
In the current situation, everything depended only on the personality of the commander - there is no doubt that if in the place of Wilhelm Karlovich there were a man of the warehouse S. O. Makarov, the 1st Pacific Ocean would have been much more active. But V. K. Vitgeft did not feel like a naval commander, did not see the strength to lead the fleet to victory. This is all the more offensive because as an admiral he was not bad at all, and he proved it in the battle on July 28 at Shantung, with a few simple but effective maneuvers neutralizing the "dances" of Heihachiro Togo in the first phase of the battle.
In general, in a situation where V. K. Witgeft should have attacked and tried to destroy the enemy forces operating from the sea on the flank of our position, he could only decide to drive off the Japanese ships and shell the advancing enemy ground forces. And, strange as it may sound, he did not dare to allocate enough forces even for such a limited-purpose operation.
Our ground forces, represented by Lieutenant Colonel Kilenkin, asked for support on June 13 at 08.35, but as early as 07.30 Novik and gunboats Bobr and Otvazhny received an order to breed pairs. The gunboats were the first to leave, which went directly behind the trawling caravan, followed by the Novik, which left the inner raid at 09.20, and 14 destroyers of both detachments followed it. This, in fact, was all - one small cruiser that could fight on an equal footing only with the weakest Japanese ships of the same class, gunboats and destroyers. No, V. K. Witgeft provided long-range cover as well, but what kind? To support the detachment, he brought the armored cruisers "Diana" and "Pallada" to the outer raid - I suppose it is needless to say that of all the Port Arthurian cruisers, these two "goddesses", which had a grand entrance of 17, 5-18 knots, were the least suitable for in order to quickly provide support to ships in need. Moreover, it is no less obvious that the firepower of these cruisers was categorically insufficient to defeat the enemy. By June 13, it was already quite obvious that the Japanese cruisers preferred to operate in detachments of 4 ships. Even having teamed up with Novik, Pallada and Diana would have had 10 * 152-mm and 4 * 120-mm guns in an onboard salvo, and even the Japanese 6th Combat Detachment, with its frankly weak Izumi, “Suma "," Akashi "and" Chiyoda "had 6 * 152-mm and 15 * 120-mm guns. And if suddenly there were "dogs"? Of course, the large size of the "goddesses" would have played a role, it is not so easy for the "six-thousanders" to inflict critical damage with 120-152-mm guns, and, in any case, these two cruisers, suffering damage from superior forces, could ensure the return " Novik”and destroyers (there is less confidence about gunboats). But what is the point of “asking for it” and accepting a battle in an unfavorable balance of forces, when there are 6 squadron battleships and 2 high-speed cruisers just a stone's throw away, on the inner roadstead?
Not only were Pallada and Diana not suitable for cover in terms of their performance characteristics, but they were also greatly delayed in leaving. As we have already said, the Novik left at 09.20 and had to catch up with the gunboats. But “Pallada” entered the outer roadstead only at 11.50, and “Diana” - generally at 14.00! And this despite the fact that the Japanese cruisers were discovered almost immediately after entering the outer raid - "Chiyoda" and "Itsukushima" were spotted between 09.20 and 09.40.
And so it turned out that having an overwhelming superiority in forces - 6 battleships, an armored cruiser and 4 armored decks against two armored Japanese cruisers (if we count as such "Chiyoda", which had a small armor belt along the waterline) and four armored decks, the Russians used only a small part forces available to them. As a result, Novik, gunboats and destroyers had to operate in conditions of Japanese superiority, which necessitated a certain amount of caution.
At 09.40 Novik discovered Japanese ships, which he identified as 2 steamers and 16 destroyers - most likely, these were the 4th and 5th squadrons of fighters and the 6th squadron of destroyers. "Novik" immediately opened fire on them from a distance of 40 cables, and after 5 minutes it was supported by the gunboat "Otvazhny", firing 4 * 152-mm shells at the enemy ships. The 5th detachment was the first to come under fire, but the Russian volleys fell short, and the fighters retreated without losses or damage. At this, the firefight was interrupted. At 11.00 the trawl caravan was released to Port Arthur, and an hour later the Russian ships dropped anchor in Tahe Bay - the fact is that the order of V. K. Vitgefta did not go further than Tahe.
For an hour and twenty minutes the detachment stood, doing nothing. Then VK himself arrived on the Vigilant destroyer. Vitgeft, after which the Russian ships at 13.40 weighed anchor and followed him. At this time on the horizon was clearly visible "Itsukushima", a two-pipe steamer and destroyers. The latter decided to approach in order to lure the Russian destroyers into the sea: they were sent from Novik as 8 large and 4 small ones, but, most likely, there was a mistake. Most likely, there really were 12 destroyers, but only the 4th fighter squadron and the 6th destroyer squadron, that is, 4 large and 4 small destroyers, went to Tahe Bay, from where the Russians were leaving. VC. Vitgeft ordered to fire at the Japanese ground positions, so at 13:45 the detachment opened fire, while the Novik fired at the coast and at the Japanese destroyers at the same time, and the gunboats - only along the coast. There were no hits on the Japanese ships, but the fire of the Russian cruiser forced them to retreat.
Russian ships fired at the Japanese ground forces…. Here, alas, the data of the documents differ greatly. According to the report of the Novik commander, the fire was stopped at 14.00, that is, they fired for only 15 minutes, but the official history reports that they fired until 14.45, and the commander of the Otvazhny gunboat said in his report that he had finished the fire at 15.00! Comparing the data of the reports, one can assume a banal slip of the tongue in the report of M. F. von Schultz, the commander of Novik, or perhaps this is a misprint of the compositor of a collection of documents. Most likely it was that they did shoot until three o'clock, and that the rear admiral ordered a ceasefire at about 14.45, and Novik (where the order was transmitted, most likely, by a semaphore) carried out his first, and the gunboats - already closer to 15.00, when on "Novik" they dialed and raised the signal with the admiral's order.
During the shelling on the Russian ships, the "main forces" of the Japanese were noticed, which they identified as "Asama", "Itsukushima", "Chiyoda" (which was correct), and two cruisers of the "Takasago" class - the latter was a mistake, these were previously mentioned by us cruisers of the 6th combat detachment. The timing of the discovery of the Japanese is also unclear: M. F. von Schultz reports that the enemy was noticed after the shelling, when the detachment was returning to Tahe Bay. But the commander of the "Brave" claims that he saw the Japanese cruisers at about 14.15, that is, long before the firing stopped. The only thing that, perhaps, can be said for sure is that the cessation of the shelling has nothing to do with the appearance of superior Japanese forces - this follows from subsequent events.
Most likely, V. K. Vitgeft suggested that the shelling of the Japanese ground positions reached its goal - but, at the same time, he did not lead his detachment back to Port Arthur, but ordered them to return to Tahe Bay, where the Russian ships moved at about 15.00. But after 20 minutes V. K. Vitgeft ordered to return and resume shelling: it was reported from the shore to Vlastny that the Japanese had launched a new attack. At 15.40, the Russian ships opened fire again, and the Novik, as on the previous time, fired at ground targets and at the Japanese destroyers held nearby at the same time. However, already at 15.50 on "Novik" they saw the approach of 4 large warships of the enemy - from the Japanese official historiography we now know that these were cruisers of the 6th combat detachment.
To fight with them with the available forces of V. K. Vitgeft, of course, could not, and was forced to retreat. At 16.00, the ships ceased fire and returned to Tahe Bay, from where they immediately went to Port Arthur, leaving only 4 destroyers on duty. The Novik arrived in Port Arthur without incident, and at 17.30 entered the inner harbor. In total, on June 13, the cruiser consumed 137 * 120-mm and 1 * 47-mm projectiles.
What conclusions can be drawn from this combat episode? As we said earlier, due to the excessive caution of V. K. Vitgefta 1st Pacific Squadron missed the opportunity to sink several Japanese ships, albeit small ones. But in no case can we blame Wilhelm Karlovich for the lack of personal courage. Everyone admires S. O. Makarov, who rushed to the rescue of "Guarding" on the small cruiser "Novik", but in this episode, V. K. Vitgeft took direct control of the detachment in the face of superior enemy forces, raising his flag on a destroyer! Without a doubt, the squadron commander was a brave man, but … as has been said many times, the courage of a soldier and the courage of a commander are two different things. The first V. K. Vitgeft was fully endowed, but with the second … alas, there were problems.
Of course, the exit of the Russian detachment thwarted the artillery support of the advancing Japanese troops, and the ships carrying it were driven off. Moreover, the Russian ships opened fire exactly when our ground units especially needed it - from 13.00 the Japanese stormed the key elevation of the position, Mount Huinsan, and the shelling, which lasted from 13.45 to 15.00, was very useful. But alas, the effectiveness of the Russian naval artillery was insufficient - at 15.30 the mountain was still occupied by Japanese troops.
Again, it is difficult to blame V. K. Vitgeft: the strength of three Russian gunboats, destroyers and "Novik" was not enough, of course, to defeat the Japanese naval forces, but for a successful shelling of the coast, according to the then views, it was quite enough. In other words, failure here is more likely to be justified by the scanty experience of the fleet's operation against the coast, and not by the miscalculation of the command. But it is noteworthy that the Japanese took the mountain half an hour after the Russians ceased fire - who knows if V. K. Vitgeft would have gone out to sea "in the heavy forces" and continued shelling without returning to Tahe, perhaps the Japanese would not have captured this hill.
The next day, "Novik" again went out to sea to Tahe Bay and Luwantan, but this time there was nothing interesting - A. M. Stoessel had already sent a telegram to V. K. Vitgeftu asking for a second shelling. Accordingly, on June 14 at 06.30 Novik, three gunboats and four destroyers, having entered the outer raid, again went into position, but at 07.40 A. M. Stoessel said that he no longer needed the help of the fleet, but he asked to leave the ships in Tahe Bay "until the situation was clarified". So they did, and the detachment joined up with 4 Russian destroyers left on patrol the previous day.
The weather was very bad, visibility was minimal, but later it cleared up and from 4:40 pm to 5:50 pm gunboats fired at the Japanese positions. We saw Japanese destroyers and cruisers, but it did not come to a skirmish and, having completed their work, the detachment returned to Port Arthur. This time "Novik" did not open fire.
The next exits of "Novik" took place on June 20, 21 and 22, the cruiser left for three days in a row, during the so-called battles for the Green Mountains, which began with the fact that General R. I. Kondratenko, on his own initiative, counterattacked the Japanese positions, which forced General Fock to send troops to storm the previously captured Huinsan Mountain. As a result, fierce battles unfolded on the land front, and R. I. Kondratenko, noticing the appearance of Japanese destroyers, asked for support from the fleet.
On June 20, at 10 o'clock, a detachment consisting of "Novik", three gunboats and 12 destroyers left, an hour later they dropped anchor in Tahe Bay. This time they were covered by the entire squadron of cruisers, not just Diana and Pallas. "Novik" with two shots drove away the destroyers circling nearby, with which, in the opinion of M. F. von Schultz, there were two gunboats, but that was the end of it. Despite the fact that the ground forces sent their representative, Lieutenant Solovyov, and the detachment reached Luvantan at 12.30, there were already Russian positions everywhere, so the shelling did not take place. The detachment returned to Port Arthur at 18.40.
On June 21, everything repeated - at 10.20 am “Novik” entered the outer roadstead, from where, accompanied by three gunboats and 8 destroyers, went to Tahe Bay. Again, a representative of the ground forces arrived, and at 16.00 Novik and the gunboats Thundering and Brave opened fire at altitude 150, while the cruiser was carrying out a rocker fire, and the gunboats moving forward were aimed. However, the fire was quickly “crushed”, because its ineffectiveness became clear - even the presence of a ground spotter officer, alas, did not improve the situation. Despite the fact that the Novik this time used up only 5 * 120-mm shells, and the gunboats, apparently, a little more, several ship shells, as it later turned out, fell into the disposition of the Russian troops. Alas, at that time, the fleet still did not know how to properly interact with the coast: however, at least the Russian ships, regularly going out to Tahe Bay, prevented the Japanese from supporting their coastal flank with fire.
The most interesting events unfolded on June 22. At 0500, Novik, four gunboats and eight destroyers again went to Tahe Bay in order to fire at Hill 150 again, and this time they were covered from the outer roadstead by all the other Port Arthur cruisers. At 06.50, on the way to Tahe, "Novik" discovered 4 enemy destroyers and drove them away with artillery fire. The detachment went to Luwantan, and "Novik" opened switch fire at "altitude 150", since aimed shooting was impossible because of the fog. Then it cleared up, and the Novik gunners saw a stone dugout at the top, as well as the movement of the Japanese. Now 120-mm guns could shoot aimingly, the accuracy, of course, increased and the movement at "altitude 150" ceased. Having fired at the dugout, "Novik" also tried to suppress the battery, which, according to intelligence, was located there by the Japanese, and since the latter was supposed to be behind the parapet at the very top, they used segmental shells, setting the tubes for a 12-second delay in order to cover the Japanese cannon shrapnel on top. Then the cruiser shifted fire to other heights, where Japanese troops were seen from the cruiser. Zeroing at them was carried out with high-explosive shells, when shooting to kill, they switched to segment ones.
The cannon boats also took part in the shelling, and on the Beaver, first the 229-mm gun and then the 152-mm gun went out of action, which is why the ship was sent back to Port Arthur. Japanese destroyers were visible, but they did not approach the Russian ships closer than 5-6 miles.
By 09.00 Novik had already fired 274 shells, the detachment finished the shelling and left for Tahe Bay in order to again support our troops with fire if necessary. Such a need soon arose - R. I. Kondratenko again asked to fire at "height 150" and "height 80", and at 14:25 the shelling resumed. However, now only gunboats were "working" along the coast, and "Novik" and destroyers covered them from the nearby Japanese ships - destroyers and gunboats, however, the latter were not looking for a battle. However, at 15.30 on the horizon appeared 2 larger Japanese ships, which turned out to be "Chin-Yen" and "Matsushima", which went to a rapprochement with the Russian detachment. Soon the distance to "Chin-Yen" was reduced to 7 miles, then the "Novik" raised the signal to return to Port Arthur. The Japanese continued to converge, and when at 16.05 the distance was reduced to 65 cables, "Chin-Yen" opened fire on "Novik" from 305-mm guns. The shells fell undershot, and falls closer than 2 cables on the Novik were not recorded. At 16.30 the detachment returned to the outer raid.
On this day, "Novik" used 184 high-explosive and 91 segment 120-mm shells, as well as 10 * 47-mm "steel grenades". And, as we said earlier, one can only regret the indecision of V. K. Vitgeft, who did not dare to bring heavy ships to the outer raid - as a result, the Russian detachment, performing an important task of supporting the ground forces, drove the ancient Japanese (more precisely, the requisitioned Chinese) battleship.
If the same "Peresvet" and "Pobeda" were assigned to the long-range cover of "Novik" in addition to the detachment of cruisers, and they were allowed to act decisively, then, with a high degree of probability, the battleship "Chin-Yen" would have been lost on June 22, and a fair amount of his insolence.
