We ended the last article with the fact that Novik, passing bypassing Japan, arrived at the Korsakov post, where it immediately began loading coal. And what were the Japanese doing at that time?
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear when and by whom exactly Novik was discovered. As can be understood from the official historiography of both sides, the news about the Russian cruiser was received when the Novik bypassed Honshu (the descriptions indicate the old name of Honshu Island - Nippon) from the east. At this time, Vice Admiral H. Kamimura was in the Korea Strait with his cruisers, so it is not surprising that the Chief of General Staff, Admiral Ito, instructed him to intercept the Novik. H. Kamimura received an order to dispatch two high-speed cruisers to the Sangar Strait and, of course, carried out the order, sending two ships from the 4th combat detachment. Unfortunately, it is not known exactly which cruisers were sent, since the indicated detachment included Naniwa, Takachiho, Akashi and Niitaka, and only two of them went to intercept. However, then H. Kamimura received an order from Heihachiro Togo to send the cruisers Tsushima and Chitose for the Novik, which was done. The previously dispatched cruisers were recalled.
By this time "Tsushima" was closer to the Sangar Strait than "Chitose", as it went from Ozaki Bay (Tsushima) to Sasebo, while "Chitose" was just approaching Ozaki from the opposite side, from about. Ross. The commander of the Tsushima, Sento Takeo (he should have known what is the name and what is the surname) was afraid to miss the Russian cruiser, and therefore immediately, without waiting for the Chitose, went to Hakodate. While the latter, having come to Ozaki Bay, spent the night to replenish supplies of coal and water, and only then went there, so that both Japanese cruisers arrived in Hakodate with a time difference of just less than a day.
Having received a message that the Russian cruiser was somewhere nearby, on August 5, Tsushima went to sea, and at midnight, the Chitose followed it: at dawn on August 6, both ships met at the island, which in the Russian translation is "Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 years. Meiji is called Oshima. On modern maps, the island with this name is located in the other direction, not far from Okinawa, but on the diagram given by the respected A. Yu. Emelin in his monograph dedicated to the cruiser "Novik", we see the above island near Hokkaido.
At about 16.00, the Japanese cruisers received a message that the Novik passed the Kunashir Strait on the morning of August 6, moving northwest. From this it obviously followed that the Russian ship would try to go around Japan, passing the La Perouse Strait, that is, between Hokkaido and Sakhalin. The Japanese cruisers immediately took all necessary measures to intercept him there.
"Chitose" went straight to the La Perouse Strait, and began patrolling, and then, in the evening, when "Tsushima" joined it, sent the latter to survey Korsakovsk Aniva Bay, on the shore of which it was located. This decision turned out to be absolutely correct: on August 7, at 4 pm, being 10 miles south of Cape Endum (that is, about 14 miles from Korsakovsk), he discovered smoke that could only belong to a fairly large ship … This was the Novik …
The Russian cruiser understood the danger of going through the Kunashir Strait, since they knew that a Japanese observation station was located on one of the islands of the Kuril ridge, which had a connection with Japan. But there was no way out - no other route was possible due to the lack of coal and its high consumption resulting from the neglected state of the machines. The Novik arrived at the Korsakov post at 07.00 am on August 7 and immediately began loading coal.
However, by immediate loading it should not at all be understood that the coal was started to be loaded onto the ship at the same time, at 07.00. There was no coal prepared for loading, so it had to be first delivered by carts to the pier, then unloaded onto barges, and only then onto a cruiser. I must say that the mood on the cruiser changed dramatically for the better, as evidenced by the memoirs of Lieutenant A. P. Stehr:
“I cannot describe vividly enough the joyful feeling that gripped me when I went ashore; after a 10-day tedious passage, find myself on the shore, on my own, Russian, shore with the consciousness that most of the task has already been completed, with the hope that in a few hours we will be on the way to Vladivostok without fear of being locked up, all this filled me with what something childish delight. The luxurious nature of southern Sakhalin contributed even more to this mood; the team must have felt the same feeling, because everyone energetically and cheerfully got down to the dirty work of loading coal."
Actually, they began to load it on the cruiser at 09.30, but at 14.30 the "wireless telegraph" began to accept negotiations from Japanese warships, and it became clear that a battle could not be avoided. By this time, almost all the coal had been loaded, there were only two barges left to load: at 15.15 the loading was completed and the pairs began to breed, and at 16.00 Novik weighed anchor with 7 boilers under steam. As far as can be understood from the descriptions of the battle, 3 more boilers were introduced before the start of the battle, and in the other 2 the pipes burst earlier and it was impossible to operate them: so, presumably, Novik went into its last battle with 10 boilers under steam out of 12.
What was the reason for such a delay, because the cruiser went to sea only 1.5 hours after the radiotelegraph operators noticed the Japanese negotiations? First, the crew had to be returned to the ship, part of which, including Lieutenant A. P. Shtera, was on the shore, busy with the coal supply. Secondly, and this, most likely, played a key role, the loading of coal should have been completed. The fact is that the commander of the cruiser M. F. von Schultz had the following plan: he was going to go east of the La Perouse Strait in order to confuse the Japanese about his intentions. And only after it gets dark, turn back, and try to pass the indicated strait at night, in order to continue to Vladivostok. It is clear that there were almost no chances for the success of this venture, and “Novik” would probably have to take the battle even before dark. Aniva Bay, if you look at the map, most of all resembles an inverted glass, and Korsakovsk is located at its very bottom, so it was almost impossible to get out of it, avoiding meeting with Japanese ships. At the same time, the Novik no longer had an advantage in speed, and in terms of artillery power it was inferior to almost any Japanese cruiser.
But, whether the battle took place, or by some miracle the cruiser would manage to avoid fire contact, it was obvious that in the evening and at night on August 7, Novik would have to go at a great pace. Coal consumption would be appropriate, and yet it was still necessary to go to Vladivostok, and the available reserves should have been enough for all this, since it would have been impossible to return for re-loading to the Korsakov post. M. F. von Steer was forced to take into account the fact that even approaching Vladivostok, he could not ask for help and towing: as we remember, the capabilities of the radio telegraph on the cruiser were extremely limited.
Thus, the cruiser needed as much coal as possible, and it made sense to stay a little longer to replenish its supplies as much as possible.
Unfortunately, M. F. von Schulz was not successful. Having weaned and leaving the raid, the cruiser, as planned, turned to the east, but at that time Tsushima, having given full speed, was already going across the Novik. The speed of the latter, according to the logbook, was 20-22 knots. (probably still 20 knots, author's note), that is, M. F. von Schultz tried to squeeze the maximum out of the remaining 10 boilers of his ship.
As soon as the Tsushima commander was convinced that Novik had been found, he ordered to send a radiogram on the Chitose: "I see the enemy and attack him." This was done, and at 5.15 pm the guns began to speak. At the same time, the Novik commander claims in his report that the first shot was fired from his cruiser, but Lieutenant A. P. Stehr and the Japanese believe that the battle was still started by Tsushima. The distance between the opponents at that moment was 40 cables, and when it was reduced to 35 cables, "Tsushima" lay on a course parallel to "Novik". The visibility was excellent: A. P. Stehr notes that on the Japanese cruiser, the superstructures were clearly visible with the naked eye, and people could also be seen through binoculars.
The Japanese very quickly took aim, therefore M. F von Schultz "began to describe a number of different-arc coordonates", that is, he turned left and right, so that soon he would again lie on the same course, parallel to the Japanese cruiser, keeping 35- 40 cables. Nevertheless, already at 17.20 the cruiser received a hole in the steering compartment.
It must be said that the description of the number and sequence of hits in "Novik" is still a problem, because the available descriptions (memoirs of A. P. Shter, the logbook he cited, the report of M. F. von Schultz) are very contradictory. Even the number of hits is unclear: for example, historians usually indicate that the ship received three underwater holes, two of which fell into the area of the steering compartment, and one more - under the senior officer's cabin, as well as "about 10 hits" in the hull and superstructures of the cruiser, which were above the water. Thus, the total number of hits seems to be about 13, but, according to the "Novik" logbook, there are about 14 of them, and in some publications it is generally indicated that "Novik" received "about 10 hits", including underwater holes … The Japanese damage schemes for Novik are of little help, but we will return to them later.
The reconstruction offered to your attention does not pretend to be an absolute truth, and is just an attempt to somehow "reconcile" the contradictions of the descriptions known to the author of this article.
So, as we have already said, the cruiser received the first hit at 17.20, only 5 minutes after the start of the battle: most likely, it was this hit that caused the most serious damage to the ship. The fact is that the projectile hit the joint between the side and the armored deck, and, although it did not cause rapid flooding, according to M. F. von Schultz, caused "a number of cracks radiating from the site of the lesion," which could not be repaired.
Then, in the interval 17.20-17.30 Novik was hit in the hull: in the area of the living deck and the wardroom.
At 17.30, one shell completely destroyed the aft bridge, and the other - the commander's and navigator's cabin, it also caused a fire in the box with maps, which, in general, was quickly extinguished (in 5 minutes). "Novik" slowed down, but the reason for this was not combat damage, but the rupture of pipes in two cauldrons - now only 8 of 12 remained.
At about the same time, another shell hit the stern of the ship, which killed the gunner of the 120-mm cannon Anikeev, ripping it almost in half, and seriously wounded two more. The place of the deceased was taken by the gunner of the 120-mm non-firing side, who "spreading his legs over his corpse, calmly sent one shell after another, trying to avenge the death of his comrade."
In the interval 17.30-17.35, another shell hit the cruiser stern, which led to the main losses in the crew. Lieutenant A. P. Stöhr described it as follows:
“There was a terrible explosion behind me; at that very second I felt a blow to the head and a severe pain in my side, my breath caught and the first impression was that a piece of my side had been torn out, so I began to look around, where it would be more convenient to fall; after some time my breathing returned, and only then did I notice that I was wounded in the head, and my side was only shell-shocked; the dead lay around me and the wounded groaned; the drummer next to him, holding his head, reported in a deplorable voice: "Your Excellency, your brains are out." This even made me laugh: I would hardly have been able to stand if my brains had gone up; just in case, he felt it with his hand; I really fell into something warm and soft, it must have been a blood clot, but since I did not feel any particular pain, I pulled my head with a handkerchief and began to pick up the wounded. This shell immediately grabbed ten people."
At 17.35 the next round made a second hole in the steering compartment, now it quickly filled with water, and the cruiser landed 2, 5–3 feet aft (75–90 cm). At about the same time, another shell hit the area of the biscuit department. But the most unpleasant were the messages received at that time: from the steering compartment they reported that it was quickly drowning with water and the steering gear was about to fail, and the mechanic reported broken pipes in two more boilers. Now the cruiser had only 6 of 12 boilers under steam, its speed dropped dramatically.
At 17.40, the water that continued to flow into the hull flooded the officers' cabins and came close to the cartridge cellar. At the same time, another underwater hole was received, apparently, we are talking about damage to the side in the area of the senior officer's cabin.
At 17.50 Novik continued to land astern, and the trim had already reached 1.8 m - there was nothing to do but turn back to Korsakovsk. Tsushima also turned in pursuit of the Russian cruiser.
At 17.55 Novik received, apparently, the last hit in this battle - the shell hit the hull above the waterline in the area of the senior officer's cabin: thus, we have listed 11 hits on the Russian cruiser, but there may have been others. And at the same time, according to the observations of our sailors, "Tsushima" stopped.
According to the Japanese description, the Russian projectile hit the cruiser under the waterline, and although the time is not specified exactly, this happened after the Novik turned back to the Korsakov post. Accordingly, we can assume that this happened somewhere between 17.50 and 17.55, when the Novik saw that the enemy cruiser stopped. "Tsushima" received serious flooding and a strong list, and was forced to retreat and withdraw from the battle, pumping out the abundant water. The cruisers dispersed, continuing, however, to fire at each other, apparently - to no avail. At 18.05 on the "Novik" the steering was completely out of order, and after another 5 minutes, at 18.10, the battle stopped.
According to the Novik's logbook, the cruiser received 3 underwater holes, through which 250 tons of water entered the ship, another hit was slightly above the waterline and, in addition, "about a dozen" surface hits. Losses in people: two killed, two mortally wounded and 11 more wounded sailors and Lieutenant A. P. Shter.
Descriptions of damage to the Japanese cruiser in this battle traditionally vary. While the logbook "Novika" reports: "The enemy was badly damaged by our shells; hits were in the bridge, in the side, and especially in the stern."
How accurate is the Japanese estimate of Tsushima's damage? The author of "Cruiser of the II rank" Novik "", A. Yu. Emelin, casts doubt on the Japanese data, inclining to believe that a single hit, and even just a 120-mm projectile, could in no way disable the Japanese cruiser. But, arguing impartially, this could well have happened, and here's why.
As we said earlier, on July 27, 1904, the hit of a 120-mm Japanese shell under the waterline, below the armored belt of the battleship Retvizan, caused a hole with an area of 2.1 m, through which 400 tons of water entered the ship's hull. Moreover, they could not even pump it out completely (although this is the fault of the design features of the battleship itself) and as a result of this damage, the Retvizan was the only ship to which V. K. Vitgeft gave permission, if necessary, to abandon the breakthrough to Vladivostok and return to Port Arthur.
Let us recall the first and last battle of the Varyag cruiser: one semi-submarine hole with an area of about 2 sq. M. on the left side caused flooding and a very strong list, in which the cruiser was not combat-ready.
Apparently, in terms of its high-explosive effect, the Russian 120-mm projectile could not be equal to the Japanese "colleague", but unfortunately, the author does not have exact data on the content of explosives in the Russian and Japanese high-explosive 120-mm projectiles. But after all, "Tsushima" was just a small cruiser with a displacement of less than 3,500 tons, much less than the "Varyag" or, moreover, "Retvizan". Therefore, it is not at all surprising that a single hit under the waterline led to a strong list of the Japanese ship, such that it was no longer able to continue the battle.
Thus, "Tsushima" really could lose combat effectiveness from a single successful Russian hit, but I would like to note the following. Of course, one should not exaggerate the accuracy of the Russian gunners in this battle, but one should also not underestimate the significance of the damage to the Tsushima.
Of course, possessing an afterthought, we understand that after the battle on August 7, 1904, Novik could no longer go anywhere. Three underwater holes, on one of which it was impossible to get a plaster (that very hit of a shell in the joint between the skin and the armored deck), made the transition an impossible task. The cruiser sat down hard aft, and the pumps either failed, or themselves were under water, so there was no way to pump out the water. The steering was out of order, and all that remained was to be controlled by the machines, but the cruiser could only hold half of its boilers under steam. It is difficult to say how much of his speed dropped at the same time, but in any case it was much less than 20 knots, and at any moment it could fall even more.
But the fact is that the Tsushima commander could not know all this. Yes, he saw that his gunners had achieved success and that the Russian cruiser, slowing down and sinking aft, turned back towards Korsakovsk. But these observations did not guarantee that the Novik was badly hit and would not be able to quickly repair the damage it had received. At the same time dusk was approaching, and Chitose obviously did not have time to finish off Novik before dark. And in the night everything is possible, so if the Russian cruiser could "heal" its damage, it could well break through the Japanese cruisers in the direction of Vladivostok. Naturally, this was in no way allowed to happen, and it was only possible to prevent a possible breakthrough of the Novik by continuing the battle with him.
So, or something like this, the commander of "Tsushima" Sento Takeo should have reasoned, and if he did not resume the fight, then only for one simple reason - he could not do it, even realizing that he risked missing the "Novik". From which it obviously follows that a single hit of the Russian cruiser for some time completely put Tsushima out of action.
It would be nice if those who assure us that the Varyag, after the battle with the Japanese squadron, has not yet exhausted all the possibilities for a breakthrough, should properly consider this historical fact …
On the whole, it turns out that the Tsushima gunners achieved not even several times, but an order of magnitude more hits: the fact is all the more offensive that Novik, as we see, did not defend itself in the inner harbor of Port Arthur, but constantly left in the sea, carrying out certain combat operations, during which periodically and not unsuccessfully he fought with Japanese ships. So, on July 13, "Novik" achieved at least two hits in the Japanese auxiliary gunboat (alas, the Japanese in their sources get confused about which one - either in "Uwajima Maru No. 5", or in "Yoshidagawa Maru"), and on July 27, the day before the breakthrough, he most likely "laid" several shells in "Itsukushima", while in both cases the cruiser fought against superior enemy forces, but did not receive any damage. What happened this time?
Alas, the author of this article cannot offer an exhaustive answer to this question, but I would like to draw the attention of dear readers to 2 important factors that are usually overlooked when analyzing the last battle of Novik.
The first of them is that the crew of the cruiser from the very morning was engaged in very hard work, loading coal, and even if we count from the moment the coal was transferred to the cruiser, then loading took a quarter to six hours. It can also be assumed that the gunners were loading coal on a par with everyone else. Lieutenant A. P. Shter was an artillery officer, and he was sent ashore to organize the loading of coal, it would be logical to assume that with his own subordinates. Perhaps it is worth reproaching the cruiser commander for not relieving his gunners from this work, but what M. F. von Schultz had any other options? It passed not far from the shores of Japan, including the Kunashir Strait, where it could have been, and even should have been discovered: then everything would indicate that the cruiser would break through the La Perouse Strait. If the Japanese had had time to send their cruisers, a "warm" meeting would have been expected, but if the Novik had managed to pass the La Perouse Strait, it would have escaped into the operational space, and it would have been not so easy to detect and intercept it at sea. Nevertheless, it was impossible to reach Vladivostok without coal, and the Korsakov post itself was a giant trap for the ship.
Thus, everything was in favor of finishing the loading as soon as possible and going to the La Perouse Strait, and if Japanese ships nevertheless met on the way … Well, a tired stoker is no better for a breakthrough than a tired gunner. M. F. von Schultz "extra" crew, which could load coal, giving rest to those who were needed in case of a battle with the Japanese.
The second factor is the maneuvers of M. F. von Schultz in battle. As we know from his own report, the Novik commander in battle was constantly describing the coordinates in both directions. Thus, M. F. von Schultz tried to knock down the Japanese zeroing, and this made a certain sense: in order to break through to Vladivostok, it was necessary to minimize the damage to the Novik, and not try to crush the Tsushima at any cost. The Japanese cruiser had the same 4 guns in the side salvo as the Novik, but of a larger caliber - 152 mm versus the Russian 120 mm. Thus, the classic battle "in line", that is, on parallel courses, did not bode well for our ship. Some hope of not getting critical damage and holding out until darkness was given only by constant maneuvering and a successful hit on a Japanese cruiser, which would have knocked him down.
But, as we see today, such a decision by M. F. von Schultz, although it was logical, nevertheless turned out to be erroneous. Constant jerks of the Novik to the left and to the right knocked down the aiming not of the Japanese, but of the Russian gunners. The artillerymen of Tsushima, despite the maneuvers of the Russian cruiser, still managed to quickly aim and achieved the first hit just 5 minutes after the start of the battle, and then stably hit the Novik. Alas, the gunners of the Novik achieved a hit only 35-40 minutes after the guns started talking: yes, it was a “golden” shell, after which Tsushima was forced to stop the battle, but this could not help Novik - by this time he had already managed to get too serious damage.
Taking into account the condition of the cruiser, M. F. von Schultz decided to flood it. Interestingly, the sources indicate different reasons for this decision. Lieutenant A. P. Stehr wrote in his memoirs:
“We loaded the cruiser to the bottom, in a shallow place, because we were in our, Russian, port and thought, having demanded funds from Vladivostok, to raise it later and fix it. We could not assume that under the Portsmouth Treaty, the southern part of Sakhalin, together with Novik, would be transferred to the Japanese!"
But the Novik commander said in his report that he still wanted to blow up the cruiser, but had no opportunity to do so, because the explosive cartridges were stored in the steering compartment, which was flooded, and there was no way to get out of there.
As a result, after the Novik's crew was brought ashore at midnight, the cruiser was sunk, as reported by M. F. Schultz, "at a depth of 28 feet," while part of its side and superstructure remained above the water.
However, this is where the history of attempts to destroy Novik was just beginning.
On the morning of August 8, a Chitose approached the Korsakov post and opened fire on the sunken Novik. It must be said that eyewitnesses to these events were sure that the Novik was only an excuse, but in fact the Japanese cruiser fired at the village, but it is difficult to say for sure. In any case, it is reliably known that as a result of the shelling in Korsakovsk, the church, 5 state and 11 private houses were damaged, but the cruiser itself did not receive noticeable damage.
On the one hand, Chitose really should have disabled the Russian cruiser so that it could no longer be used even after the war, but on the other hand, it is obvious that the Japanese could take a position in which civilians would not suffer damage … Most likely, however, the Japanese "combined business with pleasure."
Nevertheless, as we have already said, the cruiser did not receive serious damage, and, subsequently, even her artillery was brought ashore from it, which still had a chance to shoot at Japanese ships, as well as some other supplies of property. As for the "Novik" itself, it continued to receive damage, as its hull in the westerly wind hit hard against the stones. Interestingly, midshipman Maksimov, left with the wounded Novik and part of the team to organize a defense against the landing of the Japanese, even thought to build a breakwater, but, of course, he had enough worries even without such Napoleonic plans.
However, after the defeat of the Russian fleet in Tsushima, it became clear that the Russian Empire could well lose Sakhalin, so in June 1905 the commander of the Vladivostok port, with whom Korsakovsk had a message, ordered the Novik to be blown up. Alas, it was difficult to do this, because, despite numerous requests from the defenders of the Korsakov post, mines were never sent to them, where did they get the explosives from?
Maksimov (by that time already a lieutenant) made every possible effort to destroy the cruiser. First, he used mines captured from the Japanese, blowing up one of them on the left side, in the area of the onboard vehicles, and the second closer to the stern. Both exploded properly, making holes of 10 and 3, 6 sq. M. accordingly, but, of course, this was not enough to destroy the cruiser. Turning to Colonel I. A. Artsyshevsky, who commanded the ground defense forces of the Korsakov post, Maksimov received another 18 poods of black powder. From this, the enterprising lieutenant built 2 mines: the first of them, 12 pounds of smoky powder and 4 pounds of smokeless powder, was laid between the 1st and 2nd stokers. The explosion resulted in a hole of 36 sq.m., the nearest boilers were crushed, the frames were broken.
The second mine, 5 pounds of smoky and 4 pounds of smokeless powder, was installed on the site between the onboard vehicles, while the decks were previously destroyed by several small explosions. As a result of its detonation, according to the divers' assessment: "both vehicles, the armored and upper decks, beams and bulkheads were turned into a shapeless mass."
Note that such an abundance of impacts on the sunken Novik makes it difficult to assess the damage it received in battle on the basis of Japanese schemes drawn up during the recovery of the ship.
As for the further fate of the Russian cruiser … After the southern part of Sakhalin was "ceded" to the Japanese under the terms of the peace treaty, they began to survey and raise the Novik. Either 12, or 16 July, the cruiser was raised, and she was towed for docking in Hakodate. Later he was taken to Yokohama, and then, for complete recovery, to Ekosuku.
We can say that the efforts of Lieutenant Maksimov were not in vain. Yes, the Japanese eventually managed to put the ship into operation, but for this they had to carry out major repairs, which included the installation of 8 boilers of the Miyabara system, but they could not return the ship to its main tactical trump card - speed. The Suzuya, which became part of the Japanese Imperial Navy in mid-1908, so named after a river flowing through South Sakhalin and flowing into Aniva Bay, developed no more than 19 knots and did not stand out in any way against the background of old Japanese cruisers of the 3rd class.
Of course, there is no doubt that if the Japanese needed it badly, they could completely restore the ship, but, apparently, this required funds in such an amount that it would be irrational to invest in a not too new cruiser.
During the repairs, the cruiser was reinforced with armament: 152-mm guns were placed on the tank and bottom, and 4 * 120-mm guns of the Armstrong system were placed on the sides. Subsequently, however, the 120 mm guns were replaced by 6 * 76 mm, 6 * 47 mm and 2 * 37 mm guns. The rest of the days "Novik" spent in service in Port Arthur, but it was short-lived - on April 1, 1913, the cruiser was excluded from the lists of the fleet.
So the story of the fastest and most "restless" cruiser of the Port Arthur squadron ended - but not our series of articles.
