As we said earlier, on March 31, the day when Stepan Osipovich took the ships of the squadron to sea for the last time, there were no losses on the Novik. But three of his officers - the commander of the cruiser M. F. von Schultz, warrant officers S. P. Burachek and K. N. The Knorring lost their brothers who were killed at the Petropavlovsk.
And then, after the death of S. O. Makarov, a period of almost complete passivity and apathy began on the squadron: in April 1904, the ships practically did not go to sea, with the exception of the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers, the description of whose actions lies outside the scope of this series of articles. At the same time, the Japanese continued to be active - they fired at the Russian ships in the harbor with throw-over fire, tried once again to block the exit from the internal raid to the external one, and, most importantly, on April 21, the news of the landing of Japanese troops in Biziwo came. The viceroy immediately left for Mukden the next day, leaving command of the squadron to Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft.
After the ill-fated exit on March 31, when the Petropavlovsk exploded, the Novik stood for more than a month on the inner roadstead and did not participate in any business. Only on May 2, 1904, at 14.35, he nevertheless went out to the outer roadstead in order to cover, in which case, 16 destroyers returning after the attack of Japanese ships. We are talking about ships of the 1st and 2nd detachments, which V. K. Vitgeft sent to sea after it became clear that two battleships of the Japanese detachment, "Yashima" and "Hatsuse", were blown up on the obstacle put up by the minelayer "Amur". We will not describe this case in detail, since the participation of "Novik" in it is minimal - all his participation in this operation was limited to going out on an external raid. However, so to speak, this aimless, in general, exit marked the beginning of an extremely intensive operation of the cruiser.
The next day, March 3, V. K. Vitgeft was going to give the order to Amur to put up a barrier at Melanhe Bay, and cruisers and destroyers, including Novik, were supposed to cover it. But the mines were not ready, 11 Japanese destroyers and 4 large ships were seen on the horizon, so the obstacle was canceled: nevertheless, Novik and two destroyers, Silent and Fearless, were ordered to "go out on the raid for the practice of personal composition ".
The meaning of this order, alas, is unclear to this day - "Novik" and the destroyers accompanying it left at 13.00, walked along the alignment for 8 miles, returned, and at 15.15 returned to the inner pool, the enemy was not noticed. Such completely aimless movements along the raid, in the presence of a mine threat, with which, despite all efforts, they could not “win” completely, seem to be a completely unnecessary risk. It would be one thing if the ships went out to carry out a combat mission, or at least moved out to sea for reconnaissance or training - and so … Official Russian historiography notes: “This exit, which did not bring us any benefit, at the same time testified to the Japanese the failure of their barrage entrance by firemen. " True, in the latter it is difficult to agree - "Novik" went out on the outer raid on May 2, and here, probably, the "campaign" on May 3 could not tell anything new to the Japanese observers.
But on May 5, an interesting thing took place. VC. Witgeft nevertheless sent Amur, which by that time had 50 ready mines, to set up a barrier at Melanhe Bay, where the minelayer left at 13.35, accompanied by 4 destroyers and the Novik cruiser. This detachment was commanded by the commander of "Amur", captain of the 2nd rank Ivanov. In addition to the aforementioned ships, "Askold" was also involved in the operation, which provided, so to speak, long-range cover, since it did not come out with the detachment, but was ready to go to his rescue.
The ships lined up. The torpedo boats went ahead, used as "mine action vessels": they towed trawls in pairs, followed by "Amur", and after it - "Novik". At first, they kept the speed at 6 knots, but then increased it to 8-10 knots - the trawls held up well.
But, not reaching 2 miles to the Sikao Bay, the Amur saw enemy ships, which were later identified as 9 large and 8 small destroyers. As we know today, the Russians met the 4th and 5th fighter squads, as well as the 10th and 16th destroyer squads - unfortunately, the Japanese official historiography does not specify how many ships they included at that time. According to the state, they were supposed to contain 8 large and 8 small destroyers - 4 ships in each detachment, but here different things are possible. Some ships could be damaged or have breakdowns and not go on a campaign, and vice versa - sometimes the Japanese could classify another destroyer or fighter that was not part of it in the detachment. But in any case, it can be argued that if the Russian sailors were mistaken, it was not much, it is unlikely that there were less than 14-16 fighters and destroyers.
Kavtorang Ivanov immediately developed a very stormy activity. He ordered the destroyers to remove the trawls and sent "Novik" to reconnaissance, instructing him "Do not come close to the enemy and be careful." Then he called on the radio "Askold", which, however, could not come up immediately, because the "Cupid" with accompanying ships had already moved away from Port Arthur by about 16 miles. Nevertheless, at first, Ivanov considered it necessary to continue the operation, so he separated the destroyers, sending "Vlastny" and "Attentive" to the aid of "Novik", and "Sentinel" and "Quick" left at the minelayer, and together with them he continued to move towards Melanhe Bay.
I must say that the commander of the Novik, von Schultz, saw all these events a little differently - according to his words, the Novik went to sea after the Amur, but not at 13.35, but at 14.00, and an hour and a half later, at 15.30, saw several destroyers. Then the cruiser received an order to make reconnaissance and at a low speed went to the enemy. This was dictated by the desire to get as close as possible to the Japanese, since the cruiser was poorly visible against the background of the coast, but if it gave a big speed, then the smoke would certainly give it away. "Novik" "sneaked up" until 16.00, when the Japanese nevertheless found it, and, having divided into 2 groups, tried to approach and attack the cruiser.
In response, the commander of "Novik" ordered to give 22 knots, turned stern to the enemy destroyers, and from a distance of 45 cables opened fire, taking the fight on the retreat. This, of course, was extremely beneficial for the cruiser, since the fastest Japanese destroyers, even moving at full speed in order to get close to a torpedo shot, would take more than half an hour - and all this time they would slowly approach Novik under his fire. 120 mm guns.
Of course, 22 knots could not be dialed at once, and some time was spent on the turn, so the Japanese managed to get close to the cruiser with 35 cables. But already the first shots of "Novik" from this distance went well enough, moreover, the cruiser was picking up speed, so the Japanese thought it best to retreat, hoping to carry the Russian ship with them. The Novik got carried away, as it turned around and pursued the Japanese for some time, but then, seeing that it could not catch up with them, turned back to the Amur. At this time, Ivanov decided to complete the operation and raised the signal to return to Port Arthur.
This decision may seem strange and even "overly cautious", but it is completely correct. The fact is that a minefield is good when it is set up secretly, but here Amur collided with many Japanese destroyers. It is not a fact that all of them could have been dispersed, especially since, according to observations from the Amur, the destroyers pursued by Novik split into 2 detachments that went in different directions. “Novik”, with all its advantages, could not guarantee that the Japanese, who knew that the Russians had gone somewhere, would not begin to follow our detachment. Even when driven away, they could easily appear on the horizon during a mine setting, thus reducing its value to zero. And there were not so many mines left in Port Arthur to throw them in vain.
So, "Novik", having stopped pursuing the Japanese detachments, turned back and saw a signal from the "Amur" canceling the operation. But then the Japanese destroyers really split up and five large fighters again went in pursuit of the Novik. M. F. von Schultz ordered to slow down in order to let the enemy closer, and then, at 4:45 pm, from a distance of 40 cables or so, he opened fire again. As soon as the Japanese came under fire, they immediately turned around and left.
At that moment, "Askold" approached the scene of action - from it they noticed "Novik" first, as they saw how the cruiser fired 2-3 shots, but from "Novik" they noticed "Askold" only after the end of the shooting. At this, the adventures of the Russian detachment ended, and he returned to Port Arthur. During the battle, "Novik" used up only 28 rounds of 120-mm caliber, which speaks of it, rather, as a short skirmish.
I would also like to note that the very modest expenditure of shells contradicts the very colorful description of this battle in the memoirs of Lieutenant "Novik" A. P. Stehr:
“Once we had to deal with 17 destroyers; several times they tried to attack us with joint forces, but, possessing a large move, we kept them at the distance of our guns' shot all the time, not allowing them to approach, which forced them to split into three groups that tried to attack us from three sides, but this they did not succeed, since we met all three detachments with fire in turn, not allowing them to act simultaneously. It was a race in speed and in the art of maneuvering, from which Novik emerged victorious. The Japanese withdrew, having received, in all likelihood, damage, since the shooting was sustained and calculated, the sea was calm, which made it possible to adjust the distances and directions, as well as to see the fall of the shells, which mostly fell perfectly. This collision showed that such a cruiser as "Novik", with skillful management, has nothing to fear any number of destroyers."
It would be quite possible to agree with the lieutenant's conclusion, since we see that the Japanese destroyers fled every time the cruiser opened fire on them, but the description of the battle is heavily embellished - also because the reports of other eyewitnesses (the commander of Amur "Ivanov, commander of" Novik "von Schultz) does not contain descriptions of" three-way attacks ". As for the losses, as far as can be understood, neither the Japanese nor the Russians received any combat damage in this battle.
The next time "Novik" with destroyers went to sea in the morning of March 13, searching for the enemy in the Tahe Bay area. Not finding the enemy, according to the order, they stood at anchor in the bay itself until 17.00 in the evening and then returned to Port Arthur without incident.
The next day, March 14, the release of "Amur" was repeated. The differences were that this time it was decided to mine the Tahe Bay, and instead of 4 destroyers with the Amur and Novik, the mine cruisers Gaydamak and the Horseman went. This time the Japanese were not met, and 49 mines were successfully delivered, and one more mine was turned upside down due to strong pitching when dropped, which caused it to receive some damage (the cap was probably broken) and the mine exploded after 1-2 minutes after falling into the water. Fortunately, no one was hurt.
On May 16, at 18.30, Novik was ordered to separate the pairs, and at 19.25 he went to the outer roadstead. Japanese destroyers appeared, but since the sunset that day took place at 19.15, at about 20.00 the cruiser received an order to return to the inner harbor. Why did they send it at all?
General Fock insistently demanded that two Japanese gunboats be driven out of the Kheshi Bay, and on May 20 V. K. Vitgeft ordered the cruisers Bayan, Askold, Novik, two gunboats and 8 destroyers to be ready to leave. But at 05.00, General Stoessel answered "no need" to the request to send ships, and at 0900 he changed his mind. VC. Vitgeft originally intended to send "Novik" together with gunboats and torpedo boats to Golubinaya Bay, from where the torpedo boats, in the presence of fog, had to go to Inchendzy and attack whoever they met there. "Novik" and the gunboats were supposed to remain in Golubina Bay until orders were received, but it all ended with the dispatch of destroyers alone. The Novik and the other cruisers stood aimlessly under the steam.
On May 22, Novik was again escorted by Amur - this time they set 80 mines near Golubina Bay. Everything passed without incident, except that this time the caravan ran into many mines and all three large trawls were torn, which in the end had to go for a light trawl stretched between two sixes. I must say that this route (along the coast) was prescribed by V. K. Vitgeft, but the Amur commander considered him extremely dangerous, and his suspicions, alas, were “brilliantly” confirmed. But, fortunately, there were no losses.
Interestingly, on May 28, Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft sent two destroyer detachments (4 and 8 ships) to reconnoitre the islands of Cap, Reef, Iron, and Miao-tao. The first destroyer detachment left in the morning, the second - in the evening, and in such an operation "Novik" could well come in handy, as it represented the decisive "argument" when meeting with Japanese destroyers. However, the destroyers operated independently, while the Novik remained in the harbor.
It was quite another matter - June 1, 1904, when "Novik" was almost used for solving problems peculiar to it. The bottom line was the following - the generals asked to fire at the Japanese positions from the Melanhe Bay, and at the same time, 14 Japanese destroyers were discovered near Longwantan Bay, and one of them approached the bay and fired at it. VC. Vitgeft decided to oppose this and sent a detachment, consisting of "Novik" and 10 destroyers, into the sea, of which 7 were the 1st detachment, and 3 - the 2nd. At 10.45, the destroyers of the 1st detachment left their mooring and went to the outer roadstead, where they connected with the ships of the 2nd detachment, then gave a low speed course to Krestovaya Gora in order to enable Novik to catch up with the destroyers. At this time, 11 enemy destroyers were observed from Russian ships near the Lunwantan Bay, of which 7 were large.
Further, the reports of the Novik commanders von Schultz and the Eliseev destroyer detachment are somewhat different. Most likely, the situation was like this: at 11.30 Novik entered the outer roadstead, but did not join the destroyers (Eliseev writes that Novik approached them), but moved after them. Seeing this, the commander of the destroyer detachment ordered to increase their speed to 16 knots, with the Russian ships sailing under the coast.
At 11.50 (according to Eliseev's report) or at 12.00 (according to von Schultz's report) "Novik" opened fire from a distance of approximately 40 cables and almost simultaneously fired Russian destroyers from their 75-mm cannons. On the latter, it was assumed that the distance to the enemy was 25 cables, which suggests that at the beginning of the battle "Novik" lagged behind its destroyers by 1.5 miles. At the same time, not 11, but 16 destroyers were observed on the Novik, although there were also 7 large ones, as Eliseev pointed out in his report. According to Japanese records, these were the 1st and 3rd fighter squads and the 10th and 14th destroyer squads, so Novik probably counted the enemy more accurately, this is not surprising, since the view from the cruiser is better than from a destroyer. As for the ten-minute difference in the start of the battle, it must be borne in mind that Russian logbooks were usually filled after the battle, and not during it, so such deviations, alas, are quite expected.
Simultaneously with the opening of fire, "Novik" increased the speed to 20 knots, but the destroyers continued to go for some time at 16 knots, perhaps not trying to get close to the Japanese too quickly, until the "Novik" caught up with them. When the cruiser began to overtake the destroyers on the left side, they brought the speed to 21 knots.
At first, the Japanese destroyers continued to go towards the Russian ships, responding to them with their 75-mm guns, but, obviously, under the influence of the 120-mm guns, Novik were forced to turn away and retreat. At the same time, the Russian destroyers noticed that three Japanese ships were lagging behind the others, so Eliseev had a desire to cut them off and destroy them, so the 7 fastest destroyers of the 1st detachment at 12.30 turned 4 rumba and went in pursuit.
But "Novik" and 3 destroyers of the 2nd detachments did not follow them - instead they continued their way to Melanhe Bay, where they arrived at 12.50, after which they began to inspect the Japanese positions. At this time, a group of enemy destroyers again tried to approach the Novik, and, at the same time, Japanese trenches were discovered. "Novik" opened fire, firing from the left side at the Japanese land positions, located at a distance of approximately 3.5 miles, and starboard - at the enemy destroyers, forcing the latter to retreat, so that at 13:15 they completely disappeared from view. At 13.20 Novik, having fired at all the targets visible on the shore, finally "threw" several 120-mm shells over the mountains, according to the supposed location of the Japanese troops, and began to destroy the deviation. The destroyers of the 2nd detachment also fired at coastal targets, but, as far as can be understood, they did not shoot at the Japanese destroyers, most likely because the distance to the latter was too great.
On the destroyers of the 1st detachment, from 12.30 in pursuit of the enemy, at 13.00 they found that even the lagging Japanese ships could not catch up - the speeds were approximately the same. Firing from 75 mm guns proved to be ineffective, although Eliseev believed that "there were, apparently, hits" - nevertheless, the distance, which was 25 cables at the beginning of the chase, did not decrease. In the end, Eliseev ordered an end to the pursuit, and by 13.30 he returned to Melanhe Bay. There, having waited for "Novik", the Russian detachment went to Port Arthur, where they arrived without much incident. At 15.15 Novik entered the inner pool and anchored there.
In this combat episode, "Novik" used up 95 120-mm rounds, of which 30 were fired along the coast, and 65 at Japanese destroyers, and, in addition, 11 * 47-mm and 10 rifle cartridges. Shooting along the coast, apparently, turned out to be quite effective, disrupting the Japanese offensive on the right flank of our land position, but shooting at enemy destroyers was again ineffectual - the Japanese ships (like the Russians) did not receive hits in that battle. So the only naval target that suffered as a result of the exit of our ships was a domestic mine, which was unhooked and shot by Novik during the return of the detachment to Port Arthur.
The actions of "Novik" in this battle may raise some questions, the main of which is why the cruiser did not lead 7 destroyers of the first detachment and did not go in pursuit of the Japanese. After all, even holding on to 25 cables from the lagging Japanese ships, he could well expect to knock out at least one of them from his 120-mm guns, make him lose speed and drown. But, judging by the available documents, the situation was that "Novik" did not receive an order to fight the Japanese destroyers, but had an unambiguous instruction to shell the coast, and that was what he did. In other words, the Novik apparently believed that they were going to the rescue of our ground forces and considered it their duty to support them with fire as soon as possible, while the enemy destroyers were regarded as no more than an annoying hindrance to the main task.
A day later, on June 3, "Novik" again went out to sea, for the last time escorting the mine transport "Amur". On the way to the future mine position "Amur", moving along the coast in a dangerous area, touched the ground, resulting in underwater holes, and flooding of 5 double bottom compartments and 3 coal pits. The minelayer was forced to interrupt the voyage and, having entered Golubinaya Bay, began to apply the plaster and repair the damage, while the Novik and three accompanying destroyers anchored in anticipation of the repair results - the fourth destroyer, Burny, went on reconnaissance about. Reef. Soon an officer from a ground communications post arrived on the ships, reporting that Japanese destroyers were visible at sea. At this time "Burny" discovered a commercial steamer, and rushed in pursuit: all this was seen on the ships of the detachment and "Novik", with two destroyers, leaving the "Cupid" under the supervision of one "Fearless", he rushed to intercept. Soon, 11 Japanese destroyers were found on the Novik, which, however, did not make any attempt to approach and engage in battle: the steamer was stopped and turned out to be the Norwegian transport Heimdall, heading from Kobe to Newchuang for cargo for Japan. Therefore, von Schultz sent an officer and four sailors to him and ordered him to follow the Novik. The cruiser, destroyers and the captured steamer returned to the Amur, which by that time was able to get the plaster, after which the detachment returned to Port Arthur.
At this, the actions of the Amur minelayer stopped. He received serious enough damage, which the artisans of Port Arthur did not have the strength to handle, since they were loaded with the repair of other warships. In addition, there are almost no mines left in Port Arthur, so even if the Amur were in perfect order, it would still not be possible to use it. Therefore, the ship remained without repair until the end of the siege.
A day later, June 5, the cruiser's adventures continued. This time V. K. Vitgeft, at the request of the ground command, sent a detachment of Novik, gunboats Thundering and Brave, and 8 destroyers to shell the Japanese positions, which was supposed to be fired from the Sikao and Melanhe bays. The detachment was commanded by Rear Admiral M. F. Loshchinsky, who was holding the flag on the Otvazhny gunboat. I must say that this exit was quite risky, since large Japanese ships were visible on the horizon in order to avoid meeting with them, V. K. Vitgeft ordered to go under the coast, for the trawls.
At about 09.30 am the ships went to their destination, following in this order: in front were two pairs of destroyers with trawls, followed by both gunboats, then Novik with the other 4 destroyers. At the same time, 11 Japanese destroyers were seen on the horizon already during the exit to the outer roadstead, but there were no cruisers, and the campaign continued. Already at 09.45 the first mine exploded in the trawls, and then, just 2 cables from this place - another one, thus both pairs of destroyers, although they themselves did not suffer, but lost their trawls. There was only one spare trawl on the Otvazhny gunboat, but M. F. Loshchinsky did not consider it possible to go further under just one trawl, and sent one of the destroyers, the Sentinel, for another one to Port Arthur, and the rest of the detachment ships anchored in anticipation of his return. At about 10.30 the Japanese destroyers left - to the right, there was nothing interesting in observing the standing Russian ships. Only at 13.00 the detachment resumed movement, but already at 13.20 another trawl burst, catching on something on the bottom, and then the Russian ships followed one trawl.
At 14.00 6 Japanese destroyers were seen, but they left. Almost immediately they found 3 junks under sails, which were examined by the destroyers, but nothing reprehensible was found on them.
Finally, at the beginning of the 3rd hour, the detachment approached the Luwantan observation post, from which a rather vague message was transmitted to the ships that the Japanese had retreated and there was no one. M. F. Loshchinsky radioed V. K. Witgeft: “Colonel Kilenkin reports that the Japanese have left, there is no one to shoot at, I ask permission to return,” but V. K. Vitgeft insisted on shelling. There is a persistent feeling that the squadron commander, who has repeatedly had problems with the ground leadership because of his refusals to send ships to bomb the enemy, was important at least to formally fulfill the request. His indication "You have a milestone map of the Kwantung Peninsula, from it you can find out the area that can be fired on," is hardly possible to explain.
As a result, the "shelling" still took place - "Brave" used 2 * 229-m and 7 * 152-mm shells, and "Thundering" - 1 * 229-mm and 2 * 152-mm shells. They were shooting “somewhere in that direction”, because there was no one to direct and adjust the fire from the shore, since no post was organized on the shore and, although an artilleryman, an officer from the Luvantan post arrived on the ships, he could not help anything without adjusting from the land could.
Events developed as follows: at 15.50, 11 destroyers and three two-pipe and two-mast cruisers of the Japanese were found on Russian ships, they were going to join another single-mast and one-pipe ship, which was visible before. At 16.10 the gunboats opened fire, at 16.25 they stopped firing due to its complete invalidity and went full speed to Port Arthur. The Russian squadron was "accompanied" by a small Japanese squadron of 4 cruisers, 6 large and 7 small destroyers: on our ships, the cruisers were identified as "Kasagi", "Chitose", "Azumi" and "Matsushima". This Japanese formation followed our detachment to Port Arthur at a distance of 6-7 miles from the coast, but the matter did not come to a clash.
As for the Japanese squadron, as can be understood from the official history, it consisted of "Chin Yen", "Matsushima", "Kasagi" and "Takasago", which went on reconnaissance, attracted by the sound of shots. Moreover, the pursuit of the Russian detachment turned out to be accidental - it was found on Japanese ships even when the ships of M. F. Loshchinsky already entered the outer roadstead of Port Arthur.
In general, the operation, perhaps, became the standard of how not to fire the enemy ground forces from the sea. The sending of ships under the coast was justified in terms of camouflage, but led to a high risk of being blown up by mines. At the same time, if the Japanese had figured out what was happening in time, they would have had the opportunity to attack our detachment with superior forces, and if the Novik and the destroyers could easily break away due to high speed, then the two slow gunboats, of course, could not. Of course, there is no war without risk, but it was worth the risk to achieve some goal, while shelling positions without adjusting from the shore turned out to be completely pointless. I must say that the naval officers were very poorly guided by land maps, since the rugged terrain from the sea was poorly visible, and it was extremely difficult to understand where the Japanese positions were. Alas, ground officers, when they began to be taken on ships, coped with this orientation no better: the view from the sea and from an unfamiliar angle has its own characteristics, so that even those who, being on land, saw the Japanese positions, having arrived on the ships, could not always accurately point them from the sea.
The next time "Novik" left Port Arthur on June 10, when, finally, all previously damaged squadron battleships, including "Retvizan" and "Tsarevich", were repaired and technically ready for battle. Thus, it no longer made sense to defend further in the inner harbor of Port Arthur, and, prompted by telegrams, instructions and orders of the governor E. I. Alekseeva, commander of the 1st Pacific squadron, Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft decided to take her out to sea.
