In this article we will consider the participation of "Novik" in the battle on July 28, 1904 (at Shantung), as well as the events that followed.
The first thing that immediately catches the eye when studying the relevant documents: the cruiser made a breakthrough in Vladivostok far from being in the best shape, and this concerned both the technical condition of the ship itself and the physical condition of its crew. M. F. von Schultz noted in his report that the cruiser since May 1904 "never stopped steam, for it was constantly in 40 minutes of readiness." One cannot but recall the memoirs of Lieutenant A. P. Stehr:
[quote] “We must admit that the authorities, both naval and military, abused Novik sometimes without any sense: no matter what happens, they raise a signal: Novik to break up pairs; the fire-ships are coming - "Novik" to get ready for the campaign; smoke appeared on the horizon - "Novik" to go to sea; the admiral had a bad dream - "Novik" to take off anchor. To such an extent these signals were frequent and, in most cases, unexpected, that neither the people nor the officers could keep up quickly enough; then they decided to give us a mast on the Golden Mountain, which is visible from everywhere. As soon as the need for "Novik" appeared, his callsigns were raised on this mast; then drop everything and run to the ship. Once it happened to me to see this signal from the window of the bathhouse, so almost without removing the soap I had to get dressed and run home.”[/Quote]
Thus, we can say that the cruiser served for wear and tear even when there was no particular need for this: it is obvious that they preferred to keep the Novik "in full combat" just in case. This shows well the importance of small cruisers for service with the squadron, but as a result of this attitude, of course, even the current repair of boilers, not to mention the machines, was extremely difficult, while their resource was consumed at an enormous rate. And, of course, on July 28, Novik was no longer that pre-war cruiser capable of easily developing 23.6 knots in its real displacement characteristic of the ship's daily service.
As for the fatigue of the crew, let's not forget that the cruiser, before entering the breakthrough to Vladivostok, went out to fire on Japanese ground positions for two days in a row. Moreover, on June 27, "Novik" returned to the internal roadstead at 16.00, an hour later M. F. von Schultz was already on the "Askold", at a meeting of the commanders of the cruisers, which was chaired by N. K. Reitsnenstein and on which it was ordered to prepare the ships for the breakthrough and be in full combat readiness by 05.00 in the morning. As a result, it was necessary to urgently load coal onto the cruiser, which was started immediately, immediately upon the return of the commander to Novik. It was possible to finish only at 02.00 at night on July 28, three hours before the appointed date.
As you know, loading coal was perhaps the most time-consuming operation of all other ship operations, in which it was necessary to involve almost the entire crew, and who was very tired from this. Here, although this is not directly stated anywhere, it was necessary not only to load the coal, but also to put the ship in order after that. The fact is that when loading coal, the decks (and not only) of the ship are heavily contaminated, and it is very difficult to imagine that the cruiser "Novik" went into battle in this form - most likely, after loading the coal, the crew had to do a "general cleaning" cruisers. Moreover, it was really necessary: in an era when antibiotics did not yet exist, the ingress of dirt even into a minor wound could cause the need for amputation of a limb, or even cause death.
Thus, considering the events of July 28, 1904, we see that the Novik crew was tired of two previous exits in the days preceding the breakthrough to Vladivostok, and a significant part of the crew was forced to perform heavy work on the night before the breakthrough, and did not have after this opportunity to sleep well.
The course of this battle with the Japanese fleet was described in detail by the author of this article in the cycle "Battle in the Yellow Sea on July 28, 1904", and there is no point in retelling it here again. Therefore, we will focus only on those episodes in which Novik was directly involved.
At 05.00, the cruiser went out to the outer roadstead, already having steam in all the boilers (that is, at night, after loading the coal and cleaning, I also had to do this) and began to destroy the deviation, after which it anchored in the place set for it. At 08.45, the entire squadron entered the outer roadstead, formed a wake and followed the trawling caravan. At 09.00 on "Novik" they saw a signal from the "Tsarevich": "Approach the flagship", which was executed ten minutes later. The cruiser received … a rather unusual order: to go ahead of the trawling caravan and show the way. This was due to the fact that the trawling ships went astray and gradually turned into one of our own minefields, but … What would happen if the Novik stumbled upon a mine? In general, the battle has not yet begun, and the ship and its crew have already been in serious danger.
After the minefields had been passed, and the main forces of the United Fleet appeared on the horizon, “Novik” received an order to take the assigned place in the “tail” of the squadron, which was what M. F. von Schulz performed at 11.50. A detachment of cruisers was assigned to follow the battleships, with "Askold" leading the way, followed by "Novik", "Pallada" and "Diana" trailing.
Such a formation may cause some surprise, since, in theory, the cruisers should have carried out reconnaissance ahead of the battleships, but in no way trailed behind them: however, taking into account the situation on July 28, the order of the Russian ships should be recognized as correct. The fact is that the Russian ships were constantly monitored, and when the battleships, still in the inner harbor of Port Arthur, began to breed fumes, the intense smoke prompted the Japanese observers that something was being prepared.
Accordingly, already at 10.40, up to 20 Japanese destroyers scattered on the horizon were observed from Russian ships, and cruisers, including armored ones, appeared. In these conditions, it made no sense to put forward a detachment of Russian cruisers for reconnaissance, since the Russian squadron itself was under a tight cap: at the same time, the visibility was good enough, so that the battleships of the 1st Pacific squadron could not be taken by surprise. In other words, there was no particular need to find out in advance where the main Japanese forces would come from. The relatively quiet course of the squadron, forced to keep up with the Sevastopol and Poltava, did not allow expecting to avoid a battle, and good visibility gave time to rebuild and perform the necessary maneuvers after the appearance of the battleships of H. Togo within sight of the main forces. At the same time, an attempt to send the cruiser forward would lead to a battle with a superior Japanese cruising force, which was completely pointless.
However, due to the above considerations, "Novik" was again not used for its intended purpose, but was forced to "drag along in the tail of events." In the first phase of the battle, the cruiser practically did not take part, although it probably fired at Japanese ships, during a divergence on the countercurrent, when the Russian and Japanese battleships got close enough. However, the cruisers were soon ordered to move to the left traverse of the column of Russian battleships, so as not to risk them in vain, exposing them to the fire of Japanese heavy ships. There they remained throughout the second phase: outside the battle, but not so that they were completely safe, since the Japanese shells that made the flight periodically fell in the immediate vicinity of N. K. Reitenstein.
The combat work of the cruiser began much later, after the death of V. K. Vitgefta, when the squadron was returning to Port Arthur and ahead, next to its course, a Japanese detachment was found consisting of the battleship Chin-Yen, the cruisers Matsushima, Hasidate, and the armored cruiser Asama going to join them, and also many destroyers. Russian battleships opened fire on them. Then M. F. von Schultz directed the cruiser along the left side of the Russian battleships, moved forward "into the flank of the Japanese destroyer detachment" and fired at them, forcing the latter to change course. It is interesting that when "Askold" went to the breakthrough, moving along our squadron on the right, the "Novik" understood his maneuver as if N. K. Reitenstein decided to flank the Japanese detachment and fire at the Japanese destroyers in the same way as Novik had just done. Moreover, M. F. von Schultz, observing the maneuvers of "Askold", "saw" that the "Askold" not only attacked, but rushed in pursuit, and even strongly broke away from the squadron in pursuit of the enemy destroyers. All this tells us how erroneous the observations of eyewitnesses can be: it is quite clear that von Schultz had no reason to somehow embellish the actions of "Askold", and we are talking about a conscientious delusion.
But then "Askold" turned around, and, "cutting off" the battleships, went to the left flank of the Russian squadron. At 18.45 on Novik we saw N. K.'s signal. Reitenstein "cruisers to be in the wake formation" and immediately followed him, especially since in the order of the ships, "Novik" was just supposed to follow "Askold". To do this, "Novik" had to increase its speed, since by that moment it was far enough from the flagship cruiser.
Subsequent events the commander of "Novik" saw so - to the left of the course of the two Russian cruisers were "dogs", that is, "Kasagi", "Chitose" and "Takasago", as well as an armored cruiser of the "Izumo" class (possibly - "Izumo" itself) and three more armored ones: Akashi, Akitsushima and Izumi. With all of them, the Russian cruisers had to endure a short but fierce battle, since the course of the breakthrough brought the Russian and Japanese units too close together. However, the Japanese cruisers quickly lagged behind, and only the "dogs" still had enough speed to pursue the breakthrough Russian ships.
In fact, the two Russian cruisers fought the "dogs" supported by the Yakumo, but generally speaking, the description of this fragment of the battle on July 28, 1904 is extremely confusing. It is most likely, nevertheless, that at first "Askold" and "Novik" passed by "Yakumo" and "dogs", and the latter, for not quite clear reasons, were in no hurry to approach the Russian cruisers, although the speed, theoretically, allowed, and the three of them clearly superior to "Askold" and "Novik" in firepower. Then on the road of "Askold" there was a lone "Suma", on which fire was opened. This small Japanese cruiser, of course, could not withstand the Askold and Novik and retreated, and the 6th detachment (Izumi, Akashi, Akitsushima) hurrying to support him did not make it to the scene, and, if they fired at Russian ships, it was from a relatively long distance. And then "Askold" and "Novik" still broke through.
It is interesting that the commander of "Novik" M. F. von Schultz believed that during the breakthrough, his cruiser developed up to 24 knots, while on "Askold" they were sure that no more than 20 knots go and, taking into account the damage that the flagship cruiser N. K. Reitenstein received earlier, it is unlikely that he could develop great speed. At the same time, since the Novik saw the Askold signal when it was already far enough away, Novik, catching up with Askold, really went at a speed of more than 20 knots. However, given the fact that catching up with their flagship M. F. von Schultz succeeded only after the battle, the figure of 24 knots still looks very doubtful: it is still possible to assume that the ship gave such a move for a short time, but most of the time it still went at a much lower speed.
The battle with the Japanese cruisers finally ended at 20.30, and ten minutes later the doggies, pursuing the Russian ships, finally disappeared into the twilight. By this time, "Novik" received the following damage from shells of 120-152-mm caliber:
1. An underwater hole near the forward bridge on the port side;
2. Shrapnel of an exploding shell broke the tank battle lamp and killed the gunman of the running gun Zyablitsyn, on the bridge - the apprentice-signalman Chernyshev was killed and the ship's doctor Lisitsyn, who was there by chance, was lightly wounded;
3. A hole in the middle part of the cruiser, the shell did not cause significant damage, there were no losses;
4. A hole in the compartment of the bow dynamo, moreover, the side was pierced by shrapnel and the command bridge was showered.
Regarding damages No. 1-2, the report of M. F. von Schultz is unclear, and there is considerable suspicion that both of them were caused by the hit of the same projectile, and that the underwater hole was fragmentation. The fact is that the hit of a large-caliber projectile would cause significant damage and flooding, the elimination of which would certainly have been mentioned in the report, meanwhile, we do not see anything like that there. Accordingly, the leak was insignificant, and if we assume that the enemy shell exploded at the side of the cruiser, then this would explain well both the losses on the bridge and at the bow gun, and the small size of the underwater hole, which did not cause any serious consequences.
On Japanese ships, not a single hit with a caliber of 120 mm was recorded, and although there are a number of hits by shells of unknown caliber, it is doubtful that at least one of them was the merit of the Novik artillerymen. Six such shells hit Mikasa, one or two at Sikishima, three at Kasuga, and two at Chin-Yen, but most likely all of them were fired from battleships, possibly (although doubtful) in "Chin-Yen" got from "Askold", "Pallada" or "Diana". As for the hits on the Japanese destroyers, they received their damage later, during night attacks, in the repulse of which "Novik" did not take part. Thus, to all appearances, the artillerymen of our cruiser were not lucky in this battle, and they could not inflict harm on the enemy.
So, at 20.40 the last Japanese ship disappeared from sight, although, of course, the Japanese wireless telegraph talks were still being recorded. At 21.00 "Novik" finally caught up with "Askold", and, having entered its wake, reduced the speed to 20 knots.
All this time, the Novik's undercarriage worked, in general, without any complaints, but now the payback was coming for the long neglect of the ship's maintenance. At 22.00 it was noticed that the refrigerators are gradually "giving up", and the air pumps begin to warm up, which is why they turned to the Askold with a request to reduce the speed. And here the strange thing began again: the fact is that the results of the night negotiations between these two ships were interpreted in completely different ways on the Askold and on the Novik. M. F. von Schultz describes it in such a way that after the signals made at 22.00, "Askold" reduced the move, so that "Novik" kept up with him for some time. However, at 23.00, the salinity in the boilers sharply increased, which is why it was necessary to again ask "Askold" to reduce the speed, but "Askold" did not respond to the repeated request. Novik was forced to slow down and soon lost sight of the flagship cruiser.
At the same time N. K. Reitenstein saw the situation in a completely different way. The fact is that soon after losing contact with the Japanese cruisers "Askold" dropped the move: then they saw on the cruiser that "at about 22.00" "Novik" was asking for something by a ratier, but the signal was not heard. N. K. Reitenstein believed that "Novik" asked permission to act independently, because, in his opinion, the small cruiser was able to develop much more speed than "Askold", which now represented a burden to "Novik". N. K. Reitsenstein and released him without any fear, pointing out in justification of his actions that the commander of the “Novik” was dashing, and the order to break through to Vladivostok was brought to him, and there was no reason to assume that M. F. von Schultz will retreat even one iota from the order received. In addition, according to N. K. Reitenstein, it will be more convenient for cruisers to break through to Vladivostok in "loose formation". After that, the "Askold" lost sight of the "Novik".
Power plant "Novik" was three-shaft, and now had to stop the extreme to the side of the machine, leaving only the average on the move, of course, the speed of the cruiser dropped dramatically, and it was unlikely he could give more than 10 knots. If the Japanese had discovered Novik now, it would have become easy prey for them, but M. F. von Schultz was gone.
The refrigerators were opened, revealing grass (algae?) And leaking pipes. The pipes were muffled, the grass was removed, but at 02:00 several tubes burst in boilers No. 1-2, which forced them to be stopped, and at 03:00 the same damage was found in another boiler. At 05.40 it began to dawn, and smoke was found on the horizon, immediately turning away from it, but at 07.40 we saw two more smokes. Just at this time, the pipes burst in two more boilers, but M. F. von Schultz considered it impossible, since in this case he risked being in view of the enemy with 5 inoperative boilers out of 12 available on the cruiser.
At that time, the remaining amount of coal was calculated, and it became clear that there would not be enough of it before Vladivostok, so M. F. von Schultz decided to go to Kiao Chao. It must be said that the condition of the boilers was such that even if there was enough coal to complete the breakthrough, it still seemed quite reasonable to visit a neutral port, where it would be possible, without fear, to carry out urgent repairs.
“Novik” approached Kiao-Chao at 17.45, on the way it met the cruiser “Diana” and the destroyer “Grozovoy”, which was sailing with the “Diana”, and, getting close to the “Novik”, asked what he intended to do. To this M. F. von Schultz replied that he was going to Kiao-Chao for coal, after which he was going to break through to Vladivostok bypassing Japan. Then the ships parted - each in its own way.
In Kiao-Chao "Novik" found the destroyer "Silent", and, 45 minutes after the arrival of the cruiser, the battleship "Tsesarevich" arrived there. As for the Novik, having fulfilled all the formalities required for the occasion (a visit to the governor), he began loading coal, which he continued until 03.30 on July 30, and then, at 04.00, set out to sea. The cruiser gave a course of 15 knots, which went to the very shores of Japan, and then reduced the speed to 10 knots, saving fuel.
Of particular interest is the analysis of coal consumption at Novik. The total supply of the cruiser's coal was 500 tons, while, as we know, Novik left Port Arthur with an underload of 80 tons, that is, its supply was 420 tons. In Kiao-Chao, the cruiser received 250 tons of coal, a little not having reached the full reserve - if we assume that this shortage was 20-30 tons, it turns out that “Novik” arrived at the neutral port with only 220-230 tons of coal. Consequently, during the battle on July 28, 1904 and further movement, the cruiser consumed 200-210 tons of coal.
Unfortunately, it will be very difficult to calculate the length of the route covered by Novik on July 28-29 with any accuracy, but the direct route from Port Arthur to Kiau-Chau (Qingdao) is about 325 miles. It is clear, of course, that the cruiser did not go in a straight line, but one must also take into account the fact that most of the time of the battle on July 28, she went at a very low speed of no more than 13 knots, forced to "adapt" to our battleships, but full, and close to this move was, probably, a maximum somewhere from 18.30-18.45 and up to 22 hours, that is, from force, 3, 5 hours. And for all this, the cruiser was forced to spend about 40% of its total supply of coal.
At the same time, the same "direct" route from Kiao-Chao to Vladivostok through the Korea Strait is about 1,200 miles, and it should be understood that in this Strait, "Novik" would have expected many observers who would have to evade or even run at high speeds. Thus, it can be stated that with the existing condition of the boilers and machines, even with the maximum supply of coal, Novik could not expect to break into Vladivostok directly. Its passage around Japan fully confirms this thesis: the refrigerators were faulty, then in one or the other boiler pipes burst, steam escapes were observed in the cars, and all this increased the fuel consumption from the planned 30 tons per day to 54 tons. Of course, M. F. von Schultz took all possible measures to reduce coal consumption, but even after that it was still 36 tons / day, and it became clear that the cruiser would not be able to reach Vladivostok with the available coal reserves. Then M. F. von Schultz decided to enter the Korsakov post.
Up to this point, the commander of "Novik" wrote his report according to the data of the logbook, everything else - from memory.
On the whole, the passage from Qingdao to the Korsakov post left a painful impression on the crew. As, later, A. P. Shter:
[quote] “This transition was the most unpleasant memory in the entire war: ten days of uncertainty and waiting, ten days of full readiness to engage in battle day and night, knowing that there might not be enough coal to reach our shores and that it might be necessary to stay helpless in the middle of the ocean, or be thrown onto the Japanese coast."
The Novik arrived at the Korsakov post on August 7 at 7 am and immediately began loading coal. The denouement was approaching.
