In the series "The Russian Navy. A Sad Look into the Future" we talked a lot about the state of the Russian fleet, studied the decline of the ship's personnel and predicted its state for the period up to 2030-2035. However, the dynamics of the size of the fleet alone will not allow us to assess its ability to withstand an external threat - for this we need to understand the state of the fleets of our "sworn friends", that is, the probable adversaries.
Therefore, in this article we:
1. Let's give a brief overview of the current state and prospects of the US Navy.
2. Let us determine the numerical strength of the Russian Navy, capable of representing the interests of Russia in the ocean and, in the event of large-scale military operations, to participate in repelling aggression from the sea.
Let's note right away: the author does not consider himself competent enough to independently determine the optimal composition of the Russian Navy. Therefore, he entrusts this business to professionals - the authors of the book "The USSR Navy 1945-1995". Allow me to introduce:
Kuzin Vladimir Petrovich, a graduate of the Leningrad Nakhimov VMU and VVMIOLU them. F. E. Dzerzhinsky, since 1970 served in the 1st Central Research Institute of the Moscow Region. Graduated from the postgraduate course at the Naval Academy named after V. I. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, defended his Ph. D. thesis and is a specialist in systems analysis and forecasting the development of complex systems.
Nikolsky Vladislav Ivanovich, graduate of VVMIOLU named after V. I. F. E. Dzerzhinsky, served on EM "Serious" (project 30 bis) and "Sharp-witted" (project 61), graduated from the Naval Academy. Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, later served in the 1st Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, candidate of sciences, specialist in systems analysis and forecasting the development of complex systems.
Their book, dedicated to the conceptual development of the USSR Navy, its shipbuilding programs and performance characteristics of ships, aircraft and other weapons, is a fundamental work, which is one of the most important, basic sources on the military fleet of the Soviet Union. And in it, the authors proposed their own concept for the development of the Russian Navy, as they saw it as of 1996 (the year the book was published).
I must say that their proposals were very unusual and had cardinal differences from a number of key ideas on which the USSR Navy developed. In their opinion, the Russian Navy should solve the following tasks:
1. Maintaining strategic stability. For this, the fleet must be a component of the strategic nuclear forces and include a sufficient number of strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs), as well as forces to ensure their deployment and use;
2. Securing the interests of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean. For this, according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, the fleet should be able to conduct a successful air-ground operation against a separate third world state (the authors themselves described this as "an active strategy against 85% of potentially dangerous countries that do not have a common border with us and are not NATO members");
3. Reflection of an aggressor attack from sea and ocean directions in a global nuclear missile war, or in a large-scale non-nuclear conflict with NATO.
I would like to dwell on the latter in more detail. The fact is that the key tasks of the general-purpose forces of the USSR Navy were (not counting the security of SSBNs, of course), the fight against the enemy's AUG and the interruption of his sea communications in the Atlantic. The first was justified by the fact that it was the AUG that posed the greatest danger as a non-strategic means of attack from ocean directions, and the second was dictated by the need to prevent, or at least slow down, the massive transfer of the US army to Europe.
So V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolskiy took the liberty to assert that the Russian Federation (even if it returns to the level of industrial production in 1990 and exceeds it) does not have, and will not have, the economic potential to solve these problems, or even one of them. Therefore, they suggested the following:
1. Rejection of the "anti-aircraft" orientation of our fleet. From the point of view of V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, the emphasis should shift from the aircraft carrier to its aviation, and the point is this. By attacking the AUG, we are, in fact, trying to destroy the most powerful mobile fortification, which is formed by deck (and base) aircraft, enemy surface ships and submarines, and this is an extremely difficult and resource-intensive task. But against the coast, the AUG can operate mainly in the form of an air offensive, when its carrier-based aircraft operates outside the air defense systems, shipborne electronic warfare and other combat and radio equipment of the aircraft carrier's escort ships. Accordingly, it is possible, without attacking the AUG, to focus on destroying its aircraft in air battles, leading the latter with the forces of our aircraft, both deck and land-based “on our terms,” that is, in our own “bastions” formed by ground and naval air defense systems. According to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, with the destruction of 40% of the number of the carrier-based wing, the combat stability of the AUG will fall so much that it will be forced to leave the area of hostilities and retreat.
2. The danger posed by cruise missiles deployed on sea carriers, V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky is aware, but at the same time it is directly noted that the Russian Federation is not in a position to build a fleet capable of destroying these carriers. Therefore, it remains only to focus on the destruction of the missiles themselves after their launch - here V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky only hope that, firstly, the concentration on air power (see the previous paragraph) will allow to destroy a significant part of such missiles on approach, and secondly, they remind that even hundreds of such missiles were not enough to destroy air defense and communication systems such, in general, not too strong in the military sense of the country, which was Iraq during the "Desert Storm".
3. Instead of interrupting navigation and destroying enemy SSBNs in the ocean, according to V. P. Kuzin and N. I. Nikolsky, the task of constraining actions should be set. In other words, the Russian Federation will not create a fleet of sufficient size to solve such problems, but it is possible to build a fleet that will force the enemy to spend large resources on fending off possible threats. Let us explain with an example - even two hundred submarines do not guarantee victory in the Atlantic, but if the fleet is able to allocate a couple of dozen submarines to solve this problem, then NATO will still have to build a complex and expensive anti-submarine defense system in the ocean - and, in case of war, use for such a defense there are many resources that are many times greater in cost than the forces allocated by us. But otherwise, these resources could have been spent by the US Armed Forces with much greater benefit and greater danger to us …
In other words, we see that the tasks of the Russian Navy according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky is much more modest than those that the USSR Navy set for itself. Dear authors "do not aim" to defeat the US Navy, or, moreover, NATO, limiting themselves to much more modest goals. And so, based on all of the above, V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky determined the size of the Russian Navy. But … Before we move on to specific numbers, let's still return to the first question of our article.
The fact is that V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky's calculations for the Russian Navy, naturally, were based on the current size of the American fleet. Of course, if the US Navy grew or shrank compared to 1996 (the year the book was published), then the calculations of respected authors could become outdated and require adjustment. So let's see what happened to the US Navy in the period 1996-2018.
Aircraft carriers
In 1996, the US Navy had 12 ships of this type, and 8 of them were nuclear-powered (7 ships of the Nimitz type and the firstborn Forrestal), the rest were 3 Kitty Hawk ships and one Independence (representative type of non-nuclear aircraft carriers "Forrestal") had a conventional power plant. Today, the United States has 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, including 10 Nimitz-class ships and one of the newest Gerald R. Ford. Given that nuclear-powered aircraft carriers have significantly greater capabilities than their non-nuclear "counterparts", we can say that the US aircraft carrier component remained at least at the 1996 level - even taking into account the "childhood diseases" of Gerald R. Ford …
Missile cruisers
In 1996, the US Navy had a total of 31 missile cruisers, including 4 nuclear-powered (2 Virginia types and 2 California types) and 27 with a conventional Ticonderoga-type propulsion system. Today, their number has been reduced by almost a third - all four nuclear missile launchers have left the system, and of the 27 Ticonderogs, only 22 remained in service, while the United States does not plan to build new ships of this class, except in the very distant future. However, it should be understood that the combat power of the cruisers was reduced to a much lesser extent than their number - the fact is that the fleet was abandoned by ships with beam installations capable of using missiles and PLURs, as well as armed with deck-based Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers. At the same time, all 22 missile cruisers armed with Mk.41 universal launchers remain in service.
Destroyers
In 1996, the US Navy included 50 ships of this class, including 16 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, 4 Kidd-class destroyers and 30 Spruance-class destroyers. Today the Americans have 68 destroyers, including 2 Zamvolt type and 66 Arleigh Burke type. Thus, we can only state that this class of ships over the past 22 years has experienced a very rapid growth, both quantitative and qualitative.
I would like to draw your attention to the following. Missile cruisers and destroyers in the US Navy form the backbone, the backbone of surface escort forces under their own aircraft carriers. And we see that the total number of such ships in the US Navy in 1996 was 81 units. (4 nuclear, 27 conventional RRC and 50 destroyers), while today it is 90 ships - 22 "Ticonderogi", 2 "Zamvolta", 66 "Arly Berkov". At the same time, the newest destroyers with Aegis and UVP are replacing old ships that do not have a CIUS, which combine all the weapons and means of a ship into a single "organism" and / or are armed with outdated beam launchers. Thus, in general, we can talk about the strengthening of this component of the American fleet.
Frigates and LSC
Perhaps the only component of the US Navy that has undergone an all-out reduction. As of 1996, the Americans had 38 Oliver H. Perry-class frigates in service, which, for their time, were a decent type of escort ship designed to protect NATO communications in the ocean. But today they all left the ranks, and they were replaced by extremely indistinct "littoral battalion thorns": 5 ships of the "Freedom" type and 8 of the "Independence" type, and a total of 13 LSCs, which, according to the author of this article, are not at all capable of solving any problems in the context of a large-scale military conflict. However, the author does not impose this opinion on anyone, however, even if the LSC is considered an adequate and modern replacement for old frigates, one still has to diagnose an almost triple reduction in the total number of ships. It should also be noted that the Americans themselves do not at all consider the figure 13 to be any acceptable, initially they intended to build 60 LSC.
Multipurpose nuclear submarines
At the beginning of 1996, the US Navy had 59 Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines, but one submarine of this type was abandoned in the same year. Today, the US Navy has 56 nuclear submarines: 33 Los Angeles-class, 3 Seawolf-class, 16 Virginia-class submarines, and 4 former Ohio-class SSBNs converted into Tomahawk cruise missile carriers. Accordingly, we see that the US submarine fleet is successfully carrying out a massive transition to 4th generation boats (Seawulf, Virginia) and is increasing its capabilities for strikes on the shore (Ohio). In general, despite a slight decline in numbers, the potential of this class of US Navy warships has grown significantly.
As for everything else, we just recall that today the Americans have 14 Ohio-class strategic missile carriers and a strong amphibious fleet consisting of 9 universal amphibious assault ships, and 24 amphibious helicopter and landing dock transports. Despite a slight decrease in number, their combat effectiveness, at least, remained at the same level - for example, from 18 Ohio 4 were withdrawn into the general purpose forces, but the remaining 14 SSBNs were re-equipped for the newest Trident II D5 ICBMs … The same can be said about carrier-based and base aircraft - new Super Hornet, Poseidon, E-2D Hawkeye, and so on were supplied to its armament, while the older ones underwent modernization. In general, the capabilities of the US naval aviation have only increased in comparison with 1996, and the same can be said about their Marine Corps.
Thus, we can state that in comparison with 1996, the US Navy has not lost its combat power at all, with the exception, perhaps, of the failure in the frigate-class warships. However, this weakening of the ability to protect ocean communications cannot be compared with the loss of our ability to threaten these communications, but the capabilities of the American AUG and their submarine fleet have only grown.
This, in turn, means only that the estimate of the required strength of the Russian Navy, made by V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, if it is outdated, it is only downward. That is, the number they have determined today, at best, meets only the minimum needs of the fleet to solve the above tasks, and at worst, it needs to be increased. But before moving on to the numbers, let's say a few words about the classes of ships and the performance characteristics of ships, of which, in the opinion of respected authors, the Russian Navy should be.
V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky came to the conclusion that it was necessary to have several specialized types of ships in the general purpose forces. So, instead of TAVKR, they considered it necessary to build ejection carriers of moderate displacement, but with the possibility of basing up to 60 aircraft on them. Instead of missile cruisers, destroyers and large anti-submarine ships - a universal type of multipurpose missile and artillery ship (MCC) with a displacement of no more than 6,500 tons. With a larger displacement, according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky RF will not be able to ensure their large-scale construction. Also, in their opinion, the Russian Federation needed a small (up to 1,800 tons) multipurpose patrol ship (MSKR) for operations in the near sea zone.
The submarine fleet was supposed to consist of torpedo nuclear submarines of moderate displacement (6,500 tons), as well as non-nuclear submarines intended primarily for the Black and Baltic Seas. At the same time, V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky did not object to the fact that the nuclear submarine's ammunition load included missiles, but the creation of specialized missile submarines to combat enemy surface ships was considered unnecessary. As we said earlier, the authors of "The USSR Navy 1945-1995" considered the main tasks of multipurpose nuclear submarines to cover our SSBNs (that is, anti-submarine warfare) and create a potential threat to the ocean communications of the enemy's SSBNs. But the opposition to the AUG was removed from the agenda, so the construction of ships like the Project 949A Antey SSGN or "station wagons" similar to the Ash was considered unnecessary. In addition to the above, V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky considered it necessary to build universal amphibious ships and classic large landing craft, minesweepers, small missile and artillery boats of the "river-sea" class, etc.
Well, now, in fact, to the numbers:
In the notes to the above table, I would like to note several important points. The first one is at V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky offered a certain "fork", that is, for example, the number of aircraft carriers they have indicated is 4-5, but we take the minimum values. Second, the table does not include Russian military boats (according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky - up to 60 tons displacement) and patrol ships of the US Navy. Third, comparing the desired state of the Russian Navy with the actual size of the US Navy, we should not forget about the failure of the LSC program - the Americans themselves believed that they needed 60 such ships and, no doubt, they would have supplied them to the fleet if they had not "played too much" at 50-knot speeds and modularity of weapons. An alternative frigate building program is currently being worked out in the United States, and, no doubt, they will be implemented much faster than Russia will at least half "pull up" its Navy to the figures of V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky (the latter, as a matter of fact, most likely will never happen at all). Taking into account the above, the number of ships for action in the near sea zone will be 70% of the American ones, and the total number of the Russian navy will be 64.8% of the US fleet, which is reflected in the table (in parentheses). Fourth, the US naval aviation is actually stronger than the one presented in the table, because the given number of US aircraft does not take into account the aviation of their marines.
And finally, the fifth. The fact is that the above figures of V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky may seem excessive to some. Well, for example, the total number of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines should exceed the current number of US multipurpose nuclear submarines. Why is this, is it really impossible to do with less?
Perhaps, and even for sure it is possible - but this is if we consider a kind of "theoretical confrontation between the Russian Federation and the United States in a spherical vacuum." But in practice, the situation for us is extremely complicated by the fact that:
1) The Russian Navy must be divided into four isolated theaters, while the inter-theater maneuver is difficult and none of the theaters should be completely naked;
2) It is absolutely impossible to imagine that the United States will get involved in an armed confrontation with the Russian Federation alone, without involving any of its potential allies in the conflict.
If only Turkey is on the side of the United States, then the US Navy will receive a tangible increase in the form of 13 submarines, 16 frigates, and 8 corvettes. If England is on the US side, the US Navy will receive support from 6 nuclear submarines, an aircraft carrier, 19 destroyers and frigates. If Japan is on the side of the United States, then the fleet operating against us will be strengthened by 18 submarines, 4 helicopter carriers (rather, small aircraft carriers), 38 destroyers and 6 frigates.
And if they all come out against us?
At the same time, the Russian Federation does not have allied states with a somewhat serious navy. Alas, the most ingenious, albeit completely worn out today, phrase about the only allies of Russia - its army and navy, remains an absolute truth: now, and always. Therefore, you need to understand that the number of the Russian Navy according to V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky - is really the minimum for the tasks that we set for our fleet.
The author of this article almost physically feels the storm of righteous anger of those readers who sincerely believe that the Yasen-class nuclear submarine, or several Karakurt with “Caliber”, alone will easily destroy the US AUG. Well, what can you say about this? When these same people read the "analysts" from Nezalezhnaya, who in all seriousness talk about how several thirty-eight-ton armored boats of the "Gyurza" type are able to surround and tear apart the Russian Black Sea fleet, they laugh and twist their fingers to their temples. They understand that several of these boats against the modern frigate "kva" will not have time to say, as they find themselves on the bottom. That several "Karakurt", put up against the AUG will be absolutely in the same weight category as the Ukrainian "Gyurza" against the ships of the Black Sea Fleet - alas, no.
There is no doubt that other readers will also say: "Again aircraft carriers … Well, why do we need these outdated troughs, if you can invest in their construction in the construction of the same missile-carrying aircraft and missile submarines, which will give us much greater opportunities to resist the US fleet!" There is only one objection here. Two military professionals, V. P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, who specially worked on this topic, came to the conclusion that the construction of 4-5 AMG (multipurpose aircraft carrier groups) will cost the country much cheaper than alternative "air-submarine" development options.
That is, according to the calculations of respected authors, the Russian Federation, with the return of industrial potential to the level of 1990, will be quite capable of building 4-5 AMGs without straining the budget. But to create instead of them a naval missile-carrying aircraft and a fleet of nuclear submarines carrying anti-ship missiles of sufficient strength to repel an attack by the US Navy in the event of a large-scale conflict, for the reason that it will cost us much more.
