It is not the first time on the VO website that opinions have been expressed regarding the particular usefulness of vertical / short takeoff and vertical landing aircraft for modern, maneuverable combat operations. So, for example, in Dmitry Verkhoturov's article "F-35B: A New Contribution to the Blitzkrieg Theory," the respected author gives the following considerations - due to the fact that such aircraft do not need full-fledged airfields, VTOL aircraft, and vertical takeoff and vertical landing, although, strictly speaking, these are different types of machines), can be based in the immediate vicinity of the battle formations of the advancing troops on improvised sites. As a result, according to the author, several groups of VTOL aircraft deployed at such "airfields" 40-60 kilometers from the troops will be able to provide a significant reduction in the response time to requests from the ground forces, in comparison with what horizontal take-off and landing aircraft can demonstrate. … Simply due to the fact that the latter depend on the availability of an airfield network, and can easily be forced to base at a distance of several hundred kilometers from the combat area.
At the same time, there are at least two options for using such sites: as a permanent airfield for several VTOL aircraft, or as a jump airfield, when VTOL aircraft, in fact, are not based on it, but only fill empty tanks with fuel, and suspend weapons expended in battle - that is, the platforms act as a kind of analogue of a tanker aircraft, which, in addition to fuel, will also hang bombs and allow the pilot to rest.
What can you say about this? Without a doubt, the presence of a VTOL aircraft in the air force of a particular country does indeed provide certain opportunities that the air forces of those countries in which there are no VTOL aircraft are deprived of. It would be foolish to deny it. But the question arises: how valuable are these new capabilities in modern warfare, do they justify the costs of creating VTOL aircraft and reducing the fleet of aircraft for conventional, horizontal take-off and landing (hereinafter referred to as simply aircraft)? After all, not a single military budget in the world is dimensionless and a certain number of VTOL aircraft can only be built instead of combat aircraft of other classes. So is it worth the candle?
In the article offered to your attention, we will try to give answers to these questions.
So, the first thing I would like to note is that modern war on land is, without a doubt, a war of engines. During World War II, divisions differed into tank, motorized and infantry, and only the first two types of divisions had the necessary amount of transport to transport all personnel, but the infantry divisions marched on foot - the cars (and horses, by the way) assigned to them were engaged in transportation guns, ammunition, foodstuffs and other cargoes necessary for the conduct of the battle. For those times, this was normal, but today a non-motorized formation looks like sheer anachronism (except perhaps in very specific cases, like some formations of the airborne troops, or a machine-gun and artillery division defending the Kuril Islands. And here, to be honest, the author has no data on the degree of its motorization, but perhaps it is still not fully motorized).
From this we have some very interesting consequence. Blitzkrieg tactics (more precisely, tactics of mobile war, but we will use the beautiful term "blitzkrieg"), in the form in which it was used by German generals and Soviet commanders of the Great Patriotic War, is unconditionally outdated today.
The fact is that in those years there were huge, massive armies - these armies formed front lines hundreds (or even thousands) of kilometers long. Naturally, no country in the world had the resources to fully motorize such armies, so their most numerous troops were infantry divisions, which formed the front. So, the tactic of the blitzkrieg was to break through the front line, introduce motorized formations into the breakthrough, which, due to their high mobility, would be able to surround the enemy's inactive infantry forces, destroy their rear reserves, cut them off from supply, and thereby force them to surrender without physical destruction. The calculation was that the infantry units are simply not able to adequately respond to the actions of motorized forces (simply due to the low speed of movement) and therefore will quickly find themselves in the bag, and then, even if the surrounded troops do not capitulate, then due to the lack of provisions and ammunition will soon lose most of their combat capability. Well, infantry divisions will not be able to break out of the bag, again due to their low mobility, which will not allow them to quickly concentrate the necessary forces for a strike. In addition, even if this happens, the infantry that has escaped from the encirclement "in an open field" is relatively easily destroyed by tank divisions, which can be quickly transferred to the place of the breakthrough.
As we can see, the blitzkrieg tactics were based on the competent use of tank and motorized divisions against a large number of low-mobility formations. But in a modern war, all formations will be mobile, and therefore the "old recipes" will not work: this, of course, does not mean that the encirclement, flanking, etc. will lose their meaning, but all this will not be used in the same way as in years of World War II.
And further. How do modern brigades and divisions differ from similar formations of the Second World War? First of all, by a gigantic increase in firepower. Whatever one may say, but the most massive weapon of an infantryman during WWII was a rifle, today almost the entire army is without exception armed with automatic weapons. The number of various combat vehicles (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, etc.) has grown significantly, as has the number of heavy machine guns and automatic cannons installed on them. Barrel artillery has become much longer-range and more powerful, due to the use of more advanced structural materials, explosives, due to an increase in the rate of fire. MLRS also became significantly stronger than Katyusha and Nebelvelfer. Completely new types of weapons have appeared, such as anti-tank systems and operational-tactical missiles, and much more, not to mention even tactical nuclear weapons. But a significant increase in striking power, alas, is not accompanied, how to put it, by an increase in the "constructive strength" of the troops. The man did not become stronger, and despite the appearance of a large number of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, ceramic armor, body armor, etc., perhaps we can say that only tanks managed to maintain protection more or less level with the means of attack. But you can't put the whole army in a tank.
Thus, the modern armed forces received at their disposal much more powerful and long-range weapons than they had before, but the protection of the troops, although it has grown, is not on a par with the new level of threats. Accordingly, in modern hostilities, camouflage and reconnaissance, and before that extremely important, acquire literally a cult status: the first allows you to evade unnecessary attention of the enemy, and the second provides the opportunity to inflict serious, and in some cases, possibly decisive, losses on the enemy. in people and technology even before the direct clash of troops on the battlefield. At the same time, intelligence itself has also greatly improved since the Second World War - this applies to both the qualitative growth of the types of intelligence existing at that time, such as, for example, radio-technical, and the emergence of completely new (satellite) ones. And also the means of communication and command and control of troops, information exchange and combat information systems, which form a single picture of the battle for the command, have become extremely important.
What is the role of modern aviation in all of this?
The first thing to note is that the modern air force also received a multiple increase in capabilities compared to the times of the Second World War. Moreover, this applies to both, in fact, the strike function (range of delivery of ammunition, their power, guided missile weapons, etc.), and no less important, reconnaissance. Modern electronic reconnaissance aircraft are capable of providing information that generals of the mid-20th century did not dare to dream of, but what about aircraft whose on-board radars have sufficient resolution to map the terrain? Optical and infrared observation devices have also made great strides. Thus, air supremacy gives the side that has achieved it undeniable advantages: it receives a huge bonus to the ability to obtain reconnaissance information and ensures the destruction of targets within the combat radius of tactical aviation. At the same time, it is possible to resist enemy domination only in the air - regardless of any quality of ground air defense systems, they have never, in any conflict, played a decisive role in the "battle for heaven" and have not provided a clear sky on their own. This, of course, does not make the S-400, Patriots and Pantsiri-S useless - they are necessary as a component of the state's air power, and their presence significantly expands the capabilities of the armed forces and makes it difficult to use enemy aircraft. But nevertheless, they cannot independently conquer air supremacy - today only manned aviation is capable of this.
Possessing air supremacy, aviation becomes a terrible headache for the enemy. First, aerial reconnaissance allows us to obtain much more complete information about the enemy than he will have about us. Secondly, aviation is capable of delivering strikes to a greater depth than artillery and MLRS can do and can destroy the most important enemy objects, such as command posts, fuel and ammunition depots, deployment of operational-tactical missiles, etc. Thirdly, aviation is capable of providing direct support to troops, which, given its firepower, today can become a decisive argument in a ground battle against someone who does not have such support. In addition, the Air Force is to some extent capable of implementing a kind of analogue of the blitzkrieg tactics of the Second World War. The fact is that a natural consequence of the growth of firepower has become an obvious drawback - a modern brigade or division requires a significantly larger amount of supplies and ammunition than an equal number of units of the WWII era. But some fundamental breakthrough in the means of supply did not happen - as in the times of WWII - this is a train, a car, and, in some case, a transport plane: while their security, in general, remained at the level of World War II war. Thus, destroying the enemy's transport hubs and communications, aviation is capable of disrupting the supply of its ground forces, in fact blocking one or another area from the air, which, of course, will cause a sharp drop in the combat effectiveness of the "encircled" formations.
Thus, the following conclusion suggests itself: the modern and numerous enough for the solution of the above-mentioned tasks of the Air Force, having ensured air supremacy, are quite capable of making a decisive contribution to ensuring the victory of our ground forces. But this also implies the opposite - conducting combat operations against an enemy approximately equal in technical equipment and number of troops, we cannot count on success in ground operations conducted in the zone of dominance of enemy aircraft. Of course, anything can happen in a war, the enemy may make serious mistakes, or a new Suvorov may turn out to be at the head of our troops, who will find a way to defeat the enemy with all his advantages - but you need to understand that the same Suvorov will defeat the enemy much faster and with fewer losses. if the latter does not have air superiority.
Well, what happens if the enemy's air forces are also approximately equal to ours in size and combat capability? Under these conditions, it may not be possible to achieve unconditional air supremacy (although it is necessary to strive for this), but you can try to establish dominance in at least some areas: for example, in the rear, or in the area of a local ground operation, but even if this does not work out, it will only mean that neither our troops nor the enemy troops will receive a decisive advantage. Air reconnaissance, destruction of communications, direct support of ground forces from the air will be conducted by the air forces of both sides, so that there will be parity between the armed forces participating in the conflict.
Dear reader, probably already outraged by the fact that instead of analyzing the use of VTOL aircraft, we devote so much time to repetition of capital, in general, truths: but their repetition is extremely necessary for the perception of what will be said next.
As follows from the above, if we want to win in modern war, we must conduct ground operations either in the zone of dominance of our aviation, or in an area where we and our enemy have parity in the air. Accordingly, our military plans, our tactics and strategy in the offensive should provide for the advancement of both ground forces and aviation (the latter - to new airfields). We simply cannot send ground forces forward, beyond the areas where our aviation has dominance, or air parity with the enemy - if we do this, then with the highest degree of probability the troops pushed forward will suffer a heavy defeat.
In other words, an offensive in modern warfare involves the joint movement of military forces, both ground and air. But, if so, what is the role of VTOL aircraft in all this?
VTOL aircraft could become a significant factor in an air war only in one case - if their presence (when based on small, specially equipped sites on the model and likeness of those described by the respected D. Verkhoturov) would provide our troops emerging from the "umbrella "Our air force, that same air supremacy, or at least parity with enemy aircraft in the air. But this, at the current level of technology development, is completely impossible.
The fact is that air power is made up of components, the joint use of which gives a synergistic effect. By themselves, apart from other types of aircraft, neither bombers, nor multipurpose fighters, nor AWACS aircraft, nor RTR and EW aircraft will bring victory in the air. But when applied together, they form a single information space and greatly enhance the capabilities of enemy fighters and strike aircraft, while increasing their security. Therefore, VTOL aircraft, which in essence represent rather mediocre multi-role fighters (with an equal level of technical development, a horizontal take-off and landing aircraft will have better performance characteristics than VTOL aircraft - at least simply due to the lack of units that provide vertical landing), alone there is not a single chance to achieve not that air supremacy, but at least parity against modern, balanced enemy air forces. Simply because for the success of the VTOL aircraft must be supported by AWACS, RTR, electronic warfare and other aircraft, and they can operate effectively only if there are airfields relatively close to the military grouping covered by the VTOL aircraft. But if there are such airfields, then why bother building a garden with VTOL aircraft? After all, the usefulness of VTOL aircraft is usually justified precisely by the fact that they are capable of acting where "classical aviation does not reach" …
In general, all of the above indicates that a somewhat effective use of VTOL aircraft is possible only in the zone of domination (parity) of our Air Force. And what do the main VTOL operators - the United States of America - think about this?
Oddly enough, our opinions agree here almost absolutely. The only branch of the US troops that wished to have a VTOL aircraft in its composition is the Marine Corps (ILC), the use of which is associated with a number of features. And the main one is that amphibious operations often need to be carried out in areas where airplanes from land airfields "do not reach". Of course, no American commander would agree to an amphibious operation in the zone of enemy air superiority. Therefore, the aircraft carriers of the US Navy are a necessary component of such operations - they are the ones who create the "air umbrella" for the landing marines. In other words, the American concept assigns air supremacy to a "floating airfield", that is, an aircraft carrier, and VTOL aircraft are a means of direct air support for the Marines.
Why is this separation necessary? The thing is that even a super-aircraft carrier, with all its advantages, still has a limited air group, and if it is not enough to ensure air supremacy and to support the marines at the same time, then … it turns out that a second aircraft carrier is needed. And aircraft carriers are piece goods, they are very expensive and there are never many of them. In this case, the use of VTOL aircraft, which are delivered to the area of the operation on amphibious ships, fly overland and are based on specially equipped sites, looks like a cheap alternative in comparison with the need to build additional aircraft carriers for the US Navy to support amphibious operations. Or, if you like, VTOL aircraft are capable of freeing up some of the aircraft carriers for other operations.
In addition, the author of this article has one suspicion. The fact is that the US Navy and the USMC are different organizational structures (different types of armed forces). Accordingly, during the landing, the Marines cannot order the carrier-based aircraft of the air wing to do this or that - they can only make a request, which will be considered by the naval command and can be (if it considers that it has sufficient forces for this) will be satisfied. Maybe it won't. Accordingly, one can understand the desire of the command of the ILC to have aviation of "personal subordination" - well, and since, as we have already said, amphibious operations can be carried out beyond the reach of classic aircraft from existing airfields, the choice of the ILC is obvious - this is a VTOL aircraft. Here it is also necessary to understand the scale of this type of troops - the USMC, this is a large (under 200 thousand people), the most mobile and very well prepared part of the American armed forces for operations on land. In the USSR, its analogue (in terms of number and mobility) was the Airborne Forces, which, for obvious reasons, looked preferable to the marines for the continental power. Therefore, the development of specialized equipment for the needs of the US ILC should not surprise anyone.
Thus, we see that the appearance of the F-35B VTOL aircraft in the US armed forces is a consequence of the specific needs of the American marines, while it is assumed that they will be used in the zone of air supremacy, which will be provided by the air wing of the US Navy. At the same time, the US Air Force showed no interest in this aircraft, limiting itself to the F-35A. Why?
Since we have come to the conclusion that the use of VTOL aircraft is possible only "from under the umbrella" that the classic aircraft of the Air Force will provide for it, then let's think: does the VTOL aircraft have any advantages here that justify its existence as part of the Air Force? Dear D. Verkhoturov put forward a very interesting idea, which favorably distinguishes his article from many other publications on the merits of VTOL aircraft.
The essence of the idea is that it is not at all necessary to constantly base VTOL aircraft on specialized sites brought forward - it is enough to use them as jump airfields. It is no secret that one of the forms of the combat employment of aviation is air watch - it is from there that combat aircraft can strike at the request of the ground forces with a minimum time delay. But the plane, forced to be based at a remote airfield, is forced to spend a lot of time on round-trip flights, its patrol time is relatively short. At the same time, the VTOL aircraft can easily land on a specially prepared area for it, replenish fuel and ammunition supplies, and re-enter the patrol.
The idea, of course, is clever, but, unfortunately, it does not take into account one very important nuance - the flight range of an aircraft of the classical scheme significantly exceeds that of a VTOL aircraft. In the article "TAKR" Kuznetsov ". Comparison with NATO aircraft carriers. Part 4 "we examined this issue in sufficient detail in relation to the F-35C and F-35B, now we will compare the F-35A and F-35B in the same way.
The practical range of the F-35A is 2,200 km, the F-35В - 1,670 km, that is, the F-35A has an advantage of 31.7%. It would be logical to assume that the combat radius of these aircraft is correlated in the same proportion - however, according to the data presented in the open press (1,080 km for the F-35A and 865 km for the F-35В), the advantage of the F-35A here is only 24.8 %. This is implausible, and here it can be assumed that either the combat radius of the F-35B is indicated not from a vertical, but from a normal landing (and the same takeoff), or all the same, for these aircraft, when calculating the combat radius for the F-35A, a large weight of the combat load than for the F-35B.
Thus, if we bring the F-35A and F-35B "to a common denominator" - that is, compare their capabilities with an equal combat load, and provided that the F-35B uses a shortened takeoff and vertical landing, then their combat radii are correlated as 1 080 km and approximately 820 km. In other words, the F-35B, taking off from the "jump airfield", will be able to patrol over the troops located 40-60 km from the take-off site exactly as long as the F-35A, taking off from the airfield located 300-320 km behind the troops. … In other words, if we assume that the cruising speed of the F-35A and F-35B is about 900 km / h, then under the above conditions, both of these aircraft will be able to patrol for about 1 hour 40 minutes (the time to complete a combat mission, by takeoff and landing operations and round trip are of course not counted). Each additional hundred kilometers removed from the airfield from the patrol area will reduce the time spent on the F-35A patrol by about 22 minutes. That is, taking off from an airfield located at a distance of 420 km from the patrol point, the F-35A will lose to the F-35B, operating from a nearby jump airfield (60 km from the patrol point), for only 22 minutes and instead of 1 hour 40 minutes will be able to be on duty only 1 hour 18 minutes.
So, it is rather difficult to imagine that in the modern world there is no airfield at a distance of 420 km from the place of hostilities. And if this suddenly happens, then, frankly, the ground forces simply have nothing to do in such an area, since to ensure dominance in it (or at least parity) with the enemy forces, which, while retreating, will naturally have a more or less whole airfield network. the task is practically insoluble.
Thus, we see that the use of VTOL aircraft according to the scenario proposed by D. Verkhoturov gives us minimal, if not scanty, advantages. But the disadvantages of such a solution are the carriage and the small cart.
First of all, this is a large additional burden on the security forces. A "site" for VTOL aircraft must be created, vehicles are needed for its transportation and deployment (we are talking not only about coverage, but also about stocks of ammunition and fuel). The site needs to be protected - for good, placing it "under the umbrella" of the air defense system and rapid-fire artillery like the same "Tunguska" or "Pantsir", if you like. It is necessary to allocate infantry with armored vehicles to cover it (such a platform is one of the most tasty targets for sabotage groups), and all this is needed for several such sites much more than for one airfield. But even having spent all these resources, we still face the fact that aviation at such sites will remain much more vulnerable than at airfields - after all, being located in the immediate vicinity of battle formations, it is accessible not only for operational-tactical missiles, but even for MLRS.
And it is not necessary in any case to consider probable opponents to be the most complete fools, incapable of any tactical tricks. Let us recall, for example, the actions of the Israeli aviation during the "October" war (October 6-24, 1973). The Promised Land pilots were faced with the fact that the ammunition in their range did not cope very well with the Arab reinforced concrete aircraft shelters (that is, they could not withstand the hit of a concrete-piercing bomb, but you still try, hit it). And here is one of the tactical maneuvers of the Israelis: they imitated a raid on an important object. Naturally, the Arabs lifted their fighters into the air. Having fixed the take-off, the Israelis immediately left for "winter quarters" and the Arab planes, keeping watch in the air for some time, returned to the airfield. And just at that moment, when the Arabs were landing on their runways, "out of nowhere" appeared the strike groups of the Israelis who stormed the airfield.
It should be understood that the farther our airfield is located from the forward edge, the more difficult it is to destroy the aircraft based on it, even if they have no cover - here the distance "for us" begins to work, which must be covered by enemy means of attack (aircraft or missiles) in the airspace we control. That is, we simply have more time to react, and this is important.
In other words, the F-35A, located at an airfield 320 km from the line of contact, can be significantly better protected than the F-35B at its "jump airfield". Well, the best security is equal to the best survivability and minimization of losses, which today, given the value of a combat aircraft and a trained pilot, is extremely important in all respects.
And we still haven't said a word about the fact that the development of VTOL aircraft is a long and very costly process, and the supply of VTOL aircraft and classic aircraft to the troops simultaneously leads to additional costs for servicing different types of aircraft, providing them with spare parts, and the need for various programs pilot training, etc., etc. Is it all worth the extra 22 minutes of combat patrols?
Without a doubt, in certain circumstances VTOL aircraft can be useful. So, for example, one can imagine a situation when the available airfields are not enough to ensure the basing of a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct a certain operation - in this case, the presence of VTOL aircraft that can be based on "mobile airfields" will increase the air force in the desired area. It is also possible to imagine a situation in which both our and the enemy ground forces, for some unclear reason, were equally remote from the airfield network, in this case, "mobile airfields" with VTOL aircraft will also give a certain advantage. But, by and large, all of these are rare, special cases that can hardly justify the costs of development, creation, and operation of VTOL aircraft along with classic combat aircraft.
