Strictly speaking, the three "white elephants" of His Majesty's fleet, named Koreyges, Glories and Furies, have no place in our cycle. It is difficult to say for sure what exactly John Fischer needed these ships for, but there is no doubt about one thing - no one ever intended to oppose the Koreyges and its sisterships to the German battlecruisers. Nevertheless, the story of the British battle cruisers will not be complete without the Koreyges, Glories and Furies, and therefore we devote this article to these, in every respect, strange ships.
The history of their creation began almost simultaneously with the battle cruisers "Ripals" and "Rinaun". Returning to the position of First Sea Lord, John "Jackie" Fisher initiated a gigantic shipbuilding program of more than 600 ships. The overwhelming majority of them were light - destroyers, patrol boats and minesweepers, submarines … D. Fischer was absolutely right, believing that there are not many ships of these types in a war. While rightly pointing out the lack of light forces of the fleet, he at the same time took into account the needs of the so-called "Baltic project", the ideas of which were then circulating in the Admiralty and the government of England. The essence of this project was the breakthrough of the Royal Navy into the Baltic Sea in order to land a large landing of Russian or British troops on the coast of Pomerania - from where Berlin is, in general, a stone's throw.
In the previous article devoted to the battle cruisers "Ripals" and "Rhinaun", we have already said that D. Fischer justified the need for their construction, including the need for high-speed, heavily armed ships with a small draft for operations in the Baltic. They also said that this argumentation was very far-fetched, and that D. Fischer himself, having received the “go-ahead” to book a pair of battle cruisers, immediately excluded shallow draft from the project's priorities, suggesting that the designers provide it “whenever possible”. Most likely, the "Baltic project" was used by the First Sea Lord only as a "smoke screen" to smuggle through the battle cruisers dear to his heart, but this does not mean that he was not serious about the project itself. Apparently, D. Fischer considered the invasion of the Baltic and the landing of troops in Pomerania as a very important and quite achievable task.
And yet, D. Fischer, apparently, could not come to terms with the fact that out of more than 600 ships of the new emergency program, only two are fast and lightly armored ships with the heaviest guns - "Ripals" and "Rhinaun". However, even the capabilities of the First Sea Lord still had limits, and he could not "advance" a larger number of battle cruisers to construction. The reason was rather commonplace - money. It is clear that, having entered the war, England began to bear huge costs for its conduct, and the limits that the Ministry of Finance could scrape together for shipbuilding programs for 1915 were exhausted by D. Fischer. Therefore, the finance minister said that the laying of new large ships is impossible, and there is no money in the treasury for anything larger than light cruisers.
To the great regret for British financiers, the minister did not specify what exactly should be considered a light cruiser. And the First Sea Lord, of course, immediately took advantage of this, including three "large light cruisers" in the shipbuilding program: this is how the Koreyges, Glories and, a little later, Furies appeared.
In accordance with D. Fischer's requirements, the head of the military shipbuilding department, d'Eincourt, prepared a project for a new ship. Its main features were:
1. Displacement sufficient to maintain speed up to 32 knots. on a wave of medium height typical of the North and Baltic Seas;
2. Draft equal to 6, 71 m, that is, significantly less than that of battleships and battle cruisers of the Royal Navy. This would allow the "light cruiser" to operate in the shallow Baltic;
3. Armament from four 381-mm guns;
4. The thickness of the armor at the height from the waterline to the forecastle is not less than 76 mm;
5. Boules, installed in such a way that the most important spaces of the ship, including the engine rooms and boiler rooms, were moved as far as possible deep into the hull, and at least three longitudinal bulkheads should separate them from the side.
It was noted that the ship of this project will receive very strong protection against mines and torpedoes, which should definitely be feared in the shallow Baltic waters. At the same time, heavy guns will make it a dangerous enemy for a ship of any class, and a shallow draft will allow it to operate where the German heavy ships are ordered to move.
Of course, such qualities could not fit into the dimensions of a light cruiser - already in the initial versions of the project its normal displacement was, according to various sources, from 17,400 to 18,600 tons, and in the final version it reached 19,320 tons for the "Koreyges" and "Glories", while the draft reached 7, 14 m. But in the somewhat larger "Furyes" it reached 19 513 tons.
Artillery
The main caliber of the Koreyjes and Glories consisted of two twin-turrets, similar in design to those installed on the Rhinaun-class battlecruisers. Since the height of the axes of the guns above the waterline was 10.06 m for the bow tower and 7.11 m for the stern tower, we can say that their use was possible even in very fresh weather. As for the "Furyes", this ship, the only one in the entire Royal Navy, was armed with a 457-mm artillery system.
I must say that the 457-mm cannon was developed on the basis of the 381-mm artillery system, but, of course, it turned out to be much more powerful than the latter. The weight of the projectile reached 1 507 kg, its muzzle velocity was 732 m / s. However, it should be borne in mind that the data are given for an "enhanced-combat" charge containing 313 kg of gunpowder - with the usual 286 kg charge, the initial velocity of the projectile was only 683 m / s. The maximum elevation angle was 30 degrees, which is 10 degrees. surpassed that of the installations of "Koreyges" and "Glories", while the firing range of the 457-mm cannon was 27 400 m or 148 cables, and with the intensive combat - 32 000 m or almost 173 kbt. Interestingly, even with such high rates, the barrel survivability was quite decent 250-300 rounds.
The power of 457 mm shells was amazing. The explosive content in the armor-piercing ammunition was 54 kg, in the high-explosive one - enchanting 110, 2 kg. At the same time, the impact of an armor-piercing projectile effortlessly crushed any imaginable armor - according to some reports, it overcame an armor plate thick in its own caliber (that is, 457-mm) at a distance of 75 kbt!
Nevertheless, even "Korejges" and "Glories", having four 381-mm guns, experienced certain difficulties with zeroing, and even in those cases when they had the opportunity to conduct side fire, that is, to use both their turrets and four guns. If it was necessary to pursue the enemy, or run away from him, then only two barrels could shoot, and this was completely insufficient for zeroing. Well, "Furies", which instead of two-gun 381-mm turrets received single-gun 457-mm, at some great distances could hit the enemy unless by accident, especially since the maximum rate of fire of the artillery system was only 1 shot per minute.
The main caliber ammunition of the Koreyges and Glories consisted of 480 rounds, 120 rounds per gun, initially 72 armor-piercing rounds. 24 semi-armor-piercing and 24 high-explosive."Furies" had the same 120 shells per barrel - 40 armor-piercing and 80 semi-armor-piercing, there were no high-explosive shells at all (by the way, high-explosive shells were removed from the rest of the "large light cruisers" in 1917).
The anti-mine caliber of "Koreyges" and "Glories" was represented by all the same terrible three-gun 102-mm mounts, which were adopted by "Rhinaun" and "Repals" and the shortcomings of which we examined in detail in the previous article. On "large light cruisers" it was possible to install as many as six such installations, but this was the case when the quantity could not turn into quality. The British understood this very well themselves, but the 152-mm cannons were too heavy for "light" ships, and there were no other artillery systems. Furies turned out to be in an advantageous position - when designing it, they remembered that the fleet has sixteen 140-mm artillery systems requisitioned from ships under construction for Greece. These 140 mm guns were a very formidable naval weapon, and were capable of firing 37.2 kg shells with an initial speed of 831 m / s. at a distance of up to 16 200 m or 87 cables. In all respects, they were superior to the 102-mm mounts, so the Furies received 11 140-mm guns in its final version.
Anti-aircraft guns were represented by two 76-mm artillery systems, fireworks on "large light cruisers", apparently, were not installed (at least, there is no mention of this in the sources), with the exception of "Furyes", which received four 47-mm cannons …
Torpedo armament consisted of two 533-mm onboard torpedo tubes located at the barbette of the bow turret. Ammunition was 10 torpedoes. Surprisingly, it is a fact - after entering service, the torpedo armament was significantly strengthened. So, "Koreyges" received an additional 12 torpedo tubes in twin torpedo tubes mounted on the upper deck!
Reservation
In general, the level of armor protection of "Korejes", "Glories" and "Furyes" slightly exceeded that of conventional light cruisers of that era.
The basis of the citadel was made up of 51-mm "armor plates", laid on top of the 25 mm side plating. The word "armor plates" is taken in quotation marks for the reason that 51 mm sheets, in fact, were not armor - they were made of so-called high-strength steel (HT or High Tensile). Such protection, unlike real armor, was not calculated to fully resist the projectile, but only assumed that its fuse would go off directly in the process of overcoming the steel sheet - in this case, the explosion energy could be retained by the bulkheads inside the ship's hull. But still, the combination of 25 mm structural steel and 51 mm reinforced steel was not such a bad protection and could well repel 105 mm shells from German cruisers, and at long distances, probably 150 mm. The citadel began approximately from the middle of the bow tower barbette to the end of the stern barbette. The only praiseworthy indicator was, perhaps, its height - 8, 38 m, of which in the normal displacement of 1, 37 m was under water. That is, the citadel's armor plates covered the cellars, engine and boiler rooms, and almost the entire freeboard up to the forecastle deck. In the stern, the citadel was "closed" by a traverse perpendicular to the diametrical plane of the ship, while in the bow two rows of armor plates went at an angle from the side to the beginning of the barbet of the 381-mm turret. The traverses were 76 mm thick.
From the citadel in the nose, the protection was thinned to 51 mm (probably 25, 4 mm of plating and the same amount of NT steel on top of it), while it was of a lower height and ended long before the stem, closing with a traverse of the same 51 mm thickness, the plates of which also converged "House", that is, at an angle to the center plane of the ship.
According to the project, the armored deck was supposed to become even weaker than that of the Rinaun - instead of 25 mm in the horizontal part and 51 mm on the bevels, the Koreyjes received 19 and 25 mm, respectively. However, after the Battle of Jutland, the project was hastily reworked, adding another 25 mm to the armored deck, so it reached 44-51 mm. It is interesting that such an innovation, which significantly increased the protection of the cruiser, cost the shipbuilders only 116 tons.
I must say that the horizontal protection of the Koreyjes was generally quite good - in addition to the aforementioned armored deck, there was also a main deck, an inch thick (25.4 mm) above the citadel. The forecastle deck also received a local reinforcement of armor - outside the citadel its thickness was 25 mm, and within the citadel its thickness reached 19-25 mm, but not over the entire area of the deck, but only at the sides. The lower deck was located below the waterline outside the citadel - in the bow it was 25 mm thick, in the stern - the same 25 mm, which increased to 76 mm above the steering.
The ships also received 38 mm thick anti-torpedo bulkheads, stretching across the entire citadel, from the barbette to the barbette - from the ends they were "closed" with 25 mm traverses.
The turrets of the main caliber had similar armor to those installed on the Rhinaun-class cruisers - 229 mm frontal plate, 178 mm side plates and barbets. The latter, however, were heterogeneous - in the part facing the chimney, their thickness decreased to 152 mm. It must be said that the barbets had such a thickness up to the main deck, that is, for a considerable length, the supply pipes were protected not only by a 178 mm barbet, but also by 25 + 51 mm steel sides or 76 mm traverses. The 457 mm Furyes turret mounts had similar protection, except that the side walls of the turrets, like the front plates, were 229 mm thick.
The wheelhouse had quite an impressive 254 mm armor of the side walls, 76 mm of flooring and a 51 mm thick roof. The stern (torpedo control) had 76 mm walls and 19-38 mm roofs.
Power plant
Unlike Rhinaun and Ripals, which "borrowed" the design of machines and boilers from the battle cruiser Tiger, the Korejges' power plant copied (with minor changes) the installations of the Calliope-class light cruisers - only in a doubled version, four turbine units instead of two and 18 boilers versus 9. Due to the use of thin-tube boilers, this power plant had a better power density than that of "Rinaun", which had the most beneficial effect on its weight. The nominal power was supposed to be 90,000 hp, while the Koreyjes were supposed to develop 32 knots steadily, and the larger and wider Furies had to be half a knot less.
There are different opinions about what actually happened. Thus, O. Parks writes that "Koreyges" and "Glories" in daily operation easily developed 32 nodes, without informing at the same time any specifics, but V. B. Hubby gives the results of a run on the Arran measured mile (where only the Glories was tested). According to his data, the power plant of the "large light cruiser" did not reach the planned capacity, showing only 88,550 hp, which provided the ship with a speed of 31.25 knots. However, the following fact suggests thoughts - V. B. Muzhenikov indicates that the ship developed this speed, being in its design normal displacement, that is, 17,400 tons. But the actual normal displacement of the ship was 19,320 tons, and even O. Parks indicates 18,600 tons! Obviously, in such a normal displacement, the Glories' speed would be even lower, most likely, it would be somewhere between 30 and 31 knots, probably no more than 30.5 knots. On the other hand, V. B. Muzhenikov points out that the "Koreyges" with the power of mechanisms 93,700 hp. showed 31, 58 knots, and at 91,200 hp. - 30, 8 knots, while the ship's displacement was 22,100 tons.
In other words, the data on the speed of "large light cruisers" are very contradictory, although, without a doubt, they were very fast.
The fuel reserves were at a normal displacement of 750 tons for all three ships, with a full displacement - 3,160 tons for "Glories" and "Korejes", and 3 393 tons for "Furyes". Full stock was supposed to give them a range of 6,000 miles at a speed of 20 knots, which would be an extremely outstanding result.
Project evaluation
As we have said many times before, a ship should be judged according to its ability to perform its assigned tasks. And with this, the "big light cruisers" are doing not just badly, but very badly - and not because they did not correspond to their tasks, but because when they were created, no one formulated a list of tasks for ships of such a strange class.
It is known that "large light cruisers" appeared thanks to the views of the First Sea Lord, but, alas, D. Fisher himself voiced only one task for them - shelling the shores:
The Furies and her tribe were not meant to fight enemy ships. They were built for Berlin and had to penetrate shallow waters, which is why they were so fragile … their guns were so powerful and their shells so huge. These ships were supposed to make it impossible to resist the Russian landing on the coast of Pomerania. " The craters from their shells "had to be so huge that the human eye could not fully cover them, while the accuracy of the fire had to be very high … This spectacle was to accompany the German army during its flight from Pomerania to Berlin."
The first sea lord spoke very poetically - the human eye could easily cover even a crater from a megaton nuclear explosion, and, with all due respect to the British 381-mm artillery, its shells were still slightly less destructive. But logically speaking, two characteristics of a battleship are most useful for shelling the coast - firing range and draft. Obviously, the further the ship's guns can throw their shells, the more time the landing force advancing will receive their support. It is no less obvious that the less the ship's draft, the closer it will be able to approach the coastline.
Of course, in terms of the totality of these qualities, "large light cruisers" were superior to any "capital" ships of the Royal Navy (due to draft) and light cruisers (due to powerful guns), but at the same time they obviously lost to such a rather unusual class of warships, such as monitors. Let us take, for comparison, monitors of the Erebus type, laid down later than the Koreyjes, but still in the same 1915.
Their normal displacement was 8,000 tons, the draft was only 3, 56 m against more than 7 m of the "Koreyges", and even if we compare the design draft of the "light cruiser" - 6, 71 m, the advantage of the monitor is obvious. At the same time, the "Erebus" was armed with two 381-mm guns, located in one turret, however, the maximum elevation angle was increased from 20 to 30 degrees, which gave a significant increase in the firing range, which, unfortunately, different sources indicate differently … It is known that the firing range of 381 mm guns at an elevation angle of 20 degrees was about 22 420 m or 121 cables. As for the monitors, they are assigned a range of 29 260 m (158.5 kbt) or even 33 380 - 36 500 m (180-197 kbt). Perhaps the latest figures correspond to the use of an enhanced combat charge, but, without a doubt, the Erebus cannon mounts provided a significantly greater firing range than the Koreyges and Glories turrets.
Thus, we can state that "large light cruisers" were not the optimal class of ships for shelling the coast. But what other tasks could they solve? V. B. Muzhenikov points out that according to the British (most likely - one Englishman named John Fisher), the Korejzes were needed to cross the Danish Straits and to support the light forces of the fleet. Well, let's see.
The Danish Straits are very narrow sections of the sea between the Jutland and Scandinavian peninsulas. To come from the North Sea to the Baltic Sea, you first need to cross the Skagerrak Strait (about 240 km in length and 80-90 km in width), then - Kattegat (about 200 km long, width in various sections - from 60 to 122 km). It is noteworthy that even a relatively shallow Kattegat still has a depth of 10 to 30 m, and it is obvious that fast ships with a small displacement are not needed at all to force them.
However, following the Kattegat Strait, we find ourselves in a small archipelago blocking the passage from the strait to the Baltic Sea. Bypassing its islands, three straits lead to the Baltic - Small Belt, Big Belt and Øresund, the minimum width of which is, respectively, 0.5; 3, 7 and 10, 5 km.
Obviously, it is here that the British would have been waiting for the most "hot" meeting - it is very convenient to defend such straits based on coastal positions, the defense will be extremely effective. But to break through such a defense using fast, but weakly protected ships of the "Koreyges" type is simply pointless - here we need heavily armed and heavily armored ships capable of suppressing large-caliber coastal batteries, withstanding their return fire. In other words, battleships were needed to break through the Danish Straits, and it is difficult to think of which class of ships would meet this designation less than small battle cruisers, which were essentially ships of the "Koreyges" class. Consequently, "large light cruisers" were not needed to break through the straits.
And finally, the last is the support of the light forces. I would like to dwell on this issue in more detail. Strictly speaking, there are two concepts of such support.
Option 1 - we a priori believe that our light forces should be able to "deal" with enemy ships of the same class and charge them with it. In this case, the task of the support ships is to prevent enemy support ships from "offending" our light forces. So, for example, light cruisers and destroyers of the British and Germans were supported by battle cruisers, respectively, and both needed battle cruisers or similar ships to counterbalance the "support" of the enemy. This does not mean, of course, that battlecruisers should not have taken part in the defeat of the enemy's light forces, if they had such an opportunity, but their main function is still not this.
Option 2 - we are creating ships not in order to fight on equal terms with enemy support ships, but in order to quickly destroy enemy light forces and thereby ensure our light forces perform their assigned tasks. Take, for example, such an interesting class of ships as destroyer leaders. In the years when they appeared, the destroyers were supported by light cruisers. The leaders, being, in fact, larger, faster and heavily armed destroyers, were still not able to fight on equal terms with light cruisers, but they could effectively destroy enemy destroyers without distracting their own destroyers from their assigned tasks.
It is clear that such a division is very arbitrary, but the point is that the ships of the "Koreyges" type did not correspond to the first, and were not optimal for the second of the above concepts.
As we said above, the light forces of England and Germany were usually supported by battlecruisers, but the Korejges, due to extremely weak defense (compared to battlecruisers), could not fight them on equal terms. Accordingly, they did not correspond to the first of the concepts described above. On the other hand, the Koreyjes possessed an almost "indestructible" stronghold for medium-caliber artillery at a very high speed (exceeding that of light cruisers) and ultimatum-powerful guns. Thus, although they were not able to shield their light forces from enemy battlecruisers, they could (at least in theory) quickly crush enemy light cruisers.that is, to disperse the enemy's light forces and thereby save our own - thus, the Korejzes seemed to correspond to the second of the concepts we have outlined.
But the fact is that for the destruction of enemy light forces "large light cruisers" were completely redundant. Recall that when Britain was faced with the task of protecting its communications from enemy light cruisers, it created the first heavy cruisers of the Hawkins class.
These ships had a sufficient combination of protection, speed and power of their 190-mm artillery so as not to leave a chance for any of the light cruisers armed with 105-152-mm cannons, but at the same time their displacement did not exceed 10,000 tons (in fact, about 9,800 tons). Such cruisers would have been quite enough to lead the light forces - like the Koreyges, they were capable of crushing enemy light cruisers, just as the Koreyges could not resist the battle cruisers, just as the Koreyges could escape from them along with other light forces.
On the one hand, one can argue here that one "large light cruiser" can perform the functions of both a monitor and a heavy cruiser, but a monitor and a heavy cruiser cannot replace each other. But one monitor (8,000 tons) and one heavy cruiser (9,800 tons) together would most likely have a comparable price to the Koreyges, while the Royal Navy would receive two ships instead of one. And this gave a certain advantage: yes, "Koreyges" could perform the functions of both, but could not do it at the same time. At the same time, the firing range that was lower than that of the monitor seriously limited the range of tasks for shelling the coast that it could perform. So, for example, the enormous firing range of the Erebus was dictated by the desire to get a ship that could fire at coastal targets outside the German 280-mm and 380-mm coastal guns stationed in Flanders, and the Koreyges obviously had such an advantage did not possess (or possessed, but to a much lesser extent). He, perhaps, could destroy enemy light cruisers somewhat more efficiently than the Hawkins would have done, but its size and cost did not allow the Koreyges to be considered as a consumable, which, by and large, were recognized by British cruisers. In other words, it was too big a ship to risk as much as the lighter ones could.
Pocket battleships of England and Germany
The author of this article has repeatedly met the following point of view “on the Internet”: the capabilities of “large light cruisers” of the “Koreyges” type and German “pocket battleships” of the “Deutschland” type are quite comparable. However, the Deutschlands are considered to be very successful ships, while the "white elephants" of the Koreyges class are a deafening failure, and this is incorrect in relation to British shipbuilding.
Of course, there is a certain rational kernel in such reasoning, but nevertheless they cannot be recognized as correct, and the point is this. As you know, the Germans, designing their "pickpockets", wanted to get at the exit raiders - "destroyers" of British trade, able to cope with its "defenders". In those years, the strongest ships entrusted with the protection of British communications were the "Washington" cruisers of the "Kent" class, which had a standard displacement of up to 10,000 tons and an armament of 8 * 203-mm guns, capable of speeds up to 31.5 knots.
What did the Germans do? They created a ship of slightly larger displacement (the standard displacement of "pocket battleships" ranged from 11,700 to 12,100 tons), which, due to the lower speed, received much stronger weapons (6 * 283-mm) and possessed significant, if not overwhelming advantage over the "Washington" cruiser in firepower. As a result, the "pocket battleship" of Germany was a type of ship that was really faster than almost everyone who could destroy it and stronger than everyone who could catch up with it - the exception was only three battle cruisers of England, but you need to understand that they were sent to protect communications, in general, did not guarantee success in the search for raiders, but it significantly weakened the fleet of the Metropolis.
Of course, the ships of the "Deutschland" type were not ideal ships - here are the features of the diesel power plant, and the relative weakness of the armor, which did not guarantee protection against 203-mm shells, and the number of high-speed heavy ships capable of catching up and destroying "pocket battleships" in the British and French fleets grew steadily. Nevertheless, they retained their combat significance for a long time, at least as ships capable of "tearing apart" the forces of the Grand Fleet and thus ensuring the actions of the battleships of the Kriegsmarine. And most importantly, being really stronger than the "Washington" cruisers, they, at best, were 10-15% larger than the latter. In fact, "pocket battleships" were quite a specific type of heavy cruisers - and nothing more.
And what about Koreyges? Of course, its cruising range, seaworthiness and speed made it a very formidable ship for counter-raider combat. He was faster, better armed, more protected … But at what price were all these improvements bought? Beginning in 1914, the Germans laid the light cruisers of the Koenigsberg class, which turned out to be the most modern, but also the largest among all German ships of this class. Their normal displacement was 5,440 tons. And the "counter-raider" "Koreyges", as we remember, had a normal displacement of 19,320 tons, that is, not 15% or even 30%, but more than 3.5 times more. than the German light cruisers, which he should have hunted for. And the author of this article is absolutely sure that if the Germans, instead of their "pickpockets", created ships of 35 thousand tons, capable of destroying "Washington" cruisers, but at the same time absolutely helpless in front of high-speed battleships and battle cruisers, then no one would call them great achievement of German shipbuilding.
