In the last article, we examined the possibilities of artillery armament for Svetlana-class cruisers in comparison with their foreign counterparts and came to the conclusion that Svetlana has a significant advantage over foreign cruisers in this parameter. But any advantage is good only when it can be realized, and here the question arises for Svetlana. As a matter of fact, just a glance at the side projection of the cruiser suggests that the bulk of its guns are located very low from the waterline, and has it ever happened that in fresh weather it was overwhelmed by water, making artillery fire ineffective or even impossible?
In fact, of course, the flooding of the upper deck with water in fresh weather depends on many factors, and not only on its height above sea level. So, for example, the emergence on the wave is very important. For a ship with acceptable cross-country ability, it is enough to have a high forecastle: the upper deck behind it will not be too flooded. This is probably why German shipbuilders, despite their rich experience in operating cruisers during and before World War I, were not shy about low placement of weapons, even in their post-war projects.
Nevertheless, there is every reason to assert that the Svetlan's seaworthiness was not very good: despite the high forecastle, the bow contours were such that the cruiser did not strive to ascend, but to cut the wave. There are indications that in fresh weather at high speed, two or even all four 130-mm guns could not be used due to heavy splashing, although it is not clear from the source text whether this is documentary evidence or the author's opinion. It should be noted that of all the foreign cruisers that we are considering, only "Caroline" had an equally low positioned artillery, while the rest of the ships were placed much higher.
But here's what's interesting: the seaworthiness of "Caroline" and "Danae" themselves the British considered very low. As for the German "Konigsbergs", the sources differ here: the Germans themselves claim that the seaworthiness of their ships was beyond praise, but the British consider it completely unacceptable by the standards of the British fleet. In the absence of measurable evaluation criteria, one can only guess at the comparative seaworthiness of the cruisers, but, most likely, the English Chester was the best among all the ships compared to the Svetlana. And, regardless of how high the flooding rate of the Svetlan artillery actually was, its low location does not paint the project: in terms of the height of the Svetlana artillery location, together with Caroline, they share the least honorable last place. Although, we repeat, it is completely unclear to what extent the distribution of places in this rating influenced the capabilities of artillery in fresh weather.
Anti-aircraft and torpedo armament
The anti-aircraft weapons of cruisers do not make much sense to consider: they were in a very rudimentary state on all ships of the First World War and performed, rather, the task of driving off enemy aircraft, rather than destroying them. For this purpose, several small-caliber artillery guns with an increased vertical guidance angle were usually placed on the cruisers. In this regard, the four 63.5-mm guns and four Maxim machine guns, which were planned to be installed on the Svetlana, were quite adequate and approximately corresponded (and even exceeded) the anti-aircraft armament of foreign cruisers: the German ones had two 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, " Caroline "- one 76 mm and four 47, and so on. Much more interesting is what anti-aircraft weapons the Svetlana received after their completion in the 1920s, but we will return to this issue later.
In terms of torpedo armament, the Svetlana were obvious outsiders. In the first versions of the project, it was supposed to install up to 12 torpedo tubes on the ship due to the fact that cruisers of this type were supposed to launch destroyers into a torpedo attack, and, therefore, in the opinion of the admirals, they themselves could be at a torpedo shot distance from the enemy. But in the end, the matter was limited to only two traverse torpedo tubes.
Of all the foreign cruisers, only the Chester had similar weapons (two traverse torpedo tubes), but its torpedo weapons were much more powerful. The fact is that the Russian imperial fleet was late with the transition to 533-mm torpedoes. The British developed their first 533-mm torpedo back in 1908 and put it into service in 1910. We continued to arm even the newest Noviks with 450-mm torpedoes. In principle, they were quite reliable weapons, but in terms of range and mass of explosives, they were much inferior to the 533-mm "self-propelled mines" of the First World War. So, the Russian torpedo could pass 2,000 m at a speed of 43 knots, while the British 533-mm Mark II model of 1914 - 4,000 m at 45 knots, while the "Englishwoman" carried 234 kg of TNT, while Russian - only 112 kg. Therefore, in terms of torpedo armament, Svetlana was outperformed by both Chester and Caroline, which had four 533-mm torpedoes and, of course, Danae, which carried four three-pipe 533-mm torpedo tubes.
The German G7s of the 1910 model, capable of traversing 4,000 m at 37 knots and carrying 195 kg of hexonite, were inferior in their combat capabilities to the British ones, but alas, they were also superior to domestic torpedoes. At the same time, the "Konigsbergs" carried two single-tube rotary and two underwater torpedo tubes.
Thus, we can say that the torpedo armament of domestic cruisers was completely inadequate and in its original form, in general, and unnecessary. The only thing that, perhaps, were capable of traverse torpedo tubes - to sink the detained and stopped transports. But actions on communications were not a priority for the Svetlan, and during the battle, at high speeds, there was always the danger of the torpedo not leaving the traverse apparatus (a strong oncoming stream of water). And the accuracy of shooting left much to be desired. Therefore, during the post-war completion of the torpedo armament "Svetlan" was replaced and dramatically strengthened, but this happened later. And in its design form, "Svetlana" was inferior even to the Austro-Hungarian "Admiral Spaun", which carried 4 torpedo tubes with a caliber of 450 mm.
Reservation
The Svetlan booking system was simple and efficient.
The basis of vertical armor was a 75-mm armor belt with a height of 2.1 m, on the upper edge of which the lower deck rested. With a normal displacement, this armor belt was 0.9 m under water. At the same time, as far as can be understood, their total length of the cruiser is 154.8 m along the waterline, 75 mm armor was protected by 150 m from the stem in the stern, where the armor belt ended with a 50 mm traverse - 25 mm armor plates of the same height were protected from it and further aft (2, 1m).
Thus, the Svetlan's armor belt was solid and covering the entire waterline, but at the last about 5 meters its thickness decreased to 25 mm. It is also worth mentioning that his armor plates were stacked on top of 9-10 mm plating. Above the main armor belt, the space between the lower and upper decks was protected by 25 mm armor along the entire length of the ship. Interestingly, in this case, the armor plates were not laid on top of the skin, but they themselves were it and participated in ensuring the longitudinal strength of the hull. The height of this upper armor belt was 2.25 m.
The upper and lower decks of the ship along the entire length of the hull consisted of 20 mm armor plates. Thus, by and large, the protection of the Svetlana-class cruisers consisted of an armored box almost the entire length of the ship 75 mm thick, covered from above with 20-mm armor, on top of which a second armored box with a vertical wall thickness of 25 mm, also covered from above 20 -mm armor.
It is usually stated that all the armor of the Svetlana-class cruisers was produced by the Krupp method, while only 75-mm armor plates and an armored cutter were cemented, and the rest of the armor was homogeneous. However, this is very doubtful, since, most likely, they could not yet produce cemented slabs with a thickness of 75 mm either in Russia or in the world. Most likely, only the wheelhouse was protected with cemented armor plates.
In addition, the Svetlana armored ammunition supply elevators (25 mm), chimneys between the lower and upper decks, and for the bow pipe - up to the forecastle deck (20 mm), the conning tower (walls - 125 mm, roof - 75 mm, floor - 25 mm), as well as shields protecting the guns (according to various sources - 20-25 mm. But the casemates of the cruiser were not protected by armor.
In general, it can be stated that the Svetlan armor almost ideally protected against all calibers of the then artillery of 152 mm, inclusive. Its 75-mm armor belt could be pierced by an armor-piercing 152-mm projectile from a distance of about 25, possibly 30 cables. But at such a distance, of course, an enemy cruiser could only come up at night, and during the day, firing such shells at Svetlana did not make sense. At the same time, the "upper floor" of armor protection (20 mm deck and 25 mm side), of course, did not protect against high-explosive six-inch shells, but forced them to explode when overcoming it, and fragments of such shells could no longer penetrate the second 20 mm deck. At the same time, the upper 25 mm belt, although it could not withstand a direct hit, was still quite capable of protecting against shell fragments that exploded in the water next to the cruiser.
But there was one more very interesting nuance. Still, a 20-mm armored deck is not too much, and a high-explosive 152-mm projectile that exploded on it may well break it, hitting the armor-plated space with both fragments of the projectile itself and fragments of the armor plate. Wouldn't it have been better, instead of two decks of 20 mm each, to make one 40 mm, which is almost guaranteed to protect against six-inch shells?
But here's what is interesting: if, say, the same high-explosive 152-mm projectile hits the upper, 25-mm armor belt, it detonates either in the process of breaking through such armor, or immediately after overcoming it. In this case, the explosion will occur between the upper and lower decks - and you can be sure that the projectile fragments will not go either down or up, as the explosion will occur in the armored box, covered by 20 mm armor plates from above and below. Why protect the bottom, it is clear, because there are artillery cellars, engine and boiler rooms, mechanisms. But there are numerous guns at the top, and if you make the upper deck of ordinary 8-10-mm structural steel, then the fragments of a shell that exploded in the hull, piercing the upper deck, are able to mess things up, mowing down artillery crews. Two armored decks completely exclude such troubles, and this is a very important advantage of the project of the Russian ship.
And what about the cruisers of other countries?
Let's start with the British scout Caroline.
Its sides were protected by 76, 2-mm armor, which was thinned towards the nose, first to 57, 2, and then to 38 mm. In the stern, the belt thinned to 50, 8-63, 5 mm, but did not reach the end of the stern. The Caroline did not have an upper armored belt, but in the area of the engine and boiler rooms 76.2 mm armor plates did not rise to the lower deck, as in the Svetlana, but to the upper, ie. the space between the lower and upper decks had a protection of 76, 2 mm, and not 25 mm, as on a domestic cruiser. But only above the engine and boiler rooms, the rest of the side over the armor belt had no protection.
As for the armoring of the decks, everything was not good here, because it was not solid, but fragmentary: the engine and boiler rooms and the steering compartment in the stern were covered with 25-mm armor plates. The rest of the deck had no protection.
What about the protection of Caroline-class cruisers? It should be noted that it is very detailed for a ship with a normal displacement of 4,219 tons (at the time of commissioning). Without a doubt, the British put a lot of effort into protecting their scouts and achieved outstanding results: but, of course, it was impossible to provide a level of booking comparable to a Russian cruiser on a ship of this size.
The British were forced to abandon, in fact, the armor, using instead of it steel grade HT (High Tensile Steel - high resistance steel). The advantage was that this "armor" was at the same time the skin of the cruiser, by analogy with the 25 mm upper belt of the "Svetlana". So, for example, as can be understood from the description, the 76, 2 mm belt consisted of two layers of HTS - 25, 4 mm, which, in fact, played the role of sheathing and 50, 8 mm over the first.
Thus, it should be borne in mind that the 75 mm armor belt "Svetlan" cannot be directly compared with the 76, 2 m belt of the British - nevertheless, our cruiser had 9-10 mm plating behind the armor, while the British cruiser did not have “under the armor " nothing. And besides, although it can be assumed that the HTS was close to Krupp's uncemented armor in its defensive qualities, it was still not its equivalent. Unfortunately, the author of this article does not have accurate data on the composition and armor resistance of HTS, but according to his data, STS (Special Treatment Steel) was a certain analogue of homogeneous armor in England, and HTS was just a slightly improved shipbuilding steel.
Most likely, the sections of the Caroline's sides, which had 76, 2 mm thickness, were completely indestructible for high-explosive shells at almost any combat distance, but this cannot be said about the ends, especially since, according to some data, the armor belt at the waterline closer to the stem did not have 38 mm, but only 25.4 mm thick. The armored deck did not protect much from anything at all - since the upper deck was armored, a high-explosive projectile (or its fragments) entering from sharp bow or stern corners could well pass into the engine or boiler rooms bypassing the armor. And the same extremities, having no horizontal protection, could be pierced by shrapnel through and through, including the bottom of the ship.
As for the other protection, it was very impressive: 152-mm conning tower and 76-mm gun shields. It is very difficult to say how justified are shields of this thickness - it is probably not so easy to aim a gun with such a mass of armor. But the most important thing is that having paid great attention to the thickness of the protection, the British for some reason did not bother with its area at all, which left a large gap between the shield and the deck, through which the fragments hit the crews of the guns bypassing the "indestructible" shield.
Yet, despite all the shortcomings, Caroline should be considered a very well protected cruiser for her size.
The last "towns", light cruisers "Chester" and "Birkenhead".
Unfortunately, the scheme of their booking could not be found, and the available descriptions may not be entirely correct. The fact is that the booking of cruisers-"cities" has been gradually improved from one type to another, and here confusion is possible. According to the data available to the author, the protection of these cruisers looked like this: an extended armored belt, starting at the stem and ending, a little short of the stern, had a thickness of 51 mm, and along the engine and boiler rooms - 76, 2 mm (in the bow, perhaps only 38 mm). In the area of boiler rooms and engine rooms to the upper deck, but the cruiser had a very extended forecastle, so that there was still one unarmored interdeck space between the upper edge of the armor belt and the guns.
According to some reports, the armor belt was 25, 4-51 mm armor plates on 25, 4 mm "base" HTS, i.e. 76, 2-51 mm it was assigned "in total" of the thickness of the skin and armor. On top of its upper edge was a rather original armor deck, which had 19 mm above the engine and boiler rooms, 38 mm above the steering gear, and in other places - only 10 mm of armor (or was it HTS again?). In any case, it can only be argued that for a ship with a normal displacement of 5,185 tons, the armor does not strike the imagination at all and is obviously inferior to the Svetlana, especially in terms of horizontal protection.
Nevertheless, "Chester" was considered an excellently protected light cruiser and will demonstrate its capabilities in real combat. In the Battle of Jutland, he "stood up" under the fire of the 2nd reconnaissance group, including the cruisers "Frankfurt", "Wiesbaden", "Pillau" and "Elbing", and the battle began at a distance of no more than 30 cables. In less than 20 minutes, the cruiser received 17 150-mm high-explosive shells, nevertheless, the protection did its job. True, some 76, 2 mm armor plates had to be changed after being hit by German shells, but in any case, they fulfilled their main task - to prevent the destruction of boiler rooms and engine rooms and to prevent serious flooding.
"Danae". Among all British cruisers, this one is most rationally protected: an extended belt almost along its entire length, 38 mm in the bow, 57 mm against artillery cellars, 76, 2 mm against engine and boiler rooms (and here the belt rose to the upper deck), and in other places 50, 8 mm. But, alas, not from armor, but again from HTS. The armored deck finally got the coveted inch (25.4 mm), at least above the boiler rooms, engine rooms and artillery cellars (and also, probably, above the steering gear), but … it seems that the rest of the deck was not armored at all. In addition to the above, the "box" protection of the cellars - 12.7 mm vertical and 25.4 mm horizontal protection is of undoubted interest. As for the guns, their shields were significantly improved, increasing the area, but reducing the thickness to 25.4 mm.
German "Konigsbergs". Everything is more or less simple here. The Germans considered that the scheme they used on the Magdeburg was ideal for light cruisers and replicated it on all subsequent series, including the post-war Emden.
An armored belt with a thickness of 60 mm protected most of the waterline, behind it was an armored deck with bevels. At the same time, its horizontal part, which had 20 mm thickness, was located at the level of the upper edge of the armor belt (the level of the lower deck) and the bevels were adjacent to the lower edge. At the same time, the horizontal part of the armored deck had only 20 mm (probably in the area of the cellars - 40 mm), but the bevels were 40 mm. In the stern, this protection ended with an 80 mm traverse from the lower edge of which, at the level of the waterline in the stern, a new armored deck with bevels continued, which had a uniform booking of 40 mm. In the bow, the citadel ended before the end of the armor belt, with a 40 mm traverse, and then a 20 mm armored deck (probably also with bevels) went into the nose. The deckhouse had 100 mm walls and 20 mm roof, artillery - 50 mm shields.
The advantages of the German defense were in a completely "indestructible" citadel - it is doubtful that a 152-mm projectile could overcome a 60 mm armor belt and a 40 mm bevel even at close range, so the engine and boiler rooms were protected "perfectly" from the flat fire. But only 20 mm of the horizontal part of the armored deck could still be penetrated at a great distance. One can, of course, say that the Germans were preparing for war in the North Sea, where, due to weather conditions, the distances of the artillery battle are relatively low and it is necessary, first of all, to protect their ships from flat, and not from hinged fire. But there is one significant "but" - after all, the British created dual-purpose cruisers, capable not only of serving with a squadron, but also of pirating on ocean communications - and here, in raids on the Indian or Pacific oceans, horizontal protection would be very useful …
And besides, the German reservation system had another flaw - providing the ship's buoyancy with an extended belt along the waterline and perfectly protecting what is below this very waterline, the Germans left the rest of the ship with only the most fragmented protection, which was given by gun shields and an armored jacket. That is, almost any German cruiser could be crushed by high-explosive shells to a complete loss of combat capability, and its armor protection almost did not interfere with this.
As for the Austro-Hungarian "Admiral Brown", all its protection is a 60-mm armor belt covering the engine and boiler rooms and a 20 mm armored deck above it: apparently, the extremities outside the citadel were not protected by armor at all. Sources have different opinions regarding felling - 50 or 20 mm. Of course, the guns were behind the shields, but the author of this article was unable to find out their thickness. Undoubtedly, "Admiral Brown" is the least protected cruiser of all, taken for comparison with "Svetlana", but let's be fair: it was very difficult to provide even such a level of armor protection to a fast ship of only 3,500 tons of normal displacement.
All doubts, among all the above cruisers, the best protection was received by domestic ships of the "Svetlana" type.
Speed and power plant
The British had a very interesting view of the speed of cruisers. They believed that for the "defenders of trade" operating on communications, a speed of 25-25.5 knots would be sufficient, while a cruiser needed a speed of at least 30 knots to lead the destroyers.
At the same time, the "towns", that is, cruisers of the Bristol, Weymouth and, of course, "Chatham" types, confirmed in practice their planned characteristics, providing 25-25, 5 knots of full speed, while the power plants of these ships worked mainly coal. The last cruisers - "Towns", "Chester" and "Birkenhead", received oil heating and demonstrated a speed of one knot more.
The Scouts were supposed to be faster, so Caroline got oil-fired boilers. Four turbines were to develop 7,500 hp without afterburner. each, the speed was supposed to be 28 knots, but an afterburner was also envisaged, in which the cruiser had to go up to eight hours. The power of each turbine on afterburner was supposed to be 10,000 hp. but in practice nothing worked out - the maximum speed of the Caroline-class cruisers barely reached 28.5 knots. The Danae-class cruisers turned out to be somewhat faster, developing from 28 to 29, 184 knots. The Danae itself was once able to develop even a record 30.4 knots, with a machine power of 40,463 hp. but this result was not recorded, because the ship, subsequently, could not repeat it on a measured mile.
As for the German "Konigsbergs", they, in contrast to the British "scouts", retained partly coal, partly oil heating. This may seem like a strange anachronism, but only if we forget about one of the most important functions of German light cruisers - the war on communications. In those years, raiders often replenished coal reserves, reloading those from the ships they captured. This was not the best solution, because the quality of coal from conventional transport steamers, of course, could not be compared with the cardiff for warships. Of course, it was much preferable for the raider commanders to use the services of special coal miners to ensure their operations, but this was not always possible. But the raider could keep some emergency supply of high-quality coal in case of pursuit of enemy warships and battle, and daily use the reserves "expropriated" from the captured ships.
Of course, a cruiser on pure oil heating was deprived of such an opportunity. In those years, only coal was ubiquitous, and it was almost impossible to replenish stocks of liquid fuel. Therefore, the Germans were forced to continue using coal on their cruisers. Perhaps it was because of the above that the German cruisers were not super-fast, but they still developed a speed that was quite decent for their time - 27, 5-27, 8 knots. The Austro-Hungarian cruisers developed a little over 27 knots, but their running gears were so unreliable that this imposed restrictions on their participation in combat operations.
Accordingly, the light cruisers of the "Svetlana" type, capable of developing 29.5 knots (and confirming their high-speed qualities after completion), turned out to be the fastest of all the ships we considered.
So, among the British, German and Austro-Hungarian cruisers, domestic "Svetlans" carried the most formidable artillery weapons, were the fastest and best armored. But what price did you have to pay for all these advantages?
Previous articles in the series:
Light cruisers of the "Svetlana" class
Svetlana-class cruisers. Part 2. Artillery
Light cruisers of the "Svetlana" class. Part 3. Firepower versus peers
