So, up to this point, we have compared the cruisers of the First World War era with the "Svetlana", which would have turned out if the ship had been completed according to the original project. Well, now we will see how this cruiser got into service.
"Svetlana" almost got ahead of the war - if not for the February revolution, the cruiser would probably still have entered the fleet by November 1917. But this did not happen, and after Moonsund fell and there was a threat to capture Revel (Tallinn) by German troops, the ship, loaded with factory equipment and materials for completion, was transferred by tugs to the pool of the Admiralty Plant. By this time, the ship's readiness for the hull was 85%, and for the mechanisms it is not known exactly, but not less than 75%. Despite the resumption of construction work, "Svetlana", unfortunately, did not succeed in commissioning until the end of the war, but the cruiser was still in a very high technical readiness.
This predetermined its completion: on October 29, 1924, the USSR Labor and Defense Council approved the report of the Supreme Government Commission on the allocation of appropriations for the completion of the head Svetlana in the Baltic and the Admiral Nakhimov, which was in a high degree of readiness, in the Black Sea. "Nakhimov" (now - "Chervona Ukraine") entered service on March 21, 1927, and "Svetlana" ("Profintern") - on July 1, 1928.
The design of the ships practically did not change, and we will not repeat ourselves describing it, but the weapons and fire control of the cruisers have been modernized. The main caliber remained the same - 130 mm / 55 gun mod. 1913, like the number of barrels (15), but the maximum vertical guidance angle was increased from 20 to 30 degrees. However, the biggest innovation was the transition to new types of shells. Generally speaking, the 130-mm artillery systems of the Russian fleet received a lot of different types of shells, including remote, diving, and lighting, but we will only touch on those that were intended to destroy ships.
If before the revolution, 130-mm artillery used shells weighing 36, 86 kg with 4, 71 kg of explosives, then the Naval Forces of the Red Army (MS Red Army) switched to lightweight ammunition of several types, and their variety is amazing. So, for example, two types of semi-armor-piercing shells entered service, one of which contained 2.35 kg of explosives (PB-46A, drawing number 2-02138), and the other - only 1.67 kg. (PB-46, drawing number 2-918A), despite the fact that the PB-46A projectile was only 100 grams heavier than the PB-46 (33.5 kg versus 33.4 kg). Why two different shells of the same purpose were needed is completely unclear. With high-explosive shells, the same confusion. The fleet received a high-explosive F-46 (drawing number 2-01641) weighing 33.4 kg with 2.71 kg of explosives and three (!!!) types of high-explosive fragmentation shells. At the same time, two types having the same name OF-46, the same mass (33, 4 kg), but different fuses (both could use RGM and V-429, but one could also use RGM-6, and on the second - no) were made according to different drawings (2-05339 and 2-05340) and had a similar, but still different content of explosives 3, 58-3, 65 kg. But the third high-explosive fragmentation projectile, referred to as OFU-46, which had a slightly lower mass (33, 17 kg) and was equipped with a kind of adapter sleeve (what this is, the author of this article could not figure out), had only 2, 71 kg of explosives.
And it would be fine if these shells were adopted sequentially, then a change in their characteristics could be justified by a change in manufacturing technologies, materials or views on the use of 130-mm artillery in battle. But no! All of the aforementioned shells are considered to be of the 1928 model, i.e. were adopted at the same time.
It is interesting, however, that the same Shirokorad indicates only semi-armor-piercing with 1.67 kg and high-explosive fragmentation with 2.71 kg of explosives, so it cannot be ruled out that the rest were either not accepted for service or were not produced in noticeable quantities. But on the other hand, the works of the same Shirokorad contain, alas, many inaccuracies, so one should not rely on them as the ultimate truth.
In general, it can be stated that the Soviet 130-mm cannons ended up with a continuous striped pattern with the shells, but nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn. The MS of the Red Army switched to lighter, but at the same time less powerful shells with a low content of explosives. However, due to this, they were able to significantly increase the firing range of "Profintern" and "Chervona Ukrainy".
The fact is that at an elevation angle of 30 degrees, an old, 36, 86 kg projectile fired at a speed of 823 m / s? flew at 18 290 m (about 98 cables), while the new 33, 5 kg projectiles with an initial speed of 861 m / s - at 22 315 m, or just over 120 cables! In other words, with the new projectiles, the range of the Profintern's artillery came close to the capabilities of the then fire control systems to correct the firing. It is extremely doubtful that any cruiser of any country in the late 1920s or 1930s of the last century could effectively fire at a range of over 120 kbt.
Lightweight shells, of course, had other advantages. It was easier for the calculations to "tilt" them, carrying out loading, and besides, the shells were corny cheaper, which was very important for the poor USSR at that time. However, behind all these pluses remained (and, according to the author, outweighed them) the minus that the power of the shells was greatly weakened. If, when firing old arr 1911 g, "Svetlana" surpassed the "Danae" in the mass of the side salvo and in the mass of explosives in the side salvo, then with the new high-explosive projectiles (33, 4 kg, 2, 71-3, 68 kg the mass of explosives) inferior in both parameters, having 268 kg of an onboard salvo against 271, 8 kg with a mass of explosives in it 21, 68-29, 44 kg of explosives against 36 kg of explosives from the British.
On the other hand, the British 152-mm gun, even after increasing the elevation angle to 30 degrees, had a firing range of only 17 145 m, or approximately 92.5 cables. In a hypothetical duel, and taking into account the fact that the effective fire distance is always slightly less than the maximum range, this gave the Profintern the opportunity to conduct fairly accurate shooting at an English cruiser at distances of at least 90-105 cables without fear of return fire. In the event that the Profintern's JMA allowed doing this, of course, but we will return to the issue of the JMA later.
All of the above also applies to the British post-war cruisers of the "E" type - they received an additional six-inch gun, but preferred to "spend" it on increasing fire at sharp heading and aft angles, thereby correcting, perhaps, the biggest drawback of the "Danae".
As a result, the Emerald's side salvo consisted of the same six 152-mm installations with the same 30 degrees of maximum vertical guidance. It is interesting that earlier the British on one of the "D" type cruisers tested a new machine, with an elevation of up to 40 degrees, on which a 45.3 kg projectile was already flying on 106 cables. The tests were successful, but the old machines were still ordered for the new cruisers. Saving? Who knows…
The artillery of the first American post-war light cruisers is excellent, both in the quality of the 152-mm guns and in their placement on the ship. Just one glance at a photograph of an Omaha-class cruiser - and the immortal phrase of W. Churchill immediately comes to mind:
“Americans always find the only right solution. After everyone else has tried."
The first thing I would like to note is the excellent qualities of the American 152mm / 53 gun. Its 47.6 kg high-explosive projectile with an initial speed of 914 m / s carried 6 kg of explosive and flew on … but here it is already more difficult.
It all started with the fact that the Americans, having analyzed the naval battles of the First World War, saw that a light cruiser should have the ability to develop strong fire in the bow and stern, but a mighty side salvo is not superfluous. The decision was surprisingly logical - due to the use of two-gun turrets and two-story casemates in the bow and stern superstructures and when the total number of barrels was increased to twelve, the Americans, in theory, received six-gun salvoes in the bow / stern and eight-gun salvoes on board. Alas, only in theory - the casemates turned out to be inconvenient, and besides, at the stern they were also flooded with water, therefore, for a significant part of the cruisers, two six-inch aft tubes were removed (later, the ships lost a couple of six-inch tubes each, but this was, among other things, for to compensate for the weight of the additionally installed anti-aircraft artillery).
At the same time, the guns in the towers and casemates had different machines - the first had an elevation angle of 30 degrees and their firing range was 125 cable, and the second - only 20 degrees and, accordingly, only 104 cables. Accordingly, effective firing from all of the cruiser's guns was possible by about 100 kbt or even less. The turret guns could shoot farther, but one glance at the distance between the barrels
It suggests that the guns were in one cradle, which means that it was possible to shoot in only with two-gun volleys (four-gun ones would give a large spread under the influence of expanding gases from a neighboring barrel), which reduced the possibility of zeroing in practically to zero.
But the most important thing is not even this, but the fact that there is not a single reason why Omaha could avoid the problems encountered by cruisers like Oleg cruisers were forced to control the fire of the towers separately from other deck and casemate guns. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that the author has never read about such problems on Omaha, but Americans (and not only them) are generally extremely reluctant to write about the shortcomings of their designs.
Nevertheless, despite all the above absurdities, in the onboard salvo, the Omaha had 7-8 six-inch guns, which were not inferior in projectile power, and surpassed the British in terms of firing range. Accordingly, the "Omaha" had an advantage over the British "Emerald", and therefore over the "Profintern": only in firing range the "Profintern" was superior to the American light cruiser, but not so much as the English one. We can assume that, to some extent, this superiority was leveled by the complexity of controlling the fire of the turret and casemate guns, but nevertheless this, albeit well-grounded, but only guesses.
But the Japanese "Sendai" was still losing to the Profintern in terms of artillery power. Of its seven 140-mm guns, six could participate in an onboard salvo, and in terms of their characteristics, their shells were much inferior to the British and American six-inch guns - 38 kg and 2-2, 86 kg of explosives in them. With an initial speed of 850-855 m / s and an elevation angle of 30 degrees (the maximum elevation angle on Japanese light cruisers with deck mounts), the firing range reached 19,100 m or 103 cables.
As for anti-aircraft artillery, oddly enough, Soviet cruisers, perhaps, even surpassed ships of their class in foreign fleets. Not only did the Profintern have as many as nine 75-mm cannons, but they also had centralized control! Each weapon was equipped with receiving dials, telephone and ringing alarms.
Omaha had four 76-mm guns, Emerald - three 102-mm and two 40-mm single-barreled "pom-poms" and 8 Lewis machine guns of 7.62 mm caliber, Sendai - two 80-mm guns and three machine guns of caliber 6, 5-mm. At the same time, the author of this article did not come across information in any source that these artillery systems of foreign ships had centralized control, but even if they did, they still lost to Profintern in terms of the number of barrels.
However, in fairness, it must be said that the anti-aircraft artillery of the first Soviet cruisers, although it was the best among others, still did not give any effective protection against aircraft. The 75-mm guns of the 1928 model were the good old Kane 75-mm cannons, installed "backwards" on the Möller's machine, adapted for anti-aircraft shooting, and in general, the artillery system turned out to be cumbersome and inconvenient to maintain, which is why they were soon replaced by 76-mm Lender anti-aircraft guns …
In terms of torpedo armament, the Profintern received significant reinforcement - instead of two traverse torpedo tubes, it entered service with three three-tube tubes of the 1913 model, although the feed unit was quickly removed (the torpedoes were influenced by water disturbance from the propellers), but then more two. Nevertheless, despite the abundance of torpedo tubes, the small caliber of torpedoes and their venerable age (designed before the First World War) still leaves the Soviet cruiser an outsider. "Sendai" carried 8 pipes of breathtaking 610-mm torpedoes, "Emerald" - three four-pipe 533-mm torpedo tubes, "Omaha" during construction received two two-tube and two three-tube torpedo tubes caliber 533-mm, but the two-tube were removed from them almost immediately. Nevertheless, even with six 533-mm tubes, the Omaha looked preferable to the Profintern: subsequently, the Soviet cruiser received the same armament, and it was believed that the use of 533-mm torpedoes instead of 450-mm fully compensated for the double reduction in the number of torpedo tubes.
In terms of speed, the Profintern, alas, has moved from absolute leaders to absolute outsiders. Sendai developed up to 35 knots, Omaha - 34, Emerald showed 32.9 knots. As for the Soviet cruisers, they confirmed the characteristics laid down in them according to the project: "Chervona Ukraine" developed 29, 82 knots, the number of knots shown by the Profintern, unfortunately, is not reported, the sources write “over 29 knots”.
But in terms of booking, surprisingly, Profintern remained in the lead. The fact is that the very high speeds of the Omaha and Sendai were achieved “thanks to” savings on armor, as a result of which the citadel was protected exclusively by the engine and boiler rooms of both the American and Japanese cruisers. Omaha was the worst protected - 76 mm armor belt was closed from the bow by 37 mm, and from the stern - by 76 mm traverses, a 37 mm deck was laid on top of the citadel. This gave good protection against 152-mm high-explosive shells, but the extremities (including the ammunition storage) were completely open. The towers had 25 mm protection, and the casemates - 6 mm, nevertheless, for some reason, the Americans believe that the casemates had anti-splinter armor.
Sendai defended more thoughtfully.
The length of its 63.5 mm armor belt is higher than that of the "Omaha", although below the waterline it decreased to 25 mm. The armored deck extended beyond the citadel and had 28.6 mm, but over the cellars it thickened to 44.5 mm, and these cellars themselves had box-shaped protection 32 mm thick. The guns were protected by 20 mm armor plates, the wheelhouse - 51 mm. Nevertheless, the Sendai also had long and almost unprotected extremities.
The British Emerald is best armored. Its protection scheme practically duplicated the cruisers of the "D"
For a third of the length, the ship was protected by 50.8 mm armor on a 25.4 mm substrate (total thickness - 76.2 mm), and the height of the armor belt reached the upper deck, then in the bow the armor (the thickness is indicated together with the substrate) was first reduced to 57, 15 (in the area of the ammunition cellars) and up to 38 mm closer to the stem and up to it. In the stern of the 76, 2 mm belt there was a 50, 8 mm protection, but it ended, a little short of the sternpost, however, there the stern had 25, 4 mm plating. The deck was also armored with 25.4 mm armor plates.
Against this background, the 75 mm armor belt "Profintern" (on a 9-10 mm substrate, that is, from the point of view of the British method of calculating the thickness of armor - 84-85 mm) stretching almost along the entire length of the body, 25, 4 mm of armor of the upper armor belt and two 20 mm armored decks look much more preferable.
If we evaluate the Profintern's chances in a one-on-one battle against the corresponding foreign cruisers (provided that the crew is equally trained and without taking into account the capabilities of the FCS), it turns out that the Soviet ship is quite competitive. In an artillery battle, in its offensive / defensive qualities, the Profintern, perhaps, corresponds to the English Emerald - a little weaker artillery, a little stronger protection, and as for speed, the British themselves reasonably believed that the difference in speed of the order of 10% was not gives a special tactical advantage (though this applied to battleships). All the same, the indicated 10% (namely, so much surpassed the Emerald in speed by the Soviet cruiser) give the "Briton" the opportunity to withdraw from the battle or catch up with the enemy at his own discretion, and such an opportunity is worth a lot. Taking into account the superiority of the Emerald in torpedo armament, it is undoubtedly stronger than the Profintern in terms of the aggregate of its characteristics, but not so much stronger that the latter has absolutely no chance in a combat clash.
As for Omaha, for her the artillery battle with the Profintern seemed like a continuous lottery. The guns of the American cruiser are more powerful than the British, there are more of them in the side salvo and all this does not bode well for the Profintern, especially since the superior speed of the Omaha allows it to dictate the distance of the artillery battle. But the problem of the American cruiser is that the Profintern's cannons are longer-range, and at any distance its high-explosive shells pose a terrible danger to the unarmored extremities of Omaha - in fact, the confrontation between Profintern and Omaha would strongly resemble the battles of the German and British battle cruisers of the First World War. Therefore, despite all the power of the American ship, the Profintern still looks preferable in an artillery duel.
The Sendai is inferior to the Soviet cruiser both in armor and in artillery, so the outcome of their confrontation is beyond doubt - however, given that this cruiser is optimized for leading destroyers and night battles (in which it will already have before the Profintern undeniable advantages), this is completely unsurprising.
Without a doubt, the Profintern and Chervona Ukraine were completed not because of a deep analysis of their performance characteristics in comparison with foreign cruisers, but because the Red Army Naval Forces desperately needed more or less modern warships, even if they were not even of the best qualities. But, nevertheless, it was precisely the excessive dimensions of the first domestic turbine cruisers by the standards of the First World War that theoretically allowed them to take the place of "strong middle peasants" among the first post-war cruisers in the world. Of course, with the advent of light cruisers with artillery placed in towers, they quickly became obsolete, but even then they did not completely lose their combat value.
During the Second World War, both the Americans and the British (we will not talk about the Japanese, nevertheless, for their hobby - sea night battles, the same Sendai were quite suitable in the 40s), of course, they tried to keep their Omaha, “Danae "and" Emeralds "away from active combat activities, entrusting them with secondary tasks - escorting caravans, catching steamers transporting goods to Germany, etc. But with all this, the British "Enterprise" had a very impressive track record. He participated in the British Fleet's Norwegian Operation, covering the Worspight, landing troops and supporting them with fire. He was part of the squadron that carried out Operation Catapult, and in the "hottest" place - Mers el-Kebir. The Enterprise took part in escorting convoys to Malta, covered the Ark Royal aircraft carrier during combat operations, looked for auxiliary cruisers Thor, Atlantis and even the pocket battleship Scheer (thank God, I did not find it). The cruiser rescued the crews of the cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire, after the latter were destroyed by carrier-based aircraft.
But the real highlight in the Enterprise's combat service was its participation in the naval battle on December 27, 1943. At that time, the Enterprise was at the disposal of the Metropolitan fleet and was engaged in intercepting the German blockade-breakers, one of which came out to meet large forces of the Germans, consisting of 5 destroyers of the type Narvik and 6 Elbing-class destroyers. By that time, the German transport had already been destroyed by aircraft, which later also discovered German destroyers, and pointed the British cruisers Glasgow and Enterprise at them.
Formally, the German destroyers had an advantage both in speed and in artillery (25 149, 1-mm and 24 105-mm guns against 19 152-mm and 13 102-mm British), but in practice they could neither evade the battle, nor realize your fire advantage. Once again it has become clear that the cruiser is a much more stable artillery platform than a destroyer, especially in stormy seas and when firing at long distances.
The Germans fought on the retreat, but the British knocked out two destroyers (the Glasgow turret artillery apparently played a key role here). Then the Enterprise stayed to finish off the "wounded" and destroyed both of them, while the "Glasgow" continued in pursuit and sank another destroyer. After that, the cruisers retreated, being attacked by German aircraft (including the use of guided aerial bombs), but returned home with minimal damage. According to other sources, one 105-mm projectile still hit "Glasgow".
On the example of the combat activities of the Enterprise, we see that even old cruisers with archaic (by the standards of the Second World War) arrangement of artillery in deck-shield installations were still capable of something - if, of course, they were modernized in a timely manner. For example, the success of British cruisers in the battle with German destroyers to a certain extent predetermined the presence of artillery radars on British ships, which was installed on the Enterprise in 1943.
Soviet cruisers were also modernized both before the war and during it ("Red Crimea"). Torpedo and anti-aircraft weapons were strengthened, new rangefinders were installed. So, for example, the initial project provided for the presence of two "9-foot" (3 m) rangefinders, but by 1940 Soviet cruisers had one "six-meter", one "four-meter" and four "three-meter" rangefinders each. In this respect, the Profintern (more precisely, the Red Crimea) overtook not only the Emerald with its one 15-foot (4.57 m) and two 12-ft (3.66 m) rangefinders, but even heavy cruisers of the "County" type, which had four 3, 66 meter and one 2, 44 meter rangefinders. Anti-aircraft armament "Red Crimea" in 1943 included three double 100-mm Minisini installations, 4 45-mm ubiquitous 21-K, 10 automatic caliber 37-mm, 4 single-barreled 12, 7-mm machine guns and 2 quad Vickers machine guns the same caliber.
However, it is extremely surprising that the cruiser's artillery, both main caliber and anti-aircraft, even in the Great Patriotic War was controlled … all by that Geisler system of the 1910 model.
As we said earlier, although the Geisler system was quite perfect for its time, it still did not cover everything that a full-fledged LMS should perform, leaving some of the calculations to paper. She was quite competitive before the First World War, but the Danae-class cruisers received the best LMS. And progress did not stand still - although the designers of those times did not have computers at their disposal, the analog fire control devices were perfected. In the USSR, excellent central firing assault rifles TsAS-1 (for cruisers) and lightweight TsAS-2 for destroyers were created - with simplified functionality, but even in this form TsAS-2 was qualitatively superior to the Geisler system mod. 1910 g.
And the same must be said about the control of anti-aircraft artillery. The lack of a modern calculating device led to the fact that, in the presence of centralized fire control, it was not actually used - the artillerymen simply did not have time to calculate decisions against the enemy's high-speed aviation and transfer it to the guns. As a result, anti-aircraft fire control was "transferred to plutongs" and each anti-aircraft gunner fired as he saw fit.
All this greatly reduced the combat capabilities of "Chervona Ukrainy" and "Profintern" in comparison with ships of a similar class of foreign powers. The MS of the Red Army had a very real opportunity to improve the quality of its two cruisers, installing on them, if not cruising TsAS-1, then at least TsAS-2, there could be no problems with this, in the end, before the war, the USSR was building a fairly large series of modern destroyers and the production of TsAS-2 was put on stream. Even if we assume that the leadership of the fleet considered the "Chervona Ukraina" and "Red Crimea" completely outdated and suitable only for training purposes (and this is not so), then the installation of a modern LMS was all the more required for training artillerymen. And in general, the situation in which the ship is equipped with a mass of excellent rangefinders, its artillery is improved for firing at a distance of over 10 miles, but a modern FCS is not installed, is inexplicable and anomalous. Nevertheless, it is very likely that this was the case - no source reports on the placement on the cruisers TsAS-1 or TsAS-2.
At the same time, "Emerald" received the same OMS as "Danae", and "Enterprise" - already the best equipment installed on British post-war cruisers. There is no reason to believe that the Americans were doing worse with this, and all this neutralized the potential advantages that Soviet cruisers possessed at long distances. Unfortunately, we have to admit that the "strong middle peasants", taking into account the MSA, turned out to be weaker than all their "classmates".
However, it should be understood that the confrontation between the Profintern and the cruisers of the leading sea powers of the world was hardly possible - after the First World War and the Civil War, the young Soviet fleet was in the most deplorable state, and had only regional significance. Nevertheless, in terms of its naval composition, the Soviet fleet dominated the Baltic for quite a long time - the three Sevastopols undoubtedly outnumbered the six old battleships of the Weimar Republic and the Swedish coastal defense ships. While only Emden II was in the ranks of the German fleet, the Profintern could operate relatively freely throughout the Baltic, but alas - less than 10 months after the entry of the Soviet cruiser into service, the German fleet was replenished with the first light cruiser of the Koenigsberg class, and in January 1930 there were already three.
This was a completely different enemy. German cruisers of this type, no doubt, were unsuccessful due to the extreme weakness of the corps, which is why the command of the Kriegsmarine later even gave an order forbidding them to go to sea in a storm or in high seas: the Konigsbergs were certainly not suitable for raiding, but could well operate in the Baltic. Their extended citadel of 50 mm armor plates, behind which were also located additional 10-15 mm armored bulkheads and 20 mm armored deck (above the cellars - 40 mm), in conjunction with the tower placement of artillery gave good protection against the main "trump card" of the Profintern - high-explosive 130-mm shells. It is known that the crews of guns in deck installations suffer huge losses in artillery combat, which was irrefutably proved by the same Battle of Jutland. Towers provide incomparably better protection, because even a direct hit on it does not always end in the death of the crew.
Nine German 149, 1 mm guns, accelerating 45, 5 kg shells to a speed of 950 m / s, undoubtedly surpassed the artillery of the Soviet cruiser, including the firing range. The three six-meter rangefinders of the Königsberg exceeded the capabilities of the more numerous rangefinders with a smaller base on the Profintern. The control devices for artillery fire of the K-type cruisers were obviously more perfect than the Geisler system mod. 1910 All this, combined with the 32-32, 5-knot speed of the German light cruisers, did not leave the Profintern any hope of victory.
Now even the patrol service with the squadron was becoming unbearable for him, since when he met the enemy's light cruisers, he only had to go as quickly as possible under the cover of the 305-mm guns of the battleships. The "Profintern" could only find out the position of the enemy main forces by chance, but could not maintain contact, given the Germans' somewhat competent tactics, at all. In essence, from now on, his role in the Baltic was reduced only to covering battleships from attacks by enemy destroyers.
But on the Black Sea, the situation was completely different. For a long time, Turkey was for Russia, so to speak, a natural enemy, since the interests of these powers overlapped in many ways. In the First World War, the main tasks of the fleet in the hostilities against Turkey were determined. The fleet was supposed to provide support for the coastal flank of the army, the landing of assault forces, the suppression of the naval supply of the Turkish army and the disruption of coal supplies from Zunguldak to Istanbul. In the First World War, Russia did not have high-speed cruisers on the Black Sea, despite the fact that the Turkish Navy included such outstanding (for its time) walkers as Goeben and Breslau, so operations on Turkish communications had to be constantly covered with heavy ships … The Black Sea Fleet then formed three maneuverable groups, headed by the "Empress Maria", "Empress Catherine the Great" and a brigade of three old battleships - each of these formations could give battle to "Goeben" and destroy, or at least drive him out.
In 1918 "Breslau" was killed, blown up by mines, but the Turks were able to keep "Goeben". Therefore, the translation of "Sevastopol" (more precisely, now the "Paris Commune") and "Profintern" to a certain extent allowed the fleet to solve its tasks. "Profintern" and "Chervona Ukraine" could operate independently off the Turkish coast, without being too afraid of "Geben", from which they could always leave - the speed was quite sufficient. They did not need constant support from the Paris Commune. At the same time, thanks to the presence of long-range artillery and quite decent booking, ships of this type could also provide support to the coastal flank of the army, fire at enemy positions, and raids to intercept transports with coal were quite capable of them.
During the Great Patriotic War, cruisers of this type were used very intensively. So, for example, "Krasny Krym" for the period from August 23 to December 29, 1941, conducted 16 firing at enemy positions and batteries, using up 2018 130-mm shells (in a number of cases, "forty-five" 21-K were also fired), landed landing forces, carried cargo to and from Sevastopol, escorted transports … The most severe for the cruiser was the New Year's on December 29, when for over two hours he supported the landing force with fire, being under artillery and mortar fire, in addition, at the initial stage, even machine guns were fired at him and rifles. In this battle, the cruiser used up 318 130-mm and 680 45-mm shells, while 8 shells and 3 mines hit the Red Crimea, knocking out three 130-mm guns, killing 18 people and injuring 46. In 1942, " Krasny Krym "also did not mess around - so, from February to May, he broke through seven times into the besieged Sevastopol, delivering reinforcements and ammunition, taking the wounded. In general, during the war years, the "Red Crimea" made more cruises than any other cruiser of the Black Sea Fleet and many times found itself under the gun of coastal artillery batteries and enemy aircraft. Nevertheless, during the entire war, the ship never received heavy damage, which certainly indicates the good training of its crew.
"Chervona Ukraina" also fought against the fascists until its death, but its reasons are a question for a separate article and we will not analyze it here.
In general, the following can be said about Svetlana. Designed as the strongest and fastest light cruisers in the world, they also proved to be extremely expensive, but thanks to this they could look good among their post-war "classmates". Oddly enough, the leadership of the Naval Forces of the Red Army, having made considerable efforts to modernize these ships, did not install modern fire control devices on them, without which the new capabilities of the cruisers could not be fully used, which is why the latter were inferior to almost any foreign cruiser. Nonetheless, Profintern and Chervona Ukraina were focused on the Black Sea, the only theater in which the cruisers could be useful in their current state. The command of the Black Sea Fleet, obviously, was not too afraid of losing the old cruisers, so it used them more intensively than the new ships, and this allowed the "Red Crimea" and "Chervona Ukraine" to gain well-deserved fame.
