General condition of the problem
The development and modernization of the Russian naval forces in recent years has been given great attention by the country's leadership. At the same time, and this must be said frankly, the construction of new warships is carried out using outdated technologies that cast doubt on the very concept of the combat readiness of an entire branch of the armed forces. Naval sailors - professionals for this statement may notice that the author, as a private, uninformed person using only open sources of information, exaggerates everything and, trying to earn the cheap authority of a superficial naval expert, uses biting, unsubstantiated phrases. Nevertheless, let's calmly sort things out in order, armed only with irrefutable facts and logical thinking. Moreover, everything stated here was at one time the topic of repeated critical discussions between the author and military specialists who have many years of experience in serving in various combat positions on surface ships of the Russian Navy.
So, the number one statement, which is obvious and associated with the fact that in most of the most developed countries of the world, there is a widespread introduction of new weapons systems in the fleets, including anti-ship missiles (ASM), with increased combat characteristics. The appearance of such missiles as means of air attack on surface objects poses a real threat, since they have a very small effective scattering area (about 0.1-0.01 sq. M), and their flight takes place at ultra-low altitudes with a fairly high speed; in the final section of the trajectory, they, in addition, perform complex maneuvers in both the vertical and horizontal planes. All this creates significant difficulties in the fight against them and necessitates the immediate deployment of research and development work to create sufficiently reliable means of protection against this type of weapon.
At the same time, and this is irrefutable assertion number two, indicating that, within the framework of the concept of layered air defense (air defense) of ship formations and groups, when the near zone of the defense line of any ship (extending from 300 m to 4 km) falls on According to the calculations of the 1st Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, up to 30% of all targets participating in a raid on a ship, automated short-range anti-aircraft artillery systems (ZAK) with rapid-fire artillery installations with a caliber of 20 to 40 mm and with autonomous control systems are considered an important means of engaging these targets fire. The use of such ZAK is all the more justified in a real combat situation, when in the process of conducting a fleeting naval battle, a probable enemy will carry out massive missile strikes on a ship with small time intervals between missiles in a salvo and from different course angles, including those diving vertically on the ship, and also - appearing "from behind". An equally remarkable fact is that in recent years (which was especially emphasized at the international maritime exhibitions "Euronaval-2012" and "Euronaval-2014") against the background of constantly increasing threats to ships in the near zone (such as: the defeat of the crews of ships small arms from small high-speed ships, the detonation of ships with powerful improvised explosive devices installed on boats - "kamikaze") in the world, the volume of deliveries of remotely controlled warheads - a relatively new class of naval weapons systems - has significantly increased.
As the analysis of the experience of military operations at sea shows, for example, during the Anglo-Argentine conflict in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands in April-June 1982, rapid-fire small-caliber artillery, capable of creating a dense fire curtain on the course of an air target in the shortest possible time may, in fact, turn out in a number of cases to be a more effective means of combating naval targets than a self-defense anti-aircraft missile system. The high rate of fire and the relatively short reaction time of modern short-range air defense systems (up to 5000 rds / min and no more than 3-5 seconds, respectively) make it possible to achieve very good results in repelling attacks from the enemy, striving to destroy a combat surface ship.
In this regard, a completely natural question arises: do modern domestic ZAK, deployed on the surface warships of the Russian Navy, possess all the above qualities? Unfortunately, and this should also be stated as an indisputable fact, practically not a single combat ship of the Russian Navy, both in service and commissioned in service, does not possess these qualities. Worse, the promising warships being developed are supplied with obviously outdated, ineffective and, in fact, useless in combat conditions, naval ZAK. Even at the beginning of the last century, English sailors spoke of such ships as “Five minutes ships”, that is, such ships, which should take no more than five minutes to sink. The picture, of course, is unsightly and even to some extent depressing. Nevertheless, this is a 100% prospect for the existence of a combat surface fleet of Russia in the coming years. Unless, of course, you do nothing, or, wandering in the dark, demonstrate cosmetic, meaningless half-measures, or rather, actively simulate violent activity with zero end result. What is now, in varying degrees, successful, and representatives of the country's defense industry, associated with the development and production of shipborne anti-aircraft artillery systems. First of all, we are talking about JSC "Instrument-Making Design Bureau" (KBP), Tula, JSC "KB Tochmash named after A. E. Nudelman ", Moscow, and PA" Tulamashzavod ", Tula.
A new way of "assimilation" of budget funds using old methods
After all, no matter how unpleasant it may be to realize, but in the vastness of the world's oceans, the foreign ZAK "Goalkeeper" (Photo # 1), developed and adopted in NATO countries back in the 80s of the last century and having one of the most the most powerful and most accurate 30-mm anti-aircraft gun to date. And instead of developing something worthy of the "Goalkeeper" as a counterweight to the "NATO" and trying to surpass them in this field, our leading arms enterprise KBP named after A. G. Shipunova did not find anything better than for decades (since 1994) to engage in "combat toys" such as the Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft artillery complex (ZRAK), which are popular with the top officials in the Russian government and are very well sold to third world countries., but never accepted by the country's Ground Forces as the main ground-based air defense system in the near zone. At the same time, the unique automatic cannon AO-18, designed at one time by V. P. Gryazev and A. G. Shipunov, since the end of the 70s of the last century, it has not improved (except for the increase in the length of the barrels in the AO-18KD cannon from 54 to 80 calibers), being in oblivion and discrediting with its patriarchal, in general, the inherently good ZAK AK - 630M. At the same time, for several years in a row, the designers - armamentmen are concerned only with which of the new anti-aircraft missiles to hang on the shoulders of the next "raw", now sea, ZRAK "Pantsir-M" (Photo No. 2), which, as it turns out, goes into service with the Russian Navy in 2016! At the same time, I just want to ask the developers of this "miracle of technology", and where, dear sirs, is your report on the conduct of serious naval, and not land tests of this complex? They, as always in such cases, will answer you: this is a closed topic, and you do not have the appropriate clearance. I experienced this from personal experience …
Photo # 1. ZAK "Goalkeeper"
Photo No. 2. ZRAK "Pantsir-M"
Please think about this profanity: the tactical and technical characteristics of the ultramodern (as the developers say!) Marine air defense missile system are based on the results of tests in the conditions of the Kapustin Yar land range !? And where is the account of the influence on the operation of the ship's radar system (radar) of the so-called underlying surface, in other words, water? After all, it is 3-5 times stronger than on the ground, reflects radio waves (at sea, the radio reflection coefficient is equal to one, and on land, in the same Kapustin Yar -0, 2-0, 3). There are also purely physical problems. Specialists in naval weapons know that the low flight altitude of modern anti-ship missiles (no more than 3-5 m from the sea surface) leads to the fact that almost the entire route of the microwave energy emitted by the radar falls on the area near the water. The inverse (that is, increasing with altitude) distributions of humidity and air temperature arising in this area under certain weather conditions lead to the well-known phenomenon of anomalous radio wave propagation, which disrupts the normal functioning of the radar. How these nuances can be taken into account and worked out in the conditions of a stationary earth surface, for example, the surface of a steppe polygon, is not clear? And everything that happens, oddly enough it sounds, is carried out with the tacit consent or connivance of representatives of the Ministry of Defense and members of the Expert Council under the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy. Their vigilance and professionalism, apparently, were lulled by the fact that in "Pantsir-M" for the first time on a marine air defense system, a passive phased antenna array (PAR) is used as a radar, the presence of which in this complex seems to the author to be a rather redundant and unreasonable thing., since along with the advantages inherent in the radar under discussion, it also has a very significant disadvantage associated, first of all, with a narrow field of view, in which it is inferior to both parabolic and slot antennas. Of course, from the point of view of shelling sea targets with anti-aircraft missiles, the use of radar with phased array is certainly advisable. But what about the artillery component of the Pantsir-M complex, for which, just, the view sector is by no means a secondary factor, but a determining one?
Is it for this reason that the modernization of the ZAK "Goalkeeper", which is currently being carried out by the Ministry of Defense of the Netherlands and the French corporation Thales, does not imply any changes to the radar unit represented by the classic Cassegrain antenna, and does not in any way affect the existing search slot antenna. In the course of modernization, it is assumed that the existing capabilities of the "Goalkeeper" (which in terms of accuracy of fire already surpasses the Russian ZAK AK-630M by almost 3.5 times!) Will be significantly expanded due to the use of a more modern electro-optical tracking system (with, it is well known,that the French in terms of the capabilities of this type of tracking systems are now superior to everyone else in the world!) and the introduction of new control algorithms and combat use. That is, while representatives of the Russian "defense industry" together with the 1st Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation continue to endlessly exploit the obsolete idea of the ZRAK, the viciousness of which was realized by maritime specialists around the world back in the 70s-80s of the last century, our probable opponents are slowly, logically meaningfully extending the service life until 2025, also in general patriarchal ZAK "Goalkeeper", getting the opportunity with its help to guaranteed to intercept new generation supersonic anti-ship missiles and use it against high-speed small surface ships, which is especially important recently when provocations are carried out against Russian warships by Turkish naval vessels. Now imagine for a second the following situation: in place of the Turkish seiner, which maliciously attacked the patrol ship Smetlivy in the Aegean Sea on December 13, 2015, there could well be such a high-speed small vessel, armed with a whole set of anti-ship weapons, which are used instantly (within fractions of a second!), and disappearing from the zone of probable damage at a speed of more than 50 knots. The possible consequences in this case for our warship would be catastrophic …
The idea of the ZRAK, rooted in special terminology at the suggestion of the respected Tula designer Vasily Petrovich Gryazev, passed on to the fleet from the constructive-layout scheme of the famous "Tunguska" and invariably operated exclusively by Soviet and then Russian armsmen for almost three decades, now is, unfortunately, an anachronism that we inherited from the twentieth century. The concept of a combat module "with two suitcases" (transport and launch containers with anti-aircraft missiles and guns, spaced for some reason from each other at a distance of 3 m horizontally), which does not lend itself to technical comprehension in the 21st century, both from the point of view of logic and from the point of view of tactics of conducting a modern fleeting naval battle, in fact, it hinders the normal development and improvement of promising domestic ZAK, so, in fact, necessary for our modern surface warships. This idea with spaced trunks at the household level can be especially clearly demonstrated by the example of a hunter who would risk going hunting a wild boar or, even more so, a bear with a double-barreled gun, in which the trunks would initially be spaced apart from one another by some a strange whim of centimeters, a kind, thirty - forty. The question is: will the hunter return home with the prey? The answer is unambiguous: both the wild boar and the bear can sleep peacefully … For reference: from January 2016, according to information from the Tochmash Design Bureau named after A. E. Nudelman, the next state tests of the Palma air defense missile system begin (Photo No. 3), although according to the Internet portal "Voennoye Obozreniye", www.topwar.ru, dated March 21, 2014, it is known that the previous state tests of the ZRAK "Broadsword" (this is the changed name of the same ZRAK "Palma") were "successfully failed" yet in 2007, and it was accepted then only for trial operation …
Photo No. 3. ZRAK "Palma"
The bleak prospects for the Russian navy
Thus, from the previous narration, we found out that our probable opponents, as it turns out, with much more attention and perseverance than we could expect from them, relate to the improvement of anti-aircraft weapons in the near air defense zones of their surface ships.
Now let's discuss how this business is organized here, in the Russian Navy? Yes, practically nothing. Surface combat ships are designed, built and leave the stocks without any consideration of the organization of the layered air defense of the ship's near zone. Moreover, this is typical not for individual specimens of surface combat craft, but is present almost everywhere. It seems that not specialists were involved in the development and combat equipment of the ships, but randomly invited amateurs. In order not to be unfounded, consider, for example, the lead corvette of Project 20380.
Photo № 4. The head corvette of the project 20380 "Steregushchy"
"Guarding" (Photo № 4), designed by the St. Petersburg Central Design Bureau "Almaz". According to its General Designer Alexander Shlyakhtenko, "This is a multipurpose patrol ship with unique technical parameters and armament for operations on the high seas." How true is this assessment? Let's try to analyze the information available in this regard, published in the open press. So, the anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense (ABM) of the corvette is provided by the ZRAK 3M87 "Kortik" (Photo No. 5) in the bow of the ship.
Photo No. 5. ZRAK "Kortik-M" and two 30-mm anti-aircraft artillery complexes AK-630M (Photo No. 6) in the aft part of the ship
Photo No. 6. ZAK "AK-630M"
The corvette, the main purpose of which is to conduct operations on the high seas, even in the near sea zone, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities will have to act in conditions of the overwhelming superiority of a potential enemy in the air and rely only on its own air defense and missile defense systems. And what do we have so that the situation with the project 20380 corvette does not repeat itself, similar to the one that happened on May 17, 1987 in the Persian Gulf with the American frigate URO "Stark", when the Iraqi F-1 Mirage fighter with two Exoset anti-ship missiles struck a warship from the bow side due to the fact that the 20-mm ZAK "Vulcan - Falanx" was installed only at the stern of the surface vehicle? Yes, it is practically possible to defend against anti-ship missiles either from the stern or from the bow as the head corvette "Guarding" and its companions in the project 20380 "Savvy" (Photo No. 7), "Boyky" and "Stoic" (note, newest corvettes!)
Photo № 7. Corvette of the project 20380 "Savvy"
will not be able under any circumstances, since their AK-630M and its Vympel radar are spaced 10-15 m apart (for the Goalkeeper ZAK, for example, the radar is located on the same platform with the complex, on the aiming axis, in 10 cm! From the block of barrels), which directly affects the accuracy of determining the angular coordinate system of the complex, and, consequently, the accuracy of its firing at the target. Especially many questions are raised by Photo No. 7-1, on which the ZAK is located, or rather, hidden in a kind of side recess, which, apparently, should make it invisible to the enemy.
Photo No. 7-1. ZAK AK-630M in a shelter in the ship's hull
And what is it for? I just want to ask the designers of this "unique technical solution"? After all, the main idea of the existence of any ZAK in battle is to save a warship from destruction by dying. How will an artillery complex with a limited firing sector, which is "hidden" in the side recess, save the ship?
The accuracy of the AK-630M complex, or rather the circular probable deviation (CEP) of its projectiles, according to the estimated information presented in the special literature, is within 4, 0-4, 28 mRad. This means that at a distance of 1500 m, the actual random dispersion of projectiles from the aiming point will be from 4 to 4.28 m, and the dispersion area will reach 40 square meters. In a word, for every 1000 shots fired from the ZAK, no more than 4 shells will hit the midsection (the largest cross-section of a body moving in water or air) with an area of 0.1 sq. M. On the other hand, in order to fire 1000 shells at the target, a time of at least 12 seconds is required (with a rate of fire of about 5000 rounds per minute). During this time period, even the slowest subsonic anti-ship missile system of the late 60s - early 70s of the last century will fly at least 3000 meters. And this is all despite the fact that here we are not discussing in detail the speed of the complex's reaction to emerging sea targets. The effectiveness of the ZRAK "Kortik" can not be discussed at all, it is even lower than the estimates of the AK-630M complex: remember the boar, bear and hunter with his fake double-barreled gun, mentioned above. At the same time, one cannot but cause surprise and regret that the nuclear-powered missile cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov", which is currently undergoing repairs and deep modernization, assessed by the site "Army Bulletin" (www.army-news. Ru) from 07.04. 2014 in 50 billion rubles, it is planned to place as many as six air defense systems "Kortik-M" as a near-zone air defense complex. Comments, as they say, are superfluous …
Unfortunately, a similar situation is observed across the entire line of ships put into operation in the last 10-12 years. Again, so that I would not be accused of bias, now let us turn our attention to the Project 22350 frigate (Photo No. 8) or to
Photo # 8. Project 22350 frigate
small artillery ships of the project 21630, based in the Caspian and became famous after the missile attacks on Syria on October 7, 2015 (Photos No. 9 and 10). The anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense of the near zone on the ships of these projects is not just ineffective, it, in fact, is completely absent …
Photo No. 9. Small artillery ship (MAK) of project 21630
Photo No. 10. MAK project 21630 (view from the stern)
It is interesting, in this regard, to discuss how things are in this regard on the surface ships of our probable friends and no less probable enemies? Let's start with the ships of the NATO bloc (Photo № 11).
Photo # 11. The aircraft carrier "Invincible"
This is a light aircraft carrier of the British Navy "Invincible". Pay attention to how and how logically placed on the deck of the battleship 30-mm ZAK "Goalkeeper" and anti-aircraft missiles of the aircraft carrier's air defense: at the same time, the zone of possible shelling of air and surface attack weapons from the enemy completely excludes unexpected and invisible approach of anti-ship missiles and other damaging combat means to the bow of the ship. In addition, anti-aircraft missiles placed behind the ZAK, without interfering with artillery, have their own, independent firing sector.
Now compare how much the "Chinese comrades" lose to them, the NATO members, in this regard, who, in fact, put on their destroyer "Liuzhou" the not very successful clone of the "Goalkeeper" ZAK H / JP-14, placing it along the contour of the ship like this the same as it was done in Russia. That is, as God puts it on your soul (Photo № 12).
Photo No. 12. Chinese destroyer "Liuzhou"
Yes, they, of course, study diligently and collect, if possible, all the best around the world, but in this case, not only imagination should work, but also something else … This also applies to the ZAKs they design independently. Take at least their projects ZAK Type 730 or Type 1130 (Photo 13),
Photo No. 13. Chinese ZAK Type 1130
in which the features of the American - Dutch "Goalkeeper" are clearly visible, but this is where it all ends, because, all the same, you cannot literally follow the Chinese proverb “If you can copy a Master exactly, then you yourself are a Master”. In an effort to increase the firepower of the Type 1130, the Chinese, having collected 11 barrels in a single block (it is incomprehensible to the mind!), As it turns out, violated the fundamental principle of the universe, the principle of the "golden ratio", which in common people sounds like this: "The best is the enemy of the good." Therefore, the Type 1130, this monster, the Chinese armsmen decided to install, apparently, only on their not entirely successful, and so far the only aircraft carrier "Liaoning". There are three of them and at the same time they overheat when shooting.
Thus, we can finally draw one disappointing conclusion concerning the next, with fanfare, the ongoing modernization of the Russian navy: they wanted the best, but it turned out as always. Do we really need new Tsushima and Port Arthur to remember, at last, the behest of the unforgettable Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov, who calls out to his descendants, to you and me, from the stele of the monument in Kronstadt - "Remember the war!" Never belittle your opponent, whoever he is, and always be ready not only to deliver a crushing blow to the enemy, but also to effectively reflect a possible response from him.
Based on the foregoing, it seems advisable to implement a set of the following urgent measures:
1. It is necessary, and as soon as possible, within the next one and a half to two years, to rethink the entire scheme of organizing the air defense / missile defense of each of the surface ships, both in combat formation, and designed and under construction, with the issuance of specific, not contrived, recommendations for changing it in accordance with the requirements dictated by the realities of today, when, together with the elaboration of the issue of creating an echeloned defense of a combat surface ship, the dilemma of disengaging into different zones of responsibility and into different profiles of the floating craft of its artillery-anti-aircraft and missile-anti-aircraft components. This is what we saw above when discussing the air defense and missile defense system of the near zone of the British light aircraft carrier Invincible.
2. In a short time (no more than 5-7 years) to design and adopt a completely new naval anti-aircraft artillery complex with unique combat characteristics, namely:
- instant reaction (no more than 0, 1-0, 3 sec) to the appearance and shelling of emerging naval targets that threaten a combat surface ship;
- Accuracy of fire of anti-aircraft guns with KVO no more than 0.05 mRad.
3. The designed complex, as a rule, should be unified with the ZAK AK-630M (AK-630M1-2 "Duet") in the places of their installation on surface combat ships. The radar of the guidance and control system of the complex is supposed to be located on the aiming axis, on a single platform, in the immediate vicinity of the barrel assembly. A triaxial laser gyroscope with fiber-optic circuits should be installed on the platform platform of the complex, which will eliminate problems when setting the angular coordinate system of the ZAK when carrying out combat firing at sea targets.
4. It is assumed that the designed ZAK has an autonomous and at the same time adaptive (self-adaptive) guidance and control system, included in a single information field of a modern surface ship and having the ability to reconfigure when changing the range of tasks solved by the ship at the current time.
