This was written not today or even yesterday, but half a century ago by one of the most famous British military theorists and historians Basil Liddell Garth in his book "Intimidation or Defense". Since then, the tanks have been repeatedly "buried", and they again proved their necessity.
Any technical device (product) has not only its own service life, but also a lifetime. The life span should be understood as the life span of a product as a type that is displaced from use by another, more perfect, product, or if there is no practical need for it. This is a natural process that can be traced back hundreds of years. Means of war are no exception. Each of us can recall numerous examples of the evolutionary “extinction” of various types of weapons. Practice shows that over time, the service life of types of weapons tends to decrease.
Already more than forty years ago in the USSR, at the governmental level, for the first time, the question of the need for tanks as a type of weapon was seriously considered. At the present time, when the history of the tank is more than 90 years old, numerous articles in its defense began to appear, although it is completely impossible to find opposing opinions in the press. Who is the discussion with?
The birthday of the tank as a species can be considered February 2, 1916, when this combat vehicle appeared in England under the code name "Tank" (tank, tank). Moreover, tanks not only survived to this day, but also became widespread in dozens of countries around the world as the main strike means of units and formations of ground forces.
Of course, modern tanks bear little resemblance to those that took part in the First World War and were conceived as fighters of machine-gun armament that was new for those times, even for combat vehicles that fought in World War II, but its purpose as the main means of breaking through the defense in modern armies, as well as their name - "tank" - they keep and now. In any case, "this name, as a rule, means combat vehicles close in purpose with certain features that reflect the specifics of national military doctrines.
The current tank is the result of joint activities of many industries (such as metallurgy, heavy and precision engineering, instrument making), dozens of specialized factories, research and technological institutes, and design bureaus. Taking into account the costs of replenishing, maintaining, maintaining and repairing this equipment in the troops, maintaining factories for overhauling tanks, engines and their disposal, one can easily imagine how heavy and problematic this burden is for the state.
Apparently, that is why an uncomplicated way of solving this problem has been outlined and is being implemented in the state - “to stretch your legs by clothes” and, without waiting for the released cars to “die their own death” or in battle with the enemy, they are supposed to organize an unobtrusive version of “extinction”. It would be understandable if this act would contribute to raising the standard of living of the population, at least for that part of it, which drags out a miserable existence where enterprises have disappeared, there are no roads, heat, gas supply and other infrastructure elements.
Moreover, the tank design bureaus designing this equipment are forced to go out of their way to do something that "they" do not have (and even more so we will not), demonstrate it at the next exhibition and sell it abroad. How disgusting to see domestic boast from TV screens or pages of magazines, including about technical solutions that had not been reflected on the pages of foreign press for years, even after our next model was put into mass production. But, since the state does not need, design bureaus have no other way to survive, not even to survive, but simply to somehow maintain their miserable existence.
It is quite obvious that the emerging situation was created quite artificially, by our own forces, and no external prerequisites appeared for the coming coma of the BTT: the armies abroad did not disappear, the tanks in them did not evaporate, moreover, they are being improved, and the claims to our state borders and territories remain and, possibly, are exacerbated. One can agree that the apparent struggle for the redivision of the world has outwardly come to naught, however, other, more sophisticated ways have appeared to keep a number of countries in the "colonial" framework of suppliers, including suppliers of natural resources. Arming the armies of other countries, and not our own, with our modern strike weapons, we seem to show that the fate of the suppliers is not indifferent to us in this area either.
In Soviet times, armored vehicles were, as a rule, supplied abroad, which were released after the rearmament of the army with more advanced models, or, in any case, different from the one that went to our troops.
Apparently, the authors of the struggle for the existence of a kind of tank instinct felt that there was a real danger of the existence of tanks in conditions when most of the production capacity and human resources was lost, and with it the type of troops was becoming scarce. These fears are not unfounded, since there must be a certain, and rather strict, ratio between the peacetime production volume and the army's fleet of vehicles. Deviation from this ratio leads to a crisis situation in the BTT fleet. So, the presence of a large fleet with an insignificant peacetime production leads to an unjustified variety of vehicles in the army, the impossibility of maintaining the infrastructure for maintenance and repair, the untimely re-equipment of troops with the latest models and the removal of obsolete equipment from service, as well as problems with training personnel, including the loss of a mobilization reserve.
How important this ratio is can be seen in the crisis situation of the 1970s, when, due to a large fleet of tanks, a simple rearmament with a new model required at least 30 years of peacetime, even at an almost maximum rate of their production. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this period is equal to the service life of a military professional, as they say, from his "conception" in an educational institution to retirement. How many presidents, governments, mines of defense mines, commanders of ground forces, chiefs of ordering directorates and other responsible persons should survive this process steadily? At the same time, it should be recalled that everyone who comes to a high position tried to make his own certain "contribution" to the process of improving BTT.
"Lepta", as a rule, introduced confusion and vacillation in the technical policy of the ordering department, especially in the initial period of the "newcomer" assuming a position, when the apparatus arriving with him tries on the seats he has received for its anthropometric dimensions. The stay of new "apparatchiks" at a specific high place often did not exceed 3-5, less often 8-10 years, which is extremely short for mastering the specifics of creating a new armored vehicle, maintaining stable mass production, creating a repair infrastructure, combat vehicles of other branches of the armed forces and types of armed forces. So, for example, during my 35-year service of defense ministers alone, seven were replaced, over the ordering department (GBTU) various governing bodies and structures have repeatedly appeared (and sometimes disbanded). At the same time, out of 13 departments of the Science and Tank Committee, which until 1965 directly supervised the development of new equipment, in a short time there were only three such transformations (one of them was organizational), numbering only a little more than 20 officers.
Attempts by the next command leadership to collect the "annual armored crop" contradicted the natural cycle of the existence of the BTT. As a result, the army was dominated by a multi-brand, growing in time, which could not be prevented either by the newly introduced control departments of the Ministry of Defense, or by the institutes of standardization, or the occasional roar of the commander, or personnel or other organizational reshuffles.
As a result of the endless "orderings" that took place in the 1960s. As a class, the institute of testers at the tank range was eliminated, and at the same time the staff of technicians: they say, "conscripts" will master the experimental equipment much better, since tanks and other BTT objects must be calculated "for a fool." Although it is obvious that without the experience of studying previously produced machines of domestic and foreign production, experience of operating this kind of equipment, it is impossible to obtain a qualified assessment of the newly created object. This is what professionalism in the army should be based on. Behind the scenes, such "professionals", of course, still exist under the brand of research associates or other officially authorized "institute" names, instead of bearing the proud name "tester" or, for example, "honored tank tester."
However, the reality turned out to be still harsh towards the manifestation of professionalism in the army: over the next years, the troops were gradually removed from the allotment of professional officer technical personnel intended for the maintenance and maintenance of the BTT, the Academy of Armored Forces was disbanded along with the teaching staff. Is it serious in such conditions to talk about creating a professional army (without professionals!)? What structures or specialists will be entrusted with hanging the plates with the inscription "professional" in the army, in military missions, in test structures, in the military-technical structures of the Central Asian Ministry of Defense, including in the civil agency for ordering new equipment?
After analyzing the speeches of the responsible party members of parliament on professionalism in the army, it seems that they think that there are professionals somewhere in the country: as soon as they are given a "decent" salary, they are right there. Not everything is so simple: professionals need to be trained for more than one year, and huge funds must be invested in this.
But back to the tanks. One might think that military operations on land will never go beyond the fight against terrorists, in which, if tanks are needed, they are not the ones that exist. Until now, tanks were created as strike means of breaking through units and formations with a certain sense of "herd", the ability to seize a section of terrain, a bridgehead, reach a certain line, disrupt the enemy's supply, command and control systems, supply of reserves, etc. Single tanks lose many of their capabilities, regardless of how they are protected: you can always find weak points in the protection of the tank and, using available means, destroy it. Attracting tanks to fight terrorists or to free hostages is more reminiscent of the well-known fable of I. A. Krylov about a helpful bear, which is confirmed by the practice of recent decades, including the ridiculous shooting at the White House.
Perhaps, in order to fight terrorism, it is enough to have the heavy infantry fighting vehicle so often mentioned in the press, armed with the necessary countermeasures, various means of observation, aiming and eavesdropping. In this case, some practically unrealizable military requirements such as a 24-hour stay in a combat vehicle of motorized riflemen and crew, a certain level of protection lost due to the presence of loopholes, sealing to overcome infected areas and water obstacles, and many others may not be imposed on it, specific only for military infantry fighting vehicles. On such a product, it would be appropriate to implement any personal protective equipment that is often unavailable for use on a linear tank, including due to its high cost. From spetsnaz or the Ministry of Emergency Situations, such a machine will receive a name corresponding to its purpose.
However, local military conflicts are still not denied by anyone. On the contrary, one can expect that they will be deliberately provoked by third countries for the implementation of specific political, commercial and even social goals (religious motives are not excluded), including on our territory with a huge length of land borders. At one time A. A. Grechko, being the Minister of Defense of the USSR, personally revived the armored train as the basis for the rapid movement of tank units along the Trans-Siberian Railway.
And if this is so, then for land operations, for direct contact with the enemy, a worthy replacement for a tank, or rather, tank formations, has not yet been found. After all, a single tank, I repeat once again, is nothing, even if it is advertised as "super modern" and demonstrates dizzying jumps at shows or exhibitions. A linear battle tank is unlikely to correspond to the advertising prototype, since it will have to become a part of the state, and not the "military-sports" show doctrine. Moreover, one cannot hope for the purchase of the required sample abroad.
Thus, tanks continue to be a necessary element of the ground forces. Determining their optimal quantity and quality based on the same poverty of delivery vehicles to the necessary regions of the country to places of permanent deployment is a fairly simple task for any "general staff officer". Its solution can then be applied to the entire infrastructure of maintenance, repair, production of tanks, their modernization in the troops and the creation on their base of the necessary combat assets of other combat arms.
In particular, the volume of mass production in peacetime, based on the minimum permissible service life of a tank of 15-18 years, should be at least 7% of the required army fleet in order to guarantee timely rearmament and thereby ensure their reliable structure in the army. Failure to comply with this condition sooner or later leads to a very serious "disease" of tank units and formations, close in meaning to cancer. It is also obvious that without the continuous activity of specialized design bureaus, the cycles themselves, including development and serial production, cannot be provided.
Taking into account the above circumstances, at the moment there are no prerequisites to drastically change the existing fleet of armored vehicles before preparing a balanced reorganization plan, especially since participation in local conflicts cannot but affect the appearance of the main tank and its combat support and support. Until a clear development of the requirement for the peculiarities of the participation of strike forces in local collisions, one cannot speak of a radical change in approaches to the development of a new tank (let's keep this name for what can be created), or of its death as a species.
It seems to me that the answer to the question itself: "Do I need a tank?" does not yet require complex analytical calculations using supercomputers and lengthy articles in its defense. The only question is that today's state order does not support the existing fleet, production and reproduction of tanks (including providing the necessary personnel for this). It is known that creating everything anew will entail as many costs as no "democrats" dreamed of with any strategy of saving public funds. Apparently, the actual discrepancy between the order of tanks and the needs of the troops gives rise to a stream of statements in the press in defense of the tank, the life of which in a given country seems to be nearing the end.
Based on the foregoing, quite obvious conclusions suggest themselves.
First: the thesis about the extinction of tanks as unnecessary is far-fetched and dangerous. It is refuted by all recent global military practice and military-political forecasts for the foreseeable future.
Second: we are facing a real threat of "extinction" of our tanks even during the lifetime of our middle generation. The reason is the absence of a well-considered policy in the field of military reform and a militarily and economically justified system of state orders for armored weapons and equipment.
