In 1954, the development of the Strela coastal missile system with the S-2 anti-ship cruise missile began. The result of this project was the construction of four complexes in the Crimea and on the island. Kildin, the full operation of which began by 1958. Having a number of characteristic advantages, the stationary Arrow complex could not change its position, which is why it risked becoming the target of the first strike. Thus, coastal missile forces and artillery needed a mobile system that was less susceptible to retaliatory or preemptive strikes. The solution to this problem was the Sopka project.
The decision to create a mobile missile system based on existing developments was made at the end of 1955 and enshrined in a resolution of the Council of Ministers of December 1. The OKB-155 branch headed by A. Ya. Bereznyak, instructed to create a new version of the missile system with extensive use of existing developments and products. The project received the symbol "Sopka". Interestingly, it was planned to use the S-2 rocket, which was created for the Strela complex. This feature of the two projects often leads to confusion, which is why the stationary complex is often called an early modification of the Sopka. Nevertheless, despite the high degree of unification, these were two different projects created in parallel.
The creation of the Sopka complex started almost two years after the start of work on the Strela, which led to some specific results. First of all, this made it possible to speed up work on the new project through the use of already developed components and assemblies. In addition, the newer complex was to receive a number of means of later models and different from those used in Strela. It also provided for the use of some systems that should have been developed from scratch. First of all, these were the means of ensuring the mobility of the complex.
B-163 launcher with S-2 missile. Photo Wikimedia Commons
The main element of the Sopka complex was to be the S-2 guided cruise missile, the development of which was nearing completion. It was a slightly modified modification of the KS-1 "Kometa" aircraft missile and was intended to destroy surface targets. During the development of the KS-1, developments on the first domestic jet fighters were widely used, which led to the formation of a characteristic appearance of the product. "Comet" and the missiles based on it outwardly looked like a smaller copy of the MiG-15 or MiG-17 fighter without a cockpit and weapons. External similarity was accompanied by unification in some systems.
The C-2 rocket with a total length of less than 8.5 m had a streamlined cylindrical fuselage with a frontal air intake, on the upper surface of which the homing head cover was located. The rocket received a swept wing with a span of 4, 7 m with hinges for folding and a keel with a mid-horizontal tail. The main external difference between the S-2 product and the basic KS-1 was in the starting powder engine, which was proposed to be suspended under the tail of the rocket.
For the start, descent from the launch rail and initial acceleration, the C-2 rocket was supposed to use the SPRD-15 solid-fuel accelerator with a thrust of up to 41 tons. The RD-500K turbojet engine with a thrust of up to 1500 kg was proposed as a cruise power plant. The latter ran on kerosene and allowed a rocket with a launch weight of up to 3.46 tons (less than 2950 kg after dropping the accelerator) to reach speeds of up to 1000-1050 km / h and cover a distance of up to 95 km.
The missile received a semi-active radar homing head of the C-3 type with the ability to work in two modes, responsible for targeting at different stages of flight. A high-explosive warhead with a charge weighing 860 kg was placed inside the rocket fuselage. Also, the rocket received a barometric altimeter for flight to the target, an autopilot and a set of other equipment borrowed from the base KS-1.
Rocket on the launch rail. Photo Alternalhistory.com
The B-163 mobile launcher was specially developed for the Sopka missile system at the Bolshevik plant. This product was a wheeled towed chassis with outriggers and a turntable, on which a 10 m long swinging launch rail was mounted. The rail consisted of two rails on a U-shaped base, along which the rocket mounts were supposed to move. At the same time, the starting engine passed between the rails. The guide had two positions: horizontal transport and combat with a fixed elevation angle of 10 °. Horizontal guidance was carried out within 174 ° to the right and left of the longitudinal axis. An electric winch was provided for reloading the rocket from the conveyor to the guide.
The B-163 installation had a total length of 12, 235 m, a width of 3, 1 and a height of 2.95 m. When deployed due to outriggers and lifting the guide, the width of the B-163 increased to 5.4 m, the height - up to 3.76 m (excluding the rocket). It was proposed to transport the launcher using the AT-S tractor. Towing was allowed at a speed of no more than 35 km / h. After arriving at the position, the calculation of the launcher had to perform the deployment, which took 30 minutes.
For the transportation of missiles, the PR-15 product was proposed. It was a semi-trailer for the ZIL-157V tractor with attachments for the C-2 rocket and devices for reloading the product onto the launcher. To reload the rocket from the conveyor to the guide, it was required to feed the conveyor to the installation and dock them. After that, with the help of a winch, the weapon was transferred to the guide. Then some other procedures were required, including suspension of the starter motor, connecting cables, etc.
The composition of the means of search and target detection remained the same and corresponded to the basic complex. The Sopka complex, as in the case of Strela, was to include several radar stations for different purposes. In order to ensure a quick transfer of the complex to the indicated positions, all radars were to be carried out in the form of towed trailers with their own power supply systems and all the necessary equipment.
To monitor the covered water area and search for targets, the Sopka complex was supposed to use the Mys radar station. This system made it possible to conduct a circular view or follow the selected sector at ranges of up to 200 km. The mission of the Mys station was to search for targets and then transmit data about them to other means of the missile complex responsible for performing other tasks.
Tractor, PR-15 transporter and S-2 rocket. Figure Alternalhistory.com
The data on the found target was transmitted to the Burun tracking radar. The task of this system was to track surface targets with the determination of their coordinates for a subsequent attack. The capabilities of the "Burun" made it possible to track objects at ranges comparable to the maximum detection line of the "Cape", with a target speed of up to 60 knots. The data from the Burun station were used during the operation of the next element of the complex.
Directly for the attack of the target, the illumination radar S-1 or S-1M in a towed version should have been responsible. Before launching and until the end of the rocket's flight, this station was supposed to track the target, directing its beam at it. At all stages of the flight, the missile homing system was supposed to receive a direct or reflected C-1 signal and use it to orientate in space or aim at an illuminated target.
The S-3 homing head used on the S-2 rocket was a further development of the devices used in previous projects based on the Kometa. The semi-active seeker was supposed to work in two modes and, due to this, ensure flight to the target area with subsequent guidance to it. Immediately after the launch, the rocket was supposed to enter the beam of the C-1 station and be held in it until a certain moment of flight - this mode of operation of the seeker was designated by the letter "A". Mode "B" was switched on at a distance of no more than 15-20 km from the target in accordance with the pre-established flight program. In this mode, the rocket had to look for the signal of the illumination station, reflected by the target. The final targeting of the enemy object was carried out precisely by the reflected signal.
The used set of radar detection and control equipment allowed the Sopka complex to detect potentially dangerous surface objects within a radius of up to 200 km. Due to the limitations imposed by the design of the cruise missile, the target hitting range did not exceed 95 km. Taking into account the speeds of potential targets, as well as the difference in the range of detection and destruction, the calculation of the coastal complex had enough time to complete all the necessary work before launching the rocket.
The main combat unit of the Sopka complex was to become a missile division. This unit included four launchers, one set of radar stations and one command post. In addition, the division received a set of tractors, missile carriers, ammunition (most often 8 missiles) and various auxiliary equipment for maintenance, preparation for work, etc.
Rocket, rear view. A powder starter motor is visible. Photo Mil-history.livejournal.com
The coastal complex consisting of the S-2 missile and the Mys, Burun and S-1 radar stations was first tested in early June 1957. Then, as part of the tests of the stationary Arrow complex, a search for a training target was carried out, followed by the launch of a cruise missile. Due to the high unification of the two complexes, during the creation of Sopka, it was possible to significantly reduce and accelerate the test program. Most of the systems of this complex have already been tested during the previous project, which had corresponding positive consequences.
Nevertheless, the "Sopka" complex nevertheless passed the necessary checks. Factory tests of this system started on November 27, 1957. Until December 21, four missile launches were carried out on a training target. At the same time, the first two launches were single, and the last two missiles were launched in a salvo at the end of December. All four missiles successfully aimed at a target in the form of a ship standing on barrels, but only three were able to hit it. The rocket of the second launch did not hit the ship, but one of the barrels that held it in place. Nevertheless, the tests were considered successful, which allowed the work to continue.
State tests of the Sopka complex began in mid-August 1958 and continued over the next two months. During these checks, 11 missiles were used. One launch was recognized as completely successful, seven more were partially successful, and the other three did not lead to the defeat of training targets. Such indicators of the complex, as well as the possibility of a quick change of position, became the reason for the appearance of a recommendation for adoption.
On December 19, 1958, the newest coastal missile system "Sopka" with the S-2 cruise missile was adopted by the Navy. Soon thereafter, a plan was finally adopted for the serial construction of new systems, followed by the transfer to the coastal forces of the fleet and deployment on various sections of the coast.
The formation of the formations, which were to operate the new equipment, began several months before the official adoption of the "Sopka" into service. Back in June 1958, a separate division was formed as part of the Baltic Fleet, which was armed with the Sopka complex. In early 1960, this division was reorganized into the 27th separate coastal missile regiment (OBRP). In May 60, the 10th separate mobile coastal artillery regiment of the Baltic Fleet became a separate coastal missile regiment.
Preparation for launch. Photo Army-news.ru
In 1959, the Sopka complexes, after they were officially put into service, began to be supplied to the Northern and Pacific fleets. As a result, the 735th coastal artillery regiment became a missile regiment in the Northern Fleet by the 60th year. Later he received a new number, becoming the 501st OBRP. In 59, the 528th separate coastal missile regiment began service in Primorye, and a year later the 21st regiment began service in Kamchatka. In early July 1960, the new 51st OBRP appeared in the Black Sea Fleet, which immediately received the Sopka complexes. Thus, by the end of 1960, all Soviet fleets had at least one regiment armed with mobile coastal missile systems, each consisting of four divisions. Two regiments were deployed in particularly critical areas, in the Pacific and Baltic.
After the formation of new and rearmament of existing units, the Soviet Union began supplying the Sopka complexes to friendly states. The German Democratic Republic and Poland were among the first foreign customers. For example, in 1964, the 27th OBRP helped Polish and German colleagues in the development and use of new weapons. So, the first firing of C-2 missiles by Germany and Poland was carried out under the control of the Soviet military. In addition, the Sopka systems were supplied to Bulgaria, Egypt, North Korea, Cuba and Syria.
Of particular interest is the delivery of missile systems to Cuba, which actually became the first foreign operator of the Sopka. In August 1962, four divisions from the 51st separate coastal missile regiment of the Black Sea Fleet were delivered to the "Island of Freedom". The divisions had up to 35-40 C-2 missiles, as well as eight launchers (two in a division) and radar stations of all types. After the well-known events of the autumn of 1962, the soldiers of the 51st OBRP went home. The material part of the regiment was left to the coastal troops of a friendly state. Returning home, the regiment received new missile systems and continued to serve, defending the Black Sea coast.
In 1959, a project was developed to modernize the C-2 rocket using a new homing system. The updated rocket differed from the basic version by the presence of the "Sputnik-2" equipment instead of the GOS S-3. The flight mode in the beam of the illumination radar was maintained, and at the final stage it was proposed to direct the missile to the thermal radiation of the target. The use of an infrared homing head made it possible to attack surface targets when the enemy set up electromagnetic interference, as well as to protect the Sopka radar system from enemy anti-radar missiles. It was also planned to implement the "fire-and-forget" principle, in which the rocket had to go to the target area using the autopilot and then turn on the seeker. For a number of reasons, the C-2 rocket with the Sputnik-2 system did not go into production, and the troops continued to operate weapons with semi-active radar seeker.
The Sopka missile system was in service with the coastal forces of the USSR Navy until the early eighties. By this time, newer and more advanced systems of a similar purpose had been created in our country, but the operation of outdated complexes continued until their resource was fully depleted. Six missile regiments regularly participated in target engagement practice. From the early sixties to the early seventies, more than 210 missiles were used, of which just over a hundred hit their targets. So, the 51st OBRP of the Black Sea Fleet in 1962-71 used 93 missiles with 39 successful hits on the target. During the same time, two regiments of the Baltic Fleet used up only 34 missiles and completed 23 successful launches.
Products B-163 and S-2. Photo Alternalhistory.com
Until the very end of the operation of the Sopka complexes with S-2 missiles, Soviet coastal troops fired only at training targets. Nevertheless, the complex still managed to take part in a real armed conflict. During the Yom Kippur War, October 9, 1973, Egyptian missile troops stationed in the Alexandria area fired at Israeli combat boats. According to Egypt, the use of five missiles led to the sinking of one enemy boat. Israel, however, did not confirm these losses.
The Soviet Union removed the obsolete complex from service in the early eighties. The replacement for the Sopka was newer developments with guided weapons with improved characteristics. Subsequently, the majority of foreign operators abandoned the S-2 missiles. According to some sources, the Sopka complex is currently in service only in North Korea. At the same time, there is reason to believe that the North Korean industry has modernized an outdated Soviet design.
The Sopka coastal missile system has become the second and last such system based on the KS-1 Kometa aircraft missile. It was put into service later than all its predecessors, and also operated much longer than them - until the beginning of the eighties. For their time, all missile systems based on the "Kometa" were highly effective weapons with great potential, but the development of missiles and defense equipment did not stand still. Because of this, over time, the KS-1 and its derivatives lost all their advantages and became obsolete in every sense, after which they were removed from service. Outdated systems were replaced by new weapons with higher characteristics, which ensured the preservation and increase of the striking power of the fleet and its coastal troops.
