Chapter two
Why was the "Model 1891 3-Line Rifle" not used without a bayonet?
As a matter of fact, we could stop at chapter one. But after learning why the three-line was fired with a bayonet, we got a second question - why the use of a rifle without a bayonet was not envisaged. Therefore, we will not stop and turn to the 1884 "Manual on training in shooting". It was valid until the 1897 "Instruction …"
"Manual on shooting training" 1884.
We open page 170 of the indicated instruction. And what do we see there.
And here is what it says about the effect of the bayonet on the flight of the bullet.
And which rifle was in service with the Russian Empire in 1884? In 1884, the Russian Imperial Army was armed with the "Berdan rapid-fire small-bore rifle No. 2". It turns out that the Berdanka had to be shot exclusively with a bayonet. As you can see, in the "Instruction …" of 1884 there is also an indication of this.
This is a photograph of the tests of the Berdan rifle # 2. 1870 Captain Gunius (standing) and Colonel Gorlov are testing it. Pay attention - a rifle with a bayonet. That is, the Berdan rifle was originally supposed to be used only with a bayonet.
But with Berdan's rifle No. 1 it turned out to be a little more complicated. This is the first Russian rifle that was originally designed as a breech-loading rifle. This rifle was designed in the USA and was aimed without a bayonet.
But the very first tests in Russia put everything in its place. The rifle was tested, of course, with a bayonet. Gorlov, at his discretion, chose a three-edged bayonet for the rifle. But the three-edged bayonet of the old design, created for muzzle-loading weapons, could not withstand the loads created by the new ammunition. After that, a new, more durable four-sided bayonet was designed and everything fell into place. Therefore, Berdan's rifle No. 2, which was put into service in 1870, received a new bayonet - a four-sided one. He, practically unchanged, went to the "3-line rifle of the 1891 model of the year".
And what was the situation even earlier, before Berdan's rifle # 2?
Before Berdan's rifle No. 2 in Russia there was what the Minister of War Dmitry Alekseevich Milyutin called "our unfortunate rifle drama."
The fact is that thanks to the rapid development of science and technology in the second half of the 18th and first quarter of the 19th century, the gun - the main weapon of the infantryman and cavalryman - which had not changed at all for several generations before, suddenly began to develop at a very fast pace. And those who did not want to be in the position of catching up had to develop, adopt and put into production completely new designs with no less speed.
And the Russian Empire had a hard time during this period. As the same Milyutin said: "… the technique went forward with such rapid steps that before the proposed orders were tested, new requirements appeared and new orders were made."
From 1859 to 1866, the Weapons Commission (formerly the Committee for the Improvement of Fittings and Guns) tested over 130 foreign and at least 20 domestic systems.
As a result, they adopted the Terry-Norman rapid-fire primer rifle, converted from the 1856 rifle, and removed from service less than a year later as obsolete.
She was replaced by the Carle rifle - with the same success. And finally, in 1869, the Krnka rifle became the main armament of the army, and the Baranov rifle was adopted in the navy (it was produced a little - about 10,000 copies). How difficult it was for an army with so many systems during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878 is well illustrated by the following document.
This is the well-known report of General N. P. Pototsky at the Imperial Russian Technical Society.
But in all this, at the moment we are interested in the question - how were all these samples of weapons targeted? And they were shooting with a bayonet. Just like the previous samples. Because the infantry did not use rifles without a bayonet. And not just the infantry.
This is the Order of the Head of the Naval Ministry dated July 21, 1870. This order determines the procedure for supplying ship crews with small arms. Attached to it is the "Manual for training in shooting at a target from rifles and pistols."
At this point, we have exhausted the era of breech-loading rifled weapons. And what about a muzzle-loading, smooth-bore weapon?
Of course, talking about sighting, as we understand it now, cannot be used for percussion-flint and percussion-primer rifles. But the soldiers were trained in shooting. This means that there must be documents, this is regulatory training. There are such documents. For example, the "Manual on Target Shooting" of 1848. At this time, in service with the Russian army there are both obsolete silicon shock infantry models of 1808, 1826, 1828, 1839, as well as capsule models of 1845, converted from flint, models of 1828 and 1839.
I will say right away that in this "Manual …" there is no paragraph on the need to conduct training in shooting with a bayonet. But it has a paragraph in which the device of an aiming device for teaching soldiers to aim is described in great detail. This is the aforementioned device with a gun attached to it. And the gun - with a bayonet.
Now we will summarize the results of our research. The results are as follows.
The use of rifles, without fail with a bayonet attached in the Russian army, was of a military doctrinal character. The fact is that in the overwhelming majority of European armies, baguettes have been used primarily as defensive weapons since their inception.
In the Russian army, starting with the "Brief Ordinary Doctrine" of Peter I, it was recommended to use a bayonet in offensive operations of troops.
In 1716, the "Military Charter" was introduced. A significant place in it was also given to the preparation of soldiers for bayonet combat.
In addition, the charter stated that in any firing, everyone must necessarily abut bayonets, since after it they would certainly go to the enemy with bayonets. That is why the three-edged bayonet held out in service with the Russian army for so long. Although the bayonet must be constantly attached, but at the same time it made it possible to load the gun safely for the shooter. These requirements are only suitable for a triangular bayonet, which has a long neck that moves the bayonet wedge away from the muzzle to a distance that is safe for the hand when loading. In this case, the edge facing the muzzle should not be sharp. A triangular bayonet with a flat edge facing the muzzle perfectly meets these requirements.
Thus, the foundation of the tactics was laid. And it was brought to perfection by A. V. Suvorov. He, following the path that was already outlined in the Russian army by Peter I, found a solution to a problem that turned out to be insoluble for the military art of Western Europe of his time. The essence of his transformations in tactics was at first glance very simple, but their significance is enormous.
First of all, Suvorov understood more clearly than any of his contemporaries that the composition of the Russian army and the qualities of the Russian soldier make it possible to cultivate in the troops the properties necessary for the most decisive form of combat, for combat with melee weapons. Suvorov further found the necessary methods of educating and training troops in the indicated direction. And finally, Suvorov found the right way to use infantry educated and trained in his spirit in battle, the essence of which was that the bayonet strike was highlighted as a decisive act of battle.
Instead of a firing competition with a very slow approach, which, as a rule, was not brought to a blow, into which the attack poured out according to the methods of Western European tactics, Suvorov's infantry, after a short fire preparation, began a non-stop forward movement, which ended necessarily with a bayonet throw. The fire was supposed to partly upset and demoralize the enemy, disorganize his fire and reduce his effectiveness. In addition, the smoke from the shots served as a kind of disguise for the attacker. When attacking without fire preparation, the defender, shooting more calmly, had a chance to inflict heavy losses on the attacker, or even easily repulse the attack.
At this point, the famous phrase of the commander pops up in the memory of many: "A bullet is a fool, a bayonet is great!" I will dwell on it in more detail, since recently these words are sometimes used to illustrate the backwardness of the Russian army.
In the original, the words of A. V. Suvorov in Science to Win sounds like this: “Take care of the bullet for three days, and sometimes for a whole campaign, as there is nowhere to take. Shoot rarely, but accurately; with a bayonet if it is tight. A bullet will cheat, a bayonet will not cheat: a bullet is a fool, a bayonet is good. This fragment as a whole completely changes the understanding of the phrase that is usually illiterately snatched from the works of the commander. The commander only calls to conserve ammunition and shoot accurately and emphasizes the importance of the ability to work with a bayonet. The era of muzzle-loading weapons forced to try to shoot accurately, the importance of accurate shooting was impossible to underestimate. But - we emphasize again - the infantry fire at Suvorov played the role of only preparing the strike. Perhaps this is most clearly stated in the order of 1794: "A step back - death, all shooting ends with bayonets."
Thus, Suvorov, without abandoning the reasonable use of all the properties of weapons, decisively broke with the overestimation of rifle fire that prevailed at that time.
In the future, despite the changes in the tactics of troops and weapons, the bayonet did not give up its positions in the Russian army. On the contrary, bayonet fighting, along with gymnastics, is becoming increasingly important in the individual training of soldiers.
In the "Rules for teaching the use of a bayonet and butt in battle," published in 1857, it was especially emphasized that the leaders of the classes should pay main attention to the individual training of each soldier. For training in bayonet combat, mock-ups of rifles with a "soft and pliable tip", masks, bibs and gloves were provided. All techniques were ultimately practiced in full gear. At the final stage of training, it was required to conduct free battles, the techniques of fighting with a butt were also described, in addition, there were instructions on the tactics of actions in hand-to-hand combat with several opponents or with soldiers armed with different weapons.
In 1861, new "Rules for the use of a bayonet in battle" were published, which consisted of four parts, which provided for daily training sessions in bayonet combat.
"Rules for using a bayonet in battle"
In 1881, new "Rules for training in the use of a bayonet" were published, which were used for more than 25 years. And only in 1907 it was replaced by the new "Training in Bayonet Fighting".
Here you can ask the question that if the presence of a permanently attached bayonet for weapons of the 18th - 19th centuries can be explained, then how can this be explained for a rifle, which was developed almost at the threshold of the 20th century.
An explanation for this can be found in a book that has served as a tabletop for many Russian military leaders for many years. This is the "Tactics Textbook" written by General M. I. Dragomirov in 1879. M. I. Dragomirov is the largest military theorist of the Russian Empire in the second half of the 19th century. His practical, scientific and journalistic activities had a tremendous impact on all aspects of military activity, but, unfortunately, not always positive.
He expressed his vision of the development of firearms as follows: “… a bullet and a bayonet do not exclude each other, but complement each other: the first paves the way for the second. This relationship between them will always remain, no matter how far the improvement of firearms goes."
The authoritative sermon of M. I. Dragomirova was vividly reflected in the Field Regulations of 1904 and in other regulations of that time and had a considerable negative impact on the armament of the Russian army and its supply with modern technical means of struggle. For example, even in the last Charter of the field service, approved in 1912, Suvorov's "Instructions to a soldier before battle" were preserved, which contained the following "guidelines": "In battle, who is more stubborn and bolder, and not who is stronger and more skillful."; "Climb forward, at least they beat the front ones"; "Do not be afraid of death"; “The enemy can be beaten either with a bayonet or with fire, the choice of the two is not difficult”; “If the enemy is close, there are always bayonets; if farther away - first fire, and then bayonets."
It cannot be said that the Russian army did not realize the archaic nature of the constantly attached bayonet.
Thus, Minister of War D. A. Milyutin wrote in his diary in 1874: “The question of replacing bayonets with cleavers … following the example of the Prussians, has been raised again. Three times this issue has already been discussed by competent persons: everyone unanimously gave preference to our bayonets and refuted the sovereign's assumptions that bayonets should adjoin rifles only at a time when it became necessary to use cold weapons. And despite all the previous reports in this sense, the issue is raised again for the fourth time."
At the beginning of the 20th century, there were two parties in the military circles of the Russian Empire. Some recognized the "bayonet" - a sign of courage, spirit, courage - and argued that no matter what the perfection of technology and the power of fire, the main thing in a war will be a man, that it is not the weapon that is important, but the man with his decisiveness, and that so as a representative of this quality is a bayonet, then Suvorov's aphorism "a bullet is a fool, a bayonet is a good fellow" is eternal. Others, carried away by the power of modern fire, attached exaggerated importance to technology, denied the "bayonet", and with it - and Suvorov's aphorism.
M. I. Dragomirov christened the first "bayonets", the second - "fire worshipers". The first, led by Dragomirov himself, remained the winners.
The incessant wrangling between the "bayonets" and "fire worshipers" led to a lack of clarity in understanding the issues of "bullets" (matter) and "bayonets" (spirit), to false conclusions of theory and, consequently, to an incorrect setting of the preparation for war, to excessive enthusiasm for the moral side of preparation troops for battle to the detriment of military equipment.
As you can see, at the time of the creation of the three-ruler, the position of the bayonet was unshakable. By the way, they remained unshakable until the moment when the three-line was removed from service. Therefore, the use of a 7, 62-mm rifle of the Mosin system mod. 1891/30 without a bayonet was also not provided.
The Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army not only borrowed the technique of using the bayonet from the regulations of the tsarist army, it introduced various improvements to it, including taking into account the experience of foreign armies.
And here is what Malinovsky, the head of the training department of the RKKA GU, wrote in the early 1930s: “The experience of the war says that even up to the present time, bayonet fighting and, in any case, readiness for it are still very often the decisive and final element of an attack. The same experience testifies to the significance of losses in hand-to-hand combat both as a result of a bayonet attack and as a result of the inability to use a bayonet. " Therefore, it is not surprising that the Combat Regulations of the Red Army infantry taught the fighters: “The ultimate combat mission of the infantry in an offensive battle is to smash the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. Any attacker must choose a victim in the ranks of the enemy and kill it. No person who gets in the way should be left unattended, be it running, walking, standing, sitting or lying. … Now there is no doubt that in many attacks, and in the night ones - necessarily, our opponents will seek victory in a bayonet strike, and therefore we must be able to resist this strike with our more crushing blow. The experience of the war showed that many soldiers were killed or wounded only due to inability to properly use their weapons, especially the bayonet. Bayonet fighting is a decisive factor in any attack. He must be preceded by shooting to the last opportunity. The bayonet is the main weapon of night combat."
It is not surprising that the last pre-war "Manual for shooting" NSD-38 of 1938 is not much different from the 1897 "Manual for training in shooting" already discussed by us.
And what about during the Great Patriotic War?
Combat regulations of the Red Army infantry. 1942 year. The experience of the first, most difficult year of the war was taken into account.
And this is the issue of the newspaper of the Academy of the RKKA im. M. V. Frunze dated May 19, 1942.
Editorial from this newspaper. There is nothing special to add to it.
