The Second World War served as a powerful catalyst for a breakthrough in the development of weapons and military technologies. This can be fully attributed to German military-technical thought.
The defeats of the Wehrmacht on all fronts and the increasing every day massive Allied air raids on the territory of Germany itself led to the inevitable defeat of the Third Reich by the end of 1944. The German political and military leadership frantically tried to grab hold of any straw, just to turn the tide in their favor. At the same time, in order to maintain a fighting spirit and readiness for resistance in their fellow citizens, Hitler and his entourage constantly repeated about the imminent appearance of fundamentally new systems "Wunder-waffen" ("miracle weapon", "weapon of retaliation" - Goebbels' propaganda terms), developed on the basis of advanced technical ideas.
With this weapon, Germany will stop the victorious offensive of the Allies, having achieved a turning point in the war. At the final stage of the war, the Nazis pinned great hopes on any system of "weapons of retaliation", no matter how strange they may seem. And this, in turn, stimulated the thought of the designers, literally "gushing" with new projects, both real and the most fantastic. Within one year, the German armed forces were offered hundreds of different projects of weapons and military equipment, some of which promised to revolutionize military affairs. Some of these weapons were not only embodied in metal, but were also produced in small quantities in 1944-1945, having managed to take part in the last battles of 1945.
Simultaneously with the creation of anti-tank rocket launchers in the Third Reich during the war years, interesting and very promising research and development work was carried out in the design of other types of infantry jet weapons that were completely atypical for that time: portable anti-aircraft missile systems and rocket infantry flamethrowers. Work on similar samples of such weapons was completed by the victorious countries many years after the end of World War II.
Portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS)
Despite the fact that the air defense system during the last war was one of the strongest sides of the Wehrmacht, the problem of reliable protection of its ground forces from an air attack became aggravated after the defeat of the Nazi army at Stalingrad, Kursk and El-Alamein, since by this time Allied aviation increasingly began to dominate the battlefield. A particularly alarming situation has developed on the Eastern Front. The buildup of the efforts of the Soviet ground attack aviation could not pass without leaving a trace for the German ground forces, which constantly suffered significant losses in manpower and equipment. Fighter aircraft of the Luftwaffe no longer fully coped with the tasks assigned to it. This situation was mainly due not to the lack of combat vehicles, but to the lack of trained pilots. At the same time, solving this problem in the traditional way - by building up anti-aircraft artillery and large-caliber air defense machine guns in the troops. The Third Reich was no longer able to do it, since it entailed excessive material and financial costs. The top military leadership of the Reich was forced to admit the fact that, evaluating it according to the main criterion "efficiency-cost", anti-aircraft artillery turned into an increasingly expensive pleasure. So, to destroy one aircraft, an average of about 600 medium-caliber shells and several thousand small-caliber shells were required. To reverse this alarming trend of reducing the combat capabilities of the German armed forces in the field of air defense, it was urgently required to find a non-trivial solution to this problem. And here the high scientific potential of the German military industry, created in the pre-war years, played a role.
After the studies carried out, the scientists came to the conclusion that the only possible alternative to the cannon artillery of the air defense (air defense) could be anti-aircraft weapons using the reactive principle of the movement of projectiles. The development of guided and unguided anti-aircraft missiles began in Germany back in the 1930s. The range of their flight was estimated at several kilometers, with a fairly high probability of hitting the target, which created the preconditions for the adoption of truly effective air defense weapons by the Wehrmacht.
However, as in the case of anti-tank rocket weapons, many of these works were curtailed just before the outbreak of World War II. The political leadership of the Third Reich, counting on the success of the blitzkrieg, paid particular attention to offensive weapons, leaving defensive weapons in the background, this also applied to air defense systems. A promising weapon, the development of which could be realized only after a few years, was considered not of practical value for the Wehrmacht. However, the critical situation in the field of air defense, which had developed at the front by 1943, forced the command of the German armed forces to take urgent measures to intensify work in this area.
Back in 1942, the Artillery and Technical Supply Department of the Wehrmacht's Armaments Directorate instructed several firms to conduct research and development work on the development of guided and unguided anti-aircraft missiles. The experience of conducting combat operations suggested that one of the most important conditions for the successful actions of ground forces in modern maneuverable warfare could be an "air shield" that provides for a flexible combination of cannon anti-aircraft air defense systems and missile weapons. Such an integrated defense would cover the ground forces from the air enemy, acting directly in their battle formations. At the same time, having full autonomy, high combat readiness, rate of fire, it would also allow fighting ground targets.
By the beginning of 1944, a fairly harmonious system of such a combination of artillery and missile anti-aircraft air defense weapons had been created in Germany to combat enemy aircraft both at low and medium (from 200 meters to 5 kilometers) and at high altitudes (up to 10-12 kilometers) … The largest German weapons firms (Rheinmetall-Borsig, Hugo Schneider AG (HASAG), Westphaflisch-Anhaltische Sprengstoff AG (WASAG), which have joined these developments, have created more than 20 projects of anti-aircraft guided and unguided missiles of caliber from 20 to 150 mm. a real chance of creating anti-aircraft missile systems of weapons that would reliably protect ground forces from an air enemy.
Already in 1943, the concern for the production of anti-tank jet weapons and ammunition Hugo Schneider A. G. One of the first complexes of anti-aircraft weapons was created: a 73-mm unguided anti-aircraft missile RZ.65 Fohn and a multiple launch rocket launcher, initially 35-barreled, and later 48-barreled. The new weapon was intended to combat low-flying aircraft at a distance of up to 1200 meters.
The salvo fire across the areas made it possible to create a fairly dense fire curtain, significantly increasing the possibility of hitting enemy aircraft. The stabilization of the rocket in flight was carried out by rotation, thanks to the tangential nozzles. In case of a miss, the missile was supplied with a self-liquidator at a distance of 1500-2000 meters. The launcher, serviced by one operator, was a frame-type package of guides mounted on a pedestal with a horizontal firing sector of 360 degrees.
Already the first successful tests made it possible in the summer of 1944 to adopt this installation into service with the anti-aircraft units of the Luftwaffe. HASAG started the production of Fohn R. Spr. Gr. 4609 missiles, and the Czech arms company Waffenwerke Skoda Brunn was connected to the production of launchers. However, the Fohn anti-aircraft missile system, which was a stationary weapon, could not fully meet all the needs of the ground forces for such weapons, both because of its low mobility and low fire maneuverability. This was also facilitated by the unsuccessful design of the manual targeting system, although the high flight speeds of air targets (up to 200 m / s) required high targeting speeds, reaching in the vertical and horizontal planes up to several tens of degrees per minute.
The first German anti-aircraft missile system could not radically change the situation in air defense, this is also evidenced by the numbers: out of 1000 ordered launchers, only 59 were manufactured by the end of the war. The Wehrmacht needed a more effective portable anti-aircraft weapon, which, possessing great maneuverability of fire and rate of fire, would not only allow fighting enemy aircraft flying at any directional angles at speeds up to 200-300 m / s, but could also accompany troops directly to march, be in their battle formations on the battlefield, etc.
In the spring-summer battles of 1944, in all sectors of the Eastern and Western Fronts, the German ground forces became very acutely aware of the lack of air defense equipment. Allied aviation firmly occupied a dominant position in the air. The Wehrmacht suffered heavy losses from allied air raids despite the fact that by the middle of 1944 in the units of the military air defense there were 20106 anti-aircraft guns of 20-37 mm caliber, and this is not counting tens of thousands of anti-aircraft machine guns.
After a number of studies, taking into account the experience of creating previous designs of unguided missile weapons, the Wehrmacht's armaments management nevertheless developed a general concept of a new air defense weapon, which provided fairly clear answers to the question of how its power could be increased in relation to the standard one. anti-aircraft artillery. The main focus was on increasing three components: accuracy, rate of fire and the destructive effect of shells. It may seem unexpected, but the impetus for work in this direction was given by successful R&D on the creation of the Ofenrohr anti-tank rocket launcher. The tactical and technical requirements provided for the creation of a portable anti-aircraft missile system (MANPADS), consisting of a small-caliber unguided missile and a multi-barreled launcher, serviced by one operator. MANPADS was intended for salvo firing at aircraft at low level flight at a distance of up to 500 meters. Considering that combat aircraft have a high speed and are within the reach of anti-aircraft fire for a very limited time, the following requirements were imposed on these complexes: reach in height and range, high rate of fire and accuracy of fire. Moreover, the dispersion should have been no higher than 10 percent for 50 percent of the missiles fired. These systems were supposed to equip all the infantry units of the Wehrmacht. It was planned that MANPADS would be as widespread in the army as the Panzerfaust and Ofenrohr hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers. The requirements also stipulated that the design of the complex, intended for mass production, should be the same as theirs, high-tech and made of non-scarce cheap materials.
In July 1944, the Wehrmacht's weapons department again issued an order to the HASAG concern to create a similar complex for a previously designed anti-aircraft unguided missile. And already in September, the NASAG design bureau, under the leadership of a talented engineer, creator of faustpatrons Heinrich Langweiler, developed the first prototype MANPADS, which received the index "Luftfaust-A" ("air fist-A").
The complex was a four-barreled rocket launcher of 20 mm caliber with launch tubes-barrels located vertically one above the other. MANPADS was installed on a light field machine and operated by one person. The 20-mm unguided rocket, essentially repeating the design of the RPzB. Gr.4322 grenades, consisted of a warhead with a fuse, a propulsion engine - a powder check and an expelling charge. When the rocket was launched, an expelling charge ignited, which brought it (with an initial speed of 100 m / s) to a safe distance for the operator, after which the propellant checker of the main rocket engine ignited.
But the first pancake baked by German designers turned out to be lumpy. The decisive importance in this was played by the low accuracy of the new weapon, which was largely facilitated by the incomplete design of the rocket itself. The dynamic impulses of the propelling charge and the main engine of the rocket, superimposed on each other, violated the stability of its flight, despite the fact that the stabilization of the rocket with a length of 250 millimeters was carried out by folding tail stabilizers. The design of MANPADS also did not meet all the requirements, primarily this related to the low density of fire, but the failures that befell Luftfaust-A did not become a reason for a complete rejection of the further development of new weapons.
The need for weapons of this type was felt in the troops so sharply that in the fall of 1944, Langweiler began to create a new version of MANPADS and missiles. In early October of the same year, an improved version of the Luftfaust-B portable anti-aircraft missile system, also known as Fliegerfaust ("flying fist"), appeared. Its successful design, relatively cheap and easy to manufacture, promised rapid development in mass production in the shortest possible time, which was important in that critical situation when Germany lost most of its military enterprises and sources of raw materials, and the Wehrmacht had to fight on its own. territory.
The Luftfaust-B portable anti-aircraft missile system consisted of nine 20-mm smooth barrels-pipes attached to them with two firing control levers with a trigger, a folding shoulder rest, an electric ignition mechanism, and the simplest sighting devices in the form of an open rear sight, a bar and a front sight. The weapon was loaded from a nine-round magazine by ramming 9 missiles, fixed in its pallet, directly into the barrels. The store was fixed on the breech of the MANPADS with a locking device, and the fire was fired from it without its separation. The firing was carried out in succession with two volleys, first with the simultaneous launch of five missiles, and then with a deceleration of 0.1 from the remaining four. This was provided by an induction generator assembled in an electric trigger (similar to an electric generator in RPG RPzВ. 54). To connect electric missile ignitors to the induction generator of the complex, there were electrical contacts in the store.
20-mm unguided missile RSpr. Gr to Luftfaust-B, created by G. Langweiler, also received a new solution. Its main difference from the first version of the rocket was the rejection of the tail unit and the propelling powder charge. The flight performance of the new rocket has improved markedly. The rocket consisted of a warhead with a bursting charge, a tracer and a thermal retarder connected by rolling with a rocket chamber with a powder charge, a porcelain nozzle turbine with one central nozzle and four tangential side nozzles deflected from the normal by 45 degrees. In the tail section of the rocket, a thin-walled combustion chamber with a length of 170 millimeters was housed; a solid propellant was used as a propellant - a checker made of diglycol-nitrate powder weighing 42 grams. An electric igniter was mounted at the bottom of the rocket. The introduction of a high-explosive fragmentation warhead, similar to a 20-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectile for the 20-mm FLAK-38 anti-aircraft gun, with an AZ.1505 non-safety instantaneous fuse with self-destruction at an altitude of 700 meters in case of missing the target, significantly increased the damaging properties rockets. In flight, in order to increase the accuracy of fire, the rocket was stabilized by rotation around its axis. The high speed (approx. 26,000 rpm) was achieved by the successful design of the nozzle turbine.
Despite the successes achieved by the German gunsmiths in creating a new model, not everything in the design of a portable anti-aircraft missile system was successful. One of the main disadvantages of the modernized Luftfaust was the very large dispersion of missiles when firing. At ranges of up to 200 meters, it exceeded 40 meters in diameter, and only 10 percent of the missiles reached the target, although at shorter distances the effectiveness of the missile weapons turned out to be quite high.
Work on the weapon continued. At the same time, the defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht in the summer-autumn battles of 1944 on the Eastern and Western Fronts forced the Wehrmacht's armament department in November of the same year (although it was still a long way before the end of development work on MANPADS, and only a few prototypes of new weapons) to sign a contract with the HASAG directorate for the production of 10,000 Luftfaust-B portable anti-aircraft missile systems and 4,000,000 missiles for the ground forces.
The Wehrmacht command deliberately took this step, despite the fact that the combat and service-operational qualities of the new weapon were still too far from the required parameters. In addition to the critical situation at the front, the signing of the contract was largely facilitated by the fact that this rather effective weapon could be mastered by the German industry in the shortest possible time thanks to the rational technology of manufacturing stamped-welded structures. This made it possible to launch the system into production at enterprises unsuitable for this, with significant cooperation even with small firms and workshops, as well as with the massive involvement of unskilled labor. Since the inherent use of non-scarce materials and raw materials in its design in its design and the unification of a number of units and parts with other products of the military industry, and also led to a reduction in the development time, a decrease in labor costs and a decrease in the cost of production.
However, the numerous difficulties that arose with the breakdown of almost all cooperation ties with other enterprises - suppliers of raw materials and semi-finished products from the HASAG concern in preparation for the manufacture of Luftfaust-B portable anti-aircraft missile systems, as well as regular Allied aviation raids that destroyed part of the company's production facilities, played their part. a role in delaying the release of weapons, so needed by the front, by only a few months. Although in the end it was this delay that predetermined his fate. The rapid development of the production of MANPADS, which the Germans counted on, did not work out. The Leipzig company was unable to organize mass industrial production in the shortest possible time, both because of the need for constructive refinement of individual units and blocks of the system, and because of the impossibility to create in such a short time a complete production cycle for the production of a qualitatively new type of weapon.
All this taken together led to the beginning of the manufacture of MANPADS in the spring of 1945 only in the HASAG experimental workshop. By April of the same year, only 100 Luftfaust-B portable anti-aircraft missile systems had been assembled. In the last days of the Third Reich, the Hitlerite command threw everything that remained at hand on the disintegrating front, trying to delay the death of the Nazi state. Therefore, in April, the Germans urgently formed a special team of anti-aircraft gunners, which included some of the HASAG test shooters. Having received 80 MANPADS, they went to the front. We have not received information about the Wehrmacht's combat use of its latest anti-aircraft missile weapons. But it can be assumed with a high degree of confidence that "air fists", a highly effective weapon for fighting an air enemy, widely advertised by Nazi propaganda as one of the models of "weapons of retaliation", in 1944-1945 could no longer have changed the course of the war in Germany's favor even with its widespread use. Having failed to achieve the set goal, Luftfaust would only have multiplied the losses of the allied aviation, but would not have brought the expected decisive results.
So, Germany was able to come close to solving one of the most acute problems that faced the ground forces during the war years - reliable protection from enemy air attack. Despite the fact that Luftfaust at one time did not receive a wide response in military affairs, the birth at the end of the war of another type of infantry weapon - portable anti-aircraft missile systems, opened a new page in the history of weapons. And although this was the weapon of our enemy, it is necessary to pay tribute to the foresight of German scientists and designers, and first of all to Heinrich Langweiler, whose ideas for individual weapons of military air defense to combat low-flying aircraft, proposed to the Wehrmacht, were far ahead of their time. The concept of Luftfaust-B portable anti-aircraft missile systems was not in vain.
Germany, ahead of other countries by 12-15 years, gave a stable direction for the development of these weapons. In the 1960s, it received a new life, embodied in MANPADS using anti-aircraft guided missiles, as well as qualitatively new control and guidance systems created in the USSR, the USA and other countries.
Infantry disposable flamethrowers
Another unusual type of infantry weapon, created by German military-technical thought at the end of the war, were disposable flamethrowers, which are now widespread.
The German military quite reasonably believed that, among other types of melee infantry weapons, incendiary weapons proved to be extremely effective at destroying and demoralizing enemy personnel; strengthening of engineering barriers; lighting the area at night in order to increase the effectiveness of artillery and machine gun fire; to quickly destroy the vegetation cover, if necessary, unmask enemy troops, etc.
During the First and Second World Wars, jet flamethrowers were widely used, which threw a fiery jet at the target, ignited by the force of the flame at the muzzle of the flamethrower. Such a flamethrower weapon, in addition to its main task - the defeat of enemy manpower in the conduct of both offensive and defensive hostilities, also had the function of a powerful psychological impact, which, in combination with effective fire from small arms, tanks and artillery, led to the effective fulfillment of the assigned tasks at the tactical level.
Considering the importance of incendiary weapons, German gunsmiths at the final stage of World War II began work on completely new types of flamethrower weapons. Despite the fact that such a weapon had many disadvantages, and in the first place it was extremely uneconomical, since part of the fire mixture was uselessly burned out on the flight path, the Germans managed to create a very simple and effective model of a disposable flamethrower.
The Air Force Armaments Directorate ordered new weapons specifically for equipping the Luftwaffe airfield divisions, which would not require special training to handle them. A similar project was developed as soon as possible. Already in 1944, following the Panzerfaust hand-held anti-tank grenade launcher, which gained great popularity, its flamethrower analogue was also adopted by the German army, intended to defeat enemy manpower in open areas, destroy its sheltered firing points, and remove automobile and lightly armored vehicles from standing.
It was a disposable flamethrower of the 1944 model (Einstossflammenwerfer 44) - the easiest to manufacture, at the same time being a fairly effective weapon. It was used as an adjunct to the complex and expensive reusable knapsack flamethrower. The target was defeated due to the high combustion temperature. The Hitlerite leadership planned to saturate their infantry units with them as much as possible, which, along with Panzerfaust, would help slow down the unstoppable offensive of the Allies and inflict irreparable losses in manpower and equipment.
The disposable flamethrower "sample 44" was supplied with a charge of fire mixture and, after pressing the release lever, released a directed stream (force) of flame for 1.5 seconds at a distance of up to 27 m. This was quite enough to destroy enemy manpower hidden in buildings, light field fortifications structures, as well as long-term firing points (bunkers and bunkers) or vehicles. Targeting was carried out using the simplest sighting devices, consisting of a front sight and a reclining rear sight. However, the difficulty of mastering the production of a new flamethrower weapon led to the fact that by March 1, 1945, the Wehrmacht received only 3580 "sample 44" flamethrowers, which did not have time to fully demonstrate their high combat qualities.
The Second World War had a significant impact on the further development of infantry weapons, which still remained the most massive type of weapons. And although the role of hand-held firearms in terms of damage inflicted on the enemy has slightly decreased compared to the previous period, the following figures testify to the effectiveness of its use: if during the First World War, combat losses from it accounted for more than 50 percent, then during the Second World War, despite the use of more powerful than before, types of weapons - aviation, artillery, tanks, this number still amounted to 28-30 percent of all losses. However, such results were achieved at a very high cost. This is eloquently evidenced by the fact that during the Second World War, American infantrymen spent from 10 to 50,000 rounds of ammunition per hit, which required from 260 to 1,300 kilograms of ammunition, the cost of which ranged from $ 6 to $ 30,000.
At the same time, the Third Reich, like other states, did not manage to avoid mistakes in preparing for war. The hostilities in 1939-1945 did not confirm some of the tendencies that emerged in the pre-war period. Despite the fact that in the pre-war period one of the priority directions in the development of small arms was the creation of anti-aircraft machine guns, the massive use during the war years of all types of infantry weapons (from submachine guns to anti-tank rifles) for firing at aircraft showed only the weakness of special air defense means … Combat experience has shown that normal-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns are not effective enough when firing at aircraft, especially those protected by armor. Therefore, the military air defense required a stronger special anti-aircraft weapons, which were portable anti-aircraft missile systems.
In general, the Second World War showed that with the creation of the most modern means of armed struggle, the role of infantry weapons did not diminish, and the attention that was paid to them in the Third Reich during these years increased significantly. The experience of using infantry weapons, accumulated by the Germans during the war, which is not obsolete today, laid the foundations for the development and improvement of small arms not only in Germany, but also in other states for many post-war decades. The Second World War subjected the weapons of the infantry of the belligerent countries to the most serious tests. Therefore, the weapons system in all participating countries during the Second World War, including Germany, received further development and complication both in terms of the variety of weapons themselves and the number of types of ammunition.
The war once again proved the inviolability of the basic requirements for infantry weapons - high reliability and trouble-free operation. Under the new conditions, the simplicity and ease of maintenance, the manufacturability of the design, which makes it possible to ensure the mass production of small arms in wartime conditions, the desire to simplify and increase the survivability of individual units, assemblies and parts, have become of no small importance.
The increase in the power of infantry fire also affected the change in the forms and methods of combat. The constantly growing rates of military production during the war years made it possible to significantly increase the firepower of the ground forces.
