During the Patriotic War, our aviation accumulated valuable experience in assisting troops in crossing large rivers and holding captured bridgeheads. Front-line aviation had to operate in a variety of situations, when the troops began to force water obstacles at the beginning of the offensive, during it or at the final stages of operations. All this left an imprint on the content of the tasks, the scale and methods of aviation operations.
In the last two cases, a characteristic feature was the concentration of the main actions of aviation to create the necessary conditions for crossing rivers on the move. Therefore, aerial reconnaissance was of particular importance, which was faced with the task of determining the areas most suitable for crossing, the struggle to maintain operational and tactical air supremacy in the crossing zone, as well as air support for ground forces during battles to hold and expand captured bridgeheads. Aviation training before crossing water obstacles on the move was carried out only in some cases and was short-lived. Attack aircraft and bombers immediately began air support. Much attention was paid to bringing the basing of air units providing cover and support to ground forces as close as possible to the crossing area.
The air forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front had to act in a slightly different situation when crossing the Oder in the Berlin operation. The troops were to begin the operation by overcoming this large and very wide water barrier at the mouth. The actions of the 4th Air Army when crossing the Oder in the Berlin operation will be covered in this article.
In front of the formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front, in a 120-km sector from the Baltic Sea coast to Schwedt, the enemy grouping was defended, which included parts of the Svinemünde corps group and most of the forces of the 3rd German Tank Army. The strongest part of the grouping (two army corps - 32nd and "Oder") occupied the area where the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to deliver the main blow. Here, on a 45-km section of the front between Stettin (Szczecin) and Schwedt, our three combined-arms armies - 65, 70 and 49 - attacked. In this case, the main role was assigned to the 70th and 49th armies. The troops of the front were to cross the Oder, defeat the opposing German grouping and, within 12-15 days of the operation, reach the Anklam-Wittgenberg line.
For the successful development of the operation, the rapid overcoming of the Oder was of paramount importance. In the area where Soviet troops were supposed to force it, the river was divided into two branches - the Ost Oder and the West Oder. Between them there was a swampy (in many places flooded with water) floodplain, 2.5 to 3.5 km wide. Thus, on the way of our troops there was a continuous strip of water up to seven kilometers wide. The similar nature of the water barrier, in combination with the heights dominating on its western bank, made it possible for the fascists to create a powerful defense, on which they pinned great hopes. No wonder the Germans called the Oder "the river of German destiny." Our soldiers gave Oder a very accurate (in terms of the complexity of the upcoming crossing) description: "Two Dnieper, and in the middle of the Pripyat."
The large width of the impending water barrier and the swampy approaches to it from the eastern coast significantly limited the artillery maneuver and excluded the possibility of using tanks at the beginning of the operation. “Under the current conditions,” wrote K. K. Rokossovsky, - the role of aviation has increased enormously. She had to take on a number of tasks of artillery and tanks, infantry support, both during artillery preparation and after the start of an infantry attack."
Thus, for the 4th Army the most important task was to provide maximum assistance to the formations and units of the 2nd Belorussian Front when they crossed the Oder. Consequently, the success of overcoming this water barrier largely, and sometimes decisively, depended on the actions of aviation, which was supposed to compensate for the lack of range and power of artillery fire, and also, in some cases, completely replace artillery.
What was the air situation during the period of operations of the 4th Air Army? By April 18, 1945, 1,700 German aircraft, including over 500 fighters, were at the airfields in front of the 2nd Belorussian Front's offensive line. However, most of the forces of this aviation group were involved in the Berlin direction, where active hostilities began on April 16, and therefore did not pose a great threat to the troops when crossing the Oder. The 4th Air Army had at that moment 1435 aircraft, of which: fighters - 648, attack aircraft - 478, day bombers - 172, night (Po-2) - 137. As you can see, the ratio of air forces, taking into account the fact that in full The composition of the enemy air grouping could not act against the formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front, it was approximately equal. On the whole, the air situation was favorable for our troops: air supremacy had already been won and was firmly held by Soviet aviation.
The preparation of the 4th Air Army for the beginning of hostilities was carried out as soon as possible and in peculiar conditions. Until the end of March, the air units supported the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, which liquidated the East Pomeranian German grouping in the zone southeast of Danzig (now Gdansk) and north of Gdynia. On April 1, the front's troops received a new task - to carry out in the shortest possible time regrouping of the main forces to the west, to the Stettin-Rostock direction, to change the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front on the Oder line for further participation in the Berlin operation. This made it necessary for the 4th VA units to perform an operational maneuver at a distance of up to 350 kilometers and relocate to airfields located east of the Oder.
However, in the new area there were only 11 airfields, which could not ensure the normal basing of aviation. It was required to equip new ones in the shortest possible time. And the aerodrome engineering service successfully coped with this work. Within ten days, 8 new field aerodromes were restored and 32 additionally built. At the same time, only 4 airfields were located more than fifty kilometers from the front line, which ensured the conduct of intensive combat work. The redeployment of all 4 VA aviation ended four days before the start of the operation.
On April 12, the operational directive of the front commander for the 4th VA provided for the night before the offensive to strike at enemy targets that were located on the front line and close to it, in order to exhaust the enemy's manpower, to destroy the German firing points located on the opposite bank of the Oder, suppress artillery and disrupt the work of enemy headquarters. On the first day of the operation, the main efforts were supposed to be concentrated in the sector of the 70th and 49th armies, and part of the forces were to be allocated to assist the 65th army.
To support the 70th and 49th armies, which played the main role in the operation, it was planned to carry out 1,677 and 1,024 sorties, respectively, which in total amounted to about 70% of all planned for the first day of the operation. The 65th Army accounted for only 288 sorties (7.3%).
If we take into account the sorties planned for performing general front tasks (covering the strike group, air reconnaissance, striking enemy reserves), then with a total length of the contact line of 120 km, it was planned to make 96, 3 % of all sorties.
Strong enemy defense necessitated preliminary aviation training. To carry it out, it was planned to involve mainly night bomber aviation, which was to carry out combat work for three nights. Moreover, the power of the bombing strikes should have been growing all the time. It was planned to make 100 sorties on the first night, 200 on the second and on the third, i.e. on the eve of the operation - 800 sorties. The targets of the night bombers were artillery and mortar positions and German infantry in the front line and at a depth of up to seven kilometers from the front line. It was planned to conduct direct air training during the day by using only ground attack aircraft. For this purpose, 272 attack aircraft and 116 fighters were allocated to cover them. Air support was to be carried out from the moment the infantry attack. During its course, attack aircraft during the day had to make 3 sorties to suppress artillery, mortars, armored vehicles and enemy manpower on the battlefield.
The actions of daytime bombers were planned only from the moment the infantry went over to the attack. Their efforts were focused on striking the positions of artillery and mortars in the tactical depth of the German defense and the nearest Nazi reserves, 6-30 kilometers away from the front line. It is characteristic that the combat operations of the 4th VA were planned according to three possible options, which depended on weather conditions. It was envisaged that, in good weather, attack aircraft and bombers would operate as a squadron-regiment. In adverse weather conditions, the groups were reduced to 4-6 aircraft. In case of completely bad weather, the assigned tasks were planned to be performed by single aircraft or in pairs, without fighter cover. Such planning fully justified itself, since at the beginning of the offensive operation, and especially on its first day, the meteorological conditions were rather difficult.
It was also taken into account that during the crossing of the Oder, it may be necessary to carry out a quick maneuver of the aviation forces along the front, in order to concentrate its efforts in the sector where success is indicated. Therefore, the commander of the 4th Air Force decided to introduce centralized control of all aviation forces. True, the 65th, 70th and 49th armies were assigned 230, 260 and 332nd assault air divisions, respectively, however, further events showed that there was no need to decentralize command and control.
In reserve, the commander of the 4 VA left the 4th assault air corps of Lieutenant General of Aviation G. F. Baidukov, which was supposed to be used in the direction where there will be success in crossing the river. Before the start of the operation, the entire tactical depth of the German defense was photographed. Targets located within the front line and subject to aviation impact were mapped and numbered in order. This card was given to each unit commander. The same map was available in all the headquarters of the air divisions, on all radio guidance stations, in the headquarters of each combined-arms army.
In preparation for the operation, the flight personnel, and primarily the commanders of air units and subunits, regardless of which sector of the front he was to act on, had to carefully study all the targets. The radio wave and call signs of the aircraft were common to the entire front, with the addition of the index of each unit to them. All this provided the ability to quickly establish communication between airfields, radio guidance stations and groups of aircraft that were in the air, and retarget the latter to any new objects. For clearer interaction with the ground forces and for the convenience of aiming aircraft at targets, the tail unit and the cantilever part of the Il-2 wings of each assault air division were painted in a specific color.
Particular attention was paid to the interaction between ground attack aircraft and artillery. If the targets for attack aircraft were located in the immediate vicinity of the forward edge, then the aircraft had to work on them before the start of the artillery preparation or immediately after it was over. The targets for which it was necessary to act during the artillery barrage were defended by at least five kilometers. During the operation, constant and continuous observation of the battlefield was carried out, which made it possible to identify enemy targets that posed the greatest danger to the advancing troops. Air reconnaissance revealed the concentration of enemy reserves in the operational depth.
On the morning of April 20, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front began crossing the Oder on a wide front with the forces of all three armies. Night aviation training went according to plan. Despite not entirely favorable weather conditions (thick haze, poor visibility), 1,083 sorties were made during the night. Each Po-2 aircraft had an average of 8 sorties. Individual crews made 10-12 sorties each.
The weather deteriorated even more at dawn, so the planned aviation training in the morning could not be carried out. The attack of the troops was preceded only by artillery barrage. At 8 o'clock the troops began to force the Oder in the main direction. By 10 o'clock, it was possible at the front from Stettin (Szczecin) to Schwedt in several places to overcome the river and capture insignificant bridgeheads on the opposite bank. At first, the Germans did not offer serious resistance. But then their opposition increased sharply. Since it was not possible to conduct air training during the day, part of the enemy artillery located in the depths was not suppressed and began to intensively fire at our crossings. The enemy repeatedly launched counterattacks, including with the support of tanks. Further advancement of the 70th and 49th armies was suspended. Stubborn battles began to hold small bridgeheads.
In this situation, especially active aviation support was required. However, due to bad weather conditions, the Soviet troops that went on the offensive were left without air support for an hour. Only at 9 o'clock, after a slight improvement in the weather, it became possible to take off, first of individual pairs, and then of small groups, consisting of four to eight aircraft. Later, as the weather conditions improved, the composition of the groups increased, and they went to the battlefield in a continuous stream. As a result, instead of the planned 3079 sorties, 3260 were made.
On the first day of the operation, the maximum success in crossing the river was indicated in the zone of the 65th Army, which operated as part of the front-line strike group on its right flank. Air support for this army was strengthened by switching the 4th assault air corps, which had previously operated in front of the 70th army. On the first day, 464 sorties were made in the interests of the 65th Army, instead of the 290 planned.
On the second day, April 21, the success of the 65th Army became even more evident. She managed to expand the captured bridgehead to almost ten kilometers along the front and three in depth. Front commander K. K. Rokossovsky decided to transfer the main blow to the right flank. The commander of the 4th VA, General K. A. It took Vershinin only 30 minutes to concentrate the main aviation forces in the zone of the 65th Army. On that day, the pilots performed 3,020 sorties, of which 1,745 (54.5%) were in the interests of the troops of this army. According to the recall of the military council of the 65th Army, without the actions of attack aircraft on counterattacking tanks, self-propelled guns and infantry of the enemy, "it would hardly have been possible to hold the occupied bridgehead."
Having timely received powerful air support, the troops of this army in five days of fighting were able to expand the bridgehead to fifteen kilometers along the front, and six kilometers in depth. When the 70th Army, and then the 49th, having consolidated on the captured bridgeheads, began to develop the offensive, the main aviation forces (from April 24) were again switched to their support.
The table of sorties made by the 4th VA for air support of the troops in the first 5 days of the offensive operation gives a clear idea of the extent to which the maneuver along the front was carried out by the aviation forces. The limited number of sorties on 21 April was due to poor weather conditions.
As we can see, in this operation, centralized control played a crucial role in the implementation of rapid maneuver by large air forces along the front. The allocation of the 4th assault air corps to the reserve of the commander of the 4 VA of the 4th assault air corps, which redirected to new directions three times, fully justified itself. Such a strong reserve made it possible to rapidly build up air forces in certain sectors of the front in accordance with the current situation. With the actions of one or two assault air divisions in the zone of any army, their control from the ground through the main guidance radio station was carried out clearly, without any difficulties.
When most of the air forces acted first in the interests of the 65th and then the 70th army, in the zone of each of the armies, up to five or six assault divisions were concentrated in a narrow sector of the front. The simultaneous radio exchange of a large number of groups with several radio guidance stations, as well as inside the combat formations of attack aircraft, created a tense situation on the air, made it difficult to receive and issue commands. To eliminate this situation, the groups of attack aircraft were increased to 40-45 aircraft each. Provided that they were above the target for about 20-30 minutes above the battlefield, as a rule, there were three groups: one - above the target, the second - on the way to it, and the third - on the return route. At the same time, the radio discipline turned out to be quite high.
Attack aircraft went out to the battlefield in a column of 6-7 fours. With the first idle approach, they closed the circle over the object, and then in fours they attacked the target by plane, after which they took their places in the general formation. Each group made three to five runs. If in the first approach the height of the exit from the attack was 400-500 m, then in the next - 20-50 m. The enemy suffered significant damage, and our troops successfully moved forward.
Thus, concentrated and continuous strikes of large groups of attack aircraft on the same target for 20 minutes or more yielded good results. An important role was played by the formation of a "circle" order above the target, which sharply increased the self-defense of attack aircraft from attacks by enemy fighters. In addition, the fight against anti-aircraft artillery was simplified, since when operating from a circle, the pilots continuously monitored enemy anti-aircraft points, and upon detection they immediately launched an attack.
The massed actions of attack aircraft in a narrow sector were of great importance in ensuring the successful crossing by troops of such a large and complex obstacle as the Oder. The infantry, having received effective air support, was able to firmly gain a foothold on the western bank of the river and repel all attempts by the Nazis to eliminate the captured bridgeheads. This made it possible for the commanders of the combined-arms armies to concentrate on the occupied bridgeheads the required forces and means, which ensured a decisive offensive.
Since the 4th VA had a relatively small number of daytime bombers - the 5th bomber air corps of two divisions, they were used only for bombing the most important targets. Thus, the advancing troops of the 65th Army were heavily bombarded by German artillery from the Pomerensdorf stronghold. To support them flew two dozen bombers, led by Major P. G. Egorov and captain V. V. Bushnev. They carried out precise bombing of positions of enemy artillery batteries at the indicated strong point. After completing this assignment, the commander of the 4th Air Force sent the following telegram to the commander of the 5th Bomber Air Corps, which said that the Nazi artillery was suppressed, and "Soviet soldiers rose and successfully marched forward."
The successful forcing of a powerful water barrier was facilitated by the firm retention of air supremacy. The enemy air force tried to strike at the crossings and our troops on the bridgeheads. All seven days, while the Oder was crossed and the fighting was going on to break through the main strip of the fascist defense, 117 air battles were carried out, during which 97 aircraft were destroyed (among them 94 FW-190, which the enemy used as attack aircraft). On April 24 and 25, during the transition of Soviet troops to the offensive from the left-bank bridgeheads, the situation in the air turned out to be especially tense. In these numbers, 32 and 25 air battles were carried out, respectively, and 27 and 26 enemy aircraft were destroyed. To reduce the activity of the fascist aviation, strikes were made at the airfields of Prenzlau and Pasewalk, where 41 aircraft were destroyed and damaged.
To cover the main grouping, the 8th fighter air corps of Lieutenant General of Aviation A. S. Osipenko. During the crossing of the Oder and subsequent hostilities to expand the bridgeheads, a continuous fighter patrol was organized. On the first day, it was conducted in three zones. During daylight hours in each of the zones there were eight planes continuously. In the reserve of the corps commander, a fighter aviation regiment remained in order to build up the forces of patrolling fighters by flying out of the "watch at the airfield" position.
Thanks to the bold, decisive actions of the pilots and precise control of the fighters, all attempts by enemy aviation to strike at the Soviet troops on the bridgeheads were thwarted. It was not possible to destroy a single crossing of the Oder. The strength of maintaining air supremacy can also be judged by the fact that, on average, up to 30% of our attack aircraft escorting fighters took part in strikes against enemy troops on a daily basis. On some days, the proportion of these sorties was even greater. For example, on the third day of the operation (April 23), out of 622 sorties in 340 cases, fighters attacked ground targets.
It is worth noting that the aviation, together with the chemical troops, set up smoke screens in a number of sections of the Oder. Thus, the 4 VA successfully coped with the tasks facing it to provide support and cover for the Soviet troops during the crossing of the Oder.
