110 years ago, in July 1906, there were uprisings in Sveaborg and Kronstadt. They were attended by thousands of soldiers and sailors. The garrison of the Sveaborg fortress, located on 13 islands at the entrance to the Helsingfors harbor, numbered about 6 thousand sailors and soldiers. There were many former factory workers among the artillerymen, miners and in the naval crew. The Bolshevik military organization relied on them.
The situation in Finland at that time was conducive to revolutionary work. The power of the Russian gendarme administration in Helsingfors extended only to military garrisons. The Finnish Red Guard, which numbered more than 20 thousand people, many of whom had weapons, became a notable force. The Bolsheviks attached great importance to the capture of Sveaborg and Kronstadt. The uprisings in these fortresses were seen as an integral part of the general uprising of workers, soldiers and sailors in the largest centers of the country, supported by the peasant movement. The seizure of the Sveaborg and Kronstadt fortresses, the uprising of the Petersburg workers would make it possible to turn Finland and the Baltic states into a military base for the revolution. A general uprising in the Baltic Fleet was scheduled for July 29, 1906, but in Sveaborg the uprising began prematurely.
The Bolsheviks created a military center for preparing the uprising in Sveaborg and Helsingfors, which, in addition to the workers of the Central Group of the military organization, included representatives of the Finnish Red Guard and the Sveaborg Serf Military Committee. A group of workers of the military organization, who made up the "intelligence commission", was studying the situation and conditions of the upcoming uprising.
Most of the miners and artillerymen of Sveaborg, Skatuden's sailors, a significant part of the infantry in Sveaborg, Helsingfors and other garrisons (Abo, Vilmanstrand, Perki-Järvi), under the influence of Bolshevik agitation, advocated an uprising. The growth of dissatisfaction among the soldiers was facilitated by such phenomena as poor-quality shoes, frequent searches in the barracks, including at night, etc. However, there were no favorable conditions for the uprising. Meanwhile, only depending on the general situation in the country could the question of the date of the uprising be correctly resolved. The military-technical support of the uprising was still far from complete. Therefore, despite the attitude of the soldiers, the Bolshevik military organization held them back. In the face of increasing provocations from the authorities, this was a difficult matter. Provocations also came from the Social Revolutionaries, who had influence in the garrison. It is no coincidence that in July 1906, a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party, the head of their military organization E. Azef, arrived in Helsingfors, later exposed as a major agent of the secret police.
The immediate reason for the start of the uprising was the order to stop issuing the so-called "wine money" to the soldiers of the mine company. In response to this order, the miners refused to lay minefields on the outskirts of Sveaborg on July 16, for which they were arrested. The gunners rose to the rescue. After a failed attempt to free the mine company, the artillerymen seized guns, machine guns and rifles, crossed from Lagerny Island to Mikhailovsky, from where it was more convenient to attack and defend, and on the night of July 18 they gave the signal for an uprising with gunshots. The central group of the military organization of the RSDLP in Helsingfors tried to stop the untimely demonstration. The Bolsheviks argued that the uprising would be isolated, offered to postpone it at least until the fleet returned to Helsingfors, but they could not prevent the uprising.
Having received news of the aggravation of the situation in Sveaborg and the possibility of a spontaneous explosion, the Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP accepted the letter written by V. I. Lenin a draft resolution on the urgent sending of a delegation to Sveaborg to clarify the situation and help the Finnish military organization. The delegation had to achieve a postponement of the speech, and if it was impossible to do so - to join in the leadership of the uprising. The St. Petersburg Committee issued a directive to the districts to establish permanent shifts in safe houses, so that at any moment the St. Petersburg workers could be roused to strike.
The spontaneous, poorly prepared uprising, started by the artillerymen, could not be prevented. The sent delegation could not get to Sveaborg. The uprising was directly led by members of the committee of the Bolshevik military organization of the fortress lieutenants A. Emelyanov and E. Kokhansky, soldiers and non-commissioned officers T. Detiinich, M. Ivanov, P. Gerasimov, V. Tikhonov. It included 8 out of 10 artillery companies, the Sveaborg naval company and the 20th naval crew in Helsingfors (about 2000 people in total). By the morning of July 18, the rebels captured four islands. The headquarters of the uprising was located on Mikhailovsky Island, which was a strong and convenient position, both for an attack on the central fortress, where the commandant of Lyming was located with the headquarters, and for defense.
Special teams on the Commandant's Island acted with initiative and desperation. Immediately after the signal for an uprising, they managed to seize 20 machine guns with a stock of cartridges in the artillery arena and deliver to Mikhailovsky Island, then they made a successful attack on the guardhouse and freed the arrested. The artillerymen tried to win over to their side the fortress infantry units guarding the headquarters of the fortress on the Commandant Island. But negotiations with them ended in a shootout. Having picked up two dead and several wounded, the insurgent soldiers at night crossed from Komendantsky to Engineering Island. On the bridge connecting the two islands, sentry posts with machine guns were set up.
In the evening and at night of July 17, the rebels prepared for a decisive battle with government forces: they distributed the calculations for cannons and machine guns, calculated the availability of ammunition, prepared guns for firing at the Commandantsky and Camp Islands, determined the positions of soldiers from other islands.
Lieutenant Yemelyanov went to the Central Group (Helsingfors) at night for instructions. It was also necessary to agree on the delivery of food and medicine. The central group took immediate measures to alert the sailors on the Skatuden peninsula and the crew on the cruisers Emir Bukharsky, Finn and other ships. The naval committee was given the task of raising, on a signal, an uprising in the port and on ships.
The Sveaborzhians had to develop vigorous offensive actions, paralyze Lagerny Island, which is closest to Mikhailovsky, and, having delivered an ultimatum to the fortress headquarters to surrender, concentrate fire on the Commandant Island, where the infantry units of the fortress garrison settled. Members of the L. A. group were sent to the garrisons of Vyborg, Vilmanstrand, Perki-Yarvi, Tyusbyu. Vorobiev and N. M. Fedorovsky with the task of raising the soldiers and starting an uprising upon receipt of a conditional telegram.
On the morning of July 18, at a prearranged signal from the Central Group, an uprising was raised on the Skatuden Peninsula. The sailors, led by the naval committee, on alarm, seized weapons and cartridges, lined up in the courtyard of the barracks, raised a red flag in the port, and arrested the officers. A detachment of Red Guards (about 100 people) arrived to the aid of the sailors. The ships were to join the rebels. However, during the night, great changes took place on them: all the "unreliable" sailors were locked in the holds, and conductors, midshipmen and officers from other ships were added to the crews. Instead of the expected support, the sailors came under fire from machine guns and guns. Part of the rebels, together with the Red Guards, managed to get over to the city, while the other part retreated to the barracks and was arrested. At about five o'clock in the evening, Skatuden was occupied by the tsarist troops.
At dawn on July 18, the rebels of Sveaborg from the Artillery and Inzhenerny Islands opened fire on the Commandant Island from 9-pounder field guns and machine guns. The bombing was led by E. Kokhansky. The numbers of the crews worked clearly and fired accurately, like on a firing range.
By noon A. Yemelyanov returned from Helsingfors. He brought a directive that ordered the development of the uprising and go over to the offensive. The soldiers were filled with joy and enthusiasm at the news of the uprising on Skatuden and help from the Finnish Red Guard. In the Mikhailovsky Fort, on the highest place of the fortress, a large red flag brought by Yemelyanov was raised. By this time, Mikhailovsky Island was defined as the center of the uprising. The main forces, the main fortifications were concentrated here, artillery shelling of the fortress headquarters and the apartment of the commandant of Lyming was carried out from here. From the Commandant Island, only the arrows answered. The skirmish lasted all day.
The rebels had the opportunity to seize Commandant Island, eliminate the headquarters of the government forces and isolate the infantry troops, but, adhering to wait-and-see tactics, they postponed the assault until the arrival of the squadron. Such tactics helped the government gain time and transfer troops with artillery and machine guns to Helsingfors and Sveaborg.
In directing the hostilities, the headquarters of the uprising had to take care of food. Many fighters have not eaten for about a day. The headquarters sent the steamer "Shot" to Helsingfors for food. At night, he managed to break through the area illuminated by the cruisers' searchlights. It also transported about 200 Red Guards, sailors from Skatuden and Russian workers to Sveaborg. They were armed and dispersed along the coastline of Mikhailovsky Island in the rear of the batteries to repel fire and infantry attacks from Lagerny Island.
On the morning of July 19, the battle flared up with renewed vigor. At this time, government troops began to arrive in Helsingfors. The rebels did not receive reinforcements. They continued to fire at the fortress and prepared for the assault. The idea of an immediate assault was especially strengthened after receiving the commandant's answer to the ultimatum of surrender presented by the rebels, in which he threatened with brutal reprisals. In response to the commandant's threat, the gunners again began a fierce bombardment of the central fortress and Camp Island. Several houses caught fire, the Commandant Island was covered with smoke.
But at that moment, when it seemed to the rebels that victory was already close, an explosion of terrible power was heard on Mikhailovsky Island. One of the shells flew into the powder magazine, where 3,500 poods of gunpowder were stored. The explosion caused severe destruction and casualties. About 60 people were killed and seriously wounded. Among the wounded was one of the main leaders of the uprising, second lieutenant Yemelyanov.
At 6 pm on July 19, a squadron appeared on the horizon. However, the ships did not come to the aid of the rebels, but the commandant of the fortress. As it turned out, the command was able to prevent the uprising of the squadron by decisive measures. The crews of the ships were re-staffed by midshipmen and trustworthy sailors.
Moving 11-12 km away (beyond the reach of the "rebels' artillery), the battleship" Tsesarevich "and the cruiser" Bogatyr "fired fiercely at the insurgents for two hours, causing great destruction and causing fires. At the same time, the troops fired at them from guns and machine guns from the Commandantsky, Lagerny, Aleksandrovsky and Nikolaevsky islands.
The situation of the rebels was very difficult. And yet they decided to storm the central fortress. At this time, another powerful explosion occurred. Ammunition exploded from the hit of the shell. The assault had to be abandoned. The insurgents began to reinforce their positions and shelter the guns, resumed shelling. During July 18 and 19, they spent 646 shells and 90 thousand rounds of ammunition on the central fortress and ships of the squadron. However, it was clear that bombing alone could not ensure success. In addition, government troops were continuously receiving reinforcements. It was pointless to continue the struggle. In the evening, the artillery duel ended. But machine-gun and rifle fire continued on both sides.
Late at night, the wounded Yemelyanov gathered company representatives for a military council. After discussing the situation, the leaders decided to end the battle and take measures to save the lives of the participants in the uprising. Some of them in boats nevertheless broke through artillery and rifle fire into the city and the skerries. The Bolsheviks, with the help of Finnish comrades, transported about 80 soldiers and sailors across the border.
On the morning of July 20, the troops that were suppressing the uprising went on the offensive and captured the positions of the rebels. About 1,000 participants in the uprising were disarmed and arrested. The uprising of the Sveaborzhians was defeated due to a number of general and particular reasons. It took place during the recession of the revolution and was not supported by other one-time mass demonstrations. The rebels made a number of serious mistakes that hastened their defeat.
The uprising in Sveaborg was directly related to the uprising in Kronstadt, which began upon receiving a conditional telegram from the Sveaborg people. By the summer of 1906, almost all military units of the Kronstadt garrison had Bolshevik cells and circles, battalion and regimental committees, which were part of the city committee of the military organization. Since May 1906, on the instructions of the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP, an experienced organizer D. Z. Manuilsky, who won great authority among soldiers and sailors. The Bolsheviks ensured the connection of soldiers and sailors with the workers of the city.
Preparing for a joint armed uprising of workers, soldiers and sailors, the Bolsheviks waged an intense struggle against the adventurism of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who had their own rather strong military organization in Kronstadt. But the Socialist-Revolutionaries still managed to rouse the sailors and soldiers to an uprising, which was not prepared. When the uprising became inevitable, the Bolsheviks did their best to give the uprising an organized character. For this, representatives of the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP and its military organization arrived in Kronstadt. But in the remaining few hours it was difficult to do anything. It was not even possible to notify of the beginning of the uprising of the artillerymen, the fortress infantry battalions, the electrotechnical company.
The uprising in Kronstadt, which began on July 19, lasted 5-6 hours. Most of the sailors of the 1 st and 2 nd naval divisions who went out into the street did not have weapons - the authorities took them away in advance. We managed to get only 100 rifles, and those without cartridges. Lacking general leadership, the sailors soon retreated to the barracks and fired back for a while. The soldiers of the mine and sapper companies operated successfully, capturing the coastal fortification "Litke" and the fort "Constantine". However, under the influence of the superior forces of the combined detachment of government troops, the miners and sappers were forced to raise the white flag. In Kronstadt, about 300 soldiers of the mine and sapper companies, about 3,000 sailors were arrested.
On the night of July 20, the team of the cruiser Pamyat Azov, stationed in the bay, also performed. The sailors led the cruiser to the Revel raid, hoping to establish contact with the workers and raise the uprising on the training ship Riga. However, their intentions did not materialize. The performance of the cruiser crew was suppressed, 223 sailors were arrested.
The Bolsheviks tried to make the most of the performances in the army and navy. On July 20, the St. Petersburg Committee of the RSDLP received instructions from V. I. Lenin on a strike to support the Kronstadt uprising. On July 21, the strike began and covered more than 100,000 St. Petersburg workers. However, the uprisings in Sveaborg and Kronstadt were quickly suppressed, they did not serve as the beginning of an all-Russian uprising.
On July 28, the leaders of the Sveaborg uprising were shot by the verdict of the court-martial. In August - September, four more trials of soldiers and sailors - Sveaborzh residents took place, as a result of which 18 people were sentenced to death, 127 were exiled to hard labor, more than 600 were sent to disciplinary battalions.
In Kronstadt, 36 people were executed, 130 were sent to hard labor, 316 were imprisoned, 935 - in correctional and prison departments. 18 active participants in the uprising on the cruiser Pamyat Azov were also shot.
