Troubles. 1919 year. In two weeks of fighting, the Red Army achieved impressive success. The enemy offensive towards the Volga was stopped. Khanzhin's western army suffered a heavy defeat. The Reds advanced 120-150 km and defeated the 3rd and 6th Ural, 2nd Ufa corps of the enemy. The strategic initiative passed to the red command.
Defeat of Bakich's corps
Shortly before the counter-offensive of the Red Army, both sides received information about the enemy's plans. On April 18, 1919, the intelligence of the 25th division of Chapaev intercepted white couriers of communication with secret orders. They reported that a gap of about 100 kilometers had formed between the 6th corps of General Sukin and the 3rd corps of General Voitsekhovsky. It was reported that the 6th corps was beginning to turn to Buzuluk. That is, the whites could stumble upon the strike group of the Reds and tie it up in battle, destroying Frunze's plans. The Red commander planned an offensive for May 1, 1919. But then White also discovered that the Reds were preparing a counterattack. One of the red brigade commanders Avayev ran over to the whites and announced plans for a counteroffensive. Upon learning of this, Frunze postponed the offensive to April 28, so that the Kolchakites did not have time to take retaliatory measures.
However, the first battles began earlier. Wishing to take Orenburg as quickly as possible, the commander of the Southern Army Group Belov, after unsuccessful attacks on the city from the front, brought his reserve into the battle - the 4th corps of General Bakich. White, having crossed the river. Salmysh at Imangulov on the extreme right flank of the 20th Infantry Division, were supposed to assist Dutov's Orenburg army from the north in the capture of Orenburg. Then, if successful, cut the Buzuluk-Samara railway. If White could realize this plan, they could have encircled Guy's 1st Red Army together with 5th and 6th corps, and went into the rear of Frunze's strike group. As a result, Bakich's corps ran into the main forces of Gai's army, which quickly managed to respond to the threat and go on the offensive.
On the night of April 21, part of the white troops crossed Salmysh in boats. The Reds got an excellent opportunity to crush the enemy corps piece by piece. The red command threw into battle 2 infantry, 1 cavalry regiments, an international battalion, reinforced with artillery. During the fighting on April 24 - 26, the red units of the villages of Sakmarskaya and Yangizsky, with a simultaneous sudden blow from the south and north, utterly defeated the Kolchakites. On April 26 alone, the White Guards lost 2 thousand prisoners, 2 guns and 20 machine guns. The remnants of the white troops fled across the Salmysh River.
Thus, two divisions of the whites were almost completely destroyed, some of the whites went over to the side of the red. The 4th corps was staffed with mobilized peasants from the Kustanai district, where a peasant uprising had just been suppressed. Therefore, the peasants were not distinguished by high combat effectiveness, they did not want to fight for Kolchak and easily went over to the side of the Reds. Soon it will become widespread and will deal a fatal blow to Kolchak's army. Strategically, the defeat of Bakich's troops led to the fact that the rear communications of the Western army of Khanzhin to Belebey were opened. And Guy's 1st Army gained operational freedom. That is, by the end of April, the situation in the area where the strike group was located became even more favorable for the offensive. In addition, the first victories of the Red Army over the Kolchak people will inspire the Red Army.
Meanwhile, while a threat was brewing on the left flank of Khanzhin's army, the head of the clip of the Western army, which had already decreased to 18-22 thousand bayonets, continued its run towards the Volga, despite signs of an approaching catastrophe. On April 25, the White Guards occupied Art. Chelny near the city of Sergievsk, which endangered Kinel - a junction station on the rear railway communications of the entire Southern group with its main base. On the same day, the Whites took the city of Chistopol. On April 27, the 2nd White Corps took Sergievsk, and pressed the Reds in the Chistopol direction. This prompted the red command to launch an offensive without waiting for the completion of the concentration of the Turkestan army. On the Chistopol direction, the right flank of the 2nd Red Army was instructed to go on the offensive to return Chistopol.
Khanzhin, having received information about the impending enemy counterstrike, tried to take retaliatory measures. To close the gap in the south, the 11th division began to move there, sending strong reconnaissance groups towards Buzuluk. The commander of the 3rd corps was supposed to move the Izhevsk brigade there from his reserve, placing it on a ledge behind the 11th division. However, these measures were belated and only further weakened White's 3rd and 6th corps. These units could not cover the 100-kilometer gap, they only exposed themselves to attack, stretching out over a large area.
Samara. At the headquarters of M. V. Frunze is discussing the plan of the Buguruslan operation. May 1919
Frunze M. V. (bottom center) in Samara with an armored train crew before being sent to the Eastern Front. 1919 year
Counteroffensive of the Eastern Front. Buguruslan operation
On April 28, 1919, the troops of the Southern Group launched an offensive with a combined blow - from the front with units of the 5th Red Army and to the flank and rear of the Khanzhin army with a shock group in the Buguruslan direction. So the Buguruslan operation of the Red Army began, which lasted until May 13. The strike group consisted of 4 rifle brigades, on the right flank they were supported by 2 cavalry regiments, then the 24th rifle division advanced to the east.
On the night of April 28, the Chapayevites attacked the stretched units of the 11th division of the White Guards. They easily broke through the extended enemy front, crushing the Whites in parts and rushed from south to north, to Buguruslan. The 11th division was defeated. Its commander, General Vanyukov, reported that 250-300 people remained in the regiments, the soldiers surrendered en masse. The neighboring 7th Infantry Division of General Toreikin was also defeated. At the same time, the Red 24th Infantry Division pounced on the White 12th Division. It was not possible to defeat the Kolchakites here, but the Reds also took up and pressed the enemy to the north, excluding the possibility of maneuvering the 6th corps. In some areas, the White Guards still fiercely fought, especially the Izhevsk. But the Reds were outnumbered and could bypass such areas, finding gaps or less combat-ready enemy units. On May 4, the Chapaevites liberated Bururuslan. Thus, the Reds intercepted one of the two railways that connected the Western army with its rear. On May 5, the Reds recaptured Sergievsk.
Frunze introduced a fresh 2nd division into the breakthrough and threw two divisions of the 5th Army into battle. The Orenburg cavalry brigade rushed into the raid, smashing the rear of the whites. Thus, the position of Khanzhin's Western army became desperate. The Whites suffered heavy losses; in a week of fighting, the Whites lost about 11 thousand people on the main axis. The 6th corps was actually defeated and knocked out of action. The 3rd Ural Corps was also defeated. The morale of the White Army was undermined, and the fighting efficiency was rapidly falling. Affected by those deep negative prerequisites that initially developed in the army of Kolchak. As noted earlier, there was a strong staff shortage in Kolchak's Russian army. There were not enough good managerial and military personnel.
The mobilized Siberian peasants, often from the districts where the white punishers marched, more and more often surrendered and went over to the side of the Reds. While the White Guards were advancing, unity was maintained. The defeat immediately caused the collapse of the Kolchak army. Whole units went over to the side of the Red Army. On May 2, Khanzhin reported to Kolchak's headquarters that the Shevchenko kuren (regiment) from the 6th corps had revolted, killed his officers and officers from the 41st and 46th regiments and, having captured 2 guns, went over to the side of the Reds. This was not an exceptional case. During the run to the Volga, the White Guard units were drained of blood. They were filled with reinforcements of forcibly mobilized peasants and partly workers from the front line. The volunteers who made up the backbone of Kolchak's army were largely knocked out during previous battles. The rest disappeared into the new arrivals. Thus, the social composition of the Kolchak army has changed dramatically. The recruits for the most part did not want to fight at all and, at the first opportunity, surrendered or went over to the side of the Reds with weapons in their hands. At the end of April, White General Sukin noted that "all the reinforcements poured in recently were transferred to the Reds and even took part in the battle against us."
A completely different picture was observed in the Red Army. The Red Army men were inspired by the victories. Replenishments from workers and peasants who came to the Eastern Front, with a large number of communists and trade union workers, significantly strengthened the army. In the course of the struggle against the White army, new cadres of talented, initiative commanders grew up in the ranks of the Reds, who were reinforced by the already existing cadres of the old, tsarist army. They helped build a new army and crush the whites. In particular, since April 1919 the former General of the Imperial Army P. P. Lebedev was the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Front, the former General of the Old Army F. F., former lieutenant colonel of the old army D. M. Karbyshev.
The Kolchakites were still trying to recoup, stop the enemy, and then attack again. Lacking reserves, General Khanzhin requested reinforcements from Kolchak. From Siberia, at the disposal of Khanzhin, the only reserve of Kolchak's army was hastily transferred - the Kappel corps, which had not yet completed its formation. At the same time, the Whites regrouped the remaining forces of the strike group advancing towards the Volga, uniting them under the command of General Voitsekhovsky, creating a line of defense in the area west and south of Bugulma. Voitsekhovsky planned to deliver a flank counterattack on the Reds. At the same time, Chapaev's units continued their offensive.
On May 9, 1919, units of Chapaev and Voitsekhovsky collided on the Ik River head-on. The strike force of the Whites was the 4th Ural Mountain Rifle Division and the Izhevsk Brigade, which remained the main striking force of the Kolchakites. To the aid of Chapaev's 25th division, the Reds pulled up parts of two more divisions. In the course of fierce three-day fighting, the White Guards were defeated. On May 13, the Reds liberated Bugulma, cutting another railway line and a postal road - the last communications of the Western army. Now the white units, which had not yet retreated to the east, had to abandon heavy weapons, property, and leave the steppes and country roads in order to escape. The White Guards retreated across the Ik River. The Western army suffered another heavy defeat, but was not yet defeated. The main forces of the Kolchakites withdrew to the Belebey area.
Thus, in two weeks of fighting, the Red Army achieved an impressive success. The enemy offensive towards the Volga was stopped. Khanzhin's western army suffered a heavy defeat. The Reds advanced 120 - 150 km and defeated the 3rd and 6th Ural, 2nd Ufa corps of the enemy. The strategic initiative passed to the red command. However, there were still heavy battles ahead. Khanzhin's troops concentrated in the Belebey area, and Kappel's corps arrived. Here the Kolchakites were preparing for a stubborn defense and hoped, given a favorable situation, to launch a counteroffensive.
The missed opportunities of the Kolchak people
At the same time, it should be noted that now the situation has turned upside down. Having defeated the Khanzhin strike group that had escaped far ahead, the now Reds in the center of the front cut into the "white" territory with a wedge 300 - 400 km deep and about the same width. Indeed, on the flanks of the Eastern Front, the situation was still in favor of the Whites. In the north, Gaida's Siberian army still had local successes. In the south, the White Cossacks continued to attack Uralsk and Orenburg. Dutov's Orenburg army stormed Orenburg, and in May united with the Cossacks of Tolstov's Ural army. Uralsk was blocked from all sides. White Cossacks operated north of the city and threatened the rear of the southern group of Reds. They took Nikolaevsk and went to the Volga. With their advancement, the Cossacks raised uprisings in the Ural region. The commanders of the 1st and 4th red armies suggested leaving Orenburg and Uralsk, and withdrawing the troops. Frunze categorically rejected these proposals and ordered to hold the city to the last possible. And he was right. Orenburg and Ural White Cossacks concentrated all their efforts on the capture of their "capitals". As a result, the excellent Cossack cavalry during the decisive battles on the Eastern Front was shackled, did not do their own thing - they stormed the city fortifications. The Cossacks got stuck, not wanting to leave their villages, while the decisive battles were in the north.
The white command and 14-thous. By the southern army group of Belov, which continued to stand in the Orenburg steppes. There were no active actions, even demonstrative ones. Although the Belov group could be used for a flank counterattack against the Red strike group, support the Voitsekhovsky group or send Tolstov to the aid of the Ural army to take Uralsk and then jointly attack the Reds in a southern direction. This could dramatically complicate the position of the Reds in the central sector of the front. And then the red command has already taken countermeasures. Frunze ordered the strengthening of the Red Army troops on the southern wing. The Moscow cavalry division, 3 brigades, was transferred from the front reserve to Frunze. Replenishments were coming. They were often hastily put together, weak, poorly trained and armed. But they were good enough to hold the defense against the Cossacks, not to attack the enemy, but to maintain the front.
The potential of the 50,000-strong Siberian army located on the northern flank was not used to the full by the white command. The commander of the army was Radol (Rudolf) Gaida, a former military assistant of the Austro-Hungarian army, who surrendered and went over to the side of the Serbs. Then he arrived in Russia, became the captains of the Czechoslovak corps, in May 1918 he became one of the leaders of the anti-Bolshevik uprising of the Czechoslovak legionnaires. Under the Directory, he transferred to the Russian service and received the rank of lieutenant general. After the military coup, he began to serve in the army of Kolchak. He was a typical adventurer who used the turmoil to develop his personal career. Pretended to be the savior of Russia, formed a magnificent convoy following the example of the imperial one. At the same time, he did not forget to fill the trains with various goods, gifts and gifts from citizens of cities. He surrounded himself with incredible luxury, orchestras, sycophants. He had no military talents, he was mediocre. At the same time, he had a quarrelsome character. He believed that the direction of his Siberian army was the main one (Perm-Vyatka). Khanzhin's defeat even pleased Gaidu. At the same time, Gaida fell out with another narrow-minded person (cadres decide everything!) - D. Lebedev, Kolchak's chief of staff. When Kolchak's headquarters began to send orders to Gaide one after another to help the Western army, to suspend the offensive on Vyatka and Kazan, and transferred the main forces to the central direction, he ignored these orders. The directives received from Omsk on turning the main efforts of the Siberian army to the south, he considered talentless and impracticable. And instead of the south, he stepped up actions in the north. Pepeliaev's corps advanced another 45 km and took Glazov on June 2. Vyatka was under threat, but strategically the city was no longer needed. As a result, the preservation of the main forces of the Siberian army in the Vyatka direction led to the defeat of the Western army of Khanzhin, the withdrawal of the Red troops to the Siberians and the collapse of the entire Eastern Front of the Whites.
Gaida and Voitsekhovsky (almost hidden by a horse's muzzle) are hosting a parade of Czechoslovak troops on the main square of Yekaterinburg
Belebey operation
Meanwhile, the command of the Western Army was still trying to turn the tide in their favor. Khanzhin tried to organize a counterattack from the east in order to cut down the base of the Red Army wedge. For this, the Volga corps of Kappel was concentrated in the Belebey area.
However, Frunze, having learned about the concentration of enemy forces in the Belebey area, decided to destroy the enemy himself. Before the offensive on Belebey, the composition of the Southern Group was changed. The 5th Army was withdrawn from it, but two divisions of this army were transferred to Frunze. The 25th division, going to Kama, was deployed to attack Belebey from the north, the 31st division was to advance from the west, and the 24th division, pushing the white 6th corps, from the south. Kappel was hit by a triple blow and was defeated. He managed with difficulty, making complex maneuvers, hiding behind rear guards and counterattacking, to take his troops out of the "cauldron" and avoid complete destruction.
At the same time, the red command almost itself helped the whites. This happened during the change of command of the front. AA Samoilo (former commander of the 6th Army operating in the north) was appointed commander of the front instead of S. S. Kamenev. He arrived with new plans that differed significantly from the plans of the old front command and Frunze. Samoilo and Commander-in-Chief Vatsetis, not realizing the full depth of the defeat of the Western army of the Whites, underestimated the importance of a further offensive in the Ufa direction, and worried about the situation on the northern flank, they began to scatter the forces of the Southern Group, withdrawing the 5th Army from it. At the same time, the 5th Army was given a different task, it now had to advance to the north and northeast into the flank of the Siberian Army, to the aid of the 2nd Army. At the same time, the enemy was to be attacked by the 2nd and 3rd red armies.
Meanwhile, a successful breakthrough of the Southern Group in the Ufa direction would have forced Gaida's army to withdraw (which did happen). That is, the new command did not understand the situation. Within 10 days, Samoilo issued 5 contradictory directives to the commander of the 5th Army Tukhachevsky, each time changing the direction of the main attack. It is clear that confusion has arisen. In addition, the front command tried to lead individual divisions over the heads of the army commanders, to interfere in their affairs. All this complicated the course of the offensive operation. As a result, at the end of May, Samoilo was removed from the command of the front, and Kamenev again became the front commander.
The Belebey operation ended with the victory of the Red Army. Having broken the stubborn resistance of the Kappelites, on May 17, the red horsemen of the 3rd cavalry division liberated Belebey. Kolchakites hastily retreated to the Belaya River, to Ufa. This allowed the red command to strengthen the troops in the Orenburg and Ural regions and begin the Ufa operation.
Kolchak's troops during the retreat. Source:
