From the first day of the war, the mechanized corps were involved in fierce battles with German troops. They did not have to break through the enemy's defenses, enter the breakthrough and act in the depths of the rear, as envisaged by the pre-war plans. The main type of their combat activity was the infliction of counterattacks against the enemy strike forces that had broken through, which in itself was considered unlikely before the war.
In the first days of the war, the combat activity of mechanized corps was determined by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 3, issued on July 22, June 22, 1941. It read:
1. The enemy, inflicting the main blows from the Suwalki salient on Olita and from the Zamosc region on the Vladimir-Volynsky, Radzekhov front, auxiliary strikes in the Tilsit, Shauliai and Sedlits, Volkovysk directions during June 22, having suffered heavy losses, achieved small successes in these areas … 2. I order:
a) The armies of the Northern Front should continue to cover the state border firmly, the border on the left is the same;
b) The armies of the North-Western Front, firmly holding the coast of the Baltic Sea, inflict a powerful counterattack from the Kaunas area into the flank and rear of the Suwalki enemy grouping, destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front and by the end of June 24 capture the Suwalki area, the border on the left is the same;
c) The armies of the Western Front, restraining the enemy in the Warsaw direction, inflict a powerful counterattack with the forces of at least two mechanized corps and front aviation in the flank and rear of the enemy's Suwalki grouping, destroy it together with the North-Western Front and by the end of June 24 capture the Suwalki area …
d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the state border with Hungary, by concentric strikes in the general direction to Lublin by forces of the 5th and 6th armies, at least 5 mechanized corps, and the entire aviation of the front, to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the Vladimir-Volynsky front, Krystynopil, by the end of June 24, to seize the Lublin region, to firmly secure itself from the Krakow direction;
e) the armies of the Southern Front to prevent the enemy from invading our territory; when the enemy attempts to strike in the direction of Chernivtsi or to force the Prut and Danube rivers with powerful flanking attacks of ground forces in cooperation with aviation, destroy it with two mechanized corps on the night of June 23 to concentrate in the area of Chisinau and forests north-west of Chisinau."
This directive of the NCO reflected the desired rather than the actual state of affairs at the front. Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov, who was at the headquarters of the South-Western Front at that time, did not take part in its preparation and in a telephone conversation with his deputy Vatutin said: “But we still do not know exactly where and with what forces the enemy is striking. is it better to figure out what is happening at the front until morning and then make the right decision. However, the issue has already been resolved by Stalin and Tymoshenko.
The mechanized corps did not manage to achieve great success in these battles, but they managed to slow down the advance of the enemy troops in the directions of the main attacks, albeit at the cost of huge losses. In the first weeks of the war, the mechanized corps lost almost all the tanks, most of the personnel - the result of this was a directive letter from the Supreme Command Headquarters of July 15, 1941, which provided for the abolition of the mechanized corps. Tank divisions were transferred to the subordination of the commanders of the armies, the motorized ones were reorganized into rifle divisions.
Tankers choose a place for the crossing. Commander of the amphibious tank unit KOVO Art. Lieutenant Gunnikov and vehicle commander Podkhalzin.
BT-7 model 1937 of the 7th MK MVO on exercises in October 1940
Northwestern front
The composition of the troops of the Baltic Military District on the eve of the war included the 3rd and 12th mechanized corps. The 12th mechanized corps began advancing to the border by order of the commander of the district, Mr. F. I. Kuznetsov, back on 18 June. After the start of hostilities, the commanders of the mechanized corps received an order from the front commander to launch a counterstrike against the enemy grouping that had broken through: "12 mechanized corps-su - to eliminate the 23rd TD enemy tanks in Kretinga, deploy the main corps forces on the Teltyai-Poventis front to strike on the flank and the enemy's rear, breaking through to Taurogen, to the 3rd mechanized corps, leaving the 5th TD at the disposal of the commander of the 11th Army, 2nd TD and 84th MD on the night of June 23, go out in advance in the Rosiena area to strike in interaction of the 12th MK with the 9th anti-tank artillery brigade against the enemy ". The 12th Mech Corps and units of the 10th Rifle Corps from the Varniai, Uzhventis area and the 2nd Panzer Division of the 3rd MK, together with the 48th Rifle Division from the Keidaniai, Raseiniai area, were to defeat the Tilsit grouping of Germans. But, due to poor organization and support, the counterstrike on June 23-24 was reduced to hasty, not coordinated in place and time actions.
Fighting in the northwestern direction (June 22-July 15, 1941)
The commander of the ABTV NWF, P. P. Poluboyarov, described these events as follows: "The advance of troops for a counterattack took place in conditions when the divisions of the first echelon of the 8th Army were retreating under enemy pressure … The divisions of the 12th mechanized corps, even when moving to their initial lines, were subjected to strong influence of aviation The 23rd Panzer Division unexpectedly clashed with the enemy in the Zharenai area. The enemy managed to cut off the rear of its 46th Panzer Regiment from the combat units. Nevertheless, the regiments of this division were still able to concentrate in time for a counterattack in the Laukuwa area. As for the 28th Panzer Division, its units entered the designated areas with a delay of three hours. Part of its forces turned out to be tied up in repelling enemy tank attacks in the Kelme area. Here, the 202nd Corps MD was also engaged in fierce battles with the enemy. it was necessary to move three hours. The actions of the 12th mechanized corps practically resulted in an oncoming battle without proper preparation."
The 2nd Panzer Division of the 3rd MK, together with units of the 48th and 125th Infantry Divisions, counterattacked the enemy in the morning of June 23rd, but its actions did not bring territorial success either. On June 24, a fierce oncoming tank battle unfolded in the direction of the counterattack. On the front, about 60 km and up to 25 km deep, up to 1000 tanks simultaneously participated in battles on both sides. By evening, the 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded by German troops and defeated on June 26.
On the eve of the war: BT-7 LenVO at the May Day parade of 1941. The May blizzard was then perceived by many as a bad omen …
BT-5 and BT-7 on exercises before the war.
On June 27, the headquarters of the 12th mechanized corps was defeated. Komkor N. M. Shestopalov was captured (instead of him, from 1.07, the commander of the 12th corps was appointed commander V. Ya. Grinberg). On July 4, the corps was withdrawn to the front reserve.
And here is a look from the other side - the Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Halder: "The troops of Army Group North on almost the entire front (with the exception of the 291st Infantry Division advancing on Liba-wu, reflected the enemy tank counterattacks, which, presumably, were led by 3- Russian 1st Panzer Corps, supported by several mechanized brigades. Despite this, the reinforced right wing of the Army Group managed to advance as far as Viilkomir (Ukmerge). In this sector of the front, the Russians are also fighting stubbornly and fiercely. " entry: "It is only clear that only the 3rd enemy tank corps, which was from the very beginning in this area, was defeated by Reinhardt's tank corps and that Manstein's tank corps had advanced so far east that it forced the Russians to start retreating beyond the Western Dvina. The enemy is retreating in an organized manner, covering the retreat with tank formations. "The results were insignificant, and the losses in tanks were great. Only the 12th Mechanized Corps lost up to 80% of materiel by June 29. Already from June 25, the mechanized corps fought rearguard battles in separate units, covering the retreat 8 -th, 11th and 27th armies of the NWF.
As a result of the breakthrough of the 4th tank group, the troops of the NWF retreated in diverging directions - the 8th army to Riga, the 11th to Polotsk, and the road to Daugavpils and to the crossings across the Western Dvina turned out to be open. Already in the morning of June 26, the 8th Panzer Division of Manstein's 56th MK approached Dau-gavpils. To eliminate the breakthrough from the Moscow Military District, the 21st Mechanized Corps by Mr. D. D. Lelyushenko was transferred to the NWF, who received an order to cover the Daugav-Pils direction, and partly to destroy the enemy troops in the Rezekne area. On the morning of June 28, the 21st MK, which had only 98 tan-
kov, went on the offensive. The result of three days of fighting was the halt of the German offensive until July 2, right up to the approach of the main forces of the German 4th Tank Brigade. The commander of the 56th motorized corps, Manstein, described these events in his memoirs as follows: “As could have been foreseen, the enemy brought up fresh forces, not only from Pskov, but also from Minsk and Moscow. Soon we had to defend ourselves from enemy attacks on the northern bank of the Dvina, In some areas things took a serious turn … Finally, on July 2, we were able to act again after the third mechanized formation - SS "Totenkopf" division arrived in the corps, and on our left the 41st Panzer Corps crossed Dvin Jacobstad-ta (Jekabpils) ".
Pictures taken by German war correspondent Arthur Grimm on the morning of June 22 near the village of Suden. SdKfz 251/1 armored personnel carriers and "troikas" from the 1st TD pass by the burning BT. SdKfz 251/1 are equipped with rockets for launching rockets.
In July, in order to thwart the intentions of the Germans to break through to Novgorod, the 1st mechanized corps, Mr. M. D. Chernyavsky, which was part of the Leningrad Military District before the war, was sent to the North-West Fleet. By this time, there was only one 3rd Panzer Division left in it, and even that one without one tank battalion, MSP and back. Even before the war, on June 17, the 1st Panzer Division was withdrawn from its composition. On June 30, the corps became part of the NWF, and the next day the 163rd MD was transferred to the 27th Army. 5.07 units of the 1st mechanized corps, after a hard battle, occupied the city of Ostrov, but by the evening they were forced to leave it. On July 14-15, the corps struck at the 8th Panzer Division of the 56th MK near the city of Soltsy, throwing it back 40 km. This counterattack resulted in the suspension of the German offensive on Leningrad until the main forces of the German 18th Army reached the Luga line and the 4th TF was put in order. But the 1st mechanized corps itself ceased to exist as a tank formation, having lost most of the tanks.
By mid-July, all four mechanized corps operating in the NWF zone, as a result of huge losses (from June 22 to July 9 - 2523 tanks), turned into weakened rifle units covering the withdrawal of the front troops, and were soon disbanded.
Combat operations in the western direction (June 22 - July 10, 1941).
Western front
Here, directive No. 3 of the NCO Tymoshenko on the evening of June 22 set the commanders of the mechanized corps with the task of striking in the Grodno area in the direction of Suwalki, together with the NWF troops, to encircle and by the end of June 24 to destroy the Suwalki a certain group of Germans. For the counterattack, the 6th mechanized corps of the 10th army, the 11th mechanized corps of the 3rd army and the 6th cavalry corps were involved. The general leadership of the mechanized group was entrusted to the deputy front commander, General IV Boldin.
The 11th mechanized corps of General D. K. Mostovenko already on June 22 entered the battle on the right flank of the Western Front, communication with it was lost. On June 23, the 6th mechanized corps of General M. G. Khatskilevich began to move out of the Bialystok area in the direction of Grodno, having suffered losses from German air strikes. The 4th and 7th Panzer Divisions reached the deployment line by noon on June 23, where they were met with heavy anti-tank fire and were subjected to air strikes. As a result of a fierce battle, they managed to push back the Wehrmacht units that had broken through to the southeast of Grodno and by the evening to enter the defense zone of the 27th rifle division of the 3rd army. The next day, after the capture of Grodno by the Germans, the 6th mechanized corps struck in the northern direction. Faced with a powerful anti-tank defense, the corps suffered heavy losses.
In the afternoon of June 24, the tank divisions of the 6th mechanized corps were re-aimed southeast of Grodno, where in the evening they entered into battle with the formations of the 3rd Panzer Group of Gotha, trying to stop its advance in the Minsk direction. Having introduced the 8th and 20th Army Corps into the battle, on June 25 the enemy managed to dismember the divisions of the 6th Mechanized Corps, which were forced to conduct scattered battles that were not linked by a common plan. General Boldin with his staff was surrounded and lost contact with the command of the 6th MK. ZF commander Pavlov on the evening of June 25 gave the order to the commander of the 6th corps: "Immediately interrupt the battle and with a forced march, following night and day, concentrate in Slonim" (which was captured by General von Arnim's 17th TD on June 24). The 6th and 11th mechanized corps, operating against two army corps of the 9th army of the Germans, suffered significant losses and due to the lack of proper material and technical supplies in the midst of the battle were without fuel and ammunition. Under the blows of German troops, they, together with units of the 3rd Army, were forced to retreat towards Nalibokskaya Pushcha, which led to the formation of a large gap between the flanks of the NWF and ZF. At the end of June, divisions of the 6th and 11th mechanized corps were surrounded west of Minsk.
BT-7 on the march. The tank is equipped with a pair of "battle light" headlights on the cannon mask to illuminate the target during night shooting.
T-26 model 1939 with a conical turret and a turret platform with inclined armor plates. The tank, which belonged to NIIBT, bears a side number in an unusual way - not only on the turret, but also on the front sheet of the hull.
The 14th mechanized corps of General S. I. Oborin, which was part of the 4th army of general A. A. Korobkov, on the evening of June 22 received a combat order from the commander of the 4th army No. 02, which read: "to the 14th mechanized corps (22 -th and 30th TD, 205th honey) in the morning of June 23, strike from the Kryvlyany, Pelishcha, Khmelevo line in the general direction of Vysoké-Litovski with the task of destroying the enemy east of the Western Bug River by the end of the day. " At six o'clock on June 23, units of the 14th Mechanized Corps, 28th SK, 75th Rifle Division began counterattacks against the 47th, 24th MK and 12th Army Corps. By the beginning of the attack, the 30th Panzer Division had up to 130 tanks, the 22nd TD about 100. During the battle, the divisions suffered heavy losses from artillery, aviation, and tanks. Caught under the threat of encirclement as a result of a detour from the north by the forces of the 17th Panzer Division of the Germans, the owls. the troops were forced to withdraw. The total losses of the 14th mechanized corps in tanks amounted to 120 vehicles. The counterattack was unsuccessful, and the 4th Army was dismembered by Guderian's troops and began to withdraw in the direction of Slutsk. The 14th mechanized corps covered her retreat. By June 28, only 2 T-26 tanks remained in it, the corps was withdrawn to the rear and disbanded. General S. I. Oborin was accused of failure (on June 25, he was wounded, and the command of the 14th MK was taken by Col. I. V. Tugarinov), he was arrested and then shot.
The T-26 makes its way through the thicket. Spare support and support rollers are fixed on the fenders.
T-26 units of Captain Khomyakov are moving through the village near Yelnya. Western Front, July 1941
Tankers look around before entering the line.
T-34 under the cover of anti-tank artillery goes on the attack. Western Front, July 1941
By the beginning of the war, the 13th, 17th and 20th mechanized corps were still in the process of formation, so they were used in battles as rifle units, having remained without tanks by July.
In early July, the 5th mechanized corps of General I. P. Alekseenko, previously intended for the South-Western Front, and the 7th mechanized corps of General V. I. Vinogradov from the Moscow Military District, which had 924 and 715 tanks, respectively, entered the composition of the troops of the Western Front. They were included in the 20th Army of General PA Kurochkin, who received an order from the ZF commander: "Firmly holding the borders of the Western Dvina River, Dnieper, from the morning of July 6, 1941, go on a decisive offensive to destroy the Lepel group of the enemy." The depth of the blows was determined for the 5th mechanized corps up to 140 km, for the 7th - up to 130 km. On the morning of July 6, the 5th, 7th mechanized corps entered the battle. At first, their actions developed quite successfully: both corps, overcoming enemy resistance, reached the area north and south of Senno. The enemy moved the 17th and 18th tank divisions here. For two days, our corps repelled the onslaught of these formations, which delayed the advance of the entire 3rd tank group of the enemy towards the Dnieper … However, the counterstrike of the mechanized corps did not develop. The Nazis threw large air forces here, and our corps found themselves in a difficult situation, having suffered losses. They were forced to start withdrawing in difficult conditions under the blows of enemy tanks and aircraft.
The T-26 column moves into position for a counterattack.
Trapped in the mud and abandoned by the BA-20M.
A tank unit covered by an air strike on the road. The high accuracy of the bombing of German dive bombers is noticeable: the dispersion of bombs does not exceed several meters, and most of the BT-7 and KB were destroyed by direct hits.
A retreating artillery unit after an attack by German tankers.
Shielded KV-1 "Beat the Nazis".
The BA-10 column is moving out of Chisinau to the western border. June 24, 1941
Tractor "Komsomolets", inherited by the Germans with ammunition.
Major General of the tank forces A. V. Borzikov in his report to the head of the GABTU of the Red Army assessed their actions as follows: of machines goes to the enemy because of a trivial malfunction. Neither the division, nor the mechanized corps, nor the army, nor the front are able to organize repairs and evacuation. reasons, mechanized corps entered the battle at different times, as they approached the battlefield.
The main goal of the counterstrike was the defeat of the 1st Panzer Group of E. Kleist, which broke through at the junction of the 5th Army of General M. I. Potapov and the 6th Army of General I. N. Muzychenko. An oncoming tank battle unfolded in the area of Lutsk, Dubno, Rovno from June 23; from the side of Lutsk and Dubno, the 9th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky and the 19th mechanized corps of General N. V. Feklenko struck on the left flank of the 1 str. From the south, from the Brody area, the 15th mechanized corps of General I. I. Karpezo and the 8th mechanized corps of General D. I. Ryabyshev attacked Radekhov and Berestechko. On June 23, German troops continued their offensive on Lutsk, Berestechko, widening the gap between the 5th and 6th armies. On the same day, a counterattack began. In the morning, in the area of Radekhov, on a front 70 km wide, the 15th mechanized corps launched an offensive, but, having suffered heavy losses, was forced to withdraw. The 4th mechanized corps of Mr. A. A. Vlasov, instead of participating in the strike on the 1st tank group, was sent to eliminate the enemy breakthrough at the junction of the 6th and 26th armies in the Mostisk area (except for the 32nd TD, which acted in conjunction with the 15th MK). The 22nd mechanized corps, which went on the offensive on June 24, from the Voinitsa - Boguslavskaya line, advanced 7-10 km to Lokache. But, acting independently, without air support, the corps lost more than 50% of its tanks and retreated to its original positions. The 41st Panzer Division of the 22nd MK did not take part in the counterattack at all.
Fighting in the southwestern direction (June 22-July 15, 1941).
In the "Description of the hostilities of the 22nd mechanized corps of the South-Western Front for the period from 22 to 29.06.1941" This is stated as follows: “On June 24, 1941, the 19th Panzer Division at 13.30 counterattacked the advancing enemy units in the area of height 228.6, Aleksandrovka, Markovitsy. 10 - 12. Most of these tanks were destroyed by the enemy and disabled. When the tanks reached the forest area south of height 228.6, north of Kanevichi, the enemy infantry began to retreat, and strong artillery and rifle-machine-gun fire was opened from the forest, followed by the emergence of medium and heavy tanks. A strong tank battle ensued, which lasted 2.5 hours. The tanks remaining after the battle began to withdraw from the battle. The infantry began an indiscriminate retreat … the 19th TD withdrew to the line of the Serzh River. In this battle, the commander of the 22nd MK, Mr. Kondrusev, was killed (he was replaced by the Chief of Staff, Mr. Tamruchi) …
On the morning of June 25, the 9th and 19th mechanized corps went on the offensive from the north, pushing back parts of the 3rd MK of the Germans to the southwest of Rovno. But it was not possible to build on the success due to the fact that the strike from the south, due to the unpreparedness of the troops, was postponed to the next day. On June 26, the troops of the 1st Tgr and the 6th Army were counter-attacks by the 9th and 19th MK from the north, the 8th and 15th MK from the south, entering into an oncoming tank battle with the 9th, 11th, 14th and 16th TD of the Germans. The 9th and 19th mechanized corps during June 26-27 fought with the divisions of the 3rd micron, but under the blows of aviation they were forced to withdraw to the area west of Rovno. The 8th mechanized corps struck at the 16th TD, advancing 12 km. On the night of 27.06, he was withdrawn from the battle and began to concentrate behind the 37th sk."
German soldiers pass by bombed tanks. Northwestern Front, July 1941.
Abandoned on the street of the Lithuanian city T-38.
The operational summary of the headquarters of the South-Western Front No. 09 dated 1941-26-06 reported: "The 8th mechanized corps at 9.00 on June 26 hesitantly attacked the enemy's mechanical units from the Brody area in the direction of Berestechko and, not having sufficient aviation support and from the neighbor's left - 15 microns, Stopped by the enemy in the initial area for the attack. The 15th mechanized corps also acts hesitantly, not fulfilling the order to attack. By 9.00 26.06 - the beginning of the attack - MK was not yet concentrated in the initial area for the attack. " The headquarters of the South-Western Front, seeing the low effectiveness of the counterattacks, decided with the front-line reserve (31st, 36th, 37th battalions) to strengthen the defenses on the Lutsk-Kremenets line, and withdraw the MK from the battle to prepare a new powerful counterstrike. The headquarters did not approve this decision, ordering the attacks to continue on the morning of June 27. The departing divisions of the 8th MK were turned back, but their efforts were not supported by other MKs, and the 8th Mechanized Corps itself was surrounded. The commander of the 8th MK, Mr. D. I. to the Dubno area, cut off from the 7th division, the position is unknown, the aviation is heavily bombing. The 7th division suffered heavy losses."
The Sd Kfz 10/4 anti-aircraft self-propelled gun with a 20-mm automatic cannon Flak 30 is firing at Soviet tanks. Small-caliber rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns on half-track and car chassis proved to be a formidable opponent of lightly armored BT and T-26.
Tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf E broke into a Soviet artillery battery.
Counterattacks by the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front for a week delayed the offensive of the 1st Panzer Group and thwarted the enemy's plans to break through to Kiev and encircle the 6th, 12th and 26th armies of the South-Western Front on the Lvov salient, but it was not possible to achieve a turning point in the hostilities.
One of the main reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet mechanized corps in this battle was the lack of communication and interaction between them. The commander of the 9th mechanized corps K. K. Rokossovsky: "… with the information of the troops about the situation at the front, the situation was very bad. The information had to be obtained by ourselves. We did not know anything about the front. Apparently, the headquarters of the 5th army did not know anything either, because it did not inform us. Communication of the corps with the headquarters of the 5th army was often absent, and with neighbors it was periodically cut off."
Burned-out T-34 sample 1940. Western Front, July 1941
Damaged and burnt-out trucks, BT-7 and KB tanks after the battle at Velikaya. KB of early releases with an F-32 cannon and a shielded turret. Northwestern Front, Pskov direction, August 1941
T-28, out of order after the explosion of the gun.
VS Arkhipov, commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 43rd tank division of the 19th mk V. S. and from the north (9th and 19th MK), but also the communication of the higher headquarters with these groups - the headquarters of the South-Western Front … and the headquarters of the 5th Army. Therefore, the decisions that were made in the headquarters and, in turn, were transmitted to the front, often did not correspond to the changed combat situation. For example, on the evening of June 26, when, having crushed the right flank of the 11th German TD and defeated one of its tank regiments, our division reached Dubno, none of us knew that from the south, inflicting huge losses on other formations of the 48th German motorized corps, the 8th mechanized corps of General D. I. Ryabyshev was successfully advancing towards us … the next day, when all three corps are 36th street lkovy, 8th and 19th mechanized - again attacked in the Dubna direction. Again, we and our neighbors, the riflemen of the 36th corps, reached the approaches to Dubno, but did not know that the 34th tank division of the IV Vasiliev regiment from the 8th mechanized corps had already burst into the city. Thus, on June 26 and 27, Soviet tank wedges twice and very deeply - up to 30 km - cut into both flanks of the German 48th MK. However, the lack of communication between these wedges and mutual ignorance did not allow bringing the matter to its logical conclusion - to the encirclement of the 48th MK between Brody and Dubno.”The 34th Panzer Division, which occupied Dubno, was surrounded by German troops and defeated - all tanks were destroyed, commander Colonel I. V. Vasiliev died.
Tank Pz Kpfw II Ausf F, smashed by artillery fire and half-sunk in the river.
Red Army soldiers at the captured light staff armored car Sd Kfz 261. Western direction, August 1941
In general, the leadership of the mechanized corps' operations left much to be desired. Orders from commanders of different levels often contradicted one another. This is clearly seen in the example of the 8th mechanized corps. Here is an excerpt from a brief overview of the actions of the mechanized formations of the fronts for the period from 22.06 to 1.08.1941: "On June 22, 1941, without allowing the corps to carry out the order of the 26th Army, the front commander appoints a new area of concentration and subordinates the corps of the 6th Army The commander of the 6th army, not considering that the corps is marching, following the order of the commander of the South-Western Front, gives a new area of concentration. By virtue of this order, the commander had to turn the marching units in a new direction. On June 24, the commander of the 6th army transfers the corps On June 26, by order of the commander of front No. 0015, the corps is transferred to the new area, thus not participating in hostilities, but making "super-forced" marches in a vicious circle, following the orders of the commanders of the 26th, 6th armies and the front., the corps covered an average of 495 km, leaving 50% of the available combat materiel on the roads during the marches, exhausting the remaining materiel and the driver's staff. On June 6, following the orders of the front No. 0015 and 0016, the commander of the MK, without concentrating all the units, introduces his corps into battle in parts without reconnaissance of the enemy, without finding out its location and strength. As a result, the units run into a strong anti-tank defense system and swamps and suffer considerable losses without completing the assigned task. The corps' actions from the air were not covered, and interaction on the scale of the front was not organized. The nervousness of the higher staffs in the management and setting of tasks, the abundance of orders not related to one another, the failure to comply with elementary regulations in the organization and conduct of marches were the main reason for the loss of the corps' combat capability and the loss of material."
Repulsed by Soviet troops Pz Kpfwlll Ausf G with a 50 mm Kwk L / 42 cannon.
Kievans inspect the captured assault gun StuG III Ausf C, captured near the village of Vita-Pochtovaya and towed to the city. On a self-propelled gun in the center is the deputy military commissar of the Kiev stronghold, battalion commissar M. V. Pankovsky. Kiev, August 10, 1941.
The situation was no better in the 15th mechanized corps. "The frequent change in the tasks of the corps and the delivery of orders from the headquarters of the front and the 6th army with a great delay introduced uncertainty, confusion and unnecessary consumption of motor resources. For example, on June 24, an order was received from the front headquarters about the withdrawal of the 15th mechanized corps from the Kolesniki-Holoyuv line to the area south-west of Brody for a joint attack with 8 microns in the direction of Berestechko, Dubno. Corps units began to carry out this order and were en route, and some had already reached the area of their concentration. On June 25, an order was issued to return corps units to the previously occupied line with the aim of preparing an offensive in the direction of Radzekhiv, So-kol, together with the 4th micron. At 23.00 on June 26, a new order was received from the front headquarters: to defeat the enemy's mechanized group operating on Dubno, striking in the direction of Lopatyn, Berestechko, Dubno. June 27 was a new order was received again, radically changing the task of the corps: to withdraw to the area of the Zlochów Heights. The first order of the front: "Despite any difficulties and the technical condition of the materiel, advance in the direction of Berestechka on June 28th." Comments are unnecessary here.
Padded Pz Kpfw And Ausf S. July 1941
The Pz Kpfw 38 (t) knocked out by artillerymen, we know as "Prague". July 1941
Starting a counterattack, the 8th mechanized corps penetrated deeply into the Germans' lines, reaching the rear of their 11th Panzer Division and threatening the enemy's depots deployed in Dubno. The German offensive was delayed for several days, but by July 1, the main forces of the corps were surrounded, left without fuel and ammunition. There was no longer any question of continuing the counterstrike. The tankers went over to the defensive, fighting back from the dug-out tanks. The fate of the corps was disastrous, as Halder noted a couple of days later, "in the course of prolonged stubborn battles, the enemy forces were crushed and most of its formations were defeated." On June 30, the troops of the front were ordered to withdraw to the line of fortified areas along the old state border.
In early July, the troops of Army Group South managed to break through the Soviet defenses. On 7 July, the German 11th Panzer Division reached Berdichev, while the 3rd Motorized Corps of the 1st Panzer Group and the 6th Army reached Zhitomir. As a result of this breakthrough, there was a threat of the capture of Kiev and the encirclement of units of the 6th and 12th armies of the SWF southwest of Kiev. Hitler demanded the destruction of the largest enemy forces west of the Dnieper in order to deprive him of the ability to conduct organized operations in large masses of troops east of the Dnieper.
The command of the SWF was forced to take urgent measures to counter the German troops. In the Berdichev area, counterattacks were conducted by consolidated detachments of the 4th and 15th mechanized corps divisions. The 16th mechanized corps was also sent here, transferred to the Western Front from the Southern. His divisions entered the battle directly from the echelons. From parts of the 4th, 15th, 16th MK, the Berdichev group was formed under the command of the division commander A. D. Sokolov. As a result of the counterattacks, it was possible to force the Germans to go on the defensive, stopping their advance on Belaya Tserkov. At the same time, only the 11th TD of the Germans, according to German data, lost more than 2,000 people in battles. At the cost of a bloody battle, it was possible to delay the advance of Army Group Center to the south for a whole week (on July 18, 1941, Halder recorded the problem of the flank of the 1st Panzer Group: "It is still marking time in the area of Berdichev and Belaya Tserkov."). In the battles near Berdichev, the 8th and 10th Panzer Divisions especially distinguished themselves, pinning down the main forces of Kleist's Panzer Group for a week. At this time, heavy battles were fought in the Novograd-Volynsky area, where the troops of the 5th Army of the South-Western Front inflicted counterattacks on the northern flank of the German group that had reached Kiev. The main striking force of the 5th Army was three mechanized corps: the 9th Mr. A. G. Maslov (19.07 replaced K. K. Rokossovsky), the 19th Mr. N. V. Feklenko and the 22nd Mr. V. S. Tamruchi, which had only 30-35 tanks (in the 19th MK - 75 tanks).
However, the forces of the mechanized corps were exhausted by the counterattacks, and the group at Korosten was forced to go over to the defensive (as the Germans noted, "there are no more tanks").
By this time, only a shadow of their former power remained from the mechanized corps. According to the information of the headquarters of the Main Command of the South-Western direction on the state of rifle and tank divisions of the fronts on July 22, 1941, "tank divisions numbered: less than 1,000 people - about 20% of all divisions, 1-2 thousand people - about 30%, 3-5 thousand people each - about 40%, 10-16 thousand people each - 10% of all divisions. Of the 12 tank divisions, only two have 118 and 87 tanks. Most of the rest have only a few tanks. " In the second half of August, the formations of the 5th Army, including the mechanized corps, withdrew beyond the Dnieper.
Cavalry attack supported by T-26.
In general, the actions of mechanized corps in the first week of the war against enemy strike groups in order to change the course of events were not crowned with success in any of the strategic directions. The German command, assessing the actions of the Soviet troops when delivering counterstrikes, noted: "In front of Army Group South, the enemy was on top in matters of general leadership and conducting offensive operations of an operational scale. In front of Army Groups Center and North" in this regard, the enemy showed on the bad side. Command and control at the tactical level and the level of combat training of troops are mediocre."
Southern front
In the SF zone, the Soviet mechanized corps had a huge superiority over the enemy - 769 tanks of the 2nd and 18th mechanized corps were opposed by 60 Romanian ones. The ratio was 12.8: 1. But the front commander Tyulenev believed that his troops were opposed by 13 tank and motorized divisions of the Germans, although in reality there were none. Here in June-July the 2nd mechanized corps of General Yu. V. Novoselsky was most active. Together with the 48th Rifle Corps of General R. Ya. Malinovsky, he inflicted counterattacks on the German and Romanian troops at the turn of the Prut River. On July 8, the 2nd mechanized corps stopped the enemy's offensive with a strike between the 4th Romanian and 11th German armies. On July 22, the 2nd mechanized corps launched a counterattack from the Khristianovka area to Uman against the 11th and 16th tank divisions of the Germans, throwing them back 40 km, eliminating the threat of encirclement of the 18th army.
The 18th mechanized corps on June 30 from Akkerman was withdrawn to the Vopnyarka area for staffing and on July 4 transferred to the South-Western Front. On July 19, he became part of the 18th Army and launched a counterattack on the right flank of the 52nd Army Corps of the 17th Army south of Vinnitsa, with 387 tanks. On July 25, divisions of the 17th Army broke through the defenses in the zone of the 18th MK and 17th Army Corps in the Gaisin-Trostyanets area. Until July 30, the 18th mechanized corps held defenses at Gayvoron, and in August it was transferred to Pavlograd.
At the end of July, the divisions of the 2nd mechanized corps tried to help the 6th and 12th armies of the SF, half-encircled in the Uman region, but could not break through the front of the German troops. In addition, the tank units of the Law Firm by this time suffered significant losses, although their combat potential was still quite large. According to the report of the assistant commander of the LF troops for ABTV, Mr. Shtevnev, dated July 31, 1941, the LF mechanized corps had:
in 2 mk combat-ready: 1 KB, 18 T-34, 68 BT, 26 T-26, 7 flamethrowers, 27 T-37, 90 BA-10, 64 BA-20 (total tanks - 147, on 22.06.-- 489);
18 microns: 15 BT and T-26, 5 T-28, 2 flamethrowers, 1 BA-10, 4 BA-20 (total tanks - 22, on 22.06. - 280);
16 microns: 5 T-28, 11 BA-10, 1 BA-20 (on 22.06. - 608 tanks);
24 microns: 10 BT, 64 T-26, 2 flamethrowers, 10 BA-10, 5 BA-20 (total tanks - 76, on 22.06. - 222).
It also said: "As a result of the consumption of material resources, accidents, breakdowns, it requires an average overhaul: up to 200 units for the 2nd micron, up to 200 units for the 18th micron."
The state of the mechanized corps can be judged by the combat report of the headquarters of the 6th army of the SF dated July 26: mcp, up to a battalion. The 16th mechanized corps does not represent any real force at all."
Repair of the T-26 by the crew and a brigade of workers. In the days of the retreat, it was possible to withdraw the damaged vehicle only if it kept moving - there was nothing to tow the failed tanks and there was no time.
Odessa tank-tractors based on STZ-5 with armor made of ship steel. The front armored vehicle is armed with DP infantry machine guns. Pay attention to the figure of the sailor - the fleet was actively involved in the manufacture of these machines, and they were often taken to battle by sailor crews.
Repair of BT-2 in the workshop of one of the plants in Leningrad.
KV-1 with welded turret and F-32 cannon.
The crew camouflages their T-34 in cover.
The mechanized corps deployed in the internal districts were disbanded after the start of the war, and ten tank divisions of the new organization were created on their basis. The main reason for the reorganization of the mechanized corps that took the German strike was "complete exhaustion of the material part."
When considering the events of the first weeks of the war, the question arises why, having a huge quantitative superiority in tanks (in the ZF zone, the ratio was 2, 7: 1, SWF - 5, 6: 1, SF - 12, 8: 1), having tanks that were not inferior, and even superior in their fighting qualities of the German, Soviet armored forces suffered such a crushing defeat? It will be very unconvincing to explain his superiority of the enemy in military equipment and surprise of the attack, as was done before. Therefore, we present here the considerations of the commanders of tank forces, direct participants in the events described.
P. P. Poluboy ditch, commander of ABTV NWF: "Most of the counterstrikes were delivered by our troops frontally, often scattered, without concentrating the main efforts on decisive axes, on undisturbed and strong enemy groupings. The enemy had good aerial reconnaissance. Hitler's pilots quickly opened regrouping and concentration of our troops, they especially followed the movements of tank formations."
KK Rokossovsky, commander of the 9th mechanized corps of the South-Western Front in June 1941: “The troops of this district (KOVO) from the very first day of the war were completely unprepared to meet the enemy. Many formations did not have the required set of ammunition and artillery, the latter was taken to the training grounds located near the border, and left there. Even when the directions of the main blows delivered by the German troops, as well as their grouping and forces, were clearly established, the district command turned out to be unable to take responsibility and make a drastic decision to save the situation, so injure most of the troops from complete defeat, pulling them back to the old fortified area."
The tank battalion of Major Baranov takes positions in the area of the Crimean shaft. An open hatch in the upper turret hatch is designed for flag communication and launching signal flares. October 1941.
We will not touch on the reasons for defeats that are of a strategic nature - a lot of literature has been devoted to them, especially in recent years. The reasons for the failures of the operational-tactical level were assessed as early as 1941. In documents not intended for public use, they were exhaustively stated. As an example, let us cite the report of the assistant commander of the troops, Mr. Tank Forces Volsky, to the Deputy NKO of the USSR, Mr. Fedorenko, dated August 5, 1941. It deals with the actions of the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front, but its conclusions are extended to the corps of other fronts. In this document, the main reasons for the rapid failure of tank units are named:
1. From the very first day of the war, the mechanized corps were misused, for all were given to the armies …
2. All combat actions of mechanized corps took place without thorough reconnaissance, some units did not know at all what was happening in the immediate vicinity. Aviation reconnaissance in the interests of MK was not conducted at all. The control of the mech corps from the side of the combined arms commanders was poorly set, the formations were scattered (8 microns) and by the time of the offensive were torn off from each other. The headquarters of the armies were completely unprepared to manage such large mechanized formations as the mechanized corps …
3. The headquarters of the armies completely forgot that the material part has certain engine hours, that it requires inspection, minor repairs, additional replenishment of fuel and ammunition, and the technical staff and chiefs of the ABTO armies did not tell them this, and instead of taking the mechanized corps after completing the task Having given them the time necessary for this purpose, the combined-arms commanders demanded only give and nothing else. The mechanized corps had absolutely no cover both on the march and on the battlefield.
4. Information from top to bottom, as well as with neighbors, was delivered very badly. From the first day the war assumed a maneuverable character, the enemy turned out to be more mobile …
This is all about the combined-arms commanders. But there were many shortcomings made directly by the commanders of mechanized units and formations. These include:
1. The headquarters of the MK, TD and TP have not yet mastered the proper operational-tactical outlook. They were unable to draw the correct conclusions and did not fully understand the intention of the army and front command.
2. There was no maneuverability - there was lethargy, slowness in solving problems.
3. Actions, as a rule, were in the nature of frontal strikes, which led to unnecessary loss of material and personnel …
4. Inability to organize the battle formations of the corps in directions, to cover the enemy's movement paths, and the latter, mainly, moved along the roads.
5. There was no desire to deprive the enemy of the possibility of delivering fuel, ammunition. Ambushes on the main lines of his actions were not practiced.
6. Large settlements were not used to destroy the enemy and the inability to operate in them.
7. Management, from the platoon commander to large commanders, was poor, the radio was used poorly, the covert command and control of the troops was poorly organized …
8. Crew training in matters of preservation of materiel is extremely poorly organized. There were cases when crews left vehicles with ammunition, there were isolated cases when crews left vehicles and left on their own.
9. In all units and formations there were no evacuation means, and the available ones could provide microns and so on only in offensive operations.
10. The personnel of the new technology have not mastered, especially KB and T-34, and are not at all trained in the production of repairs in the field.
11. … The lack of a regular organization of evacuation means led to the fact that the evacuation of combat materiel … was absent.
12. The headquarters turned out to be poorly trained, staffed, as a rule, by combined-arms commanders who had no experience of working in tank units.
13. In higher educational institutions (academies) such types of combat, which we had to face, have never been worked out."
Abandoned in the workshops BT-7 model 1935 and 1937.
These T-26 and T-40 did not have time to enter the battle and went to the Germans right on the railway platforms.
"Thirty-fours" hit by the bomb.
It is difficult to add anything to these conclusions; it can only be confirmed by specific facts. Here are just a few:
In the 8th TD of the 4th MK of the South-Western Front, the crews destroyed 107 tanks, including 25 KB, 31 T-34s. 18 T-34s disappeared altogether for some unknown reason.
In the 10th TD of the 15th MK South-Western Front, 140 tanks were abandoned during the withdrawal, of which 34 KB and 9 T-34s. 6 cars were missing.
The 7th TD of the 6th MK ZF lost 63 tanks only on June 22 from air strikes.
The 13th TD of the 5th MK ZF in the midst of the counterstrike got up due to lack of fuel. In the same position were TD 6th, 11th, 12th and other microns.
The 5th and 7th MK ZF in July inflicted a counterattack on a terrain completely unsuitable for tank operations, which led to heavy losses.
The 22nd TD of the 14th MK ZF, stationed in Brest, already in the morning of June 22, as a result of shelling, lost most of its tanks and artillery. The warehouses of fuels and lubricants and ammunition were destroyed.
The 23rd and 28th TD of the 12th MK SZF, participating in the counterstrike against the Tilsit group, entered the battle at different times, there was no coordination of actions. The 28th Panzer Division, moreover, found itself without fuel and was forced to be inactive for half a day.
KB destroyed by an ammunition explosion.
T-34 after a battle with German tanks. There are many holes in the side, traces of a fire are visible. The road roller was torn out, and the turret hatch and fan were demolished by an explosion of ammunition.
