On the eve of World War II, the Soviet country had the most powerful armored forces in the world. They were matched by the capabilities of the domestic industry, which proved its ability to fulfill the most ambitious plans and managed to provide the army with tens of thousands of vehicles. Tank power, numbering several times more armored vehicles than all the other armies of the world put together, was brought together into large shock formations - corps and divisions, tactics of their use were developed and well-known combat experience was gained. All of them did not last long, having burned out in the flames of the battles of the first months of the Great Patriotic War, but they left a noticeable mark on its history. This paper attempts to review the short history of mechanized corps in 1940-1941. formations, their structure and experience of combat use, traced the fate of the tank and motorized divisions included in them, on the basis of archival materials, combat reports, summary reports, forms of units and formations, eyewitness accounts and combat participants.
T-27 tankettes at the May Day 1934 parade on Red Square. The slightly open armored caps are clearly visible
The first tanks appeared in the Red Army during the Civil War. These were captured vehicles captured in battles and then used against their former owners. For the first time in battle they were used during the Soviet-Polish war on July 4, 1920, when in the Polotsk area the 33rd SD was supported by 3 Ricardo tanks (this was the name given to the British MK. V in the Red Army) of the 2nd armored detachment. By the end of 1920, the Red Army had 55 automobile and 10 autotank detachments armed with British Mk. Vs, French Renault FT.17s and armored vehicles. In May 1921, by order of the RVS, the Office of the Chief of the Armored Forces of the Red Army was created, to which armored trains were also subordinated, the number of which was in the range of 105-120 units. In total, the Armor Forces of the republic had about 29 thousand personnel in 208 detachments. During the postwar transition to peacetime states in the summer of 1923, the Armored Forces were disbanded. Detachments of armored vehicles were transferred to the cavalry, and tanks and armored trains to the infantry and artillery, respectively.
In the same year, all autotank detachments were consolidated into a Separate Squadron of Tanks (the name itself suggests that many military experts saw a great similarity between tanks and warships and the methods of their use). In 1924 the squadron was transferred to the regimental system. The tank regiment consisted of 2 tank battalions (line and training) and service units, a total of 356 people, 18 tanks. In subsequent years, several more three-battalion tank regiments were deployed. The period of the search for the most effective organizational forms of tank forces began, which dragged on for 20 years, until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. And during the war and after it, the organizational structure of the armored forces has repeatedly undergone numerous changes.
The development of armored forces was hampered by the lack of their own models of armored vehicles. So, by 1927, the Red Army's tank fleet was represented by only 90 vehicles of the trophy brands "Ricardo", "Taylor" and "Renault".
But the captured vehicles were already worn out, and since there were no new receipts from abroad, the question arose about creating our own samples of armored vehicles. For this purpose, in April 1924, the Military-Technical Directorate (VTU) of the Red Army was created. November 22, 1929VTU was reorganized into the Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Army (UMMA). It was headed by the commander of the 2nd rank (since 1935) I. A. Khalepsky. Later, his position became known as the head of the Armored Directorate (ABTU) of the Red Army. This Directorate did a lot to create the tank forces of the USSR, although the fate of Khalepsky himself was sad - in 1937 he was arrested, and in 1938 he was shot.
Back in 1927, under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army M. N. Tukhachevsky, a 5-year plan for the development of the armed forces until 1932 was developed, but, oddly enough, initially tanks were not mentioned in it. However, at that time it was still not clear what they should be and how soon the industry would master their production. The mistake was corrected, and in the final version of the plan it was planned to release 1,075 tanks during the five-year plan.
On July 18, 1928, the Revolutionary Military Council adopted as a basis the "System of tank, tractor, auto, armored weapons of the Red Army", compiled under the leadership of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff V. K. Triandafilov, known as a staunch supporter of the "armor case". It operated until the end of the 30s in several successive editions for each five-year plan.
On July 30, 1928, the Council of People's Commissars approved the first five-year plan for the development and reconstruction of the USSR Armed Forces for 1928-32. According to him, by the end of the five-year plan, in addition to the production of 1,075 tanks, it was necessary to form an additional 3 new tank regiments. In July 1929, this plan was revised upward - by the end of the five-year plan, the Red Army should have had 5, 5 thousand tanks. In fact, for 1929-1933. the industry produced 7, 5 thousand tanks.
By 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council already provided for the armored forces: 3 mechanized brigades (ICBMs), 30 mixed tank battalions (32 light and 34 medium tanks in each), 4 heavy tank battalions (35 tanks in each) of the Reserve of the High Command (RGK) and 13 mechanized regiments in the cavalry.
Machine-gun two-turret T-26, known as tanks of the 1931 model. They were adopted by the Red Army by order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR dated February 13, 1931.
Twin-turret T-26 with partially welded turrets. The T-26s produced by the Leningrad plant "Bolshevik" were primarily delivered to the Leningrad Military District.
The appearance in large quantities of its own samples of armored vehicles made it possible to start creating new organizational structures for tank forces. On June 17, 1929, the Revolutionary Military Council, at the suggestion of V. K. Triandafilov, adopted a resolution, which read: and cavalry), and in the sense of the most profitable organizational forms, it is necessary to organize in 1929-1930. permanent experimental mechanized unit. A month later, the document was approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and, among other things, the minimum program for the release of 3,500 tanks during the first five-year plan was also stipulated.
In pursuance of the decree, an experienced mechanized regiment was formed in 1929, consisting of a battalion of MS-1 tanks, a BA-27 armored division, a motorized rifle battalion and an air squadron. In the same year, the regiment took part in the exercises of the Belarusian Military District (BelVO).
In May 1930, the regiment was deployed to the 1st mechanized brigade, which later received the name of K. B. Kalinovsky, the first brigade commander. Its original composition is a tank regiment (two-battalion), a motorized infantry regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery division and specialized units. The brigade was armed with 60 MC-1, 32 tankettes, 17 BA-27, 264 vehicles, 12 tractors. In 1931, the organizational and staff structure was strengthened. Now the 1st ICBM included:
1) strike group - a tank regiment, which consisted of two tank battalions and two self-propelled artillery battalions (due to the lack of self-propelled guns, they are equipped with towed 76-mm cannons on an autotrailer);
2) a reconnaissance group - a tankette battalion, an armored battalion, an auto-machine gun battalion and an artillery battalion;
3) an artillery group - 3 battalions of 76-mm cannons and 122-mm howitzers, an air defense battalion;
4) a battalion of infantry in vehicles.
The number of personnel was 4,700 people, armament: 119 tanks, 100 tankettes, 15 armored vehicles, 63 self-propelled anti-aircraft machine guns, 32 76-mm guns, 16 122-mm howitzers, 12 76-mm and 32 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 270 cars, 100 tractors.
Battalion T-26 in field exercises. A close-range tank of the 1932 model with cannon and machine-gun armament, characterized by the installation of a 37-mm cannon in the right turret. The riveted structure of the towers and the device of the viewing slots are clearly visible.
Two-turret T-26 model 1931 overcomes the ford. White stripes on the towers served to quickly identify the ownership of the tank and meant the vehicle of the second company. The same intermittent red stripes were applied to the tanks of the first company, black ones - of the third company.
At the same time (1932), 4 tank regiments of three battalions were formed: the 1st in Smolensk, the 2nd in Leningrad, the 3rd in the Moscow Military District, the 4th in Kharkov, 3 separate territorial tank battalions. In the cavalry formations, 2 mechanized regiments, 2 mechanized divisions and 3 mechanized squadrons were created. However, all this was only the beginning. In the spirit of the upsurge of that time, much larger measures were envisaged.
On August 1, 1931, the USSR Labor and Defense Council adopted the "Great Tank Program", which stated that the achievements in the field of tank building (the growth of tank production - 170 units in 1930, the emergence of new models of BTT) created solid prerequisites for a radical change the general operational-tactical doctrine on the use of tanks and demanded decisive organizational changes in the armored forces towards the creation of higher mechanized formations capable of independently solving tasks both on the battlefield and throughout the operational depth of the modern combat front. The new high-speed materiel created the preconditions for the development of the theory of deep combat and operations. " The plans were to match the name: in the first year it was supposed to give the army 10 thousand vehicles. By the same decree, a commission was created to develop the organization of armored forces (ABTV), which, at a meeting on March 9, 1933, recommended having mechanized corps in the Red Army, consisting of mechanized brigades, tank brigades of the RGK, mechanized regiments in cavalry, and tank battalions in rifle divisions.
Along with the changes in the organizational structure of the ABTV, the views on the use of tanks also changed. In the 1920s, the main principle of the combat use of tanks was considered to be their close interaction with the infantry. At the same time, already in the “Provisional Instructions for the Combat Use of Tanks” of 1928, the use of tanks was also envisaged as a so-called free-maneuvering group of the forward echelon, operating out of fire and visual communication with the infantry. This provision was included in the Field Regulations of the Red Army in 1929.
Two-turret T-26s of the 11th mechanized corps on Uritsky Square in Leningrad during the celebration of the 14th anniversary of the October Revolution.
Demonstration of one of the first T-26s in Naro-Fominsk.
At the end of the 20s, thanks to the works of V. K. Triandafilov and the chief inspector of tank forces (1st deputy head of the UMMA) K. B. operations”), the essence of which was expressed by solving two problems:
1. Hacking the enemy front with a simultaneous strike to its entire tactical depth.
2. Immediate introduction of mechanized troops into the breakthrough, which, in cooperation with aviation, must advance to the entire depth of the enemy's operational defense until his entire grouping is destroyed.
At the same time, this military doctrine, for all its progressiveness, was an obvious reflection of the sentiments prevailing at that time and the “proletarian strategy of destruction” proclaimed by Stalin and Voroshilov, without suggesting a different picture of events, which played a tragic role a decade later.
The death of Triandafilov and Kalinovsky in 1931 in a plane crash interrupted their fruitful activities.
Since the beginning of the 30s, a new stage in the development of the theory of ABTV application begins. These problems were discussed on the pages of the magazines Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army, Automotive Armored Journal, Military Thought and others. S. N. Ammosov, A. E. Gromychenko, P. D. Gladkov, A. A. Ignatiev, P. A. Rotmistrov, I. P. Sukhov and others took an active part in the discussion. The result was the creation of an official theory, enshrined in the manuals for the combat use of ABTV in 1932-1937. and in the Field Regulations of the Red Army 1936-1939. They provided for three main forms of combat use of tank forces:
a) in close cooperation with the infantry or cavalry as groups of their direct support (tank groups NPP, NPK);
b) in tactical cooperation with rifle and cavalry units and formations as their long-range support groups (DPP tank groups);
c) in operational cooperation with large combined arms formations (army, front) as part of independent mechanized and tank formations.
Large-scale tasks required new organizational structures. A major step was the emergence of qualitatively new, more powerful tactical formations - mechanized corps, which made it possible to implement the requirements put forward. On March 11, 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council decided to form two mechanized corps of the following composition:
- mechanized brigade on the T-26;
- 3 tank battalions;
- small arms and machine gun battalion (SPB);
- artillery battalion;
- sapper battalion;
- anti-aircraft machine gun company.
- mechanized brigade at BT (the same composition);
- small arms and machine gun brigade (SPBR);
- reconnaissance battalion;
- sapper battalion;
- flamethrower battalion;
- anti-aircraft artillery battalion;
- technical base;
- company for traffic control;
- squadron.
Machine gun T-26 in driving lessons.
Practical training in driving tanks on simulators is conducted by Senior Lieutenant G. V. Lei (center) and N. S. Gromov. May 1937
In April 1932, the Defense Commission of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, on the report of the Revolutionary Military Council, adopted a resolution on the formation of mechanized corps. The first mechanized corps was deployed to the Leningrad Military District on the basis of the 11th Red Banner Leningrad Infantry Division (SD) in the fall of 1932. The 11th MK included 31, 32 ICBMs and the 33rd SPBR. At the same time, in the Ukrainian Military District, on the basis of the 45th Red Banner Volyn SD, the formation of the 45th MK (133, 134 ICBMs, 135 SPBR) began.
In the same, 1932, the formation of five separate ICBMs began - the 2nd - in the Ukrainian Military District; 3, 4, 5th - in BelVO; 6th - in OKDVA; two tank regiments, four mechanized cavalry divisions, 15 tank and 65 tank battalions for rifle divisions.
Due to the aggravation of the situation in the Far East, the 11th mechanized corps, or rather one 32nd ICBM (the 31st ICBM and the 33rd SPBR remained in the Leningrad Military District), was transferred to the Soviet-Mongolian border in Transbaikalia, where it included 20 -I ICBM, formed in 1933 in the Moscow Military District and then transferred to the region of Kyakhta - which became the location of the entire 11th MK.
By January 1, 1934, the Red Army had 2 mechanized corps, 6 mechanized brigades, 6 tank regiments, 23 tank battalions and 37 separate tank companies of rifle divisions, 14 mechanized regiments and 5 mech divisions in cavalry. The staffing level of all of them was at the level of 47% of the standard.
The crew is engaged in the maintenance of the T-26. Despite all the picturesqueness of the picture, reminiscent of socialist realist sculptures, the repair is carried out by no means with a fake tool - most of the work on the materiel required the use of pound crowbars and sledgehammers. Summer 1934
T-26 in the exercise overcomes the forest. The tank belongs to the 1st company of the 1st battalion. Summer 1936
In 1933, a plan for the development of the Red Army for the 2nd five-year plan was adopted, which provided for 25 mechanized and tank brigades by January 1, 1938 (they were reorganized from tank regiments). Therefore, in 1934, two more mechanized corps were formed - the 7th in the Leningrad Military District on the basis of the 31st ICBM and 32 SPBR, the 5th MK in the Moscow Military District was reorganized from the 1st ICBM, leaving the name of K. B. Kalinovsky. In the next year, 1935, the mechanized corps were transferred to new states, since experience showed that they were inactive and poorly controlled due to a lack of communications. Low reliability of materiel and poor training of personnel led to the failure of a large number of tanks on the march. The number of corps units was reduced, and the supply and technical support functions were transferred to the brigades, which was very significant for supporting the activities and covering all the needs of the operation of combat units.
To increase the mobility of the T-26 tanks in the hulls, from February 1935, they were replaced by more high-speed wheeled-tracked BTs. Now the mechanized corps consisted of a command, two ICBMs, an SPBR, a separate tank battalion (reconnaissance) and a communications battalion. According to the state, it was supposed to have 8,965 personnel, 348 BT tanks, 63 T-37, 52 chemical tanks (as flamethrower tanks were called then) OT-26. A total of 463 tanks, 20 guns, 1444 vehicles. These measures made it possible to increase the mobility of mechanized corps, but did not solve the problems of managing units.
Separate mechanized brigades began to include:
- three tank battalions;
- rifle and machine gun battalion;
- combat support battalion;
- repair and recovery battalion;
- motor transport company;
- a communications company;
- a reconnaissance company.
According to the staff, the brigade had 2,745 people, 145 T-26s, 56 artillery and chemical tanks, 28 BA, 482 vehicles and 39 tractors.
Without the participation of tanks - the embodiment of the power and strength of the Red Army - in the 30s. not a single holiday was complete, from revolutionary celebrations to honoring leaders. In the photo - battalion T-26 LenVO in front of the Winter Palace on November 7, 1933.
The two-turret T-26 overcomes an obstacle made of logs. May 1932
By 1936, ABTV had grown qualitatively and quantitatively - and if in 1927 they had 90 tanks and 1050 vehicles, then in 1935 there were already more than 8 thousand tanks and 35 thousand vehicles.
In 1936, the ABTV Red Army tank fleet consisted of the following vehicles:
- reconnaissance amphibious tank T-37 - the main tank of the support service for all mechanical units and a means of infantry combat reconnaissance;
- the T-26 combined arms tank - the main quantitative enhancement tank of the RGK and the combined arms formations tank;
- operational tank BT - tank of independent mechanical connections;
- T-28 - a tank of high-quality reinforcement of the RGK, designed to overcome heavily fortified defensive zones;
- T-35 - a tank of high-quality reinforcement of the RGK when breaking through especially strong and well-fortified bands;
- chemical tanks; *
- sapper tanks;
- control tanks and teletanks with radio control.
* So then were called flamethrower machines and tanks designed for chemical warfare with contamination of the area with OM and its degassing.
The Stalinist repressions brought great harm to the development of the armored forces, causing enormous damage to the command and technical personnel. They were arrested and shot: the commander of the 45th MK Divisional Commander A. N. Borisenko, the commander of the 11th MK Divisional Commander Ya. L. Davidovsky, the commander of the 8th ICBM Divisional Commander D. A. Schmidt, the commander of the ICBM of the Ural Military District, Divisional Commander M. M. Bakshi, the head of the ABTV OKDVA division commander S. I. Derevtsov, the first head of the ABTU RKKA I. A.
In 1937, the 3rd five-year plan for the development and reconstruction of the Red Army for 1938-42 was adopted. They provided for:
1) maintaining the existing number of tank formations - 4 corps, 21 tank brigades, as well as three separate MBBRs on armored vehicles (formed in 1937 in the Trans-Baikal Military District for operations in desert-steppe terrain, then redeployed to Mongolia, each had 80 BA. Based (1939) 7th MBBR - Dzamin-Ude, 8th - Bain-Tumen, 9th - Undurkhan).
2) the creation of eleven training tank regiments instead of training brigades.
3) the transition to reinforced tank platoons with five vehicles instead of the previous three.
4) set the staffing of tanks at the following level: light tank brigade - 278 BT tanks, tank brigade - 267 T-26, heavy tank brigade - 183 (136 T-28, 37 BT, 10 chemical), T-35 brigade - 148 (94 T -35, 44 BT and 10 chemical), a tank regiment - from 190 to 267 tanks.
5) to add a tank battalion of two company composition (T-26 and T-38) to each rifle division, and a tank regiment to the cavalry division.
6) eliminate the division of names into mechanized and tank units, keeping one name - tank units.
7) transfer light tank brigades (including as part of tank corps) to a new organization:
- 4 tank battalions of 54 line and 6 artillery tanks each;
- reconnaissance;
- motorized rifle battalions;
- support subdivisions.
In 1938, all mechanized corps, brigades, regiments were renamed into tank with a change in numbering - for example, the 32nd ICBM of the ZabVO turned into the 11th TBR. By the beginning of 1939, the Red Army had 4 tank corps (TK) - the 10th - in the Leningrad Military District, the 15th - in the Western Military District, the 20th - in the ZabVO, the 25th - in the KVO. According to the state, the corps had 560 tanks and 12,710 personnel.
Machine gun T-26 model 1931 with one turret in the BelVO exercises in 1936
T-26 of the Narofominsk brigade during the summer exercises of 1936
In August 1938, the OKDVA tankers had to engage in battle. During the conflict in the area of Lake Khasan, the 2nd ICBM participated in the battles with the Japanese (formed in April 1932 in Kiev, in 1934 transferred to the Far East, in October 1938 it was transformed into the 42nd LTBM).
In the summer of 1939, the 6th and 11th tank brigades of the ZabVO, as part of the 1st army group, took part in the conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol river. They played a major role in the encirclement and defeat of the 6th Japanese Army, showing high combat qualities. There were also losses - so the 11th TBR lost 186 tanks in battles, 84 of them irrevocably. For these battles, the 11th TBR was awarded the Order of Lenin and was named after the brigade commander Yakovlev, who died in battle. The 6th TBR became the Red Banner.
Combat actions 1938-1939 showed shortcomings in the organization of troops. On August 8-22, 1939, these issues were discussed by a special commission chaired by the Deputy NCO GI Kulik. It included S. M. Budenny, B. M. Shaposhnikov, E. A. Shchadenko, S. K. Timoshenko, M. P. Kovalev, K. A. Meretskov and others. She decided:
1. Leave the tank corps, excluding the rifle and machine-gun brigade from its composition. Remove the rifle and machine gun battalion from the tank brigade.
2. In an offensive with the development of a breakthrough, a tank corps must work for infantry and cavalry. Under these conditions, tank brigades operate in close connection with infantry and artillery. The Panzer Corps can sometimes act independently when the enemy is upset and unable to defend.”
It was recommended to use tank brigades armed with BT tanks for independent actions, and brigades of T-26 and T-28 tanks to strengthen rifle troops. It is not difficult to notice in this the strengthening of the role of the “cavalrymen” of the Stalinist encirclement in the leadership of the Red Army, who replaced the knocked out command personnel. Be that as it may, soon the next military company made it possible to test the capabilities of the tank forces almost in full accordance with the original designation and almost in range conditions.
Presentation of the Order of the Red Banner to the Armored Commander Improvement Courses. Leningrad, 1934
The T-26 of the 1933 model became the most massive version of the tank, produced in an amount of 6065 units, including 3938 equipped with a 71-TK-1 radio station with a handrail antenna. Signal flags remained on the remaining tanks by means of communication.
In September 1939, the following took part in the campaign to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus: as part of the Belorussian Front - 15th Tank Corps (2nd, 27th LTBR, 20th MSBR) under the command of Divisional Commander M. P. Petrov, 6 - I light tank brigade of the Bolotnikov regiment and other units; as part of the Ukrainian front - the 25th tank corps (4th, 5th LTBR, 1st MRPBR) IO Yarkin regiment, 23rd, 24th, 26th light tank brigades.
The campaign showed that the corps commanders had great difficulty in directing the actions of the tank brigades, and their mobility left much to be desired. This was especially true of the formation of the IO Yarkin regiment, whose tankers lagged behind even the infantry and cavalry, due to the lack of discipline of the command, they ended up in their rear, and sometimes with a cluster of their cars blocked the way for other units. It was obvious that there was a need to “unload” bulky associations and switch to more “manageable” and operationally mobile forms. Based on this, the Main Military Council on November 21, 1939.recognized it necessary to disband the management of tank corps and rifle and machine-gun brigades. Instead of corps, a more flexible structure was introduced - a motorized division (the obvious influence of the experience of the German "ally" in the Polish company - the Wehrmacht formations quickly proved their effectiveness). In 1940, it was planned to form 8 such divisions, and in 1941 - the next 7, which were supposed to be used to develop the success of the combined arms army or as part of a mechanized cavalry group (front-line mobile group). Tank corps administrations and corps units were disbanded by January 15, 1940. At the same time, tank brigades remained. On August 22, 1939, the NKO K. E. Voroshilov sent a report to Stalin, in which he proposed to form 16 tank brigades equipped with BT tanks, 16 TBR T-26 RGK with 238 tanks in each, 3 TBR T-28 RGK with 117 T- 28 and 39 BT, 1 TBR T-35 RGK from 32 T-35 and 85 T-28. These proposals were approved and the tank brigade was adopted as the main unit of the armored forces. The number of tanks in the state was later changed - in the light tank brigade - 258 vehicles, in the heavy ones - 156. By May 1940, 39 tank brigades and 4 motorized divisions were deployed - 1, 15, 81, 109th.
In the winter of 1939-1940. the tankers had another test - the Soviet-Finnish war, where they had to operate in the most unsuitable conditions for tanks. The beginning of the war interrupted the ongoing reform and liquidation of the corps. On the Karelian Isthmus, the 10th tank corps (1, 13 LTBR, 15 SPBR), the 34th LTBR, the 20th tank brigade and other formations fought. The 20th brigade in September 1939 was transferred from Slutsk to Leningrad Military District and had 145 T-28s and 20 BA-20s in its composition, since 1939-13-12 new heavy tanks - KV, SMK and T- were tested in it. 100. Losses of the brigade in battles amounted to 96 T-28s.
The total losses of the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus in the period from 1939-30-11 to 1940-10-03 amounted to 3178 tanks.
By May 1940, the Red Army had 39 tank brigades - 32 light tank brigades, 3 - equipped with T-28 tanks, one (14th heavy TBR) - T-35 and T-28 tanks, and three armed with chemical tanks. In 20 cavalry divisions there was a tank regiment (64 battalions in total), and in rifle divisions there were 98 separate tank battalions.
But the transformation did not end there. On the contrary, in 1940 a new radical restructuring of the organizational forms of ABTV began. In June 1940, the USSR NKO reviewed the experience of using tanks at Khalkhin-Gol, the combat operations of German tank forces in Europe. The new leadership of the NKO, headed by S. K. Timoshenko, decided as soon as possible to catch up and overtake the Wehrmacht in terms of the number and quality of armored forces. Their main striking force was to be tank divisions united in mechanized corps.
T-26 at the UkrVO maneuvers in the summer of 1935. The white top of the towers with a red star, introduced during these exercises, meant that the tanks belonged to one of the sides.
T-26 overcomes a breach in a brick wall.
Tanks, cavalry and artillery on Uritsky Square during the reception of the May Day parade of 1936 by the commander of the Leningrad Military District. The formation of the companies corresponds to the adopted transition to reinforced tank platoons of five vehicles instead of the previous three.
"Stakhanov crew" of the BA-6 armored car of the 2nd company of the 2nd battalion of the 18th Turkestan mountain cavalry division, awarded the Order of the Red Banner. TurkVO, 1936
Inspection of the T-26 after the march. By the beginning of the war, tankers often wore cloth budenovka instead of depreciation helmets.
Flamethrower tank OT-26. In the "chemical battalions" of mechanized corps, there were 52 flamethrower tanks each, necessary for breaking through enemy defenses. By the end of 1939, three separate brigades of "chemical tanks" with 150 vehicles each were formed.
The two near-by BT-5 tanks in the 1936 photo have welded towers (the first one is the commander's one with a hand-held radio antenna), the next two have riveted towers.
Military attaches of foreign states are watching the BT-5 during the Kiev maneuvers. 1935 g.
Cleaning the BT-7 gun after firing.
Tankers of the Krasnograd camp. Frunze LenVO welcomed the guests of Chelyuskin. Summer 1934
Tractors "Comintern" towing guns at the May Day parade of 1937
