"Tank killer" JAGM in the series: the issue of increasing the security of the Russian Army has become even more acute

"Tank killer" JAGM in the series: the issue of increasing the security of the Russian Army has become even more acute
"Tank killer" JAGM in the series: the issue of increasing the security of the Russian Army has become even more acute

Video: "Tank killer" JAGM in the series: the issue of increasing the security of the Russian Army has become even more acute

Video:
Video: The Grand Strategy of Japan, 1919 - 1941 2024, April
Anonim
Image
Image

Over the past six months, the news sections of dozens of domestic and foreign military-analytical resources have not ceased to be full of headlines and short publications about the advancement of the promising project of the American promising multipurpose tactical air-launched missile JAGM ("Join Air-to-Ground Missile"), which is a worthy development of the anti-tank family. AGM-114 "Hellfire". The variant of the JAGM rocket, developed by Lockheed Martin since 2012 in accordance with the 1st stage ("Increment 1") (the variant from the Boeing-Raytheon consortium was also considered earlier), in February 2018 successfully passed the next stage of full-scale tests at the Yuma test site, after which the developer's headquarters decided to start small-scale production of a direct descendant of the well-proven versions of Hellfire, fired in the amount of 75 thousand missiles. The first order from the US Armed Forces for a batch of "fresh" JAGMs worth almost $ 27 million, announced on August 16 by the US Defense Department, was not long in coming. In view of such circumstances, it would be extremely important to assess the degree of threat to units of the Russian Army in the European theater of operations from this type of multipurpose missiles.

To perform such an analysis, it is necessary to start from three criteria - the type of air carrier for the JAGM, as well as the flight performance and detailed characteristics of the missile guidance system. The modification of the JAGM missile within the "Increment 1" phase is a kind of conceptual and constructive improved hybrid of the AGM-114K "Hellfire II" and AGM-114R "Longbow Hellfire" anti-tank missiles, which became the donors of a dual-range guidance system for JAGM. The first was borrowed a semi-active laser guidance channel, represented by a photodetector, "capturing" the point from the laser designator beam, placed either on board the carrier, or on a third-party combat unit. From the second, a millimeter active Ka-band homing radar channel (with a frequency of 94000 MHz) was taken, providing the highest pointing accuracy even in difficult meteorological conditions. As a result, depending on atmospheric conditions, terrain and enemy interference, the carrier's crew (for example, the AH-64D "Apache Longbow" attack helicopter) can vary the operating modes of the JAGM guidance system in a tactically correct configuration. Conclusion: it will not be so easy to disorient the dual-band seeker of the JAGM missile both with the help of electronic countermeasures and with the help of a smoke screen. There are a number of other ways, but not everything is so smooth here either.

First of all, this is the use of active protection systems such as "Arena" and "Arena-M" (in the case of the T-72B3M and T-90S / AM), as well as "Afganit" (in the case of the T-14 "Armata"), which are able to easily deal with JAGM missiles approaching at a speed of 1, 3M, because the estimated speed of the targeted target for the Arena / -M KAZ reaches 700 m / s, and for the Afghanit - 1500-2000 m / s. But, unfortunately, today there is no talk of any large-scale renovation of the Russian tank fleet even with simple "Arenas". Just what is the situation with the T-72B3M, on the frontal armor plates of the turrets of which the obsolete wedge-shaped modules 4S22 of the Kontakt-5 reactive armor are still "adorned".

Secondly, this is the use of such "exotic" means as high-frequency combat EMP generators of the "Ranets-E" type or more advanced options that can easily disable the onboard electronic "stuffing" of tactical missiles of any type at a distance of a couple of tens of kilometers … It is known that the work on the "Backpack-E" project has been carried out by specialists from the Moscow Radio Engineering Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences since the mid or late 90s, but later, in the early 2000s, all developments and progress on this program were initially postponed to a long box, and later completely forgotten by analogy with the project of a long-range air combat missile "Product 180-PD" with an integral ramjet rocket engine. Such a sad fate befell more than one project that is strategically important for the defense capability of our country; and, unfortunately, this tradition continues.

As a third option for countering the two-channel seeker of JAGM missiles, the use of laser complexes of the "Peresvet" type and various types of self-propelled laser systems can be considered, which could damage the laser photodetector of the rocket with its own high-power beam, after which the JAGM rocket, having lost its semi-active laser guidance channel, could to use an exclusively active radar sensor, for "deception" of which it would be enough to develop specialized false targets emitting response and diverting interference in the W-band at a frequency of 94 GHz. But all this is present only in our theory, while the number of various laser systems at the disposal of the Aerospace Forces and / or military air defense does not exceed a few units. And there is absolutely no information about the capabilities of these laser systems for targeting from radars of military air defense systems. Conclusion: the most proven way to counter the threat from multipurpose JAGM missiles is to modernize self-propelled military air defense systems as such.

Considering the fact that when used from the Apache suspension, the effective range of the JAGM reaches 16 km, completely covering not only the range of the Tor-M1 air defense missile system (12 km using the standard 9M331 missile defense system), but also the range of the new Tor -M2U / KM "(15 and 16 km using 9M331D and 9M338 missiles, respectively), operators of any version of this self-propelled air defense system are not able to intercept carrier helicopters at the moment when missiles are launched. And even from closer distances (with difficult terrain), such an interception of Apaches by means of the Tor-M2U complexes is not guaranteed, because a helicopter hidden in the lowlands cannot be hit by radio command-guided missiles, since there is a line of sight between the air defense missile system and the enemy's rotorcraft is lost. For such a "hunt" missiles are needed either with an active radar seeker (like the British CAAM complex "Land Ceptor"), or with IKGSN (like "IRIS-T"). The Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile and artillery system in the process of repelling the Apache strike will look in a much better light, since it will be able to open fire on enemy attack helicopters even before the launch of JAGM missiles (at a distance of 17 - 19 km), which can deprive the calculation "Headache" associated with the need to intercept dozens of already running JAGMs. But such an alignment is possible only on an ideal flat terrain, while on difficult terrain the same problem will be observed as with the "Thors", because the 57E6E anti-aircraft guided missiles also have a radio command guidance method.

Image
Image

Based on the foregoing, it can be stated that today (in duel situations, when friendly fighter squadrons are diverted to air battles with enemy fighters), the protection of motorized rifle regiments and tank brigades of the Russian army from air strikes using JAGM missiles has a very dubious appearance, where instead of the early destruction of carrier helicopters, the operators of the Tor-M2U and Pantsirey-S1 military air defense systems will have to intercept already launched missiles, the number of which can reach tens of units.

The Apache alone can take 16 missiles of this type on the hardpoints. Naturally, our "Thors" and "Shells" have the potential for such interceptions, especially given the low flight speed of the JAGM and the high channeling of the air defense missile system. But why risk the lives of servicemen (in case of missing several missiles during a massive strike), when you can simply develop a longer-range interceptor missile with active radar homing and destroy attack helicopters or low-altitude UAVs even before the attack from their side? And the installation of active protection systems for armored vehicles on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles would be worth thinking about today.

Recommended: