A LOOK AT THE REALITY OF THE MILITARY-TECHNICAL FORMATION OF IRAN
It is well known that the fact of the implementation of the deal on Iran's nuclear program was a very unpleasant surprise for the defense departments of Western countries, the states of the Arabian Peninsula (the so-called "Arabian coalition") and Israel, which is always worried about the Iranian military potential. The fact is that Tehran, in exchange for the usual 66% limitation on the number of operating gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment and a reduction in nuclear fuel reserves, opens up a colossal number of opportunities and loopholes to modernize non-nuclear military potential, which even now is at a level of more -a less developed regional superpower. At the same time, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, almost immediately after reaching an agreement, said that the deal does not mean the end of research in the field of nuclear technologies. Consequently, against the backdrop of continuing pressure on Iran from the new US administration, Iran has every right and opportunity to withdraw from the "deal" after the necessary time has elapsed. And before withdrawing from the agreement, Tehran will have time to increase the maximum combat capabilities of those combat arms in which a deep crisis has been observed for two decades.
We are already seeing this growth today on the example of modernizing the country's air defense system: stationary radars of the Ghadir missile attack warning system are being built (operating in the meter range at ranges up to 1100 km), work is underway on more serious and accurate decimeter / centimeter radars with AFAR type "Najm-802" (analogue of our "Gamma-DE"), and, finally, serial production of new air defense systems "Bavar-373" with a modern Chinese digital element base, which will perfectly complement our 4 divisions C-300PMU-2 … Against this background, the bizarre, sometimes insane strategies of the Israeli Defense Ministry to conduct a strategic aerospace operation against Iran look as ridiculous as the hopes that the purchase of low-maneuverable, stealthy fighters with moderate combat qualities F-35I "Adir" will make it easy to "get through" into the airspace of Iran and do bad things there. The time of the Osirak bombing has sunk into oblivion and Tel Aviv will have to take into account all the new operational and strategic realities of Asia Minor.
In our previous works, we returned several times to the analysis of the unsatisfactory state of the Iranian Air Force, considered various configurations for updating an extremely outdated aircraft fleet with the help of contracts with the Chinese companies Chengdu and Shenyang, as well as the Russian United Aircraft Corporation for the purchase of such machines like J-10A / B, FC-31, Su-35S and MiG-35. It was determined that in order to establish a parity ratio with the improving air forces of the "Arabian coalition" and Israel, Tehran should have either an equivalent number of J-10A generation 4+ vehicles (500 - 700 vehicles), or 300 such advanced machines of the transitional generation 4 ++ ", like the MiG-35. As for the Su-35S and Su-30MKI, the needs of the Iranian Air Force would be fully satisfied by a contract for the purchase of 150-200 such fighters. In addition to the high training of Iranian flight personnel, even a hundred of such aircraft can be head and shoulders above the dominant Saudi Arabian Air Force, not to mention Qatar and Kuwait. But so far none of the possible contracts has even reached the initial phase of the agreement and the long-range air approaches to the state remain practically unprotected, and the strike capabilities of the Iranian Air Force are barely ahead of those of Kuwait (this will become especially noticeable after the Kuwait Air Force is updated with new F / A-18E / F "Super Hornet").
Quite serious problems are also observed with the Iranian Naval Forces. The radar architecture, as well as the design of the superstructures of Iranian surface ships, correspond to the technologies of military shipbuilding of the 70s - 80s. XX century. Most ships, including Alvand-class frigates (3 ships), Bayandor corvettes, and the Jamaran frigate, hull number 76 (Project Moudge), are equipped with obsolete AWS-1 type parabolic radar detectors with low noise immunity and "ancient" element base for processing radar information. Their range of action against a typical air target of the "fighter" type with an RCS of 5 m2 is about 120-150 km (in the absence of electronic countermeasures). And only 2 frigates of the Jamaran class - Damavand and Sahand - are equipped with a modern UHF surveillance radar with PFAR of the Asr type (an analogue of our Fregat-MAE radar). All corvettes and frigates have a large radar signature: design solutions aimed at increasing the “stealth” characteristics of the NK (side rollbacks, the minimum number of bulky antenna posts and UVPU) have not been found. In terms of detecting modern enemy air attack weapons, the above-mentioned frigates Davamand and Sahand can be considered more or less worthy ships, but what about the destruction of these weapons? It is here that the main drawback of the surface component of the Iranian Navy looms - the extremely low air defense-missile defense capabilities of the ship group. What kind of anti-aircraft missile / artillery systems are Iranian surface combatants equipped with?
Three active patrol ships (patrol frigates) of the Alvand class are content with: two large-caliber 12, 7-mm anti-aircraft machine guns, three 20-mm automatic anti-aircraft guns Oerlikon 20 mm / 70 (were in serial production from 1927 to 1945), with an effective range of 4.4 km and a height of 3 km and one twin 35-mm AP "Oerlikon" 35 mm / 70 in the stern of the ship with a similar effective range of fire. Judging by the presence of the Sea Hunter-4 naval combat information and control system on the Alvands, the 1x2 35-mm charger should be controlled by a specialized centimeter or millimeter guidance radar, but, for example, the photos of the frigate 73 Sabalan are good it can be seen that in the gun turret of this anti-aircraft installation there is a niche for calculation, based on which it is easy to conclude about the low automation of the gun and visual guidance using ordinary optical devices. This gun is unlikely to be able to destroy even single anti-ship missiles "Harpoon" or "Exocet", which are in service with Qatar and the US Navy. The rate of fire of the gun is only 9 shots / s, which is not enough even to intercept a modern small-sized UAV.
In addition to ineffective anti-aircraft machine guns and artillery, the "Alvandy" also has a short-range anti-aircraft missile system "Sea Cat". On these ships, the air defense missile system is represented by two posts with transmitting radio command control antennas, linked to a fire control system of the MRS-3 type, and therefore the air defense missile system has 2 target channels. Guidance is carried out according to the binocular optical-electronic sighting device located at the antenna post. An additional TV viewfinder is used for automatic tracking of the anti-aircraft missile tracer and target. However, this does not save Iranian frigates from being destroyed by enemy anti-ship missiles, because the Sea Cat Mod.1 missiles have the lowest flight technical and tactical characteristics against the background of all known short-range missiles. Developed back in 1961, the single-stage Sea Cat missiles have an extremely low elongation of the hull with a "swing" wing, as well as a moderately "high-torque" dual-mode solid-propellant rocket engine, which provides a maximum speed of no more than 1150 km / h. This does not leave "Sea Cat" a single chance in the fight against modern anti-ship and anti-radar missiles. This complex will not cope with the enemy's high-precision guided aerial bombs. Conclusion: frigates of the "Alvand" class can operate only in the immediate vicinity of the home ports on the coast of the Persian Gulf, where the S-300PMU-2 and "Tor-M1" complexes have installed a reliable "umbrella" of the air defense-missile defense system. If the ships are removed from the shores of Iran with an attempt to conduct independent actions, the consequences will be quite predictable.
The next class of warships of the Iranian Navy, which have anti-aircraft missile weapons on board, are all the same Jamaran-class frigates. The anti-aircraft potential of these patrol boats can be easily compared with the American frigates of the "Oliver Perry" class. The last two ships of the series are armed with the "Fajr" medium-range anti-aircraft missile system (analogue of the American SM-1). Regarding the SD-2M anti-aircraft missile, the Fajr air defense missile system is apparently unified with the Talash medium-range anti-aircraft missile system, which has been developed in Iran in recent years. The interceptor missile SD-2M "Sayyad" is structurally similar to the American RIM-66B and Chinese HQ-16. According to Iranian sources, its range can be from 70 to 120 km when intercepting at altitudes over 12 km, and the speed is 4M. The missile is equipped with a semi-active radar homing head, target illumination for which is carried out by a centimeter STIR-type continuous-radiation radar, which is a simplified version of the "Aegis" "radar searchlight" AN / SPG-62. This radar makes it possible to most widely demonstrate the potential of SD-2M anti-aircraft missiles, since the STIR range is about 115 km.
The photographs of the frigate "Damavand" clearly show that the Iranian admiralty is very serious about the level of security of the SD-2M "Sayyad" missiles located directly on the deck inclined launcher. Unlike the American open-type Mk-13 single-beam launcher, the Iranian modification includes a special rotating container with a hydraulically lifted upper flap. The thickness of the steel or aluminum sheet of the container can be up to 15 - 20 mm, which protects anti-aircraft missiles and mechanisms of beam launchers from damage that can be caused by the detonation of anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft missiles. However, this does not negate the fact that "Fjar" is a single-channel anti-aircraft missile system that can only withstand a single air attack. And the ammunition load in the missile cellar in the amount of 4-6 SD-2M missiles cannot inspire much confidence.
The bottom line is this: the surface component of the Iranian Navy cannot withstand any modern fleet in Western Asia. The most impressive latent force remains only behind the underwater component, represented by 3 ultra-quiet diesel-electric submarines of Project 877 "Halibut". In the event of a possible regional conflict between Iran and other Central Asian states, these submarines will account for a fairly large number of destroyed enemy NKs.
Officially, the Iranian admiralty has not yet expressed the need for an urgent update of the ship's air defense systems of the Iranian Navy. But internal consultations on this issue are obviously taking place. And the prerequisites have already appeared. In the second half of March 2017, very interesting news appeared on the Tasnim News resource. As it became known, an agreement was reached between the South African company Denel Dynamics and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the preparation of a contract for the delivery of a ground modification of the Umkhonto-IR short-range anti-aircraft missile system to the Iranian Armed Forces. The implementation of the transaction (worth $ 118 million) for the sale of several batteries of the complex will be a breakthrough commercial success for the project of the South African company "Denel" only specialists from the Ministry of Defense of Finland. In 2006, Finland acquired 6x8 built-in vertical launchers with anti-aircraft guided Unkhonto-IR Mk.2 to equip 4 Hamina-class patrol boats and 2 Hameenmaa minesigns and conducted several stages of successful tests in the Baltic Sea.
The interest of the Iranian Armed Forces in the ground version of this complex is extremely clear, since today only 29 more or less modern self-propelled air defense systems "Tor-M1" are in the protection of the lower border of the country's airspace, which are critically insufficient not only for the positional air defense of a huge number of science-intensive strategic objects productions, but also to cover the "dead zones" of long-range air defense systems "Bavar-373". The 9K331 Tor-M1 complex has a 4 times smaller target channel (2 targets versus 8), and the radio command control of 9M331 anti-aircraft missiles requires the guidance process to be supported immediately until the target is hit. In "Umkhonto-IR Mk.2" everything is much more complicated: anti-aircraft guided missiles are equipped with bispectral IKGSN (operate in the ranges of 3-5 microns and 8-14 microns), which instantly "lock" the near target and switch to the "fire-and-forget" mode, allowing the computational means of the air defense missile system to focus on other purposes. Moreover, the advantage over "Thor" is also observed in terms of better concealment of their own positions. "Tor-M1", even when using an optoelectronic TV-sighting device, during combat operation is forced to transmit a radio command control channel to the missile, which will be immediately tracked by the enemy's electronic reconnaissance means. Umkhonto, on the other hand, has the ability to attack an airborne object by targeting third-party radar or optical-electronic means, and no radio correction that reveals the position will be required in this case due to the presence of IKGSN.
The maneuverability of the Umkhonto-IR Mk.2 missiles is about the same, or even better, than the 9M331 missiles, since the former have a gas-jet nozzle system for deflecting the thrust vector, which makes it possible to maneuver with an overload of 40-50 units. until the fuel burns out. The choice of the Umkhonto-IR Mk.2 complex by the Iranian Air Force and the Ministry of Defense as the last line of defense for long-range air defense systems and nuclear research facilities is a very wise decision. Even in the most difficult jamming situation, in the event that the long-range S-300PMU-2 missile high-precision weapons of the enemy, the Umkhonto is quite capable of stopping it 1–20 km from the point of destination.
The conclusion of a contract on the ground-based Umkhonto option may become a direct prerequisite for preparing a new deal for the acquisition of the Umkhonto ship modification for the Iranian Navy. In addition to the Umkhonto-IR Mk.2 anti-aircraft missile with an infrared seeker, this complex provides for the use of a Umkhonto-R Mk.2 active radar seeker with a range of 25-30 km. This will make it possible to maintain efficiency even in difficult meteorological conditions, when the use of a "thermal" rocket becomes almost impossible. Interceptor missiles of the Umkhonto family also have increased compactness, and therefore ideally fit into the architecture of the missile armament of small Iranian frigates of the Alvand and Jamaran classes, as well as the Bayandor corvettes. On the Jamaran-class SC, the built-in Umkhonto launchers for 8 cells can be squeezed: between the tower of the 76-mm Fajr-27 artillery mount and the front superstructure, in front of the Fajr-27 artillery mount, and also instead of the useless 20-mm anti-aircraft gun "Oerlikon" 20mm / 70, located on the rear superstructure of the ships. Thus, frigates of this type will be able to carry 24 Umhonto missiles, capable of repelling the "star raids" of enemy anti-ship missiles. There will also be volumes for new missiles on other ships of the “cutter / corvette / frigate” class being designed in Iran.
The “Umkhonto-IR Mk.2” (“Spear”) missiles have a heavy high-explosive fragmentation warhead weighing 23 kg and weighing about 150 kg, has an interception height of 10 km and a range of 20 km. At the same time, the maximum flight speed of the rocket reaches 2200 km / h, the "radio" version of the Umkhonto-R Mk.2 is undergoing a refinement stage and will be able to intercept the target at an altitude of 12 km and a range of 30 km. With a similar mass of 165 kg, the 9M331 (Tor-M1) missile defense system is equipped with a total of 14.5-kilogram warheads and has a height reach of 6 km. In turn, the advantage of our rocket is the 1.32 times higher flight speed (2900 km / h), due to which the Tor-M1 more effectively intercepts high-speed targets at a distance of 4-6 km. For the Iranian Navy, the basis of the fundamentals remains the channel, noise immunity, as well as the maneuverability and power of warheads of new missiles, and therefore here all the trump cards are in the hands of the South African manufacturer - Denel Dynamics with their unique Spear.
Meanwhile, in relation to the Iranian contract, a very unpleasant snag has already been "drawn" associated with the resolution of the UN Security Council, which was requested by the "law-abiding" South African Republic. Obviously, the request from Cape Town was made due to the remaining sanctions, which provide for an embargo on the supply of offensive and types of weapons to Iran. But the "Umkhonto-IR Mk.2" refers to purely defensive weapons. Here it can be assumed that South Africa is simply reinsuring itself in order to avoid disagreements with Washington, since South Africa understands that the Umkhonto complex will seriously affect the balance of power in Western Asia, reducing to a minimum the effectiveness of high-precision weapons of American allies - Saudi Arabia and Israel.
