Irrational decision-making, painful self-confidence and poor choice of allies are the reasons for Germany's defeat in World War II, says Bernd Wegner, professor at the Bundeswehr University in Hamburg, specialist in the history of WWII operations.
- How possible was it for one country, even with allies, to win the world war?
- If we are talking about the Third Reich, then I do not think that he had at least some opportunity to win the world war as a whole.
- When you say “in general,” does it mean that success in certain regions: in Europe, in North Africa, in the Middle East - was possible?
- Yes, Germany had the ability to win in specific theaters of war and achieve operational success. I must immediately clarify that the concept of the "operational level" in Germany means what is called the "strategic level" in Russia, that is, large-scale military operations. The strategic level in Germany is called an even higher level, which also includes political, economic and other decisions. So, France is an excellent example of operational success. It was a real military triumph. However, this is very different from a war won as a whole. De Gaulle understood this very well when in the summer of 1940 he said: "France has lost the battle, but not the war." Germany, in turn, won the campaign, but did not win the war. Looking at the complexity of the processes that took place, I am sure that Germany had no chance of winning the war as a whole. An all-out war cannot be won only in a military theater. This is a war waged by the whole country, the whole society. The military component is only part of this war. Industry, economics, propaganda, politics are its other components. And in these areas Germany was doomed to failure, since it was unable to wage a protracted complex war.
- And yet, what did Germany lack in the spheres of total war you listed?
- The main reason that Germany lost the war was undoubtedly the allies. And first of all, the Soviet Union - I have always held to the point of view that the war was won mainly by the USSR. Unfortunately, this fact has been lost in Cold War historiography.
But the war was won by the Allies also because the Third Reich suffered from a number of structural deficits. Germany did not have a stable strategic military-political concept of warfare. It sounds unexpected, but Germany fought most of the war in an improvised mode. Germany was incapable of creating stable alliances, of perceiving its allies as equal partners. Finally, there was a lack of rationality in decision making. In Nazi Germany, foreign policy decisions were made haphazardly. For example, declaring war on the United States was Hitler's sole decision. The Barbarossa plan, as well as the Blau plan - the German offensive in 1942 in the Caucasus - were not systematically prepared. To a greater or lesser extent, they were created by Hitler on an intuitive level, and the headquarters were confronted with the need to further substantiate these plans. Another structural deficiency was Nazi ideology. Ideology did not allow an early peace to be concluded, and it was precisely the ideology that pushed the Germans to systematically underestimate the enemy, especially the Soviet Union, and to overestimate their own forces until 1943.
- But Germany nevertheless regularly demonstrated successes in certain theaters of military operations. Was it impossible to capitalize on these successes?
- Victories are a very dangerous thing. Victories are deceiving. They are tempted to believe in the illusion that success is a foregone conclusion. This especially affected the German military leadership. The German generals were fixated on the old idea of a decisive battle, going back to the German military tradition. The generals were convinced that the war would be won by a decisive battle, after which the troops occupied the enemy's capital, and now - victory. That is, they thought that everything would be like during the Franco-Prussian War, the Battle of Sedan, and so on. Incidentally, Hitler belonged to a minority that did not share this illusion. His views on war were more modern than those of most of his generals. However, in general, such views led to the fact that the German generals overestimated their capabilities. And most of all they overestimated them after the victory over France in the summer of 1940. In just six weeks, the army, considered the most powerful in the world, at least among the land armies, was defeated. Who else can stop the Wehrmacht? The Nazis imagined that they could do anything, and with this attitude, they began to plan a war against the USSR, which they regarded as a much weaker enemy than France.
However, one must understand that until the spring of 1941, blitz victories were only operational victories. They were achieved due to the fact that the German army more successfully used such modern aspects of warfare as mobility, surprise, superiority in firepower. The war against the Soviet Union was completely different. For this war, German industry again had to prepare the army for the offensive.
It must be understood that in the Third Reich there was a very close connection between the military industry and army planning. And here we run into the most important factor in the shortage of human resources. Germany simply lacked people. By May 1, 1941, Germany planned to deploy 180 fully manned divisions. But first it was necessary to produce weapons and ammunition for this army. Therefore, in the summer of 1940, the idea of a military-industrial blitzkrieg was put forward. Part of the army was demobilized. These soldiers were sent home, where they turned into workers and began to forge weapons, which they themselves then in 1941 had to use. Ideologically, this was a wonderful move for the Third Reich, since it demonstrated the unity of the front and the rear, the worker and the soldier. However, this first strategically planned German blitzkrieg was very risky. After all, it was necessary to make plans in advance and calculate everything. How long will the campaign last? It was assumed that a maximum of six months. How much weapons and ammunition will be required in all branches of the armed forces? How much fuel? How many soldiers? How much ammo will be used up? How much of the weapon will break? How many people will be killed and wounded?
- And the further the planning horizon, the greater the deviation from reality.
- Exactly. At the same time, the calculations were based on the results of the campaign against France. When the strategic blitzkrieg failed by the fall of 1941, it meant a strategic disaster. The fall of 1941, a turning point near Moscow, was not just an operational defeat for the Wehrmacht. Much worse was what became clear: the German military concept had lost its foundation. The losses turned out to be much greater than anticipated. Consumption of materials, wear and tear of weapons, the amount of used ammunition also turned out to be much higher than planned. And Germany had no opportunity to make up for the losses. As a result, by the end of 1941, the war was almost lost: the only available war strategy failed, and Germany did not have a backup plan.
- Let's go back to the battle of Moscow. In the fall of 1941, German troops were one step away from Moscow, and the city was in panic. It can be assumed that if the winter were not so cold or the supply of the Wehrmacht was slightly better, then the German troops would have a chance to capture the Soviet capital. Would the war have been won in that case? After all, with a high probability the Soviet government would have been deposed after that, or it would have decided to capitulate.
- Obviously, with a slightly more successful coincidence of circumstances, German troops could enter Moscow. When I say that the Third Reich could not win the war as a whole, I do not mean that Germany was unable to succeed in its military campaign against the USSR. The Soviet Union barely survived the German attack. In 1941-1942, the USSR was on the verge of collapse. But even a victory over the USSR, even the collapse of the centralized leadership would not mean the end of the war in Russia. It seems to me much more likely that hostilities in the occupied territory would continue in a decentralized version. A significant mass of German troops would have continued to remain in Russia. In addition, Germany, even in this case, would not have been able to plunder the USSR as successfully as planned. In general, the economic benefits from the occupation of the USSR have consistently turned out to be well below German expectations. This means that Germany, as I said, could achieve success on this military bridgehead, but this would not prejudge the outcome of the war - the war with the Western allies would not have gone anywhere. And although I say that the USSR was the power that crushed Germany, we must not forget that the United States was the best guarantee of the impossibility of a global victory for Germany. If Germany had defeated the USSR, the war would not have ended. And the atomic bomb might have fallen on Berlin.
- How obvious was the inevitability of Germany's defeat for the German generals in the fall of 1941?
- Despite the losses, the generals remained optimistic. They believed that the war had become more difficult, but few people in Germany then realized how bad everything was. Perhaps Hitler understood this, since he generally understood the total nature of war better than his generals. I admit that at the turn of 1941 and 1942, he began to realize that there was no chance of winning the war. Of course, he had to radiate optimism. He even hoped that the 1942 campaign would help seize the resources needed for a long war and turn the tide. You see, Germany was forced - if she wanted to continue the war - to seize as many resources as possible as quickly as possible in order to be able to resist the allies.
Therefore, in the wars waged by Hitler, economic goals have always played a primary role. It was part of the ideology. In the 1942 campaign - in the rush to the Caucasus oil and to Stalingrad - economic goals were absolutely predominant. Without the seizure of resources, primarily the Caucasian oil, waging a protracted war was simply impossible. It would be impossible to produce fuel for the army - which means waging war on vast land areas. It would be impossible to conduct operations at sea that required a huge amount of fuel, it would be impossible to conduct an air war. This fact found understanding with difficulty among the military. Already after the war, Halder wrote with amazing frankness that "the seizure of oil fields was unusual." That is, this is again the same old military tradition: it is necessary to defeat the enemy army, capture the city, and parade through it. And to fight for an oil refinery is somehow unusual. But this was more than obvious to Hitler. It was a conflict between old and new thinking.
- How did it happen that Germany, which had a sufficient number of allies, primarily in the person of European dictatorships, was forced to wage the war practically alone and, moreover, was left without vital resources, with the possible exception of Romanian oil?
- Throughout the war, the Third Reich was never able to build a working system of allies. There were two reasons for this. Firstly, a real military alliance with any country was impossible for the National Socialists. After all, a military alliance presupposes the existence of more or less equal partners. In the National Socialist view, equality between countries did not exist. The allies were perceived only as help people, bringing closer the victory of National Socialism. For some time, Mussolini was perceived as an equal partner - but, rather, it was Mussolini as a person, and not Italy as a country.
The second problem was the lack of strategic planning in the selection of allies. Germany did not plan to wage a protracted war, therefore, when choosing allies, the ability of these countries to wage a protracted war was not taken into account. All of Germany's allies - except the USSR - were even poorer in resources than Germany itself. Take Japan - it's a disaster! Finland, Italy - these countries themselves needed industrial support from Germany. The only country that was truly resilient in terms of resources and industry was the Soviet Union, and it was eventually attacked by Germany.
Germany's allies had no common plans with her, no common goals of the war. Japan was at war with the United States, but did not consider it her duty to attack the Soviet Union. Italy also did not consider the USSR as its main adversary. Romania and Hungary - both Germany's allies - viewed each other as adversaries! Such an alliance could hold out only as long as Germany was strong and her troops were victorious. The Western allies, on the other hand, had a common goal: victory over Hitler. From this point of view, the Soviet term "anti-Hitler coalition" is absolutely correct - it names exactly the goal that united the allies.
- Let's get back to the practical side of warfare. You have already touched upon the topic of increased wear and tear on vehicles in the Russian campaign. How effective was the supply system of the German troops?
- The German army had two major drawbacks regarding the material side of military operations. First, German weapons were extremely complex and often not adapted for a specific theater of military operations. The armament of the German division was assembled from German, Czech, French, Dutch and other types of equipment. All this technique required millions of different unique parts. Technique, weapons were too complex and difficult to apply in the conditions of the Russian winter or Russian thaw. The leadership of the Wehrmacht did not assume at all that it was possible to fight in winter. The Red Army has demonstrated many times how this is done. The armament of the Red Army was in many cases the best.
The second weakness of the Wehrmacht was the underestimation of the role of supply and logistics, traditional for the German military tradition. The talented and ambitious officers of the German General Staff were eager to engage in operational planning - but not in supply. Less gifted, second-class, third-class officers were assigned to supply. The supply business was a duty: someone had to do it, but you won’t achieve fame here. Hitler also did not fully understand the role of supply. This was the deepest mistake. For example, in the American army, it was the opposite: logistics were key.
German industry was not always flexible in responding to changing technical requirements. In addition, often due to a lack of time and resources, samples of equipment entered the troops without proper running-in. Of course, the Red Army had the same problem - tanks entered the army straight from the assembly line. However, if we recall the superiority of the USSR over Germany in human strength, in resources, in production volumes, then we can understand that the price of the mistake of the Soviet leadership was lower than the price of the mistake of the German leadership, and not so often had catastrophic consequences. On average, the production of the Allies for the main types of equipment since 1941 exceeded the same production in Germany by three to four times. And this gap could not be compensated for by any operational successes.
- By the way, weren't the German military plans different precisely by the fact that the German generals constantly planned operations at the limit of their capabilities, each time assuming that the result would be as beneficial as possible for the Wehrmacht?
“This is another structural deficit of the Third Reich - what I call the" tabooization of defeatism. " German generals in every possible way avoided the very idea of the possibility of a negative outcome of the operation and did not create plans for this case. If the general wanted to maintain this influence, he had to radiate optimism.
Of course, the officer must remain optimistic. But optimism doesn't have to be reckless. And among the Nazi leadership, even realism fell under suspicion. As a result, planners gave an optimistic forecast even when they realized that the operation was not well prepared, that it could end in failure. The leadership created illusions with which it replaced reality.
It can be clearly seen that already starting from 1941, planning was carried out with the expectation of the best possible scenario for the development of the situation. While responsible planning also requires thinking through the worst-case scenario. I remember working in London with British documents and was surprised to find that Churchill was asking his generals: what happens if we lose the battle of El Alamein? What opportunities will remain with us in this case? It is simply impossible to imagine that Hitler is sending such a question to his General Staff1. The very idea that the battle could be lost had already been declared taboo. The decision-making process in Germany was, in this sense, completely irrational.
