On February 13, 1945, the enemy's Budapest grouping ceased its resistance. Over 138 thousand soldiers and officers surrendered. The assault and capture of Budapest was carried out by the Budapest Group of Soviet Forces under the command of General I. M. Afonin (then I. M. Managarov) as part of the Budapest operation. The city was defended by 188 thous. German-Hungarian garrison under the command of General Pfeffer-Wildenbruch.
During the Budapest operation on December 26, 1944, the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky and the 3rd Ukrainian Front of Marshal F. I. Tolbukhin surrounded the capital of Hungary. The enemy garrison was offered to surrender, but the ultimatum was rejected, and the parliamentarians were killed. After that, a long and fierce battle for the Hungarian capital began. Of the capitals of Europe taken by the troops of the Red Army, Budapest took first place in the duration of street battles. This was due to the difficult operational situation on the outer ring of the encirclement, where the German command repeatedly tried to break through the encirclement using large mobile armored formations. In addition, the Soviet command, wishing to preserve the monuments of architecture and not cause severe destruction to the city, avoided using heavy artillery and ground attack aircraft, which delayed the course of hostilities.
On January 18, 1945, Soviet troops took the left-bank part of the Hungarian capital - Pest. In the right-bank part of the Hungarian capital - hilly Buda, turned by the German-Hungarian troops into a real fortified area, fierce street battles continued for almost four more weeks. Only after the failure of another attempt by the German command to unblock the encircled garrison (by February 7), the Budapest group, having lost hope of liberation, surrendered on February 13. 138 thousand men were taken prisoner. man, a whole army.
The beginning of the siege of Budapest
During October 1944, during the Debrecen operation, the troops of the Red Army occupied about a third of the territory of Hungary and created the prerequisites for an offensive on Budapest (Battle of Hungary). The headquarters decided to continue the offensive with the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. The strike group of the 2nd Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Rodion Malinovsky (46th Army of Shlemin, reinforced by the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps, 7th Guards Army of Shumilov, 6th Guards Tank Army of Kravchenko) October 29-30 went on the offensive on Budapest direction. During November 1944, Soviet troops broke through the enemy's defenses between the Tisza and Danube rivers and, having advanced up to 100 km, reached the outer defensive line of Budapest from the south and southeast. Meanwhile, the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, having defeated the opposing enemy forces, captured a major bridgehead on the western bank of the Danube. After that, the troops of the center and the left wing of the 2nd Ukrainian Front received the task of creating an encirclement ring around the Hungarian capital.
In the course of fierce battles from 5 to 9 December, the formations of the 7th Guards, 6th Guards Tank Armies and the mechanized cavalry group of Lieutenant General Pliev intercepted the northern communications of the Budapest grouping. However, from the west, the city was not immediately bypassed. When parts of the 46th Army began to cross the Danube on the night of December 5, they could not achieve surprise. Enemy troops destroyed most of the boats with heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. As a result, the crossing of the water barrier was delayed until December 7. The slowness of the troops of the 46th Army allowed the enemy to create a solid defense on the line Erd, Lake Velence. In addition, to the southwest, at the turn of the lake. Velence, lake. Balaton, the Germans were able to stop Zakharov's 4th Guards Army from the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
On December 12, the Soviet Headquarters clarified the tasks of the two fronts. The Soviet armies were to complete the encirclement and defeat of the Budapest grouping by joint strikes from the northeast, east and southwest, and take the Hungarian capital, which was turned into a real fortified area with three defensive lines. Malinovsky threw the 6th Guards Tank and 7th Guards Armies into the offensive in the direction of the main attack. At the same time, the tankers attacked in the first echelon, having a separate offensive zone. On December 20, Soviet tankers broke through the enemy defenses and the 5th Guards Tank Corps by the end of the day seized the crossings on the river. Hron near Kalnitsa. After that, two tank and two mechanized brigades rushed south to support the advance of the 7th Guards Army.
On the night of December 22, the German command, having concentrated units of the 6th, 8th and 3rd tank divisions in the Sakalosh region (up to 150 tanks), launched a strong counterstrike from the southern direction on the flank of the Soviet tank army. German troops were able to break through to the rear of the 6th Guards Tank Army. However, the Soviet shock wedge continued the offensive and itself went into the rear of the German tank group. By the end of December 27, as a result of the joint efforts of Soviet tankmen and infantry, German troops were defeated. In addition, the troops of the 7th Guards and 6th Guards Tank Armies, developing an offensive in the western and southern directions, reached the northern bank of the Danube and started fighting on the outskirts of Pest.
The troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front also resumed their offensive on December 20, 1944. However, the formations of the 46th and 4th Guards armies were unable to break through the enemy defenses. Front Commander Tolbukhin brought mobile units into battle - the 2nd Guards and 7th Mechanized Corps of Major Generals Sviridov and Katkov. However, the introduction of these formations into battle also did not lead to a decisive result. Another mobile unit had to be thrown into battle - Major General Govorunenko's 18th Panzer Corps. After that, the German defenses were broken through. Parts of the 18th Panzer Corps overcame the enemy's army line of defense and, developing an offensive in the northern direction, liberated the town of Esztergom on December 26. Here, the tankers of the 3rd Ukrainian Front established contact with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front.
Meanwhile, units of the 2nd Guards Mechanized Corps reached the western outskirts of Buda. Thus, the encirclement of the Budapest group was completed. The "boiler" got 188 thous. an enemy grouping consisting of various German and Hungarian units and subunits.
At first, both sides overestimated each other's strengths, so the Soviet side did not launch attacks, and the German-Hungarian counter-attacks. There were gaps in the encirclement, through which some German-Hungarian units fled. On the evening of December 25, the last commuter train left the Hungarian capital, packed to capacity with all sorts of Salashist functionaries who were afraid of a fair punishment. The local Hungarian population, tired of the war and for the most part hating the Salasi regime, almost everywhere welcomed the Red Army.
Doubts of the German-Hungarian command
The German and Hungarian military commanders believed that Budapest should not be defended in a complete encirclement. The commander of Army Group South, Johannes Friesner, asked the high command to withdraw German troops to the western bank of the Danube in the event of a breakthrough of the defense line by the Red Army. He wanted to avoid the protracted and bloody street fighting at all costs. At the same time, he emphasized not on military factors, but on anti-German sentiments that reigned among the inhabitants of Budapest and the possibility of a revolt of the townspeople. As a result, German troops would have to fight on two fronts - against the Soviet troops and the insurgent townspeople.
The Hungarian military command also considered it possible to defend the capital only in the defense zone of the Attila Line. The city, after breaking through the defensive line and the threat of encirclement, was not planned to be defended. The "national leader" of the Hungarian state, Ferenc Salashi, who seized power after the overthrow of Admiral Horthy (he planned to conclude a separate truce with the USSR), immediately after coming to power said that from a military point of view it is more profitable to evacuate the population of the capital and withdraw troops to the mountainous regions. When Soviet troops were rushing to Budapest, Salashi took almost no measures to strengthen the city's defenses. Salashi did not focus on the defense of the Hungarian capital. This was connected not only with the possible destruction of the old city, but also with the danger of an uprising of the population (the Hungarian Fuhrer called it "the rabble of the big city"). To suppress the population of the capital, neither the Germans nor the Hungarians had free forces, all combat-ready units fought at the front. In December, Salashi once again raised the issue of the defense of Budapest. However, his question remained unanswered.
The only figure who insisted on the defense of Budapest was Adolf Hitler. However, his voice was the most powerful. On November 23, 1944, the Fuhrer issued an order (after which a whole series of similar instructions followed) about the need to fight for every house and not reckon with losses, including the civilian population. On December 1, Hitler declared Budapest a "fortress". The supreme leader of the SS and police in Hungary, general of the SS troops, Obergruppenführer Otto Winkelmann, was appointed commandant of the city. The 9th SS Mountain Corps, commanded by SS Obergruppenführer Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch, was transferred to him. He, in fact, became responsible for the defense of the Hungarian capital. Its main task was to prepare the capital for the upcoming assault. Each stone house was to become a small fortress, and streets and quarters were turned into bastions. To suppress possible unrest of the civilian population, units of the German and Hungarian gendarmerie were subordinated to the command of the SS corps. The military police were mobilized. Special detachments began to be formed in the city commandant's office. Consolidated companies began to be created from logisticians (drivers, cooks, secretaries, etc.). Thus, 7 consolidated companies were formed in the Feldhernhalle division, and 4 companies in the 13th Panzer Division.
Thus, Berlin ignored the interests of the Hungarian people. The wishes of the Hungarian leadership to make Budapest an "open" city and save it from destruction were rejected. The German ambassador Edmond Fesenmeier, who served as the special authorized Fuhrer, expressed himself very clearly: "If this sacrifice will keep Vienna, then Budapest could be destroyed more than a dozen times."
The opinion of the German command on the defense of Budapest was also not taken into account. Although Friesner more than once tried to get permission from the German headquarters to change the front line in the interests of the army group. However, the whole proposal was resolutely rejected. The command of Army Group South had no doubts about the possibility of holding the capital of Hungary. On December 1, Friesner ordered the evacuation of all military institutions and civil services under his command from the city. The remaining services were to be in full readiness for evacuation. The commander of the 6th German Army, General Maximilian Fretter-Pico, proposed to retreat behind the Attila Line in order to avoid the threat of encirclement. Hitler forbade retreat. Friesner and Fretter-Pico were soon removed from their posts.
Commander of Army Group South Johannes Friesner
Hungarian Fuhrer Ferenc Salasi in Budapest. October 1944
Commander of the 9th SS Mountain Corps, responsible for the defense of Budapest Karl Pfeffer-Wildenbruch
Forces of the Budapest group. Her fighting efficiency
The encircled Budapest grouping included: the German 13th Panzer Division, the Feldhernhalle Panzer Division, the 8th and 22nd SS Cavalry Divisions, part of the 271st People's Grenadier Division, units of the 9th SS Mountain Corps and subordinate detachments, 1st SS police regiment, battalion "Europe", heavy anti-aircraft artillery battalion (12 guns), 12th assault air defense artillery regiment (48 guns) and other units.
Hungarian troops: 10th Infantry Division, 12th Reserve Division, 1st Panzer Division, part of the 1st Hungarian Hussar Division, units of the 6th Self-Propelled Guns Division (30-32 self-propelled guns), six anti-aircraft artillery battalions (168 guns), army artillerymen (20-30 guns), five gendarme battalions and a number of separate units and formations, including the Hungarian militias.
According to the Soviet command, 188 thousand people were surrounded in the Budapest area (of which 133 thousand people surrendered). In the summaries of the command of Army Group "South" it is reported at the end of 1944 in the Hungarian capital, about 45 thousand German soldiers and officers and 50 thousand Hungarians got into the "cauldron". The command of the Budapest group did not have accurate data on their forces. As noted by the chief of staff of the 1st Army Corps, Sandor Horvat, for seven weeks he “did not come across plausible data on the number of combat units, the amount of weapons and ammunition at their disposal. There was not even a scheme for identifying the accounted and unaccounted parts. " The directorate of the 1st Army Corps itself did not have any troops in its composition, except for the Budapest battalion, which was busy guarding important city objects. It is also difficult to count volunteers. So in January 1945, many Hungarian students, cadets, gymnasium students and teenagers became volunteers, who most easily succumbed to propaganda.
Hungarian self-propelled gun "Zrínyi" II (40 / 43M Zrínyi) on the street of Budapest
A significant part of the Hungarian troops, who were surrounded, tried to avoid battles and checks. Some units surrendered at the very beginning of the operation. The Hungarians were demoralized by the loss of the war, and many hated the Germans. Therefore, the Hungarian commanders tried to underestimate the number of soldiers and weapons at their disposal so that the German command did not entrust them with dangerous tasks. The Hungarians preferred German troops to fight in dangerous directions. For example, the Hungarians stated that by January 14, 1945, the strength of the 10th Infantry and 12th Reserve Divisions had been reduced to 300 people, although supply documents showed that only the 10th Division absorbs provisions for 3,500 people. That is, the figures for only one division were underestimated by more than 10 times! Hungarian commanders considered the battle for Budapest lost and did not want to shed blood in vain. As a result, no more than a third of the Hungarian soldiers took part in the battles.
Many Hungarian units were weak, poorly trained and armed. So, just before the siege, they began to form special combat police detachments. Many of the police officers themselves expressed a desire to defend the city. As a result, about 7 thousand people signed up for these units. However, the police did not have the skills to conduct combat operations and, when faced with army units, in the very first battles they lost up to half of the number of killed and wounded.
In addition, many Hungarian soldiers were not ideological fascists, so at the first opportunity they surrendered. The Germans were afraid to throw such units into battle, so as not to worsen the situation. An example of such a unit was the 1st Hungarian Panzer Division. In just two weeks in December, 80 people deserted in the division. Moreover, the command of the division was not going to conduct even a formal investigation, and no criminal proceedings were instituted against the deserters. And the command of the division itself during the siege of the capital sat down with the 6th reserve regiment in warehouses and sat there until the end of the fighting. A similar position was taken by other Hungarian commanders who imitated fighting. In fact, the Hungarian officers no longer wanted to fight and only wanted to survive this battle. At the same time, the Hungarian troops suffered greater "losses" than the actively fighting German troops, they simply gradually dispersed to their homes. The German and Hungarian command, apparently, knew about this, but made peace in order not to get a mutiny in the rear. In addition, the German commanders were able to shift the blame for the defeat onto the Hungarians.
The most combat-ready part of the Hungarian part of the Budapest grouping were self-propelled artillery divisions (about 2 thousand people and 30 vehicles). These soldiers had combat experience and fought well.
The Hungarian tank Turan II knocked out in the suburbs of Budapest with screens on the turret and hull. February 1945
Therefore, the entire burden of the siege of Budapest had to be borne by the German troops. In their fighting spirit, skill and weapons, they were far superior to the Hungarians. True, this did not mean that all German soldiers demonstrated high combat effectiveness. So, the German SS units, recruited from the Hungarian Volksdeutsche, often not only did not speak German, but did not want to die for Greater Germany. They deserted most of the time. Therefore, it was necessary to create barrage detachments. Machine-gun crews shot without any warning those who tried to escape from the battlefield.
The core of the German group was the 13th Panzer Division, the Feldhernhalle Division and the 8th SS Cavalry Division. These units had great combat experience, they had many volunteers, members of the Nazi party. Therefore, these units fought to the death.
The 150-mm heavy self-propelled howitzer "Hummel", knocked out by the Red Army units on the streets of Budapest. February 1945
